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A Markov chain model of power indices in corporate structures
Crama, Yves; Leruth, Luc; Wang, Su
2009
 

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Keywords :
shareholder network; game theory; control; power
Abstract :
[en] This paper proposes to use a game-theoretic framework in analyzing complex corporate networks, notably in measuring the ``amount of control'' of both direct and indirect shareholders. The values of the indices are defined by complex voting games, composed by interlocked weighted majority games. This paper proposes a characterization of corporate networks in which the notion of ``control'' can be well defined, as well as an algorithm that consistently estimates the power indices when it is the case.
Research center :
QuantOM
Disciplines :
Quantitative methods in economics & management
Author, co-author :
Crama, Yves  ;  Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > Recherche opérationnelle et gestion de la production
Leruth, Luc ;  Université de Liège - ULiège > HEC-Ecole de gestion : UER > UER Economie
Wang, Su
Language :
English
Title :
A Markov chain model of power indices in corporate structures
Publication date :
2009
Available on ORBi :
since 16 February 2015

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