Intentionalisme et phénoménologie de l'intentionnalité

This paper presents an argument in favor of a “phenomenological” approach to intentionality. This approach, as I see it, involves the view that intentional facts are better expressed with the help of appearance words (“seems”, “appears”, “is similar to”, etc.). By contrast, what I call the “intentionalist approach” assumes that intentional facts are better expressed by intentional verbs. The argument is as follows. First, it is well-known that the use of intentional verbs to express typically intentional facts generates anomalies with respect to existential generalization, substitution of identicals, and the principle of excluded middle. Secondly, I argue that the use of appearance words does not generate the same anomalies, which suggests that appearance words are more appropriate to describe intentional facts. This, I conclude, is an argument for preferring the phenomenological to the intentionalist approach to intentionality.