References of "Gautier, Axel"
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See detailA Theory of Soft Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULg

E-print/Working paper (2010)

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to ... [more ▼]

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. [less ▲]

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See detailThe benefit and cost of winner-picking: Redistribution vs. Incentives
Gautier, Axel ULg; Heider, Florian

in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics = Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft (2009), 165(4), 622-649

This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate headquarters' investment and incentive ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate headquarters' investment and incentive policies. Winner-picking, i.e. the efficient reallocation of scarce resources in an internal capital market, adds an extra layer of noise to the moral hazard problem of incentivizing division managers to produce the resources that can then be redistributed. In particular, division managers with strong future investment opportunities anticipate that headquarters will bail them out should they fail to produce enough resources themselves. This reduces incentives to create the resources in the first place with possible consequences for the optimal investment policy. [less ▲]

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See detailDelegation, externalities and organizational design
Gautier, Axel ULg; Paolini, Dimitri

in Economics Bulletin (2009), 29(4),

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the ... [more ▼]

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents. [less ▲]

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See detailRegulation of an Open Access Essential Facility
Gautier, Axel ULg; Mitra, Manipushpak

in Economica (2008), 75

A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both firms use the same essential input. The regulator’s ... [more ▼]

A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both firms use the same essential input. The regulator’s objectives are (i) to ensure financing of the essential input and (ii) to generate competition in the downstream market. The regulatory mechanism grants non-discriminatory access of the essential facility to the entrant provided it pays a two-part tariff to the incumbent. The optimal mechanism generates inefficient entry. The inefficient entry captures the trade-off between market efficiency and infrastructure financing resulting from incomplete information and non-discriminatory access. [less ▲]

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See detailAccess Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULg

in Review of Network Economics (2008), 7(2), 207-230

In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final ... [more ▼]

In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous. [less ▲]

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See detailLa libéralisation du secteur postal
Gautier, Axel ULg

in Regards économiques (2008), 60

En 2011, le marché postal sera entièrement libéralisé. Le service universel sera-t-il maintenu ? Comment sera-t-il financé ? Dans cet article, nous abordons la question du financement du service universel ... [more ▼]

En 2011, le marché postal sera entièrement libéralisé. Le service universel sera-t-il maintenu ? Comment sera-t-il financé ? Dans cet article, nous abordons la question du financement du service universel postal dans un environnement concurrentiel. La Commission européenne propose plusieurs pistes, les Etats Membres doivent maintenant choisir la solution la plus appropriée à leur marché. [less ▲]

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See detailAccess, Bypass and Productivity Gains in Competitive Postal Markets
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULg

in Crew, Michael; Kleindorfer, Paul (Eds.) Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector (2008)

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See detailNational Postal Strategies after a Full Postal Market Opening
d'Alcantara, Gonzales; Gautier, Axel ULg

in Crew, Michael; Kleindorfer, Paul (Eds.) Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector (2008)

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See detailTeaching versus Research: The Role of Internal Financing Rules in Multi-Department Universities
Gautier, Axel ULg; Wauthy, Xavier

in Dewatripont, M.; Thys-Clement, F.; Wilkin, L. (Eds.) Higher education in a globalized world: Governance, competition and performance, (2008)

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See detailTeaching versus research: A multi-tasking approach to multi-department universities
Gautier, Axel ULg; Wauthy, Xavier

in European Economic Review (2007), 51(2), 273-295

We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create ... [more ▼]

We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efficiency in the management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal financial rules which create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments. [less ▲]

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See detailDelegation and Information Revelation
Gautier, Axel ULg; Paolini, Dimitri

in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics = Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft (2007), 163

This paper analyzes, in a set-up where only the control over actions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random parameter ... [more ▼]

This paper analyzes, in a set-up where only the control over actions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random parameter and only the agent knows its realization. If the principal delegates the control over the first decision to the agent, his choice may indicate the information that he possesses. If the principal retains control over the second decision, discovering this information is valuable. Hence, this paper provides a new rationale for delegation: A transfer of control to the informed party can be used to discover the private information. (JEL: D23, D82, L22 , M41) [less ▲]

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See detailNetwork financing with two-part and single tariffs
Gautier, Axel ULg

in Dewenter, R.; Haucap, J. (Eds.) Access Pricing: Theory and Practice (2007)

In this paper, we compare two types of access pricing: a two-part tariff where the fixed part aims to cover (part of) the network’s fixed cost while the variable part covers the network’s usage costs and a ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we compare two types of access pricing: a two-part tariff where the fixed part aims to cover (part of) the network’s fixed cost while the variable part covers the network’s usage costs and a single tariff where both the usage and (part of ) the infrastructure costs are covered by a per-unit access charge. We compare how the regulator trades-off the degree of competition induced by the access charges and the network financing. (JEL: L11, L51). [less ▲]

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See detailDynamics of Dowstream Entry in Postal Markets
Gautier, Axel ULg

in Crew, Michael; Kleindorfer, Paul (Eds.) Liberalization of the Postal and Delivery Sector (2006)

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See detailRegulating a monopolist with limited funds
Gautier, Axel ULg; Mitra, Manipushpak

in Economic Theory (2006), 27

We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism sat- isfies four properties. The first property is bunching at ... [more ▼]

We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism sat- isfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient types. The third property is full bunching of types when the available fund is small enough. The fourth property of the mecha- nism is that it is a third best one, that is, the output under this regulatory mechanism is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. [less ▲]

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See detailInternal Capital Market Efficiency of Belgian Holding Companies
Gautier, Axel ULg; Hamadi, Malika

in Finance (2005), 26(2), 11-34

In this paper, we raise the following two questions. (1) Do Belgian holding companies operate an internal capital market to transfer financial resources amongst their subsidiaries? And if yes, (2) is the ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we raise the following two questions. (1) Do Belgian holding companies operate an internal capital market to transfer financial resources amongst their subsidiaries? And if yes, (2) is the internal capital market efficient? To answer the first question, we check if group cash flow is a determinant of the group members investment spending. The answer is positive if the holding company’s subsidiary is affiliated to a coordination center and negative otherwise. To answer the second question, we evaluate if internal transfers are driven by efficiency. From our estimations, we cannot conclude that Belgian Holding companies have an efficient internal capital market. [less ▲]

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See detailInformation Acquisition in Repeated Relationships
Gautier, Axel ULg; Paolini, Dimitri

in Pelzer, Lawrence (Ed.) New Developments in Macroeconomics Research (2005)

This paper presents a new rationale for delegation. In a repeated relationship, when the principal gives up at time t the control over an action to the better informed agent, the decision taken by the ... [more ▼]

This paper presents a new rationale for delegation. In a repeated relationship, when the principal gives up at time t the control over an action to the better informed agent, the decision taken by the agent signals his private information to the principal. The revelation of information is valuable to the principal only in a context of repeated relation where the principal can use the information at time t + 1 to take another decision. In this paper, we present an example where delegation occurs only if the relation lasts for more than one period. In a single period context, if the agent has a bias in favor of one project, he does not have incentives to select a project that is not his preferred one; hence he does not disclose his private information and delegation is not valuable. While in a repeated relationship, it becomes costly for the agent to keep the principal non-informed and this counterbalances the agent’s bias for one project. Shared-control (partial delegation) is then the preferred organizational structure when the interaction is repeated. Moreover, shared-control dominates an alternative mechanism where the principal centralizes all the decisions and the information is transferred through a message game. [less ▲]

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See detailLe rail belge s'ouvre à la concurrence. Peut-on tirer parti de l'expérience étrangère ?
Gautier, Axel ULg

in Regards économiques (2004)

La Commission européenne vient de décider d’ouvrir d’ici 2010 l’ensemble du marché ferroviaire à la concurrence. À l’avenir, la SNCB ne sera plus la seule compagnie à transporter des passagers dans notre ... [more ▼]

La Commission européenne vient de décider d’ouvrir d’ici 2010 l’ensemble du marché ferroviaire à la concurrence. À l’avenir, la SNCB ne sera plus la seule compagnie à transporter des passagers dans notre pays. Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous analysons au travers de l’expé- rience de deux pays, l’Allemagne et l’Angleterre, les conséquences de la libéralisation du secteur sur le rail belge. [less ▲]

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See detailRegulation under Financial Constraints
Gautier, Axel ULg

in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics = Annales de l'Economie Publique, Sociale et Coopérative (2004), 75(4), 645-656

This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) where the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of ... [more ▼]

This article studies a simple procurement problem (Laffont and Tirole, 1993) where the regulator faces a cash-in-advance constraint. The introduction of such a constraint not only reduces the amount of public good provided but also limits the instruments available to the regulator. The wealth constraint could change the optimal regulatory contract from a two-part tariff, where the quantities produced depend on the firm's cost, to a less efficient fixed fee where the firm produces the same quantity whatever its cost. [less ▲]

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See detailRégulation et concurrence dans le transport collectif urbain
Coppe, Aurélie; Gautier, Axel ULg

in Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique (2004), 43(4), 65-76

In Europe, most of the urban public transport services are not operated on a commercial basis. The implication of local public authorities in the sector is important: they organize their local market ... [more ▼]

In Europe, most of the urban public transport services are not operated on a commercial basis. The implication of local public authorities in the sector is important: they organize their local market, they finance services and, sometimes, they also act as producers. This paper analyzes the public transport system in four European cities: Lyon, Stockholm, Helsinki and Brussels and concentrates, in particular, on the introduction of regulated competition. Four different market mechanisms can be used in the public transport sector: (1) competitive tendering, (2) open access with on-track competition, (3) yardstick competition where the operator’s reward is based on a comparative evaluation of its performance and (4) the possibility of challenging the incumbent public operator. The pros and cons of different competitive mechanisms are presented and the article discusses the conditions under which a truly competitive market could be settled [less ▲]

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See detailIncentives in Organizations
Gautier, Axel ULg

Doctoral thesis (2001)

Detailed reference viewed: 63 (8 ULg)