Reference : Delegation, externalities and organizational design

	Document type :	Scientific journals : Article
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Microeconomics
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/27685

Title :	Delegation, externalities and organizational design
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Gautier, Axel [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > Economie industrielle >]
	Paolini, Dimitri [ > > ]
Publication date :	28-Oct-2009
Journal title :	Economics Bulletin
Volume :	29
Issue/season :	4
Audience :	International
Abstract :	[en] In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.
Research units :	CREPP
Target :	Researchers
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/27685
Other URL :	http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I4-P21.pdf

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	Fulltext file(s): File Commentary Version Size Access Open access EB-09-V29-I4-P21.pdf Publisher postprint 367.21 kB View/Open

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