References of "Neyrinck, Norman"
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See detailCollective dominance: An overview of national case law
Petit, Nicolas ULg; Neyrinck, Norman ULg

in e-Competitions (2011), N°39129

This article aims at providing an overview of the national case law on collective dominance in Europe. We observe that overall, most domestic decisions have manifestly integrated the EU case law and ... [more ▼]

This article aims at providing an overview of the national case law on collective dominance in Europe. We observe that overall, most domestic decisions have manifestly integrated the EU case law and followed the shift from a structural approach towards a more behavioral approach. We higlight several protruding cases on the definition of the notion of abuse and the most creative remedies devised by national competition authorities so far. [less ▲]

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See detailCredit Rating Agencies and Competition Law
Petit, Nicolas ULg; Neyrinck, Norman ULg

in CPI Antitrust Journal (2011), 8(Summer),

Interestingly, while all the evidence points to the existence of a competition problem in the rating industry, almost nothing has been written on whether the CRAs could be amenable to antitrust scrutiny ... [more ▼]

Interestingly, while all the evidence points to the existence of a competition problem in the rating industry, almost nothing has been written on whether the CRAs could be amenable to antitrust scrutiny. This paper aims at identifying competition law tools that could be used to redress the functioning of the market for credit rating services. [less ▲]

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See detailDroit de la concurrence et instrumentalisation parisitaire
Petit, Nicolas ULg; Neyrinck, Norman ULg

in Roquilly, Christophe (Ed.) La contribution des juristes et du droit à la performance de l'entreprise (2011)

This paper explore whether, and to what extent, firms can instrumentalize the competition rules to free ride on others’ efforts. We come to the conclusion that attempts to free ride through Article 101 ... [more ▼]

This paper explore whether, and to what extent, firms can instrumentalize the competition rules to free ride on others’ efforts. We come to the conclusion that attempts to free ride through Article 101 TFEU allegations are likely to fail. In contrast, Article 102 TFEU offers a more promising legal avenue to wanna-be free riders. [less ▲]

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See detailRambus déclare forfait. La Commission dans un fauteuil.
Neyrinck, Norman ULg

in Revue du Droit des Technologies de l'Information [= RDTI] (2010), 41

The present contribution comments the undertaking decision of the European Commission in the Rambus case. We put the case into context and introduce the economic notions needed to understand patent ambush ... [more ▼]

The present contribution comments the undertaking decision of the European Commission in the Rambus case. We put the case into context and introduce the economic notions needed to understand patent ambush issues. We then explain how such strategies may harm the economy. Second, we present the various legal tools which may be invoked to fight patent ambushes, with a specific emphasis on competition law tools. Third, we discuss whether such tools provide an efficient answer to the patent ambush issue. If the intervention of the Commission seems legally possible, by offering commitments, Rambus gets the Commission out of a difficult situation. [less ▲]

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See detailIl faut criminaliser les cartels
Neyrinck, Norman ULg

Article for general public (2010)

This article supports the view according to which cartels should be criminalized in EU. Despite their impressive amounts, administrative fines fail to deter collusion. In order to tackle "agency issues ... [more ▼]

This article supports the view according to which cartels should be criminalized in EU. Despite their impressive amounts, administrative fines fail to deter collusion. In order to tackle "agency issues", managers should be held responsible for their involvement in cartels. [less ▲]

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See detailA Review of the Competition Law Implications of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Petit, Nicolas ULg; Neyrinck, Norman ULg

in CPI Antitrust Journal (2010), 1

A review of the modifications brought to competition law by the Lisbon Treaty.

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See detailBehavioral Economics and Abuse of Dominance: A Proposed Alternative Reading of the Article 102 TFEU Case-Law
Petit, Nicolas ULg; Neyrinck, Norman ULg

in Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series (2010), (02/2010),

Behavioral economics has become a popular field of study. With the reconsideration of the homo economicus paradigm, psychology and sociology have infiltrated economic theory. More recently, several ... [more ▼]

Behavioral economics has become a popular field of study. With the reconsideration of the homo economicus paradigm, psychology and sociology have infiltrated economic theory. More recently, several commentators have argued in favor of an incorporation of behavioral economics within antitrust law. This paper argues, however, that EU competition law already integrates the findings of behavioral economics. A review of the Article 102 TFUE case-law reveals that contrary to the more conservative approach adopted by US agencies and courts, EU competition authorities already acknowledge the boundaries and biases of economic agents, and take into account the limits of the rationality assumption whilst drafting their decisions. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 151 (8 ULg)