References of "Arda, Yasemin"
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See detailVehicle loading optimization with stochastic supply
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg et al

Conference (2010, January 29)

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See detailA capacity game in transportation planning
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Conference (2010, January 28)

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of ... [more ▼]

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of actors often leads to sub-optimal supply chain actions due to the antagonistic nature of the economic objectives of the partners. With the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance in such supply chains, this study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a third-party logistics provider (carrier) using game theoretical approaches. The partners of the studied supply chain play a Stackelberg game in which the retailer is the leader and the carrier is the follower. The retailer faces an uncertain demand and needs to supply his store from his warehouse. he has the option of not meeting all the demand but must satisfy at least a minimum proportion of the fi nall demand. On the other hand, the carrier has to determine the number of trucks needed to satisfy this demand before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the reserved transportation capacity is insufficient, the carrier also has the possibility to requisition trucks at a higher price. We modelise the problem and propose a contract having two parameters : the quantity of transported items and the number of truck used. In our settings, the retailer is the one that submits the contract and the carrier decides if he accepts it or not. We compare this situation with a centralized model where a single decision maker takes all the decisions. [less ▲]

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See detailSupply chain vs marketing
Nondonfaz, Robert ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg; Limbourg, Sabine ULg

Article for general public (2010)

Detailed reference viewed: 32 (9 ULg)
See detailRAPPORT DE RECHERCHE SUR UNE APPLICATION DE GESTION DE LA COLLABORATION DU SERVICE EXPÉDITION DU CHARGEUR AVEC LE TRANSPORTEUR
Pironet, Thierry ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg et al

Report (2009)

Dans ce rapport, les échanges d'information d'un donneur d'ordre, d'un transporteur et d'un fournisseur au sein d'une chaîne de distribution sont analysés. Les possibilités de tracking et de tracing de ... [more ▼]

Dans ce rapport, les échanges d'information d'un donneur d'ordre, d'un transporteur et d'un fournisseur au sein d'une chaîne de distribution sont analysés. Les possibilités de tracking et de tracing de TransLogisTIC sont utilisés pour générer des KPI de performance et un modèle d'optimisation de quais de chargement est décrit dans une version Off-line et On-line. [less ▲]

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See detailVehicle loading optimization with stochastic supply
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg et al

Conference (2009, July 07)

The increased availability of information makes it possible to coordinate processes which are usually functionnally separated in large companies, such as production and transportation. This work ... [more ▼]

The increased availability of information makes it possible to coordinate processes which are usually functionnally separated in large companies, such as production and transportation. This work investigates the optimization of vehicle loading for individual orders over a multiperiod horizon when items have stochastic release dates from production, and time windows are imposed for delivery at the customer plant. The loading decisions are made in order to minimize the expected cost. Starting from the deterministic model, we develop scenario-based models for the stochastic version of the problem and we investigate the performance of various solution methods. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 26 (9 ULg)
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See detailFret ferroviaire : vue prospective
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Nondonfaz, Robert ULg

Article for general public (2009)

Livre blanc de la Commission Européenne. Faiblesses du transport ferroviaire de fret : interopérabilité, ferroutage

Detailed reference viewed: 9 (2 ULg)
See detailRAPPORT INTERNE : REVUE DE LITTERATURE SUR LA GESTION DES RESSOURCES RÉUTILISABLES ET DES MÉTHODES D’OPTIMISATION
Pironet, Thierry ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg et al

Report (2009)

Dans cette revue de la littérature scientifique, on peut trouver une synthèse des thématiques liées aux modèles et aux techniques d'optimisation utilés pour la gestion de ressources réutilisables dans un ... [more ▼]

Dans cette revue de la littérature scientifique, on peut trouver une synthèse des thématiques liées aux modèles et aux techniques d'optimisation utilés pour la gestion de ressources réutilisables dans un réseau tels que les containers entre des ports de mers ou des wagons dans un réseau ferroviaire. Les textes fondateurs sont mentionnés dans un ordre historique et un commentaire est fait soit sur le modèle investiqué et ses particularités ou la technique de résolution. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 88 (9 ULg)
See detailRAPPORT DE RECHERCHE SUR L’OPTIMISATION DU ROUTAGE ET DU CHARGEMENT DE VEHICULES.
Pironet, Thierry ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg et al

Report (2009)

Dans ce rapport confidentiel, un algorithme d'optimisation du chargement de véhicules a été mis au point dans le cadre d'une application avec un partenaire industriel.

Detailed reference viewed: 92 (9 ULg)
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See detailLe logisticien et la gestion des déchets
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Limbourg, Sabine ULg; Nondonfaz, Robert ULg

Article for general public (2009)

Detailed reference viewed: 26 (6 ULg)
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See detailLogistiques et energies
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Nondonfaz, Robert ULg

Article for general public (2008)

Detailed reference viewed: 18 (2 ULg)
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See detailLe supply chain risk manager
Nondonfaz, Robert ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Article for general public (2008)

Detailed reference viewed: 31 (3 ULg)
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See detailLogistique durable
Nondonfaz, Robert ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Article for general public (2008)

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Peer Reviewed
See detailInventory control in a decentralised two-stage make-to-stock queueing system
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Hennet, Jean-Claude

in International Journal of Systems Science (2008), 39(7),

In an Enterprise network, several companies interact to produce families of goods. Each member company seeks to optimise his own production and inventory policy to maximise his profit. These objectives ... [more ▼]

In an Enterprise network, several companies interact to produce families of goods. Each member company seeks to optimise his own production and inventory policy to maximise his profit. These objectives are generally antagonistic and can lead to contradictory choices in the context of a network with a high degree of local decisional autonomy. To avoid a global loss of economic efficiency, the network should be equipped with a coordination mechanism. The present article describes a coordination contract negotiated between a manufacturer and a supplier. The purpose of the negotiation is to determine the price of the supplied intermediate goods and the delay penalty in case of a late delivery. For a manufacturer with a dominant contracting position, the outcome of the negotiation can be computed as a Stackelberg equilibrium point. Under the resulting contract, the two-stage supply chain reaches globally optimal running conditions with the maximal possible profit obtained by the manufacturer and the smallest acceptable profit obtained by the supplier. [less ▲]

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Peer Reviewed
See detailUn problème de chargement/déchargement profitable d'une flotte de véhicules soumise à des fenêtres de temps
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Pironet, Thierry ULg

Conference (2008, February 26)

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or ... [more ▼]

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or visited integraly. So, the total earning is supposed to be constant. Conversely, the costs related to trip length or duration or either to the fleet size are consequences of the operations management efficiency. Therefore, typically the objective function is reduced to a cost minimization. On the contrary, this model tends to maximize the global profit. Let’s consider a fleet of vehicles starting at different initial times from different locations and oblige to return to their final depots before fixed maximal times. On their way-back, these vehicles are performing full-truck-load transportation between pickup and delivery points and have to respect time windows for the loading and unloading operations. Realized transportation orders add positive contributions while linking paths generate costs. In summary, the goal for the fleet resides in the selection of transportations orders among available ones while fullfilling the final time requirements and the time restrictions for the un/loading operations. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 154 (30 ULg)
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Peer Reviewed
See detailA profitable pickup and delivery problem with time windows
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Pironet, Thierry ULg

Conference (2008, January 18)

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or ... [more ▼]

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or visited integraly. So, the total earning is supposed to be constant. Conversely, the costs related to trip length or duration or either to the fleet size are consequences of the operations management efficiency. Therefore, typically the objective function is reduced to a cost minimization. On the contrary, this model tends to maximize the global profit. Let’s consider a fleet of vehicles starting at different initial times from different locations and oblige to return to their final depots before fixed maximal times. On their way-back, these vehicles are performing full-truck-load transportation between pickup and delivery points and have to respect time windows for the loading and unloading operations. Realized transportation orders add positive contributions while linking paths generate costs. In summary, the goal for the fleet resides in the selection of transportations orders among available ones while fullfilling the final time requirements and the time restrictions for the un/loading operations. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 275 (24 ULg)
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See detailPolitiques d’approvisionnement dans les systèmes à plusieurs fournisseurs et Optimisation des décisions dans les chaînes logistiques décentralisées
Arda, Yasemin ULg

Doctoral thesis (2008)

Coordinating product flows between the partners of a supply chain is a difficult task because of random variations in demand and supply processes and the antagonistic nature of the individual economic ... [more ▼]

Coordinating product flows between the partners of a supply chain is a difficult task because of random variations in demand and supply processes and the antagonistic nature of the individual economic objectives of the partners. This study concentrates on the management of interorganizational product flows in supply chains. Two approaches are analyzed with the aim of improving performances of production/inventory systems controlled by base stock type product flow control policies. In the first approach, the effects of multi-supplier strategies on the performances of supply chains are studied. It is shown that a multi-supplier strategy decreases the expected replenishment delay and the expected inventory holding and shortage costs. The second approach deals with the deviations from the set of supply chain optimal actions due to the decentralisation of decision rights in a two-stage supply chain. In the game theory framework, the partners play a two-stage game of the Stackelberg type. A coordination contract is proposed and it is shown that the optimal supply chain performance is achievable using the proposed contract. [less ▲]

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Peer Reviewed
See detailSupply chain coordination: A game-theory approach
Hennet, Jean-Claude; Arda, Yasemin ULg

in Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence (2008), 21

In a supply chain organized as a network of autonomous enterprises, the main objective of each partner is to optimize his production and supply policy with respect to his own economic criterion. Conflicts ... [more ▼]

In a supply chain organized as a network of autonomous enterprises, the main objective of each partner is to optimize his production and supply policy with respect to his own economic criterion. Conflicts of interests and the distributed nature of the decision structure may induce a global loss of efficiency. Contracts can then be used to improve global performance and decrease risks. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the efficiency of different types of contracts between the industrial partners of a supply chain. Such an evaluation is made on the basis of the relationship between a producer facing a random demand and a supplier with a random lead-time. The model combines queuing theory for evaluation aspects and game theory for decisional purposes. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 203 (19 ULg)
Peer Reviewed
See detailInventory control in a decentralized two-stage make-to-stock queuing system
Arda, Yasemin ULg; HENNET, Jean-Claude

in INCOM 06, 12th IFAC Symposium on Information Control Problems in Manufacturing, Saint-Etienne, France, 17-19 May 2006 (2006, May 17)

In an Enterprise network, several companies interact to produce families of goods. Each member company seeks to optimize his own production and inventory policy to maximize his profit. These objectives ... [more ▼]

In an Enterprise network, several companies interact to produce families of goods. Each member company seeks to optimize his own production and inventory policy to maximize his profit. These objectives are generally antagonistic and can lead to contradictory choices in the context of a network with a high degree of local decisional autonomy. To avoid a global loss of economic efficiency, the network should be equipped with a coordination mechanism. The present paper describes a coordination contract negotiated between a manufacturer and a supplier. The purpose of the negotiation is to determine the price of the supplied intermediate goods and the delay penalty in case of a late delivery. For a manufacturer with a dominant contracting position, the outcome of the negotiation can be computed as a Stackelberg equilibrium point. Under the resulting contract, the two-stage supply chain reaches globally optimal running conditions with the maximal possible profit obtained by the manufacturer and the smallest acceptable profit obtained by the supplier. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 9 (1 ULg)
See detailContracting in manufacturing networks with inventories
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Hennet, Jean-Claude

Conference (2006, April 18)

An important issue in the management of supply chains and manufacturing systems is to achieve the desired customer service level while respecting the individual economic objectives of the partners. These ... [more ▼]

An important issue in the management of supply chains and manufacturing systems is to achieve the desired customer service level while respecting the individual economic objectives of the partners. These objectives are generally antagonistic and can lead to contradictory choices in the context of a network with a high degree of local decisional autonomy. The challenge involved is to determine a coordination mechanism that avoids global loss of economic efficiency and to solve nonlinear optimization problems that capture the key dynamics of a complex production/inventory system. This study investigates a two-stage serial supply chain with one manufacturer and one supplier. The manufacturer, producing goods to serve a Poisson demand process, procures a key component from his supplier. At each production facility, the successive processing times of the units are independent exponential random variables. In the decentralized setting considered, each firm manages the local production/inventory control system while attempting to maximize his own steady state expected profit. The main operational decision at each stage is the level of the inventory control parameter. In the game theory framework, the partners play a two-stage game of the Stackelberg type. The manufacturer leads the game by setting the component purchasing price as a function of the observed lateness of delivery. In the considered make-to-stock queuing system, the production facility of the supplier behaves as an M/M/1 queue. However, the departure of units from the finished-goods inventory of the supplier is not a Poisson process. In order to derive closed form results, the method of Lee and Zipkin (1992) is used to approximate the limiting probabilities of the second stage production process. The supplier’s profit function is concave and the optimal action of the supplier can be correctly anticipated by the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s constrained optimization problem consists of determining the optimal values of the contract parameters and the second stage base-stock level. It is shown that using the defined contracting scheme, the system optimal solution is obtained as the Stackelberg equilibrium. [less ▲]

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Peer Reviewed
See detailCoordination de chaînes logistiques, une approache par la théorie des jeux
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Hennet, Jean-Claude

in MOSIM 06, 6e Conférence Francophone de MOdélisation et SIMulation, Rabat, Maroc, 3-5 Avril 2006 (2006, April 03)

Les chaînes logistiques étudiées sont constituées de différentes entreprises qui interviennent dans le processus de fabrication d’une famille de produits. Pour chaque entreprise, il s’agit principalement ... [more ▼]

Les chaînes logistiques étudiées sont constituées de différentes entreprises qui interviennent dans le processus de fabrication d’une famille de produits. Pour chaque entreprise, il s’agit principalement d’optimiser sa politique de production et d’approvisionnement par rapport à ses propres critères économiques. Puisque les objectifs des acteurs sont souvent antagonistes, le caractère distribué de la structure décisionnelle peut conduire à une perte d’efficacité pour l’ensemble de la chaîne et nécessite des mécanismes de coordination permettant d’améliorer les performances globales, tout en limitant les risques encourus par chacun des partenaires. Dans cet article, nous analysons un maillon élémentaire à deux niveaux d’une chaîne logistique, composé d’un producteur confronté à une demande aléatoire et d’un fournisseur qui gère sa production et son stock de produit intermédiaire. Nous étudions les effets des décisions locales sur les délais de livraison et nous proposons un contrat de coordination qui permet d’amener les performances du système distribué vers les performances théoriques du modèle centralisé. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 70 (6 ULg)