  Nash equilibrium as the minimum of a function. Application to electricity markets with large number of actors; ; et al in Proceedings of the 2007 Power Tech (2007) We introduce in this paper a new approach for efficiently identifying Nash equilibria for games composed of large numbers of players having discrete and not too large strategy spaces. The approach is ... [more ▼] We introduce in this paper a new approach for efficiently identifying Nash equilibria for games composed of large numbers of players having discrete and not too large strategy spaces. The approach is based on a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of minima of a function and relies on stochastic optimization algorithms to find these minima. The approach is applied to compute Nash equilibria of some electricity markets and, based on the simulation results, its performances are discussed. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 40 (4 ULg)Reference transmission network: A game theory approach; Ernst, Damien  ; et alin IEEE Transactions on Power Systems (2006), 21(1), 249-259 The transmission network plays a key role in an oligopolistic electricity market. In fact, the capacity of a transmission network determines the degree to which the generators in different locations ... [more ▼] The transmission network plays a key role in an oligopolistic electricity market. In fact, the capacity of a transmission network determines the degree to which the generators in different locations compete with others and could also greatly influence the strategic behaviors of market participants. In such an oligopolistic framework, different agents may have distinct and sometimes opposite interests in urging or hindering certain transmission expansions. Therefore, the regulatory authority, starting from the existing grid, faces the challenge of defining an optimal network upgrade to be used as benchmark for approval or rejection of a given transmission expansion. The aim of this paper is to define the concept of reference transmission network (RTN) from an economic point of view and to provide a tool for the RTN assessment in a deregulated framework where strategic behaviors are likely to appear. A general game-theoretic model for the RTN evaluation is presented, and the solution procedure is discussed. The strategic behavior of market agents in the spot market is modeled according to a Supply Function Equilibrium approach. The impact of transmission capacity expansion on market participants' strategic behavior is studied on a three-bus test network. The RTN is computed and compared with the optimal expansion found when perfect competition among power producers is assumed. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 35 (3 ULg)Market dynamics driven by the decision-making of both power producers and transmission owners; Ernst, Damien ; in Proceedings of the IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting 2004 (2004) In this paper we consider an electricity market in which not only the power producers but also the transmission owners can submit a bid. The market is cleared at each stage by minimizing the sum of the ... [more ▼] In this paper we consider an electricity market in which not only the power producers but also the transmission owners can submit a bid. The market is cleared at each stage by minimizing the sum of the production prices and the transmission prices. A model of the strategic behavior is formulated for the different agents of the system. This strategic behavior modelling leads to a market dynamics that can be used to determine the different payoffs of the agents over a temporal horizon. Simulations are carried out for several configurations of this two node power system. The influence of the transfer capacity and the market structure on the payoffs of the different agents is discussed. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 10 (0 ULg)Market dynamics driven by the decision-making power producersErnst, Damien ; ; in Proceedings of 2004 IREP Symposium - Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control - VI (2004) In this paper we consider a tool for analyzing the market outcomes when competitive agents (power producers) interact through the market place. The market clearing mechanism is based on the locational ... [more ▼] In this paper we consider a tool for analyzing the market outcomes when competitive agents (power producers) interact through the market place. The market clearing mechanism is based on the locational marginal price scheme. A model of the strategic behavior is formulated for the agents. Each agent chooses its bid in order to maximize its profit by assuming that the other agents will post the same bid as at the previous session of the market, and by knowing the network characteristics. The income of each agent over a certain temporal horizon for different power system configurations (the addition of new transmission capabilities, new power plants) is evaluated according to this market dynamics and by integrating this dynamics over the chosen temporal horizon. The mathematical formulation, for the sake of simplicity, is related to a two node power system. In the simulations, the influence of different conditions (line transfer capacity, the number and size of generators, the presence of portfolio) on market outcomes is analyzed, and interesting and sometimes counterintuitive results are found. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 34 (1 ULg) |
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