References of "Leruth, Luc"
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See detailPower indices and the measurement of control in corporate structures
Crama, Yves ULg; Leruth, Luc ULg

in International Game Theory Review (2013), 15

This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic ... [more ▼]

This paper proposes a brief review of the use of power indices in the corporate governance literature. Without losing sight of the field of application, it places the emphasis on the game-theoretic aspects of this research and on the issues that arise in this framework. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 92 (2 ULg)
See detailControl and Voting Power in Complex Shareholding Networks
Crama, Yves ULg; Leruth, Luc ULg; Su Wang

Conference (2011, June)

Detailed reference viewed: 34 (3 ULg)
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See detailControl and voting power in corporate networks: Concepts and computational aspects
Crama, Yves ULg; Leruth, Luc ULg

in European Journal of Operational Research (2007), 178(3), 879-893

This paper proposes to rely on power indices to measure the amount of control held by individual shareholders in corporate networks. The value of the indices is determined by a complex voting game viewed ... [more ▼]

This paper proposes to rely on power indices to measure the amount of control held by individual shareholders in corporate networks. The value of the indices is determined by a complex voting game viewed as the composition of interlocked weighted majority games; the compound game reflects the structure of shareholdings. The paper describes an integrated algorithmic approach which allows to deal efficiently with the complexity of computing power indices in shareholding networks, irrespective of their size or structure. In particular, the approach explicitly accounts for the presence of float and of cyclic shareholding relationships. It has been successfully applied to the analysis of real-world financial networks. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailA Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries
Leruth, Luc ULg; Paul, Elisabeth ULg

in OECD Journal on Budgeting (2007), 7(3),

A well-functioning public expenditure management system (PEM) is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency. This article discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical ... [more ▼]

A well-functioning public expenditure management system (PEM) is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency. This article discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, the authors analyse the benefits derived from the use by the ministry of finance of ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. The authors derive a set of possible “control regimes” which can be used by the ministry of finance. [less ▲]

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See detailA Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries
Leruth, Luc ULg; Paul, Elisabeth ULg

in IMF Working Paper (2006), 06/204

A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper ... [more ▼]

A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory. This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of two control instruments; ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible “control regimes” which can be used by the MoF. Although we illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, it is also relevant to developed economies. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 49 (4 ULg)