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See detailA capacity game in transportation management
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

E-print/Working paper (2012)

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See detailA capacity game in transportation management
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Conference (2011, July 10)

This study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a carrier with the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance. In order to face a random demand, the ... [more ▼]

This study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a carrier with the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance. In order to face a random demand, the retailer submits a contract to the carrier based on the number of units transported and on the number of truck used. Then, before uncertainty is resolved, the carrier decides of the number of trucks that he reserves. Once the demand is known, the carrier may also request additional trucks at a higher cost. The result shows that the proposed contract does not coordinate the supply chain. [less ▲]

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See detailMultiperiod vehicle loading optimization with stochastic supply
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg et al

Scientific conference (2011, April 07)

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Peer Reviewed
See detailA capacity game in transportation management
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Conference (2011, March 03)

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of ... [more ▼]

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of actors often leads to sub-optimal supply chain actions due to the antagonistic nature of the economic objectives of the partners. With the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance in such supply chains, this study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a third-party logistics provider (carrier) using game theoretical approaches. The partners of the studied supply chain play a Stackelberg game in which the retailer is the leader and the carrier is the follower. The retailer faces an uncertain demand and needs to supply his store from his warehouse. he has the option of not meeting all the demand but must satisfy at least a minimum proportion of the fi nall demand. On the other hand, the carrier has to determine the number of trucks needed to satisfy this demand before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the reserved transportation capacity is insufficient, the carrier also has the possibility to requisition trucks at a higher price. We modelise the problem and propose a contract having two parameters : the quantity of transported items and the number of truck used. In our settings, the retailer is the one that submits the contract and the carrier decides if he accepts it or not. We compare this situation with a centralized model where a single decision maker takes all the decisions. [less ▲]

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See detailVehicle loading optimization with stochastic supply
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg et al

Conference (2010, January 29)

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See detailA capacity game in transportation planning
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Conference (2010, January 28)

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of ... [more ▼]

Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the number of actors often leads to sub-optimal supply chain actions due to the antagonistic nature of the economic objectives of the partners. With the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal system performance in such supply chains, this study analyzes the contractual relation between a retailer and a third-party logistics provider (carrier) using game theoretical approaches. The partners of the studied supply chain play a Stackelberg game in which the retailer is the leader and the carrier is the follower. The retailer faces an uncertain demand and needs to supply his store from his warehouse. he has the option of not meeting all the demand but must satisfy at least a minimum proportion of the fi nall demand. On the other hand, the carrier has to determine the number of trucks needed to satisfy this demand before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the reserved transportation capacity is insufficient, the carrier also has the possibility to requisition trucks at a higher price. We modelise the problem and propose a contract having two parameters : the quantity of transported items and the number of truck used. In our settings, the retailer is the one that submits the contract and the carrier decides if he accepts it or not. We compare this situation with a centralized model where a single decision maker takes all the decisions. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 27 (11 ULg)
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See detailSupply chain vs marketing
Nondonfaz, Robert ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg; Limbourg, Sabine ULg

Article for general public (2010)

Detailed reference viewed: 41 (9 ULg)
See detailRAPPORT DE RECHERCHE SUR UNE APPLICATION DE GESTION DE LA COLLABORATION DU SERVICE EXPÉDITION DU CHARGEUR AVEC LE TRANSPORTEUR
Pironet, Thierry ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg et al

Report (2009)

Dans ce rapport, les échanges d'information d'un donneur d'ordre, d'un transporteur et d'un fournisseur au sein d'une chaîne de distribution sont analysés. Les possibilités de tracking et de tracing de ... [more ▼]

Dans ce rapport, les échanges d'information d'un donneur d'ordre, d'un transporteur et d'un fournisseur au sein d'une chaîne de distribution sont analysés. Les possibilités de tracking et de tracing de TransLogisTIC sont utilisés pour générer des KPI de performance et un modèle d'optimisation de quais de chargement est décrit dans une version Off-line et On-line. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 152 (31 ULg)
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See detailVehicle loading optimization with stochastic supply
Amand, Guillaume ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg et al

Conference (2009, July 07)

The increased availability of information makes it possible to coordinate processes which are usually functionnally separated in large companies, such as production and transportation. This work ... [more ▼]

The increased availability of information makes it possible to coordinate processes which are usually functionnally separated in large companies, such as production and transportation. This work investigates the optimization of vehicle loading for individual orders over a multiperiod horizon when items have stochastic release dates from production, and time windows are imposed for delivery at the customer plant. The loading decisions are made in order to minimize the expected cost. Starting from the deterministic model, we develop scenario-based models for the stochastic version of the problem and we investigate the performance of various solution methods. [less ▲]

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See detailFret ferroviaire : vue prospective
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Nondonfaz, Robert ULg

Article for general public (2009)

Livre blanc de la Commission Européenne. Faiblesses du transport ferroviaire de fret : interopérabilité, ferroutage

Detailed reference viewed: 10 (2 ULg)
See detailRAPPORT INTERNE : REVUE DE LITTERATURE SUR LA GESTION DES RESSOURCES RÉUTILISABLES ET DES MÉTHODES D’OPTIMISATION
Pironet, Thierry ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg et al

Report (2009)

Dans cette revue de la littérature scientifique, on peut trouver une synthèse des thématiques liées aux modèles et aux techniques d'optimisation utilés pour la gestion de ressources réutilisables dans un ... [more ▼]

Dans cette revue de la littérature scientifique, on peut trouver une synthèse des thématiques liées aux modèles et aux techniques d'optimisation utilés pour la gestion de ressources réutilisables dans un réseau tels que les containers entre des ports de mers ou des wagons dans un réseau ferroviaire. Les textes fondateurs sont mentionnés dans un ordre historique et un commentaire est fait soit sur le modèle investiqué et ses particularités ou la technique de résolution. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 94 (9 ULg)
See detailRAPPORT DE RECHERCHE SUR L’OPTIMISATION DU ROUTAGE ET DU CHARGEMENT DE VEHICULES.
Pironet, Thierry ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg et al

Report (2009)

Dans ce rapport confidentiel, un algorithme d'optimisation du chargement de véhicules a été mis au point dans le cadre d'une application avec un partenaire industriel.

Detailed reference viewed: 95 (9 ULg)
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See detailLe logisticien et la gestion des déchets
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Limbourg, Sabine ULg; Nondonfaz, Robert ULg

Article for general public (2009)

Detailed reference viewed: 34 (8 ULg)
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See detailLogistiques et energies
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Nondonfaz, Robert ULg

Article for general public (2008)

Detailed reference viewed: 21 (3 ULg)
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See detailLe supply chain risk manager
Nondonfaz, Robert ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Article for general public (2008)

Detailed reference viewed: 37 (3 ULg)
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See detailLogistique durable
Nondonfaz, Robert ULg; Arda, Yasemin ULg

Article for general public (2008)

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Peer Reviewed
See detailInventory control in a decentralised two-stage make-to-stock queueing system
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Hennet, Jean-Claude

in International Journal of Systems Science (2008), 39(7),

In an Enterprise network, several companies interact to produce families of goods. Each member company seeks to optimise his own production and inventory policy to maximise his profit. These objectives ... [more ▼]

In an Enterprise network, several companies interact to produce families of goods. Each member company seeks to optimise his own production and inventory policy to maximise his profit. These objectives are generally antagonistic and can lead to contradictory choices in the context of a network with a high degree of local decisional autonomy. To avoid a global loss of economic efficiency, the network should be equipped with a coordination mechanism. The present article describes a coordination contract negotiated between a manufacturer and a supplier. The purpose of the negotiation is to determine the price of the supplied intermediate goods and the delay penalty in case of a late delivery. For a manufacturer with a dominant contracting position, the outcome of the negotiation can be computed as a Stackelberg equilibrium point. Under the resulting contract, the two-stage supply chain reaches globally optimal running conditions with the maximal possible profit obtained by the manufacturer and the smallest acceptable profit obtained by the supplier. [less ▲]

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See detailUn problème de chargement/déchargement profitable d'une flotte de véhicules soumise à des fenêtres de temps
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Pironet, Thierry ULg

Conference (2008, February 26)

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or ... [more ▼]

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or visited integraly. So, the total earning is supposed to be constant. Conversely, the costs related to trip length or duration or either to the fleet size are consequences of the operations management efficiency. Therefore, typically the objective function is reduced to a cost minimization. On the contrary, this model tends to maximize the global profit. Let’s consider a fleet of vehicles starting at different initial times from different locations and oblige to return to their final depots before fixed maximal times. On their way-back, these vehicles are performing full-truck-load transportation between pickup and delivery points and have to respect time windows for the loading and unloading operations. Realized transportation orders add positive contributions while linking paths generate costs. In summary, the goal for the fleet resides in the selection of transportations orders among available ones while fullfilling the final time requirements and the time restrictions for the un/loading operations. [less ▲]

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See detailA profitable pickup and delivery problem with time windows
Arda, Yasemin ULg; Crama, Yves ULg; Pironet, Thierry ULg

Conference (2008, January 18)

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or ... [more ▼]

In most pickup and delivery problems, usually the aim is to minimize either the trip length or duration or the fleet size. Transportation orders or customers are finite sets which should be performed or visited integraly. So, the total earning is supposed to be constant. Conversely, the costs related to trip length or duration or either to the fleet size are consequences of the operations management efficiency. Therefore, typically the objective function is reduced to a cost minimization. On the contrary, this model tends to maximize the global profit. Let’s consider a fleet of vehicles starting at different initial times from different locations and oblige to return to their final depots before fixed maximal times. On their way-back, these vehicles are performing full-truck-load transportation between pickup and delivery points and have to respect time windows for the loading and unloading operations. Realized transportation orders add positive contributions while linking paths generate costs. In summary, the goal for the fleet resides in the selection of transportations orders among available ones while fullfilling the final time requirements and the time restrictions for the un/loading operations. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 295 (24 ULg)
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See detailPolitiques d’approvisionnement dans les systèmes à plusieurs fournisseurs et Optimisation des décisions dans les chaînes logistiques décentralisées
Arda, Yasemin ULg

Doctoral thesis (2008)

Coordinating product flows between the partners of a supply chain is a difficult task because of random variations in demand and supply processes and the antagonistic nature of the individual economic ... [more ▼]

Coordinating product flows between the partners of a supply chain is a difficult task because of random variations in demand and supply processes and the antagonistic nature of the individual economic objectives of the partners. This study concentrates on the management of interorganizational product flows in supply chains. Two approaches are analyzed with the aim of improving performances of production/inventory systems controlled by base stock type product flow control policies. In the first approach, the effects of multi-supplier strategies on the performances of supply chains are studied. It is shown that a multi-supplier strategy decreases the expected replenishment delay and the expected inventory holding and shortage costs. The second approach deals with the deviations from the set of supply chain optimal actions due to the decentralisation of decision rights in a two-stage supply chain. In the game theory framework, the partners play a two-stage game of the Stackelberg type. A coordination contract is proposed and it is shown that the optimal supply chain performance is achievable using the proposed contract. [less ▲]

Detailed reference viewed: 75 (13 ULg)