Reference : Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures
E-prints/Working papers : First made available on ORBi
Business & economic sciences : Quantitative methods in economics & management
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/98375
Power indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures
English
Crama, Yves mailto [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > Recherche opérationnelle et gestion de la production >]
Leruth, Luc mailto [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg >]
Sep-2011
1
15
No
[en] simple games ; voting ; power index ; corporate governance ; ownership structure
[en] This paper proposes a review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance
literature. It places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research, but it also addresses some of the key issues linked to the specific field of application.
QuantOM
Researchers
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/98375
Accepted for publication in: International Game Theory Review

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