References of "Gautier, Axel"
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See detailLe coût de l'énergie verte en Wallonie 2003-2012.
Boccard, Nicolas; Gautier, Axel ULg

E-print/Working paper (2015)

In 2003, the Walloon region has installed a tradable green certificate mechanism to support the production of ‘green’ electricity. In this paper, we estimate that the total cost of the mechanism amounts ... [more ▼]

In 2003, the Walloon region has installed a tradable green certificate mechanism to support the production of ‘green’ electricity. In this paper, we estimate that the total cost of the mechanism amounts to 1,871 billion € for the period 2003-2012, corresponding to a support of 107 €/MWh produced, with important differences between production technologies, the solar photovoltaic receiving up to 588 €/MWh. International comparisons indicate that the Walloon mechanism is particularly generous. We also show that the induced carbon savings are extremely costly with an implicit price of avoided CO2 of 425 € per ton. [less ▲]

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See detailOptimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The Commitments Procedure under Uncertainty
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2015, April 09)

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See detailOptimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The Commitments Procedure under Uncertainty
Gautier, Axel ULg; Petit, Nicolas ULg

E-print/Working paper (2015)

Since the introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive ... [more ▼]

Since the introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Bebchuk, 1984; Shavell, 1988) to identify the optimal procedure to resolve cases in a context of uncertainty related to the law (L-uncertainty) and to the facts (F-uncertainty). We show that commitments are suboptimal when L-uncertainty is high. Furthermore, the generalized use of commitments creates an additional risk of under-enforcement when F-uncertainty is significant. [less ▲]

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See detailInvestir et gérer le transport public urbain ?
Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference given outside the academic context (2015)

Detailed reference viewed: 14 (1 ULg)
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See detailFaut-il payer le train plus cher à l'heure de pointe ?
Gautier, Axel ULg

Article for general public (2015)

La semaine dernière, la presse faisait écho du projet de la SNCB d'introduire des tarifs plus élevés pour les voyages effectués à l'heure de pointe. Concrètement, celui qui prendrait le train dans les ... [more ▼]

La semaine dernière, la presse faisait écho du projet de la SNCB d'introduire des tarifs plus élevés pour les voyages effectués à l'heure de pointe. Concrètement, celui qui prendrait le train dans les tranches 6h-9h et 15h-18h paierait un supplément. La SNCB motive son projet par le fait que le prix actuel est un des plus faible d'Europe. La proposition a –comme on s'en doute- reçu un accueil glacial de la part des usagers du rail. Dans ce focus de Regards économiques, Axel Gautier livre les réflexions d'un économiste (qui est aussi navetteur) à propos de ce projet de la SNCB. [less ▲]

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See detailOptimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The Commitments Procedure under Uncertainty
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2015, January 08)

Detailed reference viewed: 4 (0 ULg)
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See detailNot on my network! App exclusion and the net neutrality debate
Broos, Sébastien ULg; Gautier, Axel ULg

in LCII Policy Brief (2015), (2015/1),

The net neutrality debate is at its peak. On January 27, the Dutch Authority for Competition and Markets (DACM) fined KPN and Vodafone for the first violation of the Dutch net neutrality law ever.i On ... [more ▼]

The net neutrality debate is at its peak. On January 27, the Dutch Authority for Competition and Markets (DACM) fined KPN and Vodafone for the first violation of the Dutch net neutrality law ever.i On February 26, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approved new regulations for broadband internet, preserving the net neutrality.ii In brief, the net neutrality proponents seem to be winning the debate. In a recent economic paper, Sébastien Broos and Axel Gautier analyze whether this toughened stance of regulatory authorities is the best way forward. [less ▲]

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See detail“Settle ‘em all”: Generalized Commitments and the Under and Over Enforcement of Antitrust Law
Gautier, Axel ULg; Petit, Nicolas

in LCII Policy Brief (2014), (2014/2),

Detailed reference viewed: 15 (4 ULg)
See detailLes services publics: Organisation et performance
Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference given outside the academic context (2014)

Detailed reference viewed: 6 (0 ULg)
Peer Reviewed
See detailCompeting One-Way Essential Complements : the Forgotten Side of the Net Neutrality Story
Broos, Sébastien ULg; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2014, July 11)

We examine the incentives of an internet service provider (ISP) to break net neutrality by excluding internet applications competing with its own products, a typical example being the exclusion of VoIP ... [more ▼]

We examine the incentives of an internet service provider (ISP) to break net neutrality by excluding internet applications competing with its own products, a typical example being the exclusion of VoIP applications by a telecom company offering internet and voice services. We show that exclusion is not a concern when the ISP is a monopoly because it can extract the additional surplus created by the application through price rebalancing. By contrast, when ISP’s compete, in an attempt to differentiate, only one ISP will offer the app. Applying a no-exclusion rule in this case can lead to monopoly. [less ▲]

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Peer Reviewed
See detailCompeting One-Way Essential Complements : the Forgotten Side of the Net Neutrality Story}
Broos, Sébastien ULg; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2014, June 12)

We examine the incentives of an internet service provider (ISP) to break net neutrality by excluding internet applications competing with its own products, a typical example being the exclusion of VoIP ... [more ▼]

We examine the incentives of an internet service provider (ISP) to break net neutrality by excluding internet applications competing with its own products, a typical example being the exclusion of VoIP applications by a telecom company offering internet and voice services. We show that exclusion is not a concern when the ISP is a monopoly because it can extract the additional surplus created by the application through price rebalancing. By contrast, when ISP’s compete, in an attempt to differentiate, only one ISP will offer the app. Applying a no-exclusion rule in this case can lead to monopoly. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 16 (3 ULg)
Peer Reviewed
See detailRegulation in Practice: Choice among regulatory Tools
Bougnouch, Mehdi ULg; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2014, May 28)

Detailed reference viewed: 45 (12 ULg)
See detailOptimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The Commitments Procedure under Uncertainty
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2014, May 22)

Detailed reference viewed: 4 (0 ULg)
See detailLa collecte des déchets en Wallonie : organisation et performances
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2014, April 03)

Detailed reference viewed: 16 (2 ULg)
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Peer Reviewed
See detailMarket Power in the Credit Rating Industry: State of Play and Proposal for Reforms
Candelon, Bertrand; Gautier, Axel ULg; Petit, Nicolas ULg

in CPI Antitrust Chronicle (2014), 2

In recent years, the Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”) have been in the eye of the storm. Some argue that CRA rating errors—symptomatized by rating inflation or deflation—originate in excessive competition ... [more ▼]

In recent years, the Credit Rating Agencies (“CRAs”) have been in the eye of the storm. Some argue that CRA rating errors—symptomatized by rating inflation or deflation—originate in excessive competition. This paper argues that the low level of competition in credit rating is a better explanation for rating this phenomenon. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 54 (8 ULg)