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| Reference : Regulating a monopolist with limited funds |
| Scientific journals : Article | |||
| Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/2268/3380 | |||
| Regulating a monopolist with limited funds | |
| English | |
Gautier, Axel  [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > Economie industrielle >] | |
| Mitra, Manipushpak [ > > ] | |
| 2006 | |
| Economic Theory | |
| Springer Science & Business Media B.V. | |
| 27 | |
| 705-718 | |
| International | |
| 0938-2259 | |
| New York | |
| NY | |
| [en] Regulation ; Limited funds ; Asymmetric information | |
| [en] We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown
costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism sat- isfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient types. The third property is full bunching of types when the available fund is small enough. The fourth property of the mecha- nism is that it is a third best one, that is, the output under this regulatory mechanism is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/2268/3380 | |
| 10.1007/s00199-004-0555-8 |
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