References of "Gautier, Axel"
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See detailThe postal sector as a vector of financial inclusion
Gautier, Axel ULg; d'Alcantara, Gonzales

in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (2013), 84(2), 119-137

Access to finance has become a major policy issue under the term Financial Inclusion. In this paper, we focus on the role of postal operators in financial inclusion policies. In developing countries ... [more ▼]

Access to finance has become a major policy issue under the term Financial Inclusion. In this paper, we focus on the role of postal operators in financial inclusion policies. In developing countries, postal firms typically manage a dense network of counters with a unique coverage of rural areas where the banking sector is totally absent. We use a formal location model for postal counters and bank agencies to show that in rural areas a post-bank partnership can be a vector of financial inclusion and that this can be done profitably. [less ▲]

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See detailContract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector
Gautier, Axel ULg; Yvrande-Billon, Anne

in Review of Economics and Institutions (2013), 4(Winter), 2

In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodically put out for tender. Thus, operators’ incentives to reduce costs come from both profit maximization during the ... [more ▼]

In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodically put out for tender. Thus, operators’ incentives to reduce costs come from both profit maximization during the current contract and from the perspective of contract renewal. We construct a dynamic incentive regulation model that captures these features and we show that both the level of cost-reducing effort and its repartition during the contracting period depend on the contract type (cost-plus, gross cost or net cost contract). We then estimate a cost frontier model for an eight-year panel of French bus companies (664 company-year observations) to test our predictions. [less ▲]

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See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2012, September)

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See detailVers un service universel 2.0?
Gautier, Axel ULg

Article for general public (2012)

La révolution numérique a radicalement changé notre façon de communiquer. Il faut repenser le service universel des communications en intégrant les changements technologiques.

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See detailReforming the Postal Universal Service
Gautier, Axel ULg; Poudou, Jean-Christophe

Conference (2012, March 22)

The postal sector has dramatically changed in the recent years with the ongoing liberalization process and the increased competitive pressures from alternative communication channels (e-substitution ... [more ▼]

The postal sector has dramatically changed in the recent years with the ongoing liberalization process and the increased competitive pressures from alternative communication channels (e-substitution). These two effects concur to decrease the mail volume handled by the historical operator which in turn may threaten the financial viability of the universal service and may call for a reform of the universal service. This paper examines the question of reforming the postal universal service, first by considering that the universal service remains confined in the postal word and, latter, by defining a universal service that includes postal and electronic technologies. [less ▲]

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See detailStrategic Bypass Deterrence
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2012, March 17)

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. [less ▲]

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See detailEnergie et environnement
Gautier, Axel ULg

Speech/Talk (2012)

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See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULg

E-print/Working paper (2012)

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produce the network input more efficiently. We show that the incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers and welfare because competition is fiercer under bypass. [less ▲]

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See detailCompetitively Neutral Universal Service Obligations
Gautier, Axel ULg; Wauthy, Xavier

in Information Economics and Policy (2012), 24

Universal service obligations impose specific costs on the universal service provider and the latter may call for an appropriate compensation. Most often, a two-step procedure is put forward to finance ... [more ▼]

Universal service obligations impose specific costs on the universal service provider and the latter may call for an appropriate compensation. Most often, a two-step procedure is put forward to finance the universal service in a competitive environment. Firstly, the cost of the universal service is assessed; secondly, the provider must be compensated for this cost. We argue that this procedure is problematic because the implementation of a compensation scheme affects the behavior of market participants and leads to an overcompensation of the universal service provider. We put forward an alternative approach to this problem that fully acknowledges the distortions that result from the compensation mechanism. [less ▲]

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See detailRethinking Regulatory Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULg

in Harrington, Joseph; Katsoulacos, Yannis (Eds.) Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation (2012)

Conventional capture models rely on the idea that regulator is induced to lenient behavior by the regulated firm through offers of monetary transfers, the bribery model, or future employment, the ... [more ▼]

Conventional capture models rely on the idea that regulator is induced to lenient behavior by the regulated firm through offers of monetary transfers, the bribery model, or future employment, the revolving doors model. To avoid socially costly capture, the political principal should then either implement collusion-proof mechanisms through the delegation of welfare gains, or severely restrict the career paths of regulatory staff. The paradox of capture is that neither the two modes of capture, nor the remedy are commonly found in practice. This paper proposes to rethink capture based on the widespread use of industry-commissioned consultants, experts and lobbyists that produce information for regulatory and policy use. A small model (Agrell and Gautier, 2010) introduces a 'soft capture' concept based on a self-enforced collusion between the firm and regulator, linked to the role of the regulator as information-processing intermediate for the political principal. The firm puts processed but biased information at the free disposal of the regulator, 'no strings attached', who can then either use the submitted information or produce a more accurate information by a costly process. Under a set of mild conditions, the equilibrium involves soft capture and the regulator uses the submitted information, leading to some distortions in welfare. A case study of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in USA serves to motivate and illustrate the model. As shown by the case, the soft capture model may have a stronger positive potential than the conventional models, also implying that policy advice based on it may be valuable. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 132 (9 ULg)
See detailIntegration of quality indices of distribution in benchmarking analysis
Coelli, Tim; Gautier, Axel ULg; Perelman, Sergio ULg et al

Report (2011)

Detailed reference viewed: 19 (7 ULg)
See detailIntegration of quality indices of distribution in benchmarking analysis
Coelli, Tim; Gautier, Axel ULg; Perelman, Sergio ULg et al

Report (2011)

Detailed reference viewed: 13 (1 ULg)
See detailRethinking regulatory capture
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2011, November 14)

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See detailAméliorer la régulation et la politique de concurrence
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2011, November 09)

Detailed reference viewed: 12 (2 ULg)
Peer Reviewed
See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Gautier, Axel ULg; Bloch, Francis

Conference (2011, October 17)

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. [less ▲]

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See detailLa régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique
de Streel, Alexandre; Gautier, Axel ULg; Wauthy, Xavier

in Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique (2011), L(3), 73-92

Le bilan que l’on peut dresser concernant la libéralisation et le nouveau mode de régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique est assez mitigé. En particulier, les bénéfices issus de la libéralisation ... [more ▼]

Le bilan que l’on peut dresser concernant la libéralisation et le nouveau mode de régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique est assez mitigé. En particulier, les bénéfices issus de la libéralisation tardent à être transférés vers les utilisateurs finaux et le financement des investissements nécessaires aux gains d’efficacité dynamiques n’est parfois pas assez facilité par l’action des régulateurs. Dans cet article, nous analysons tout d’abord d’un point de vue général, les enjeux et les difficultés auxquels les autorités de régulation sont confrontés et ensuite nous identifions quelques éléments critiques, spécifiques à trois industries : l’électricité, les télécommunications, et le transport de fret ferroviaire. En conclusion nous insistons sur la nécessité d’une indépendance accrue des régulateurs, un énoncé plus clair de leurs orientations stratégiques et une simplification institutionnelle. Ces trois conditions nous semblent indispensables pour assurer la sécurité juridique nécessaire à la réalisation optimale des investissements nécessaires dans les infrastructures. Par ailleurs, dans certains cas, une intégration européenne plus poussée est justifiée. [less ▲]

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See detailSoft Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2011, September)

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See detailUniversal Service Financing in Competitive Postal Markets: One Size Does Not Fit All
Gautier, Axel ULg; Paolini, Dimitri

in Review of Network Economics (2011), 10(3), 6

In the postal sector, the financial burden of the universal service depends on its content, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors ... [more ▼]

In the postal sector, the financial burden of the universal service depends on its content, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the market. In this paper, we consider countries with different geographical characteristics and we show that the choice of an appropriate mechanism to share the burden of universal service between market participants depends on the country configuration. Thus, for universal service financing, one size does not fit all. [less ▲]

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See detailGradual Network Expansion and Universal Service Obligations
Gautier, Axel ULg; Mizuno, Keizo

in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics = Annales de l'Economie Publique, Sociale et Coopérative (2011), 82(2), 97-113

Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a ... [more ▼]

Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Postal Sector as a Vector of Financial Inclusion
Gautier, Axel ULg; d'Alcantara, Gonzales

Conference (2011, June)

Detailed reference viewed: 32 (1 ULg)