References of "Pestieau, Pierre"
     in
Bookmark and Share    
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailLongevity and annuities: an introduction
Cremer, Helmuth; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in Journal of Public Economic Theory (2010), (12), 1-5

Detailed reference viewed: 18 (4 ULg)
See detailMyopia, redistribution and pensions
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, December 18)

Detailed reference viewed: 35 (5 ULg)
See detailSocial and private LTC insurance with variable altruism
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, November 06)

Detailed reference viewed: 9 (1 ULg)
See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, October 09)

Detailed reference viewed: 10 (2 ULg)
See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, October 08)

Detailed reference viewed: 10 (2 ULg)
See detailSocial and private LTC insurance with variable altruism
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, September 17)

Detailed reference viewed: 13 (1 ULg)
See detailWealth Taxation: a survey
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2009, September 09)

Detailed reference viewed: 20 (2 ULg)
See detailMyopia, redistribution and pensions
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, June 18)

Detailed reference viewed: 13 (1 ULg)
See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, June 17)

Detailed reference viewed: 10 (1 ULg)
See detailMyopia, redistribution and pensions
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2009, June 15)

Detailed reference viewed: 16 (0 ULg)
See detailUnequal wages for equal utilities
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Scientific conference (2009, June 11)

Detailed reference viewed: 9 (3 ULg)
See detailSocial and private LTC insurance with variable altruism
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2009, May 14)

Detailed reference viewed: 11 (0 ULg)
See detailTagging with leisure needs
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2009, May 14)

Detailed reference viewed: 7 (0 ULg)
See detailSocial insurance and redistribution
Pestieau, Pierre ULg

Conference (2009, March 31)

Detailed reference viewed: 18 (1 ULg)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailForced Saving, Redistribution, and Nonlinear Social Security Schemes
Cremer, Helmuth; De Donder, Philippe; Maldonado, Dario et al

in Southern Economic Journal (2009), (76), 86-98

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement ... [more ▼]

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save ‘‘enough’’ for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 28 (5 ULg)
Full Text
Peer Reviewed
See detailOptimal redistribution with unobservable disability:Welfarist versus non-welfarist social objectives
Racionero, María; Pestieau, Pierre ULg

in European Economic Review (2009), (53), 636-644

This paper examines the optimal non-linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure or disability, but the disability is not ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the optimal non-linear income and commodity tax when the same labor disutility can receive two alternative interpretations, taste for leisure or disability, but the disability is not readily observable. We compare the optimal policy under alternative social objectives, welfarist and non-welfarist, and conclude that the nonwelfarist objective, in which the planner gives a higher weight to the disutility of labor of the disabled individuals, is the only reasonable specification. It has some foundation in the theory of responsibility; further, unlike the other specifications it yields an optimal solution that may involve a lower labor supply requirement from disabled individuals [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 17 (2 ULg)
See detailBelgian Social Protection Portrait
Atta, C.; Pestieau, Pierre ULg; Perelman, Sergio ULg

Report (2009)

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (2 ULg)