Strategic Analysis of Risk-Shifting Incentives with Convertible Debt

in Quarterly Journal of Finance (2011), 1(2), 293-321

Convertible debt eliminates asset substitution in a one-period setting (Green, 1984). But convertible debt terms are usually set before the asset substitution opportunity. This allows shareholders and ... [more ▼]

Convertible debt eliminates asset substitution in a one-period setting (Green, 1984). But convertible debt terms are usually set before the asset substitution opportunity. This allows shareholders and convertible debtholders to play a strategic noncooperative game. Two risk-shifting Nash equilibria are attainable: pure asset substitution when, despite no conversion, shareholders benefit from shifting risk, and strategic conversion when, despite early conversion, convertible debtholders expropriate wealth from straight debtholders. Even when initial convertible debt is designed to minimize the risk-shifting likelihood, the risk of asset substitution remains economically substantial — contrasting with the agency theoretic rationale for issuing convertible debt. [less ▲]

Portfolio Theory with Venture Capital

Conference (2010, May)

This paper studies the contracting choices between an entrepreneur and venture capital investors in a portfolio context. We rely on the mean-variance framework and derive the optimal choices for an ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the contracting choices between an entrepreneur and venture capital investors in a portfolio context. We rely on the mean-variance framework and derive the optimal choices for an entrepreneur with and without the presence of different kinds of venture capitalists. In particular, we show that the entrepreneur always has the incentive to share the risk and benefits of the venture whenever possible. On the basis of their objectives and characteristics, we distinguish the situations of the corporate, independent, and bank-sponsored venture capital funds. Our framework enables us to derive the optimal contract design for the entrepreneur, featuring the choice of investor, the entrepreneur's investment in the venture, and her dilution in the project's equity as a function of her bargaining power. This result allows us to characterize the choice of the investor depending on her cost of equity and debt capital. In addition to project size and risk, entrepreneur's risk aversion turns out to be a critical determinant of VC investor choice -- a finding which is strongly supported by a panel analysis of VC fund flows for 5 European countries over the 2002--2009 period. [less ▲]

Credit derivatives with multiple debt issues

in Journal of Banking & Finance (2004), 28(5), 997-1021

We evaluate the most actively traded types of credit derivatives within a unified pricing framework that allows for multiple debt issues. Since firms default on all of their obligations, total debt is ... [more ▼]

We evaluate the most actively traded types of credit derivatives within a unified pricing framework that allows for multiple debt issues. Since firms default on all of their obligations, total debt is instrumental in the likelihood of default and therefore in credit derivatives valuation. We use a single factor interest rate model where the exponential default frontier is based on total debt and is made coherent with observed bond prices. Analytical formulae are derived for credit default swaps, total return swaps (both fixed-for-fixed and fixed-for-floating), and credit risk options (CROs). Price behaviors and hedging properties of all these credit derivatives are investigated. Simulations document that credit derivatives prices may be significantly affected by terms of debt other than those of the reference obligation. The analysis of CROs indicates their superior ability to fine-tune the hedging of magnitude and arrival risks of default. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]