 Strategic bypass deterrence; Gautier, Axel  Conference (2012, September) Detailed reference viewed: 5 (0 ULg)Strategic Bypass Deterrence; Gautier, Axel Conference (2012, March 17) In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼] In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 2 (0 ULg) Strategic bypass deterrence; Gautier, Axel E-print/Working paper (2012) In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼] In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produce the network input more efficiently. We show that the incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers and welfare because competition is fiercer under bypass. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 13 (2 ULg)Strategic bypass deterrenceGautier, Axel ; Conference (2011, October 17) In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼] In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 7 (1 ULg)Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector; Gautier, Axel in Review of Network Economics (2008), 7(2), 207-230 In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final ... [more ▼] In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous. [less ▲] Detailed reference viewed: 43 (15 ULg)Access, Bypass and Productivity Gains in Competitive Postal Markets; Gautier, Axel in Crew, Michael; Kleindorfer, Paul (Eds.) Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector (2008) Detailed reference viewed: 40 (8 ULg) |
||
