| Reference : Inventory control in a decentralized two-stage make-to-stock queuing system |
| Scientific congresses and symposiums : Paper published in a book | |||
| Business & economic sciences : Production, distribution & supply chain management | |||
| http://hdl.handle.net/2268/120872 | |||
| Inventory control in a decentralized two-stage make-to-stock queuing system | |
| English | |
Arda, Yasemin [Université de Liège - ULg > HEC-Ecole de gestion de l'ULg : UER > UER Opérations : Supply Chain Management >] | |
| HENNET, Jean-Claude [Laboratoire des Sciences de l'Information et des Systèmes (LSIS) de Marseille > > > >] | |
| 17-May-2006 | |
| INCOM 06, 12th IFAC Symposium on Information Control Problems in Manufacturing, Saint-Etienne, France, 17-19 May 2006 | |
| Yes | |
| No | |
| International | |
| INCOM 06, 12th IFAC Symposium on Information Control Problems in Manufacturing | |
| 17-19 May 2006 | |
| Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Saint-Etienne | |
| Saint-Etienne | |
| France | |
| [en] inventory control ; manufacturing systems ; stochastic modelling | |
| [en] In an Enterprise network, several companies interact to produce families of goods. Each member company seeks to optimize his own production and inventory policy to maximize his profit. These objectives are generally antagonistic and can lead to contradictory choices in the context of a network with a high degree of local decisional autonomy. To avoid a global loss of economic efficiency, the network should be equipped with a coordination mechanism. The present paper describes a coordination contract negotiated between a manufacturer and a supplier. The purpose of the negotiation is to determine the price of the supplied intermediate goods and the delay penalty in case of a late delivery. For a manufacturer with a dominant contracting position, the outcome of the negotiation can be computed as a Stackelberg equilibrium point. Under the resulting contract, the two-stage supply chain reaches globally optimal running conditions with the maximal possible profit obtained by the manufacturer and the smallest acceptable profit obtained by the supplier. | |
| Researchers ; Professionals ; Students | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/2268/120872 |
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