References of "Gautier, Axel"
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See detailAméliorer la régulation et la politique de concurrence
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2011, November 09)

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See detailStrategic bypass deterrence
Gautier, Axel ULg; Bloch, Francis

Conference (2011, October 17)

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate ... [more ▼]

In liberalized network industries, entrants can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own infrastructure capacity (bypass). In this paper, we demonstrate that, under the threat of bypass, the access price set by an unregulated and vertically integrated incumbent is compatible with productive efficiency. This means that the entrant bypasses the existing infrastructure only if it can produces the network input more efficiently. The incumbent lowers the access price compared to the ex-post efficient level to strategically deter inefficient bypass by the entrant. Accordingly, from a productive efficiency point of view, there is no need to regulate access prices when the entrant has the option to bypass. Despite that, we show that restricting the possibilities of access might be profitable for consumers. [less ▲]

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See detailLa régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique
de Streel, Alexandre; Gautier, Axel ULg; Wauthy, Xavier

in Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique (2011), L(3), 73-92

Le bilan que l’on peut dresser concernant la libéralisation et le nouveau mode de régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique est assez mitigé. En particulier, les bénéfices issus de la libéralisation ... [more ▼]

Le bilan que l’on peut dresser concernant la libéralisation et le nouveau mode de régulation des industries de réseau en Belgique est assez mitigé. En particulier, les bénéfices issus de la libéralisation tardent à être transférés vers les utilisateurs finaux et le financement des investissements nécessaires aux gains d’efficacité dynamiques n’est parfois pas assez facilité par l’action des régulateurs. Dans cet article, nous analysons tout d’abord d’un point de vue général, les enjeux et les difficultés auxquels les autorités de régulation sont confrontés et ensuite nous identifions quelques éléments critiques, spécifiques à trois industries : l’électricité, les télécommunications, et le transport de fret ferroviaire. En conclusion nous insistons sur la nécessité d’une indépendance accrue des régulateurs, un énoncé plus clair de leurs orientations stratégiques et une simplification institutionnelle. Ces trois conditions nous semblent indispensables pour assurer la sécurité juridique nécessaire à la réalisation optimale des investissements nécessaires dans les infrastructures. Par ailleurs, dans certains cas, une intégration européenne plus poussée est justifiée. [less ▲]

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See detailSoft Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2011, September)

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See detailUniversal Service Financing in Competitive Postal Markets: One Size Does Not Fit All
Gautier, Axel ULg; Paolini, Dimitri

in Review of Network Economics (2011), 10(3), 6

In the postal sector, the financial burden of the universal service depends on its content, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors ... [more ▼]

In the postal sector, the financial burden of the universal service depends on its content, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the market. In this paper, we consider countries with different geographical characteristics and we show that the choice of an appropriate mechanism to share the burden of universal service between market participants depends on the country configuration. Thus, for universal service financing, one size does not fit all. [less ▲]

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See detailGradual Network Expansion and Universal Service Obligations
Gautier, Axel ULg; Mizuno, Keizo

in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics = Annales de l'Economie Publique, Sociale et Coopérative (2011), 82(2), 97-113

Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a ... [more ▼]

Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later. [less ▲]

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See detailThe Postal Sector as a Vector of Financial Inclusion
Gautier, Axel ULg; d'Alcantara, Gonzales

Conference (2011, June)

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See detailSoft Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2011, April)

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See detailSoft Capture
Gautier, Axel ULg

Scientific conference (2010, November 25)

Capture of regulatory agencies by firms or other stakeholders has given rise to a rich literature, much of which is dominated by models in which the motivation for the welfare-reducing behavior is found ... [more ▼]

Capture of regulatory agencies by firms or other stakeholders has given rise to a rich literature, much of which is dominated by models in which the motivation for the welfare-reducing behavior is found in side-contracting (bribes, corruption), threats (blackmail, political support) or corresponding mechanisms for repeated games (reputation, career concerns, signaling for promotion). Notwithstanding, the empirical support for monetary corruption and 'revolving doors' is scarce and inconclusive. We propose an alternative and more intuitive model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. [less ▲]

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See detailPrice competition under universal service obligations
Gautier, Axel ULg; Wauthy, Xavier

in International Journal of Economic Theory (2010), 6(3), 311-326

In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service ... [more ▼]

In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In this paper we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti et al. (2002) defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices. [less ▲]

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See detailPrice Competition under Universal Service Obligations
Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2010, September)

In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service ... [more ▼]

In industries like telecom, postal services or energy provision, universal service obligations (uniform price and universal coverage) are often imposed on one market participant. Universal service obligations are likely to alter firms' strategic behavior in such competitive markets. In this paper we show that, depending on the entrant's market coverage and the degree of product differentiation, the Nash equilibrium in prices involves either pure or mixed strategies. We show that the pure strategy market sharing equilibrium, as identified by Valletti et al. (2002) defines a lower bound on the level of equilibrium prices. [less ▲]

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See detailContract renewal as an incentive device: An application to the French urban transport sector
Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2010, July)

In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodically putted out forto tender. Thus, operators’ incentives to reduce costs come from both profit maximization ... [more ▼]

In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodically putted out forto tender. Thus, operators’ incentives to reduce costs come from both profit maximization during the current contract and from the perspective of contract renewal. We have constructed a dynamic incentive regulation model that captures these features and we show that both the level of cost-reducing effort and its repartition during the contracting period depend on the contract type (cost-plus, gross cost or net cost contract). We then estimated a cost frontier model for an eight-year panel of French bus companies (677 company-year observations) to test our predictions. [less ▲]

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See detailScoring-rule and the choice of a contractor by a financially constrained government
Gautier, Axel ULg

Conference (2010, June 15)

Governments and public authorities are increasingly relying on Public-Private Partnerships for the provision of public goods and services. It is often argued that the use of a public private partnership ... [more ▼]

Governments and public authorities are increasingly relying on Public-Private Partnerships for the provision of public goods and services. It is often argued that the use of a public private partnership can relieve the government from a strained budget constraint and, in this paper, we analyze the choice of a contractual solution for designing, constructing and managing a project, with observable externalities, by a budget-constrained government. We show that the quality of the project and the designed contractor are affected by the extent of the budget constraint and we show that the use of a PPP may partially overcome the resulting inefficiencies. [less ▲]

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See detailEfficient access pricing and endogenous market structure
Gautier, Axel ULg

Poster (2010, May)

We investigate how a regulatory mechanism can influence the nature of competition in a network industry. In the downstream market, the seller of a differentiated retail product competes with an incumbent ... [more ▼]

We investigate how a regulatory mechanism can influence the nature of competition in a network industry. In the downstream market, the seller of a differentiated retail product competes with an incumbent firm. The incumbent firm is also the owner of the essential input. The regulator may or may not observe the cost of the entrant. To maximize social welfare the regulator specifies the access charge that the entrant must pay to the incumbent, and the retail prices. The optimal access charge is a uniform price that respects the criteria of transparency and non-discrimination that are imposed by the competition and regulation directives in most countries. We derive new formulas for retail and access prices adhering to the traditional Ramsey rule. Since the competing firm takes the decision to enter following the choice of the regulatory regime, the nature of the retail market competition is endogenous [less ▲]

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See detailUniversal service financing in competitive postal markets: One size does not fit all
Gautier, Axel ULg; Paolini, Dimitri

Conference (2010, March)

In the postal sector, the financial burden of the universal service depends on its content, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors ... [more ▼]

In the postal sector, the financial burden of the universal service depends on its content, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the market. In this paper, we consider countries with different geographical characteristics and we show that the choice of an appropriate mechanism to share the burden of universal service between market participants depends on the country configuration. Thus, for universal service financing, one size does not fit all. [less ▲]

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See detailA Theory of Soft Capture
Agrell, Per; Gautier, Axel ULg

E-print/Working paper (2010)

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to ... [more ▼]

n this paper, wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information. In a three-tier model, a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator. The firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents. The main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. [less ▲]

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See detailThe benefit and cost of winner-picking: Redistribution vs. Incentives
Gautier, Axel ULg; Heider, Florian

in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics = Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft (2009), 165(4), 622-649

This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate headquarters' investment and incentive ... [more ▼]

This paper examines the agency cost of winner-picking in multidivision firms and uses explicit incentive contracts to analyze the interaction between corporate headquarters' investment and incentive policies. Winner-picking, i.e. the efficient reallocation of scarce resources in an internal capital market, adds an extra layer of noise to the moral hazard problem of incentivizing division managers to produce the resources that can then be redistributed. In particular, division managers with strong future investment opportunities anticipate that headquarters will bail them out should they fail to produce enough resources themselves. This reduces incentives to create the resources in the first place with possible consequences for the optimal investment policy. [less ▲]

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See detailDelegation, externalities and organizational design
Gautier, Axel ULg; Paolini, Dimitri

in Economics Bulletin (2009), 29(4),

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the ... [more ▼]

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents. [less ▲]

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See detailRegulation of an Open Access Essential Facility
Gautier, Axel ULg; Mitra, Manipushpak

in Economica (2008), 75

A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both firms use the same essential input. The regulator’s ... [more ▼]

A vertically integrated firm owns an essential input and operates on the downstream market. There is a potential entrant in the downstream market. Both firms use the same essential input. The regulator’s objectives are (i) to ensure financing of the essential input and (ii) to generate competition in the downstream market. The regulatory mechanism grants non-discriminatory access of the essential facility to the entrant provided it pays a two-part tariff to the incumbent. The optimal mechanism generates inefficient entry. The inefficient entry captures the trade-off between market efficiency and infrastructure financing resulting from incomplete information and non-discriminatory access. [less ▲]

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See detailAccess Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector
Bloch, Francis; Gautier, Axel ULg

in Review of Network Economics (2008), 7(2), 207-230

In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final ... [more ▼]

In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 51 (15 ULg)