References of "Charland-Verville, Vanessa"
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See detailCharacteristics of Near-Death Experiences Memories as Compared to Real and Imagined Events Memories
Thonnard, Marie ULg; Charland-Verville, Vanessa ULg; Brédart, Serge ULg et al

in PLoS ONE (2013), 8(3),

Since the dawn of time, Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) have intrigued and, nowadays, are still not fully explained. Since reports of NDEs are proposed to be imagined events, and since memories of imagined ... [more ▼]

Since the dawn of time, Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) have intrigued and, nowadays, are still not fully explained. Since reports of NDEs are proposed to be imagined events, and since memories of imagined event have, on average, fewer phenomenological characteristics than real events memories, we here compared phenomenological characteristics of NDEs reports with memories of imagined and real events. We included three groups of coma survivors (8 patients with NDE as defined by the Greyson NDE scale, 6 patients without NDE but with memory of their coma, 7 patients without memories of their coma) and a group of 18 age-matched healthy volunteers. Five types of memories were assessed using Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ – Johnson et al., 1988): target memory (NDE for NDE memory group, coma memory for coma memory group, and first childhood memory for no memory and control groups), old and recent real event memories and old and recent imagined event memories. Since NDEs are known to have high emotional content, participants were requested to choose the most emotionally salient memories for both real and imagined recent and old event memories. Results showed that, in NDE memories group, NDE memories have more characteristics than memories of imagined and real events (p<0.02). NDE memories contain more self-referential and emotional information and have better clarity than memories of coma (all p<0.02). The present study showed that NDE memories contain more characteristics than real event memories and coma memories. Thus, this suggests that they cannot be considered as imagined event memories. On the contrary, their physiological origins could lead them to be really perceived although not lived in the reality. Further work is needed to better understand this phenomenon. [less ▲]

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See detailMemories of Near-Death experiences are they memories of imagined events?
Thonnard, Marie ULg; Charland-Verville, Vanessa ULg; Brédart, Serge ULg et al

Poster (2012, October 27)

Background: The phenomenon of Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) has always intrigued but is still not fully explained despite numerous theories and studies. Since reports of NDEs are proposed to be imagined ... [more ▼]

Background: The phenomenon of Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) has always intrigued but is still not fully explained despite numerous theories and studies. Since reports of NDEs are proposed to be imagined events (French, 2001), and since memories of imagined events have, on average, fewer phenomenological characteristics than real event memories (e.g. Johnson et al., 1988), we here compared phenomenological characteristics of NDEs reports with memories of imagined and real events. Methods: We included 3 groups of coma survivors (8 patients with NDE as defined by the Greyson NDE scale – the “NDE memory group”- , 6 patients without NDE but with memory of their coma – the “coma memory group” – and 7 patients without memories of their coma – the “no memory group”) and a group of 18 age-matched healthy volunteers. Five memories were assessed using Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ – Johnson et al., 1988): target memory (NDE for NDE memory group, coma memory for coma memory group, and first childhood memory for no memory and control groups), old and recent real event memories and old and recent imagined event memories. Results: In NDE group, NDE memories showd more characteristics than memories of imagined and real events (p<0.02). These memories contain more self-referential and emotional information and have better clarity than memories of coma (all p<0.02). Conclusion: The present study showed that NDE memories contain more characteristics than real event memories and coma memories. Thus, they cannot be considered as classic imagined event memories. On the contrary, their physiological origins could lead them to be really perceived although not lived in the reality. Further work is needed to better understand this phenomenon [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 92 (11 ULg)
See detailThe ethics of managing disorders of consciousness
Demertzi, Athina ULg; Gosseries, Olivia ULg; Bruno, Marie-Aurélie ULg et al

in Schnakers, Caroline; Laureys, Steven (Eds.) Coma and disorders of consciousness (2012)

Detailed reference viewed: 19 (1 ULg)
See detailFunctional imaging and impaired consciousness
Vanhaudenhuyse, Audrey ULg; Boly, Mélanie ULg; Bruno, Marie-Aurélie ULg et al

in Schnakers, Caroline; Laureys, Steven (Eds.) Coma and disorders of consciousness (2012)

Detailed reference viewed: 17 (2 ULg)
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See detailResting state networks and consciousness: alterations of multiple resting state network connectivity in physiological, pharmacological, and pathological consciousness States.
Heine, Lizette ULg; Soddu, Andrea ULg; Gomez, Francisco et al

in Frontiers in Psychology [=FPSYG] (2012), 3

In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to conscious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI ... [more ▼]

In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to conscious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) functional connectivity under physiological (sleep), pharmacological (anesthesia), and pathological altered states of consciousness, such as brain death, coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and minimally conscious state. The reviewed resting state networks were the DMN, left and right executive control, salience, sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks. We highlight some methodological issues concerning resting state analyses in severely injured brains mainly in terms of hypothesis-driven seed-based correlation analysis and data-driven independent components analysis approaches. Finally, we attempt to contextualize our discussion within theoretical frameworks of conscious processes. We think that this "lesion" approach allows us to better determine the necessary conditions under which normal conscious cognition takes place. At the clinical level, we acknowledge the technical merits of the resting state paradigm. Indeed, fast and easy acquisitions are preferable to activation paradigms in clinical populations. Finally, we emphasize the need to validate the diagnostic and prognostic value of fMRI resting state measurements in non-communicating brain damaged patients. [less ▲]

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See detailDésordres de la conscience : aspects éthiques.
Demertzi, Athina ULg; Gosseries, Olivia ULg; Bruno, Marie-Aurélie ULg et al

in Schnakers, Caroline; LAUREYS, Steven (Eds.) Comas et états de conscience altérée (2011)

L’apparition de la ventilation mécanique dans les années cinquante et le développement des soins intensifs dans les années soixante ont permis à de nombreux patients de survivre à de graves lésions ... [more ▼]

L’apparition de la ventilation mécanique dans les années cinquante et le développement des soins intensifs dans les années soixante ont permis à de nombreux patients de survivre à de graves lésions cérébrales. Bien que ces avancées technologiques soient étonnantes, de nombreux patients vont alors se retrouver dans des états cliniques critiques peu rencontrés auparavant (1). L’impact éthique de ces états d’inconscience se reflète lors de la rédaction des premiers comités de bioéthique et lors de l’apparition du concept d’acharnement thérapeutique. En 1968, le comité spécial de l’école médicale de Harvard a publié un article essentiel redéfinissant la mort comme étant un coma irréversible et une perte permanente de toutes les fonctions cérébrales (2). Le comité, composé de dix médecins, d’un théologien, d’un avocat et d’un historien des sciences, a débattu des questions médicales, juridiques et sociétales quant à la prise en charge des patients en mort cérébrale. Nous donnerons ici un bref aperçu des principales questions éthiques liées à la notion de conscience et à la prise en charge médicale des patients atteints de troubles de la conscience (TDC) tels que le coma, l’état végétatif et l’état de conscience minimale. Nous mettrons également l’accent sur le problème de la gestion de la douleur et des prises de décision en fin de vie. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 61 (16 ULg)