[en] The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of Brentano's critique of Fechner's psychophysics. An attempt is made to show that, far from being a mere historical curiosity, the dispute with Fechner is of strategic importance for Brentano's theory of sensation. I defend the view that Brentano not only raised strong objections against the logarithmic law, but also sought to lay new foundations for the idea of a psychophysical measurement set forth by Fechner in his Elements of Psychophysics. In the first section, I briefly review some facts about Fechner's psychophysical law and discuss two corrections proposed by Brentano. In the second section, I examine some further, more general objections. In the final section, I then show how Brentano's late theory of "sensory spaces" could be viewed as a positive contribution to the psychophysical problem as posed by Fechner.
[Université de Liège - ULg > Département de philosophie > Phénoménologies >]
