http://hdl.handle.net/2268/76 Search this channel search http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/simple-search http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146702 Title: Travailler moins pour travailler plus longtemps <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Cremer, Helmuth; Dedonder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario Fri, 12 Apr 2013 16:14:52 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146382 Title: Optimal linear taxation under endogenous longevity <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Leroux, ML; Ponthiere, Gregory Mon, 08 Apr 2013 12:18:59 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146344 Title: Myopia, regrets, and risky behaviors <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Pontiere, Gregory Sun, 07 Apr 2013 14:35:12 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146343 Title: Voting on pensions with endogenous retirement age <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Casamatta, G.; Cremer, H.; Pestieau, Pierre <br/> <br/>Abstract: It is often argued that the observed trend towards early retirement is due mainly to the implicit tax imposed on continued activity of elderly workers. We study the relevance of such a distortion in a political economy model with endogenous age of retirement. The setting is a two-period overlapping generations model. Individuals differ in their productivity. In the first period they work a fixed amount of time; in the second, they choose when to retire and then receive a flat rate pension benefit. Pensions are financed by a payroll tax on earnings in the first and in the second period of life. Such a tax is non distortionary in the first period; it is distortionary in the second period. We allow for some rebating of the second period tax. Individuals vote on the level of the payroll tax given the rebate which can range from 0 (biased system) to 100% (neutral system). We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium and study its properties. Under these conditions, high tax rates are supported by all the old and by low productivity young individuals. We show that the pivotal voter is a young individual. The number of young individuals who have higher wage than the pivotal voter equals half the total population. We also show that the introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension system. Finally, we study the simultaneous determination of the bias and the tax rate through a voting procedure and show that the equilibrium (if any) implies a bias which is always positive and may or not be larger than one. Sun, 07 Apr 2013 13:11:24 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146340 Title: The double dividend of postponing retirement <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Cremer, H.; Pestieau, Pierre <br/> <br/>Abstract: Early retirement seems to plague social security systems in a number of European countries. In this paper we argue that delaying retirement may have two positive effects: it is likely to partially restore the financial balance of the system, and it may foster redistribution among retirees. To obtain such a double dividend, the benefit rule of the initial social security scheme must have the following two characteristics. First, it operates redistribution within generations. Second, it is "biased" and induces early retirement. Sun, 07 Apr 2013 13:04:11 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146338 Title: Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Cremer, H.; Pestieau, Pierre; Rochet, J. C. <br/> <br/>Abstract: This paper extends the Atkinson-Stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxation to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics: productive ability and inherited wealth. Bequests are motivated by the 'joy of giving'. A child's inheritance is a random variable with a probability distribution that depends on his parent's investment in a 'bequest technology'. Public borrowing is assumed and implies the modified golden rule. We study the optimal tax policy when two instruments are available: a non-linear (wage) income tax and a proportional tax on capital income. We show that the second instrument ought, in general, to be used but that the tax rate is not necessarily positive. However, a positive tax rate is more likely when there is a positive correlation between inherited wealth and innate ability. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Sun, 07 Apr 2013 12:55:26 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146337 Title: Long-Term Care Insurance and Family Norms <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Canta, Chiara Sun, 07 Apr 2013 12:52:19 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146181 Title: Charities and the political support for estate taxation <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Casamatta, Georges; Cremer, Helmuth Fri, 05 Apr 2013 13:10:43 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146126 Title: The economics of long-term care: A survey <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Cremer, Helmuth; Ponthiere, Gregory Thu, 04 Apr 2013 16:10:53 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145900 Title: The political economy of derived pension rights <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Leroux, Marie Louise Sun, 31 Mar 2013 18:39:26 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145741 Title: Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Leroux, Marie Louise; Racionero, Maria del Mar Thu, 28 Mar 2013 15:00:17 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145738 Title: The impact of a minimum pension on old age poverty and its budgetary cost. Evidence from Latin Am <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Dethier, Jean Jacques; Ali, Rabia Thu, 28 Mar 2013 14:33:01 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145737 Title: Taxing Sin Goods and Subsidizing Health Care <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario Thu, 28 Mar 2013 14:27:56 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145736 Title: Policy Implications of Changing Longevity <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthière, Grégory Thu, 28 Mar 2013 14:22:38 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145734 Title: How powerful is demography? The Serendipity Theorem revisited <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; de la Croix, David; Ponthiere, Gregory Thu, 28 Mar 2013 14:20:47 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145730 Title: Accidental bequests <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Pestieau, Pierre; Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz Thu, 28 Mar 2013 14:14:25 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/145701 Title: Measuring poverty without the Mortality Paradox <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Lefebvre, Mathieu; Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthiere, Grégory <br/> <br/>Abstract: Under income-differentiated mortality, poverty measures reflect not only the “true” poverty, but, also, the interferences or noise caused by the survival process at work. Such interferences lead to the Mortality Paradox: the worse the survival conditions of the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is. We examine several solutions to avoid that paradox. We identify conditions under which the extension, by means of a fictitious income, of lifetime income profiles of the prematurely dead neutralizes the noise due to differential mortality. Then, to account not only for the “missing” poor, but, also, for the “hidden” poverty (premature death), we use, as a fictitious income, the welfare-neutral income, making indifferent between life continuation and death. The robustness of poverty measures to the extension technique is illustrated with regional Belgian data. Thu, 28 Mar 2013 10:21:54 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/143765 Title: Social Security and Economic Integration <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Artige, Lionel; Dedry, Antoine; Pestieau, Pierre Tue, 26 Feb 2013 11:20:50 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/142447 Title: Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts : Experimental Evidence <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Lefebvre, Mathieu Thu, 07 Feb 2013 11:27:13 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/2268/142444 Title: tax evasion and peer effects: an experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Lefebvre, Mathieu Thu, 07 Feb 2013 11:16:23 GMT