References of "Pestieau, Pierre"
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See detailLong-term care social insurance. How to avoid big losses?
Klimaviciute, Justina ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2017, February 10)

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See detailLong-term care social insurance. How to avoid big losses?
Klimaviciute, Justina ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2016, November 15)

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See detailLong-term care social insurance. How to avoid big losses?
Klimaviciute, Justina ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2016, November 10)

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See detailLong-term care social insurance. How to avoid big losses?
Klimaviciute, Justina ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2016, June 13)

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See detailLong-term care social insurance. How to avoid big losses?
Klimaviciute, Justina ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2015)

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See detailUnited but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce, and the marriage contract
Cremer, Helmuh; Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Roeder, Kerstin

in Journal of Population Economics (2015), 28

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization is optimal with no divorce risk. Couples can self ... [more ▼]

This paper studies how the risk of divorce affects the human capital decisions of a young couple. We consider a setting where complete specialization is optimal with no divorce risk. Couples can self-insure through savings which offers some protection to the uneducated spouse, but at the expense of a distortion. Alternatively, for large divorce probabilities, symmetry in education, where both spouses receive an equal amount of education, may be optimal. This eliminates the risk associated with the lack of education, but reduces the efficiency of education choices. We show that the symmetric allocation will become more attractive as the probability of divorce increases, if risk aversion is high and/or labor supply elasticity is low. However, it is only a “second-best” solution as insurance protection is achieved at the expense of an efficiency loss. Finally, we study how the (economic) use of marriage is affected by the possibility of divorce. [less ▲]

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See detailTagging with leisure needs
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Racionero, Maria

in Social Choice and Welfare (2015)

We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private information about ... [more ▼]

We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals differ in two characteristics—earning ability and leisure needs—assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private information about their abilities but needs are observable. With different levels of observable needs the population can be separated into groups and needs may be used as a tag.We first assume that the social planner considers individuals should be compensated for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging.We also consider an alternative social objective where individuals are deemed responsible for their needs. [less ▲]

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See detailTax evasion and social information: an experiment in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in International Tax and Public Finance (2015), 22

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive ... [more ▼]

We experimentally study how receiving information about tax compliance of others affects individuals’ occupational choices and subsequent evading decisions. In one treatment individuals receive information about the highest tax evasion rates of others in past experimental sessions with no such social information; in another treatment they receive information about the lowest tax evasion rates observed in the past sessions with no such social information. We observe an asymmetric effect of social information on tax compliance. Whereas examples of high compliance do not have any disciplining effect, we find evidence that examples of low compliance significantly increase tax evasion for certain audit probabilities. No major differences are found across countries [less ▲]

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See detailSocial Security and Economic Integration
Artige, Lionel ULg; Dedry, Antoine ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Economics Letters (2014), 123(June), 318-322

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See detailThe Macroeconomics of PAYG Pension Schemes in an Aging Society
Artige, Lionel ULg; Cavenaile, Laurent; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

E-print/Working paper (2014)

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See detailOn the policy implications of changing longevity
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Ponthiere, Grégory ULg

in CESifo Ecoonmic Studies (2014), 60

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See detailLong-Term Care Insurance and Family
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Canta, Chiara

in B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2014)

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See detailUnited but (un)equal: human capital, probability of divorce, and the marriage contract
Cremer, Helmuh; Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Roeder, Kerstin

in Journal of Population Economics (2014)

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See detailEndogenous Altruism, Redistribution, and Long Term Care
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz

in B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2014), 14(2), 499-524

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See detailSocial Security and Family Support
Leroux, Marie Louise; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Canadian Journal of Economics (2014), 47(1), 115-143

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See detailThe Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution in an Ageing Society
Artige, Lionel ULg; Cavenaile; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2013, June 18)

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See detailSocial Security and Economic Integration
Artige, Lionel ULg; Dedry, Antoine ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2013, June 03)

Detailed reference viewed: 24 (9 ULg)
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See detailSocial Security and Economic Integration
Artige, Lionel ULg; Dedry, Antoine ULg; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

E-print/Working paper (2013)

Detailed reference viewed: 49 (11 ULg)