http://hdl.handle.net/2268/75 Search this channel search http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/simple-search http://hdl.handle.net/2268/147133 Title: Accrued Pension Rights in Belgium: Micro-Simulations of Reforms <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Jousten, Alain; Perelman, Sergio; Sigismondi, Fabio; Tarantchenko, Ekaterina http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146679 Title: Strategic bypass deterrence <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel <br/> <br/>Abstract: In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produce the network input more efficiently. We show that the incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers and welfare because competition is fiercer under bypass. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146538 Title: Strategic bypass deterrence <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel http://hdl.handle.net/2268/146341 Title: Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Cremer, H.; Lozachmeur, J. M.; Pestieau, Pierre <br/> <br/>Abstract: It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. The point of this paper is that, when first-best redistributive instruments are not available, because some variables are not observable, the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirement decision. Consequently, the inducement of early retirement may be part of the optimal tax-transfer policy. We consider a model in which individuals differ in their productivity and their capacity to work long and choose both their weekly labor supply and their age of retirement. We characterize the optimal non-linear tax-transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when weekly earnings and the length of active life are observable while individuals' productivity and health status are not observable. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/131619 Title: Generational Accounting in Belgium: Fiscal Sustainability at a Glance <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Decoster, André; Flawinne, Xavier; Vanleenhove, Pieter http://hdl.handle.net/2268/122912 Title: Vers un service universel 2.0? <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel <br/> <br/>Abstract: La révolution numérique a radicalement changé notre façon de communiquer. Il faut repenser le service universel des communications en intégrant les changements technologiques. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/122426 Title: Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel; Yvrande-Billon, Anne <br/> <br/>Abstract: In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodically put out for tender. Thus, operators’ incentives to reduce costs come from both profit maximization during the current contract and from the perspective of contract renewal. We construct a dynamic incentive regulation model that captures these features and we show that both the level of cost-reducing effort and its repartition during the contracting period depend on the contract type (cost-plus, gross cost or net cost contract). We then estimate a cost frontier model for an eight-year panel of French bus companies (664 company-year observations) to test our predictions. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/119211 Title: Améliorer la régulation et la politique de concurrence <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel http://hdl.handle.net/2268/119173 Title: Integration of quality indices of distribution in benchmarking analysis <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Coelli, Tim; Gautier, Axel; Perelman, Sergio; Saplacan-­Pop, Roxana http://hdl.handle.net/2268/117774 Title: A Theory of Soft Capture <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel <br/> <br/>Abstract: n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/117773 Title: Strategic Bypass Deterrence <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel <br/> <br/>Abstract: In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/117772 Title: Reforming the Postal Universal Service <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel; Poudou, Jean-Christophe <br/> <br/>Abstract: The postal sector has dramatically changed in the recent years with the ongoing liberalization process and the increased competitive pressures from alternative communication channels (e-substitution). These two effects concur to decrease the mail volume handled by the historical operator which in turn may threaten the financial viability of the universal service and may call for a reform of the universal service. This paper examines the question of reforming the postal universal service, first by considering that the universal service remains confined in the postal word and, latter, by defining a universal service that includes postal and electronic technologies. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/115428 Title: Competitively Neutral Universal Service Obligations <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel; Wauthy, Xavier <br/> <br/>Abstract: Universal service obligations impose specific costs on the universal service provider and the latter may call for an appropriate compensation. Most often, a two-step procedure is put forward to finance the universal service in a competitive environment. Firstly, the cost of the universal service is assessed; secondly, the provider must be compensated for this cost. We argue that this procedure is problematic because the implementation of a compensation scheme affects the behavior of market participants and leads to an overcompensation of the universal service provider. We put forward an alternative approach to this problem that fully acknowledges the distortions that result from the compensation mechanism. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/111727 Title: Energie et environnement <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel http://hdl.handle.net/2268/109422 Title: Rethinking Regulatory Capture <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel <br/> <br/>Abstract: Conventional capture models rely on the idea that regulator is induced to lenient behavior by the regulated firm through offers of monetary transfers, the bribery model, or future employment, the revolving doors model. To avoid socially costly capture, the political principal should then either implement collusion-proof mechanisms through the delegation of welfare gains, or severely restrict the career paths of regulatory staff. The paradox of capture is that neither the two modes of capture, nor the remedy are commonly found in practice. This paper proposes to rethink capture based on the widespread use of industry-commissioned consultants, experts and lobbyists that produce information for regulatory and policy use. A small model (Agrell and Gautier, 2010) introduces a 'soft capture' concept based on a self-enforced collusion between the firm and regulator, linked to the role of the regulator as information-processing intermediate for the political principal. The firm puts processed but biased information at the free disposal of the regulator, 'no strings attached', who can then either use the submitted information or produce a more accurate information by a costly process. Under a set of mild conditions, the equilibrium involves soft capture and the regulator uses the submitted information, leading to some distortions in welfare. A case study of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in USA serves to motivate and illustrate the model. As shown by the case, the soft capture model may have a stronger positive potential than the conventional models, also implying that policy advice based on it may be valuable. http://hdl.handle.net/2268/107436 Title: Rethinking regulatory capture <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel http://hdl.handle.net/2268/107435 Title: Soft Capture <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel http://hdl.handle.net/2268/107434 Title: Soft Capture <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel http://hdl.handle.net/2268/107432 Title: The Postal Sector as a Vector of Financial Inclusion <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel; d'Alcantara, Gonzales http://hdl.handle.net/2268/103030 Title: Strategic bypass deterrence <br/> <br/>Author, co-author: Gautier, Axel; Bloch, Francis <br/> <br/>Abstract: In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers.