References of "Seron, Denis"
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See detailSur l'avenir de la philosophie
Brentano, Franz; Seron, Denis ULiege

in Fisette, Denis; Fréchette, Guillaume (Eds.) Essais et conférences (in press)

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See detailHorwicz comme recenseur
Brentano, Franz; Seron, Denis ULiege

in Fisette, Denis; Fréchette, Guillaume (Eds.) Essais et conférences (in press)

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See detailReview of: F. Brentano & G.T. Fechner, Briefwechsel über Psychophysik 1874-1878 (M. Antonelli, Ed.)
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Grazer Philosophische Studien (in press)

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See detailPhenomenology and metaphysics
Seron, Denis ULiege

Conference (2017, September 28)

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See detailMarty, Husserl, and the (psycho)logical a priori
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Fréchette, Guillaume; Taieb, Hamid (Eds.) Mind and Language - On the Philosophy of Anton Marty (2017)

This paper aims to discuss some aspects of the Marty–Husserl debate about grammar. My suggestion is that the debate is first of all an epistemological debate, that is, a debate about what a priori ... [more ▼]

This paper aims to discuss some aspects of the Marty–Husserl debate about grammar. My suggestion is that the debate is first of all an epistemological debate, that is, a debate about what a priori knowledge is and how it is acquired. The key opposition is between Marty’s Brentanian notion of ‘analytic intuition’ and Husserl’s Bolzanian notion of ideation. As I will argue, the underlying issue is the possibility of a psychological a priori. On the one hand, analytic intuition provides the psychologist with a priori knowledge about empirical facts. On the other hand, ideation provides the logician with entities that are disconnected from empirical facts—entities which are ‘purely logical’. I conclude with some brief remarks on the Brentanian background of both conceptions. [less ▲]

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See detailApparaître: Essai de philosophie phénoménologique
Seron, Denis ULiege

Book published by Brill (2017)

Intentionality — the mind’s directedness towards the world — is currently one of the most debated issues in the area of the philosophy of mind. In Apparaître: Essai de philosophie phénoménologique, Denis ... [more ▼]

Intentionality — the mind’s directedness towards the world — is currently one of the most debated issues in the area of the philosophy of mind. In Apparaître: Essai de philosophie phénoménologique, Denis Seron aims to show that the phenomenological approach can contribute positively to this debate. He proposes to understand the notion of intentionality as a basic phenomenological notion and thus to define it in terms of appearances. On the basis of this, he then sketches a theory of appearance which he suggests is best suited to address a range of other issues such as the unity of consciousness, the unconscious, etc. [less ▲]

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See detailLa conscience a-t-elle des parties?
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Lestocart, Louis-José (Ed.) Esthétique de la complexité: Pour un cognitivisme non linéaire (2017)

Classique dans la philosophie empiriste depuis Hume jusqu’aux gestaltistes, le problème de l’unité de la conscience a connu un spectaculaire regain d’intérêt dans la littérature récente, dans une ... [more ▼]

Classique dans la philosophie empiriste depuis Hume jusqu’aux gestaltistes, le problème de l’unité de la conscience a connu un spectaculaire regain d’intérêt dans la littérature récente, dans une perspective qu’on peut qualifier, au sens large, de « phénoménologique ». La conception dominante est aujourd’hui la conception en termes de touts et de parties. De vives controverses opposent cette conception à celle, non méréologique et d’allure jamesienne, de Searle et de Tye. Après avoir passé en revue des versions divergentes de la conception méréologique, j’en souligne les difficultés intrinsèques et plaide pour une approche résolument non méréologique. En conclusion, j’esquisse quelques réflexions en vue de reformuler sur cette base la question de l’unité de la conscience. [less ▲]

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See detailBrentano's Project of Descriptive Psychology
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Kriegel, Uriah (Ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (2017)

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See detailBrentano on Appearance and Reality
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Kriegel, Uriah (Ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (2017)

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See detailIntentionalisme et phénoménologie de l'intentionnalité
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Etudes Phénoménologiques - Phenomenological Studies (2017), 1

This paper presents an argument in favor of a “phenomenological” approach to intentionality. This approach, as I see it, involves the view that intentional facts are better expressed with the help of ... [more ▼]

This paper presents an argument in favor of a “phenomenological” approach to intentionality. This approach, as I see it, involves the view that intentional facts are better expressed with the help of appearance words (“seems”, “appears”, “is similar to”, etc.). By contrast, what I call the “intentionalist approach” assumes that intentional facts are better expressed by intentional verbs. The argument is as follows. First, it is well-known that the use of intentional verbs to express typically intentional facts generates anomalies with respect to existential generalization, substitution of identicals, and the principle of excluded middle. Secondly, I argue that the use of appearance words does not generate the same anomalies, which suggests that appearance words are more appropriate to describe intentional facts. This, I conclude, is an argument for preferring the phenomenological to the intentionalist approach to intentionality. [less ▲]

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See detailReview of: K. Mulligan, Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro-allemande (Paris, 2012)
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Dialectica : International Journal of Philosophy & Official Organ of the ESAP (2016), 70(1),

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See detailAdolf Reinach sur le continu
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Philosophie (2016), 128

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See detailRobert Brisart, la no ready-made theory
Dewalque, Arnaud ULiege; Leclercq, Bruno ULiege; Seron, Denis ULiege

in Brisart, Robert; Gauvry, Charlotte (Eds.) Perception et concept. Le conceptualisme en question (2016)

Préambule exposant les grandes lignes du "constructivisme conceptualiste" défendu par Robert Brisart (1953-2015), inopinément décédé au cours de la préparation de ce volume.

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See detailUn empirisme de style husserlien
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Revue Philosophique de Louvain (2016), 114(1), 49-71

L’objectif poursuivi dans cette étude est de mettre en avant un empirisme « de style husserlien » et d’en indiquer les avantages sur l’empirisme ordinaire. D’abord, partant d’une définition classique due ... [more ▼]

L’objectif poursuivi dans cette étude est de mettre en avant un empirisme « de style husserlien » et d’en indiquer les avantages sur l’empirisme ordinaire. D’abord, partant d’une définition classique due à Chisholm et Sellars, l’auteur énumère les principales thèses de l’empirisme au sens ordinaire et en discute quelques difficultés intrinsèques à la lumière des critiques de Chisholm, Sellars, Goodman et d’autres. Il tente ensuite de montrer que, par son « principe des principes », Husserl a proposé une forme originale d’empirisme, plausiblement moins problématique que ses variantes classiques. L’argument est que l’empirisme de style husserlien échappe aux difficultés énumérées par sa double dimension réflexive et normative. [less ▲]

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See detailIntroduction historique à la philosophie phénoménologique (vers. 4)
Seron, Denis ULiege

Learning material (2016)

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See detailLa théorie auto-représentationnelle de la conscience
Kriegel, Uriah; Seron, Denis ULiege

in Dewalque, Arnaud; Gauvry, Charlotte (Eds.) Conscience et représentation: Introduction aux théories représentationnelles de l'esprit (2016)

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See detailLa violation du tiers exclu comme critère d’intentionnalité
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Richard, Sébastien; Malherbe, Olivier (Eds.) L’ontologie de Roman Ingarden: Forme et modes d’être (2016)

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See detailDes mots, des couleurs et des octaèdres
Seron, Denis ULiege

in Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (2016), 12(2), 139-169

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See detail布伦塔诺的“描述”实在论
Seron, Denis ULiege; Xu, Weiqin

in 世界哲学 = World Philosophy (2016), 3

Brentano’s metaphysical position in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is usually assumed to be metaphysical realism. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Brentano was at that ... [more ▼]

Brentano’s metaphysical position in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is usually assumed to be metaphysical realism. I propose an alternative interpretation, according to which Brentano was at that time, as well as later, a full-fledged phenomenalist. However, his phenomenalism is markedly different from standard phenomenalism in that it does not deny that the physicist’s judgments are really about the objective world. The aim of the theory of intentionality, I argue, is to allow for extra-phenomenal aboutness within a phenomenalist framework. [less ▲]

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See detailPrésentation du numéro
Seron, Denis ULiege; Dewalque, Arnaud ULiege

in Philosophie (2015), 124

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