Reference : Delegation, externalities and organizational design
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/27685
Delegation, externalities and organizational design
English
Gautier, Axel mailto [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > Economie industrielle >]
Paolini, Dimitri [ > > ]
28-Oct-2009
Economics Bulletin
29
4
Yes
International
[en] In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric
information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
CREPP
Researchers
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/27685
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I4-P21.pdf

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