A general lot-sizing problem in a closed-loop supply chain with returns

Conference (2013, February 08)

We consider a stochastic version of the multi-product multi-level capacitated lotsizing and scheduling problem with sequence-dependent setups. A bottler needs to determine its production schedule over a ... [more ▼]

We consider a stochastic version of the multi-product multi-level capacitated lotsizing and scheduling problem with sequence-dependent setups. A bottler needs to determine its production schedule over a finite horizon in order to satisfy a deterministic demand. The raw materials are supplied through two different sources: uncapacitated reserves of new bottles and the uncertain returns of used bottles. We present results for the single-item case. [less ▲]

A capacity game in transportation management

Conference (2011, July 10)

This study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a carrier with the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance. In order to face a random demand, the ... [more ▼]

This study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a carrier with the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance. In order to face a random demand, the retailer submits a contract to the carrier based on the number of units transported and on the number of truck used. Then, before uncertainty is resolved, the carrier decides of the number of trucks that he reserves. Once the demand is known, the carrier may also request additional trucks at a higher cost. The result shows that the proposed contract does not coordinate the supply chain. [less ▲]

A capacity game in transportation management

Conference (2011, March 03)

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of ... [more ▼]

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of actors often leads to sub-optimal supply chain actions due to the antagonistic nature of the economic objectives of the partners. With the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance in such supply chains, this study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a third-party logistics provider (carrier) using game theoretical approaches. The partners of the studied supply chain play a Stackelberg game in which the retailer is the leader and the carrier is the follower. The retailer faces an uncertain demand and needs to supply his store from his warehouse. he has the option of not meeting all the demand but must satisfy at least a minimum proportion of the fi nall demand. On the other hand, the carrier has to determine the number of trucks needed to satisfy this demand before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the reserved transportation capacity is insufficient, the carrier also has the possibility to requisition trucks at a higher price. We modelise the problem and propose a contract having two parameters : the quantity of transported items and the number of truck used. In our settings, the retailer is the one that submits the contract and the carrier decides if he accepts it or not. We compare this situation with a centralized model where a single decision maker takes all the decisions. [less ▲]

A capacity game in transportation planning

Conference (2010, January 28)

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of ... [more ▼]

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of actors often leads to sub-optimal supply chain actions due to the antagonistic nature of the economic objectives of the partners. With the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance in such supply chains, this study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a third-party logistics provider (carrier) using game theoretical approaches. The partners of the studied supply chain play a Stackelberg game in which the retailer is the leader and the carrier is the follower. The retailer faces an uncertain demand and needs to supply his store from his warehouse. he has the option of not meeting all the demand but must satisfy at least a minimum proportion of the fi nall demand. On the other hand, the carrier has to determine the number of trucks needed to satisfy this demand before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the reserved transportation capacity is insufficient, the carrier also has the possibility to requisition trucks at a higher price. We modelise the problem and propose a contract having two parameters : the quantity of transported items and the number of truck used. In our settings, the retailer is the one that submits the contract and the carrier decides if he accepts it or not. We compare this situation with a centralized model where a single decision maker takes all the decisions. [less ▲]