|Reference : Scoring-rule and the choice of a contractor by a financially constrained government|
|Scientific congresses and symposiums : Unpublished conference/Abstract|
|Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics|
|Scoring-rule and the choice of a contractor by a financially constrained government|
|Gautier, Axel [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > Economie industrielle >]|
|International conference on "contracts, procurement and public-private agreements'|
|June 14, 15|
|Chaire EPPP, IAE|
|[en] PPP ; Budget constraint ; Scoring-rule|
|[en] Governments and public authorities are increasingly relying on Public-Private Partnerships for the provision of public goods and services. It is often argued that the use of a public private partnership can relieve the government from a strained budget constraint and, in this paper, we analyze the choice of a contractual solution for designing, constructing and managing a project, with observable externalities, by a budget-constrained government. We show that the quality of the project and the designed contractor are affected by the extent of the budget constraint and we show that the use of a PPP may partially overcome the resulting inefficiencies.|
|Researchers ; Professionals|
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