Reference : Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives: The Effect of Accountability
Scientific journals : Article
Business & economic sciences : Economic systems & public economics
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/130578
Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives: The Effect of Accountability
English
Lefebvre, Mathieu mailto [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > Economie politique et finances publiques >]
vieider, ferdinand []
2013
Theory and Decision
75
4
495-517
Yes
International
0040-5833
[en] Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk
taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the
shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective
checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk taking. We thus tell one group of
experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision making processes in
front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk taking and increases the
performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.
Researchers
http://hdl.handle.net/2268/130578

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