References of "Cherkaoui, Rachid"
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See detailNash equilibrium as the minimum of a function. Application to electricity markets with large number of actors
Beck, Elena Vdovina; Cherkaoui, Rachid; Minoia, Anna et al

in Proceedings of the 2007 Power Tech (2007)

We introduce in this paper a new approach for efficiently identifying Nash equilibria for games composed of large numbers of players having discrete and not too large strategy spaces. The approach is ... [more ▼]

We introduce in this paper a new approach for efficiently identifying Nash equilibria for games composed of large numbers of players having discrete and not too large strategy spaces. The approach is based on a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of minima of a function and relies on stochastic optimization algorithms to find these minima. The approach is applied to compute Nash equilibria of some electricity markets and, based on the simulation results, its performances are discussed. [less ▲]

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See detailA comparison of Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for power markets
Krause, Thilo; Beck, Elena Vdovina; Cherkaoui, Rachid et al

in International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems (2006), 28(9), 599-607

In this paper we compare Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for assessing the market dynamics of network-constrained pool markets. Power suppliers submit their bids to the market place in ... [more ▼]

In this paper we compare Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for assessing the market dynamics of network-constrained pool markets. Power suppliers submit their bids to the market place in order to maximize their payoffs, where we apply reinforcement learning as a behavioral agent model. The market clearing mechanism is based on the locational marginal pricing scheme. Simulations are carried out on a benchmark power system. We show how the evolution of the agent-based approach relates to the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium or multiple equilibria in the system. Additionally, the parameter sensitivity of the results is discussed. (C) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailA comparison of Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for power markets
Krause, Thilo; Andersson, Goran; Ernst, Damien ULg et al

in Proceedings of the 15th Power System Computation Conference (PSCC 2005) (2005)

In this paper we compare Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for assessing the market dynamics of network-constrained pool markets. Power suppliers submit their bids to the market place in ... [more ▼]

In this paper we compare Nash equilibria analysis and agent-based modelling for assessing the market dynamics of network-constrained pool markets. Power suppliers submit their bids to the market place in order to maximize their payoffs, where we apply reinforcement learning as a behavioral agent model. The market clearing mechanism is based on the locational marginal pricing scheme. Simulations are carried out on a benchmark power system.We show how the evolution of the agent-based approach relates to the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium or multiple equilibria in the system. Additionally, the parameter sensitivity of the results is discussed. [less ▲]

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See detailNash equilibria and reinforcement learning for active decision maker modelling in power markets
Krause, Thilo; Andersson, Goran; Ernst, Damien ULg et al

in Proceedings of the 6th IAEE European Conference: Modelling in Energy Economics and Policy (2004)

In this paper, we study the behavior of power suppliers who submit their bids to the market place in order to maximize their payoffs. The market clearing mechanism is based on the locational marginal ... [more ▼]

In this paper, we study the behavior of power suppliers who submit their bids to the market place in order to maximize their payoffs. The market clearing mechanism is based on the locational marginal price. To study the interaction of the power suppliers, we rely on two different approaches and compare the results obtained. One approach consists of computing the Nash equilibria of the market, and the other models each player’s behavior by using reinforcement learning algorithms. Simulations are carried out on a five node power system. [less ▲]

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