You are here:
| Reference : Are purely formal objects entities or concepts ? |
| Scientific conferences in universities or research centers : Scientific conference in universities or research centers | |||
| Arts & humanities : Philosophy & ethics | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/2268/17569 | |||
| Are purely formal objects entities or concepts ? | |
| English | |
| [fr] Les objets purement formels sont-ils des entités ou des concepts ? | |
Leclercq, Bruno  [Université de Liège - ULg > Département de philosophie > Philosophie analytique et de la logique >] | |
| 15-Jun-2009 | |
| 22 | |
| International | |
| Conférence plénière | |
| 15 juin 2009 | |
| Bulgarian Academy of Science | |
| Sofia | |
| Bulgaria | |
| [en] Formal objects ; Structures ; Mathematics ; David Hilbert ; Gottlob Frege ; Rudolf Carnap ; Edmund Husserl ; Ontology | |
| [fr] Objets formels ; Structures ; Mathématiques ; David Hilbert ; Gottlob Frege ; Rudolf Carnap ; Edmund Husserl ; Ontologie | |
| [en] In this paper, our purpose will be to question the ontological nature of the structural - or purely formal - entities which, according to the formalist point of view, are defined within an axiomatic system, rather than described by this system.
After a brief reminder of the famous debate between Hilbert and Frege (in a postmail exchange from December the 27th 1899 to January the 6th 1900), as well as of the intuitionistic stance, we will consider Edmund Husserl’s and the early Carnap’s positions. This will lead to a new evaluation of the relations between the notions of “object” and “givenness”, as well as a to a new consideration of the respective contributions of conceptual description and acquaintance in the process of identifying purely formal objects. | |
| Phénoménologies ; Métaphysique et théorie de la connaissance - MéThéor | |
| Researchers | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/2268/17569 |
There is no file associated with this reference.
All documents in ORBi are protected by a user license.
