References of "Cremer, Helmuth"
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See detailEndogenous Altruism, Redistribution, and Long Term Care
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz

in B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2014), 14(2), 499-524

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See detailThe economics of long-term care: A survey
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, Helmuth; Ponthiere, Gregory

in Nordic Economic Policy Review (2012), (2), 108-148

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See detailCharities and the political support for estate taxation
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Casamatta, Georges; Cremer, Helmuth

in Economics Letters (2012), 115

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See detailTaxing Sin Goods and Subsidizing Health Care
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe et al

in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2012), 114(1), 101-123

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See detailAccidental bequests
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz

in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2012), 114('), 1435-1459

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See detailTravailler moins pour travailler plus longtemps
Cremer, Helmuth; Dedonder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario et al

in Annales d’Economie et de Statistique = Annals of Economics and Statistics (2011), 2(101/102), 257-270

Nous développons un modèle dans lequel les travailleurs peuvent avoir tendance à trop travailler quand ils sont jeunes, parce qu’ils ne peuvent ou ne veulent pas voir les conséquences que cela peut avoir ... [more ▼]

Nous développons un modèle dans lequel les travailleurs peuvent avoir tendance à trop travailler quand ils sont jeunes, parce qu’ils ne peuvent ou ne veulent pas voir les conséquences que cela peut avoir sur leur santé et sur leur capacité à travailler longtemps. Pour les obliger à mieux répartir leurs efforts sur leur cycle de vie, une taxe sur les revenus du travail en début de vie et une subvention de l’épargne sont souhaitables. Si la subvention de l’épargne n’est pas disponible, la taxe optimale arbitre entre quatre considérations différentes. Nous étudions également la taxe optimale quand les individus diffèrent en productivité. [less ▲]

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See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Racionero, Maria

in International Tax and Public Finance (2011), 18

When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax, and when individuals differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal policy is typically rather regressive. Resources ... [more ▼]

When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax, and when individuals differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal policy is typically rather regressive. Resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a “cake” as big as possible to share among individuals through income taxation. In this paper, we put forward another reason to push for regressive education. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability but to the property that welfare may be a convex function of an individual’s wage. For simplicity, we assume a linear education technology and a given education budget. To give the equal wage outcome the best chance to emerge, we also assume that individuals have identical learning abilities. Nevertheless, it turns out that in the first-best wage inequality is always preferable to wage equality. Even more surprisingly, this conclusion remains valid in the second-best when the feasible degree of wage differentiation is sufficiently large. This is in spite of the fact that wage equalization would eliminate any need for distortionary income taxation. [less ▲]

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See detailCollective Annuities and Redistribution
Cremer, Helmuth; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2010), (12), 23-41

This paper studies the role of alternative pension systems that offer collective annuities. The defining characteristic of collective annuities is that they do not depend on an individual’s survival ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the role of alternative pension systems that offer collective annuities. The defining characteristic of collective annuities is that they do not depend on an individual’s survival probabilities. We show that such a system may be welfare improving (with a utilitarian social welfare function) even when private annuity markets are perfect and when life expectancy and earning abilities are positively correlated (i.e., in a setting that is a priori biased against collective annuities). We first concentrate on linear pension systems and contrast two schemes: a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension and a flat rate (Beveridgean) pension. We show that the case for collective annuities is stronger when they are associated with a flat pension system. Then we analyze nonlinear pension schemes.We show that the solution can be implemented by a pension scheme associated with annuities that reflect some degree of “collectiveness.” Unlike under pure collective annuities, benefits do depend on life expectancy but to a lesser degree than with actuarially fair private annuities. In other words, the impact of survival probabilities is mitigated rather than completely neutralized. [less ▲]

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See detailLongevity and annuities: an introduction
Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2010), (12), 1-5

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See detailForced Saving, Redistribution, and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes
Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario et al

in Southern Economic Journal (2009), (76), 86-98

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases. [less ▲]

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See detailProviding sustainable long term care: a looming challenge
Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Toulouse School of Economics (2009), (3),

Long-term care (LTC hereafter) concerns people who depend on help to carry out daily activities. It is mainly delivered informally by families and to a lesser extent formally by professional care ... [more ▼]

Long-term care (LTC hereafter) concerns people who depend on help to carry out daily activities. It is mainly delivered informally by families and to a lesser extent formally by professional care assistants and nursing homes. Most EU governments are also involved in some way in the provision or financing of LTC services. Right now, the future of LTC provision appears to be gloomy, for demographic, societal and financial reasons. This TSE Note studies the strengths and weaknesses of three institutions providing LTC services - namely the family, the State and the private insurance market - and provides policy recommendations based on the view that governments should take the leadership towards a comprehensive approach of the dependency problem, while relying as much as possible on the family and the market. [less ▲]

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See detailPiracy prevention and the pricing of information goods
Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Information Economics and Policy (2009), (21), 34-42

This paper studies the effects of piracy on prices and welfare and determines the optimal enforcement policy. A monopolist sells an information good at a non-linear price in two versions designed for two ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the effects of piracy on prices and welfare and determines the optimal enforcement policy. A monopolist sells an information good at a non-linear price in two versions designed for two types of consumers with different willingness to pay. Consumers with low willingness to pay consumers can copy the good at some cost and with some quality loss. High valuation customers cannot engage in full-fledged piracy. However, they can consume the version designed for the other customer type. We show that copying or piracy may be welfare enhancing because it enables a good to be provided to individuals with a low willingness to pay without undermining the producing firm’s ability to finance the development cost via the pricing scheme applied to high valuation consumers. There are then three levels of piracy control. The highest is that chosen by the private monopoly. The next level is the one chosen by a welfare-maximizing monopoly. The lowest level, which can be zero, is the level of control chosen by the public authority when the good is sold (and priced) by a profit-maximizing monopoly. ! 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailUse and misuse of unemployment benefits for early retirement
Cremer, Helmuth; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in European Journal of Political Economy (2008), (25), 174-185

Unemployment insurance (UI) in some countries is one of the most widely used routes to early retirement. Accordingly, firms lay off elderlyworkerswhosewages exceed their productivity. These workers then ... [more ▼]

Unemployment insurance (UI) in some countries is one of the most widely used routes to early retirement. Accordingly, firms lay off elderlyworkerswhosewages exceed their productivity. These workers then receive unemployment benefits until they enter formal retirement, even though they have effectively already exited the labor market. To persuade theminto finding the deal acceptable, they quite often may also receive some additional compensation from their employers. In this paper we consider three routes of transition fromwork to formal retirement that rely on UI: (i) standard unemployment compensation, (ii) public early retirement program yielding benefits higher than the unemployment compensation and (iii) unemployment compensation along with an income supplement provided by the former employer. The study examines under which conditions these three alternative practices can occur. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailSocial Desirability of Earnings Tests
Cremer, Helmuth; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in German Economic Review (2008), 9(2), 114-134

In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual’s benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when ... [more ▼]

In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual’s benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two ‘endings’: an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before.We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before. [less ▲]

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See detailVoting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic
Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario et al

in Journal of Public Economics (2007), 91(10), 2041-2061

This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far-sighted and myopic individuals. All individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short-term view (instant gratification) when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply. Consequently, they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions. Henceforth, when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving. We consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters: the payroll tax rate (that determines the size or generosity of the system) and the "Bismarckian factor" that determines its redistiibutiveness. Individuals vote sequentially. We examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system. Our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind (all far-sighted or all myopic), while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far-sighted agents. Furthermore, while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far-sighted counterparts, the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics. (c) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V. [less ▲]

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See detailDesigning a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity
Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario et al

in International Tax and Public Finance (2007)

This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings and labor supply decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is “paternalistic”: the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates, with and without liquidity constraints. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree is unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals. [less ▲]

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See detailRetirement age and health expenditures
Cremer, Helmuth; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique (2007), (83/84),

We study the design of pension benefits and contributions when an individual’s health status depends on his consumption of health services. Health services can be subsidized and their uniform public ... [more ▼]

We study the design of pension benefits and contributions when an individual’s health status depends on his consumption of health services. Health services can be subsidized and their uniform public provision is also considered. We show that the second-best policy induces early retirement and that health expenditures ought to be subsidized under plausible assumptions. When only linear subsidies are available, the case for uniform public provision of health services appears to be quite strong. [less ▲]

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See detailDisability Testing and Retirement
Cremer, Helmuth; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2007)

We study the design of retirement and disability policies and illustrate the often observed exit from the labor force of healthy workers through disability insurance schemes. In our model, two types of ... [more ▼]

We study the design of retirement and disability policies and illustrate the often observed exit from the labor force of healthy workers through disability insurance schemes. In our model, two types of individuals, disabled and leisure-prone ones, have the same disutility for labor and cannot be distinguished. However, they are not counted in the same way in social welfare. We determine first- and second-best optimal benefit levels and retirement ages. Then we introduce the possibility of testing that can sort out disabled workers from healthy but retirement-prone workers. We show that such testing can increase both social welfare and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled workers are better taken care of. It is not optimal to test all applicants. Surprisingly, the (second-best) solution may imply later retirement for the disabled than for the leisure-prone. In that case, the disabled are compensated by higher benefits. [less ▲]

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See detailPensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility
Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Journal of Public Economics (2006), 90(12), 2303-2321

This paper studies the design of a pay-as-you-go social security system in an overlapping generations model where fertility is in part stochastic and in part determined through capital investment. If ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the design of a pay-as-you-go social security system in an overlapping generations model where fertility is in part stochastic and in part determined through capital investment. If investments are publicly observable, pension benefits must be linked positively to the level of investment, and payroll taxes negatively to the number of children. The outcome is characterized by full insurance with all parents, regardless of their number of children, enjoying identical consumption levels. Without observability, benefits must increase, and payroll taxes decrease, with the number of children. The second-best level of investment, and the resulting average fertility rate, are less than their corresponding first-best levels. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailWealth Transfer Taxation: A Survey of the Theoretical Litterature
Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Kolm, Serge-Christophe; Mercier Ythier, Jean (Eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. Volume 2 (2006)

The purpose of this paper is to survey the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint of both ... [more ▼]

The purpose of this paper is to survey the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint of both equity and efficiency. The gist of this survey is that the optimal design crucially depends on the assumed bequest motives. Alternative bequest motives are thus analyzed either in isolation or combined. Even though there are as many results as models and as many models as combinations of bequest motives, the general conclusion is that the case for a zero taxation of inheritance is very weak. [less ▲]

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