Reference : Prodigality and Myopia - Two Rationales for Social Security

	Document type :	Scientific journals : Article
	Discipline(s) :	Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
	To cite this reference:	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/16571

Title :	Prodigality and Myopia - Two Rationales for Social Security
Language :	English
Author, co-author :	Possen, Uri [Cornell University > > > >]
	Pestieau, Pierre [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg >]
Publication date :	2008
Journal title :	Manchester School
Publisher :	Blackwell Publishing
Volume :	76
Issue/season :	6
Pages :	629-652
Audience :	International
ISSN :	1463-6786
Abstract :	[en] Among the rationales for social security, there is the fact that some people have to be forced to save. To explain undersaving, rational prodigality and hyperbolic preferences are often cited but treated separably. In this paper we study those two particular behaviors that lead to forced saving within an optimal income tax second-best setting.
Research units :	Centre de Recherche en Économie Publique et de la Population - C.R.E.P.P
Permalink :	http://hdl.handle.net/2268/16571

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