References of "Scandinavian Journal of Economics"
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See detailA Theory of Soft Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULg

in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (in press)

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to ... [more ▼]

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. [less ▲]

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See detailAccidental bequests
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz

in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2012), 114

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See detailTaxing Sin Goods and Subsidizing Health Care
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe et al

in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2012), 114(1), 101-123

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See detailSocial Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Boadway, Robin; Leite-Monteiro, Manuel; Pestieau, Pierre ULg et al

in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2006), 108(2), 279-298

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post ... [more ▼]

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. We study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. The case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity. [less ▲]

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