Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives: The Effect of Accountability

in Theory and Decision (in press)

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing ... [more ▼]

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed. [less ▲]

tax evasion and peer effects: an experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

Conference (2013, January 28)

Social Security and Retirement: the Relationship between Workers, Firms and Government

in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics = Annales de l'Economie Publique, Sociale et Coopérative (2013), 84(1), 43-61

In this paper we survey a number of theoretical and empirical studies in order to propose explanations to the fall of labor force participation at older age. Starting from the largely studied e ect of ... [more ▼]

In this paper we survey a number of theoretical and empirical studies in order to propose explanations to the fall of labor force participation at older age. Starting from the largely studied e ect of social security schemes on labor supply, we explore the employers behavior and the role of govern- ments in the development of early retirement schemes. We show that early retirement is the result of a global agreement between rms and government where workers have incentives to early exit the labor market due to generous non actuarial bene ts. Firms have an advantage to separate older workers because they are costly compare to young workers and governments hope that by pushing elderly into early retirement they will solve the massive unemployment problem. [less ▲]

A Structural Model for Early Exit of Older Men in Belgium

Scientific conference (2012, May 29)

L'État-providence en Europe. Performance et dumping social

Book published by Editions rue d'Ulm (2012)

Disability in Belgium: There is More than Meets the Eye

in Wise, David (Ed.) Social Security and Retirement around the World: Historical Trends in Mortality and Health, Employment, and Disability Insurance Participation and Reforms (2012)

The paper provides a perspective on the development of the Belgian disability insurance system. Using both survey and administrative data, it sketches a picture of the (changing) factors leading towards ... [more ▼]

The paper provides a perspective on the development of the Belgian disability insurance system. Using both survey and administrative data, it sketches a picture of the (changing) factors leading towards disability, as well as the outcomes in terms of program participation. The paper shows the key role of integrating other forms of early retirement programs into the analysis. The main findings are an unspectacular trend in the number of DI beneficiaries over time combined with a strong expansion of (early-) retirement schemes. [less ▲]

La performance de l’Etat-providence européen. Quel enseignement pour la Belgique?

in Regards Economiques (2011), 93

Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous présentons une mesure multidimensionnelle de la performance des Etats- providence de l’Union européenne. Cette mesure permet de comparer la performance des pays ... [more ▼]

Dans ce numéro de Regards économiques, nous présentons une mesure multidimensionnelle de la performance des Etats- providence de l’Union européenne. Cette mesure permet de comparer la performance des pays de l’Europe des 15 avec celle des 12 nouveaux membres; elle donne aussi la possibilité de tester l’hypothèse d’un éventuel dumping social; enfin elle peut être utilisée pour mieux appréhender la performance de la protection sociale de la Belgique et de ses composantes régionales. [less ▲]

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

Scientific conference (2011, October 11)

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

Scientific conference (2011, July 29)

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about ... [more ▼]

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others’ behavior. Subjects have to decide between a ‘registered’ income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an ‘unregistered’ income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging. [less ▲]

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and ”The Broken Windows” Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

Conference (2011, June 09)

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about ... [more ▼]

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others’ behavior. Subjects have to decide between a ‘registered’ income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an ‘unregistered’ income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging. [less ▲]