References of "Cremer, H"
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See detailMyopia, redistribution and pensions
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, H.

in European Economic Review (2011), 55

This paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension ... [more ▼]

This paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension design when individuals differ also in productivity. This double heterogeneity gives rise to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations, which is at the heart of most of the results that are presented. The main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of pension design when myopic individual do not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement because their ‘‘myopicself’’ (with a high discount rate) emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. Some extensions and variations are considered in the second part. In particular we deal with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are subject to ‘‘habit formation’’and where sin goods have a detrimental effect on second period health. Myopic individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption, which complicates public policy. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Tax Treatment of Intergenerational Wealth Transfers
Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Cremer, H.

in CESifo Economic Studies (2011)

This article surveys the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint of both equity and ... [more ▼]

This article surveys the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint of both equity and efficiency. The gist of this survey is that the optimal design crucially depends on the assumed bequest motives. Alternative bequest motives are thus analyzed either in isolation or combined. [less ▲]

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See detailVoting on pensions with endogenous retirement age
Casamatta, G.; Cremer, H.; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in International Tax and Public Finance (2005), 12(1), 7-28

It is often argued that the observed trend towards early retirement is due mainly to the implicit tax imposed on continued activity of elderly workers. We study the relevance of such a distortion in a ... [more ▼]

It is often argued that the observed trend towards early retirement is due mainly to the implicit tax imposed on continued activity of elderly workers. We study the relevance of such a distortion in a political economy model with endogenous age of retirement. The setting is a two-period overlapping generations model. Individuals differ in their productivity. In the first period they work a fixed amount of time; in the second, they choose when to retire and then receive a flat rate pension benefit. Pensions are financed by a payroll tax on earnings in the first and in the second period of life. Such a tax is non distortionary in the first period; it is distortionary in the second period. We allow for some rebating of the second period tax. Individuals vote on the level of the payroll tax given the rebate which can range from 0 (biased system) to 100% (neutral system). We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium and study its properties. Under these conditions, high tax rates are supported by all the old and by low productivity young individuals. We show that the pivotal voter is a young individual. The number of young individuals who have higher wage than the pivotal voter equals half the total population. We also show that the introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension system. Finally, we study the simultaneous determination of the bias and the tax rate through a voting procedure and show that the equilibrium (if any) implies a bias which is always positive and may or not be larger than one. [less ▲]

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See detailSocial security, retirement age and optimal income taxation
Cremer, H.; Lozachmeur, J. M.; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Journal of Public Economics (2004), 88(11), 2259-2281

It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best ... [more ▼]

It is often argued that implicit taxation on continued activity of elderly workers is responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or of first-best efficiency, there would be no such implicit taxation. The point of this paper is that, when first-best redistributive instruments are not available, because some variables are not observable, the optimal policy does imply a distortion of the retirement decision. Consequently, the inducement of early retirement may be part of the optimal tax-transfer policy. We consider a model in which individuals differ in their productivity and their capacity to work long and choose both their weekly labor supply and their age of retirement. We characterize the optimal non-linear tax-transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when weekly earnings and the length of active life are observable while individuals' productivity and health status are not observable. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailCapital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable
Cremer, H.; Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Rochet, J. C.

in Journal of Public Economics (2003), 87(11), 2475-2490

This paper extends the Atkinson-Stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxation to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics: productive ability and inherited wealth. Bequests are motivated ... [more ▼]

This paper extends the Atkinson-Stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxation to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics: productive ability and inherited wealth. Bequests are motivated by the 'joy of giving'. A child's inheritance is a random variable with a probability distribution that depends on his parent's investment in a 'bequest technology'. Public borrowing is assumed and implies the modified golden rule. We study the optimal tax policy when two instruments are available: a non-linear (wage) income tax and a proportional tax on capital income. We show that the second instrument ought, in general, to be used but that the tax rate is not necessarily positive. However, a positive tax rate is more likely when there is a positive correlation between inherited wealth and innate ability. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailThe double dividend of postponing retirement
Cremer, H.; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in International Tax and Public Finance (2003), 10(4), 419-434

Early retirement seems to plague social security systems in a number of European countries. In this paper we argue that delaying retirement may have two positive effects: it is likely to partially restore ... [more ▼]

Early retirement seems to plague social security systems in a number of European countries. In this paper we argue that delaying retirement may have two positive effects: it is likely to partially restore the financial balance of the system, and it may foster redistribution among retirees. To obtain such a double dividend, the benefit rule of the initial social security scheme must have the following two characteristics. First, it operates redistribution within generations. Second, it is "biased" and induces early retirement. [less ▲]

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See detailSocial insurance competition between Bismarck and Beveridge
Cremer, H.; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Journal of Urban Economics (2003), 54(1), 181-196

Social insurance schemes differ according to the relationship between contributions and benefits. Bismarckian systems provide earnings-related benefits, while Beveridgean systems offer flat payments. The ... [more ▼]

Social insurance schemes differ according to the relationship between contributions and benefits. Bismarckian systems provide earnings-related benefits, while Beveridgean systems offer flat payments. The conventional wisdom is that with factor mobility poor people have incentives to move towards Beveridgean countries. Consequently, Beveridgean regimes would not be sustainable under economic integration. This paper studies the validity of such a conjecture within a simple model. It is shown that mobility does have a significant impact on social protection. However, the equilibrium patterns that can emerge are more complex and diversified than the initial conjecture suggests. In some cases, the equilibrium may even imply that all the poor move to the Bismarckian country. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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