Reference : Price competition under universal service obligations
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/72187
Price competition under universal service obligations
English
Gautier, Axel mailto [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > Economie industrielle >]
Wauthy, Xavier mailto [> >]
Sep-2010
International Journal of Economic Theory
Blackwell Publishing
6
3
311-326
Yes (verified by ORBi)
International
1742-7355
[en] Universal service ; uniform price ; universal coverage
[en] In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In this paper we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti et al. (2002) defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices.
Centre de Recherche en Économie Publique et de la Population - C.R.E.P.P
Researchers
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/72187
10.1111/j.1742-7363.2010.00137.x

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