References of "Pestieau, Pierre"
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See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Scientific conference (2009, October 09)

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See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Scientific conference (2009, October 08)

Detailed reference viewed: 11 (2 ULiège)
See detailSocial and private LTC insurance with variable altruism
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Scientific conference (2009, September 17)

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See detailWealth Taxation: a survey
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Conference (2009, September 09)

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See detailMyopia, redistribution and pensions
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Scientific conference (2009, June 18)

Detailed reference viewed: 14 (1 ULiège)
See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Scientific conference (2009, June 17)

Detailed reference viewed: 11 (1 ULiège)
See detailMyopia, redistribution and pensions
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Conference (2009, June 15)

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See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Scientific conference (2009, June 11)

Detailed reference viewed: 10 (3 ULiège)
See detailSocial and private LTC insurance with variable altruism
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Conference (2009, May 14)

Detailed reference viewed: 11 (0 ULiège)
See detailTagging with leisure needs
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Conference (2009, May 14)

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See detailSocial insurance and redistribution
Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

Conference (2009, March 31)

Detailed reference viewed: 18 (1 ULiège)
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See detailForced Saving, Redistribution, and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes
Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario et al

in Southern Economic Journal (2009), (76), 86-98

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases. [less ▲]

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See detailOptimal redistribution with unobservable disability:Welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives
Racionero, María; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

in European Economic Review (2009), (53), 636-644

This paper examines the optimal non-linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure or disability, but the disability is not ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the optimal non-linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure or disability, but the disability is not readily observable. We compare the optimal policy under alternative social objectives, welfarist and non-welfarist, and conclude that the nonwelfarist objective, in which the planner gives a higher weight to the disutility of labor of the disabled individuals, is the only reasonable specification. It has some foundation in the theory of responsibility; further, unlike the other specifications it yields an optimal solution that may involve a lower labor supply requirement from disabled individuals [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 18 (2 ULiège)
See detailBelgian Social Protection Portrait
Atta, C.; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege; Perelman, Sergio ULiege

Report (2009)

Detailed reference viewed: 27 (8 ULiège)
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See detailProviding sustainable long term care: a looming challenge
Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

in Toulouse School of Economics (2009), (3),

Long-term care (LTC hereafter) concerns people who depend on help to carry out daily activities. It is mainly delivered informally by families and to a lesser extent formally by professional care ... [more ▼]

Long-term care (LTC hereafter) concerns people who depend on help to carry out daily activities. It is mainly delivered informally by families and to a lesser extent formally by professional care assistants and nursing homes. Most EU governments are also involved in some way in the provision or financing of LTC services. Right now, the future of LTC provision appears to be gloomy, for demographic, societal and financial reasons. This TSE Note studies the strengths and weaknesses of three institutions providing LTC services - namely the family, the State and the private insurance market - and provides policy recommendations based on the view that governments should take the leadership towards a comprehensive approach of the dependency problem, while relying as much as possible on the family and the market. [less ▲]

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See detailPiracy prevention and the pricing of information goods
Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

in Information Economics and Policy (2009), (21), 34-42

This paper studies the effects of piracy on prices and welfare and determines the optimal enforcement policy. A monopolist sells an information good at a non-linear price in two versions designed for two ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the effects of piracy on prices and welfare and determines the optimal enforcement policy. A monopolist sells an information good at a non-linear price in two versions designed for two types of consumers with different willingness to pay. Consumers with low willingness to pay consumers can copy the good at some cost and with some quality loss. High valuation customers cannot engage in full-fledged piracy. However, they can consume the version designed for the other customer type. We show that copying or piracy may be welfare enhancing because it enables a good to be provided to individuals with a low willingness to pay without undermining the producing firm’s ability to finance the development cost via the pricing scheme applied to high valuation consumers. There are then three levels of piracy control. The highest is that chosen by the private monopoly. The next level is the one chosen by a welfare-maximizing monopoly. The lowest level, which can be zero, is the level of control chosen by the public authority when the good is sold (and priced) by a profit-maximizing monopoly. ! 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

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See detailIs migration a good substitute for education subsidies?
Docquier, Frédéric; Faye, Ousmane; Pestieau, Pierre ULiege

in Journal of Development Economics (2008), (86), 263-276

Assuming a given educational policy, the recent brain drain literature reveals that skilled migration can boost the average level <br />of schooling in developing countries. In this paper, we introduce ... [more ▼]

Assuming a given educational policy, the recent brain drain literature reveals that skilled migration can boost the average level <br />of schooling in developing countries. In this paper, we introduce educational subsidies determined by governments concerned by <br />the number of skilled workers remaining in the country. Our theoretical analysis shows that developing countries can benefit from <br />skilled emigration when educational subsidies entail high fiscal distortions. However when taxes are not too distortionary, it is <br />desirable to impede emigration and subsidize education. We then investigate the empirical relationship between educational <br />subsidies and migration prospects, obtaining a negative relationship for 105 countries. Based on this result, we revisit the country <br />specific effects of skilled migration upon human capital. We show that the endogeneity of public subsidies reduces the number of <br />winners and increases the magnitude of the losses. <br />© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 31 (4 ULiège)