Special Issue

Intersections of intersubjectivity

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Introduction

Intersections of intersubjectivity

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Recent years have seen a growing interest in the study of subjectivity, as the linguisti-
c expression of speaker involvement through lexical, grammatical and/or constru-
cal choices (see Smith 2002, Athanasiadou, Canakis & Cornillie 2006, Cornillie &
Delbecque 2006, De Smet & Verstraete 2006, Visconti forthc.). Intersubjectivity, on
the other hand, has received little explicit attention in its own right so far, let alone
systematic definitions and operationalization criteria (but see Davidse et al. 2010).

Intersubjectivity and seemingly related notions such as interpersonal mean-
ing, appraisal, stance and metadiscourse appear frequently in cognitive-functional
accounts, as well as historical linguistic and more applied linguistic approaches.
These domains offer (partly) conflicting uses of 'intersubjectivity' and differ in the
overall scope of the concept and the phenomena that it covers. Traugott (2010),
from the perspective of grammaticalization research, is mainly interested in how
attention to the addressee’s social self is semantically encoded in constructions,
and largely restricts the process of intersubjectification to the (rare) emergence of
politeness markers, such as honorifics in Japanese (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 263–
276). Inspired by argumentation theory and building on Langacker’s Cognitive
Grammar framework, Verhagen (2005) sees intersubjectivity as the coordination
of cognitive systems between speakers and hearers, which is the very basis of dis-
course and a precondition for language use. Particular constructions profile this
coordination more than others, which makes them more intersubjective. Negation
patterns as well as adversative connectors are examples of intersubjective construc-
tions for Verhagen, whereas Traugott would classify the latter as (textually) subjec-
tive at most (cf. Traugott 2010). In more applied approaches such as Hunston &
Thompson (2000) and Hyland (2005), terms such as evaluation, appraisal, stance
and metadiscourse appear to cover both subjective and intersubjective notions
and may relate to lexis, grammatical patterns or to the more abstract function of
text organization. From this perspective, hedges, but also connectives, cohesion
devices and deixis can be covered by intersubjectivity.
Given the present terminological confusion, there is a need to come to terms with intersubjectivity and intersubjectification, parallel to De Smet and Verstraete’s (2006) study of subjectivity. This special issue brings together for the first time contributions from synchronic cognitive-functional and historical linguistics as well as more applied linguistic approaches. In this way we hope to go some way towards disentangling the current web of intertwined notions of intersubjectivity. Rather than focusing on the potentially conflicting views of these respective approaches, this special issue explicitly aspires to resolve part of the conceptual puzzle by cross-fertilization between them, and hopes to spark discussion on how to operationalize ‘intersubjectivity’ in linguistic research.

Contributors to this special issue, from their respective backgrounds, position themselves vis-à-vis a number of interlocking questions:

- Do we need intersubjectivity as a separate concept? If so, should we distinguish between different subtypes of intersubjectivity? As Brems (2011) and Ghesquière (2009, 2010) have suggested, one possible step in solving the existing conceptual confusion is to distinguish between (at least) two types of intersubjectivity, viz. textual and attitudinal intersubjectivity. In accordance with Traugott’s (1995: 47) own broad view of subjectification, which encompasses both a text-creating and an attitudinal component, intersubjectivity can be extended to include deictic meanings by which the speaker negotiates discourse referent tracking for the hearer. In other words, in a more encompassing view, combining different approaches, intersubjectivity then includes meanings focused not only on the social self and face of the hearer (Traugott & Dasher 2002), but also textual meanings negotiating discourse referent tracking by the speaker to the hearer.

- What are the boundaries between the notions of objectivity, subjectivity/subjectification and intersubjectivity/intersubjectification? Is subjectivity/subjectification a prerequisite for intersubjectivity/intersubjectification, as suggested by Traugott?

- Can and/or should ‘intersubjectivity’ be restricted to either the domain of lexis, grammatical constructions (cf. Traugott) or to the coordination of cognitive systems between discourse participants (cf. Verhagen)? Does the fact that authors define intersubjectivity vis-à-vis these levels preclude arriving at a reconciliation of their thoughts? (How) does the pragmatics/semantics distinction come into play?

- How can intersubjectivity be operationalized diachronically as a potential concomitant of linguistic change? Which parts of the grammar are recruited for intersubjectification?

- What semantic and/or formal parameters are there for intersubjective meaning? In keeping with Adamson (2000) and Company Company (2006) one might wonder if it involves such syntactic reflexes as leftward movement for instance.

The issue starts off with contributions by Traugott and Narrog, who look at (inter)subjectification in the context of grammaticalization. Theirs is followed by the contribution by Nuyts, which is primarily synchronic in nature. The last set of contributions, by Thompson and Adel, tackle intersubjectivity from a more applied angle.

After briefly summarizing her current views on intersubjectification, Elizabeth Traugott directs her attention towards the relation between intersubjectification and clause periphery. A number of authors working within the tradition instigated by Traugott’s earlier work have observed that intersubjective meanings tend to appear in the right periphery whereas subjective meanings typically occur in the left periphery. In her paper, Traugott addresses this directionality issue from a diachronic perspective, focusing on the development of turn-giving or agreement-seeking uses of markers. Corpus studies of of no doubt and surely show that whereas the directionality claims capture general tendencies, the correlation between subjectivity and left periphery on the one hand and between intersubjectivity and right periphery on the other hand does not always hold. The author also suggests other operationalization criteria for (inter)subjectification which apply to response-eliciting strategies.

Heiko Narrog takes Traugott’s understanding of intersubjectivity as his starting-point, but on the basis of research on modality and mood in English and Japanese he proposes that the existing notion is in need of elaboration and refinement. The case studies he presents all provide evidence of shifts whereby main clause modal or mood marking is integrated in the formation of complex sentences. The author argues that such shifts entail not only intersubjectification, as the resulting constructions serve to accommodate the addressee’s point of view, but also a shift towards the textual component of language, as they serve to connect propositions. Narrog hence proposes to distinguish between three main types of semantic change, namely speaker-orientation (which more or less correlates with Traugott’s understanding of subjectification), hearer-orientation (correlating with intersubjectification) and discourse-orientation. All three changes constitute what the author terms speech-act orientation.

Jan Nuyts understands intersubjectivity in terms of the way in which meaning is represented, i.e. as shared between a speaker and hearer or not, rather than the way in which it is coded. He illustrates this by means of a case study of modal constructions. He argues that the various notions to do with intersubjectivity
proposed in the literature so far are not interchangeable, but may partially be used alongside one another in accounting for different aspects of one and the same linguistic phenomenon.

**Geoff Thompson**, from an applied linguistic perspective, sees intersubjectivity as a discoursal phenomenon with the text as its main habitat. By means of a case study of two contrasting sets of UK newspaper articles, he shows how intersubjective choices from different linguistic subsystems are exploited to interact dialogistically with their intended audience and create a specific reader and writer-in-the-text.

**Annele Ådel** approaches the notion of intersubjectivity from the perspective of English for Academic Purposes (EAP), a field where the non-objective nature of written discourse has long been recognized. In her article, she investigates the use of the second person pronoun you in spoken and written academic discourse. This pronoun is mostly treated as a so-called ‘engagement marker’, endorsing the relation between the writer/speaker and the reader/hearer, and hence as an intersubjective marker par excellence. Ådel takes issue with this undifferentiated account, and arrives at a more fine-grained typology, which pays heed to the surrounding context in which the pronoun functions. It is shown that not all instances of you can be rubricated as intersubjective, and that they fulfill a variety of discourse functions.

This special issue concludes with a paper by the guest editors. In it we offer our views on intersubjectivity and intersubjectification and link these back to ideas put forward in the other contributions from different domains. We propose to define intersubjectivity independently from subjectivity and argue for different subtypes of intersubjectivity, i.e. attitudinal, responsive and textual intersubjectivity. In addition, we assess the possibility of defining systematic formal correlates of intersubjective meaning as well as the necessity of intersubjectivity developing unidirectionally from subjectivity.

**References**


Intersubjectification and clause periphery

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Ways of identifying subjectification and especially intersubjectification are discussed using data from the history of English no doubt and surely. These adverbs arose out of non-modal expressions and were recruited for use as epistemic adverbs and metadiscursive markers. The data are shown not to support the hypothesis that expressions at left periphery are likely to be subjective (oriented toward turn-taking and discourse coherence), those at right periphery intersubjective (oriented toward turn-giving or elicitation of response, and toward the Addressee’s stance and participation in the communicative situation.). While no doubt is subjective at both left and right periphery, surely is intersubjective at both peripheries.

1. Introduction*

In recent years there has been extensive discussion of possible correlations between position in the clause or intonation unit and expressions with subjective and intersubjective meanings. Much of the discussion has been language specific, but a few attempts have been made to develop cross-linguistic hypotheses. One such attempt is:

Expressions at left periphery are likely to be subjective, those at right periphery intersubjective (Beeching, Degand, Detges, Traugott, and Waltereit 2009)

The hypothesis assumes a basically asymmetric view of the clause. On this view, the left periphery (LP) characteristically hosts discourse-coherence markers such as topic and topicalization markers. It also hosts turn-taking functions in which the Speaker takes the floor, thus preempting talk for the “ego”. By contrast, the right periphery (RP) expresses Addressee-oriented interpersonal turn-giving functions in which the Speaker pays attention to the “alter”, cedes a turn, etc. The hypothesis encompasses linguistic expressions that are both “internal” and “external” to the clause. In the first case, (inter)subjective expressions may coincide with predicate
and argument structure elements at the periphery or “edge” of the proposition. For example, Detges and Waltereit (2011) argue that in French, tonic stress on the subject may have different meanings at LP and RP. At LP it serves anaphoric and contrastive functions, i.e. links with prior discourse (1a), while at RP it may comment on what has been said, but essentially opens up a turn (1b).

(1)  
(a) French  
Moi, je ne sais pas.  
‘[As for me] I don’t know’  
(b) Je ne sais pas, moi  
‘I don’t know’ [I am skeptical] (Detges and Waltereit 2011)

(Inter)subjective expressions that are “external” to the proposition precede or follow it. Degand and Fagard (2011) show that in French conversation alors marks a topic-shift at LP (2) while at RP it marks a conclusion and request for confirmation (3):

(2)  
et euh / elle a grandi et puis elle commence un/ elle commence un petit peu à parler // alors elle dit euh // elle dit doudou pour tout ce qu’elle aime  
‘and er / she grew up and then she starts a / she starts to talk a little // alors she says er / she says “doudou” for all the things she likes’  
(Degand and Fagard 2011:36)

(3)  
L1 ben oui je pense bien  
L2 ah il y avait des chambres inoccupées alors  
L1 ouais ouais  
‘L1 well yes I think so. L2 oh there were unoccupied rooms alors. L1 yeah yeah’ (Degand and Fagard 2011:48)

In either case, the hypothesis predicts that from a historical perspective expressions recruited to LP are likely to undergo subjectification, while those recruited to RP are likely to undergo intersubjectification. In this paper I test the hypothesis with reference to the development of two modal adverbs of certainty (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007) in English: no doubt and surely. In Present Day English both may be used clause-medially, where they have an epistemic modal function, and clause-externally, i.e. “outside” the proposition, where they both serve metadiscursive functions in the sense of expressing Speaker’s stance toward the proposition in the “core” of the clause (subjective). In addition, surely may seek agreement from the Addressee (intersubjective). Both adverbs counterexemplify the asymmetric hypothesis, but do so in different ways. This suggests that, as noted in Detges and Waltereit (2011) and Degand and Fagard (2011), the hypothesized correlation between subjectivity and LP, and intersubjectivity and RP is robust, but not deterministic.

2.  
Intersubjectification

In my view intersubjectification is a process of change. It is the development of markers that encode the Speaker’s (or Writer’s) attention to the cognitive stances and social identities of the Addressee (Traugott 2003:124). These markers arise out of expressions with non-intersubjective meanings. The intersubjective meaning is typically one of the polysemes of a multifunctional expression.

Similarly, subjectification is a process of change giving rise to expressions of the Speaker’s beliefs, and stance toward what is said (see Traugott 2010a; papers in Davidsd, Vandelanotte, and Cuyckens 2010). (Inter)subjectification as processes of change that result in the development of expressions needs to be distinguished from (inter)subjectivity, in other words from the ambient contexts of Speaker-Addressee interaction that are the locus of linguistic change and to which linguistic change contributes. In other words, -ation needs to be distinguished from -ify, even though grammars are flexible and it may not always be possible to determine when a change has taken place.

To anticipate possible confusion, it should be noted that my views of (inter)subjectification focus on semasiological developments, that is, on meaning shifts over time. I therefore address a different question from Langacker, since he is concerned with cognitive profiling by a conceptualizer (Speaker/Hearer), especially in connection with subjectification (e.g. Langacker 1990, 2006; papers in Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie 2006). However, our perspectives on subjectification intersect (see De Smet and Verstraete 2006). López-Cousso (2010) provides an excellent overview of different perspectives on (inter)subjectification, primarily from a European-American point of view. Onodera (2004) and Onodera and Suzuki (2007) provide detailed accounts of Japanese perspectives on (inter)subjectification. Since the right edge of the clause is rich in pragmatic markers in Japanese and many other Asian languages these languages call into question many generalizations based on European languages.
If we consider which functions of language are most likely to mark the Speaker's attention to the intersubjective “face” of the interlocutors, these are likely to be of at least two types. One is related mainly to politeness (encoding of the Speaker’s appreciation and recognition of the Addressee’s social status, Jucker Forthcoming), the other mainly to metadiscursive functions such as turn-giving or elicitation of response, though these two functions clearly overlap at certain points in a linguistic system. The extent to which expressions are recruited in a language to serve politeness functions is highly dependent on social norms (see Onodera 2007, Nevala 2010). Most European languages have a range of politeness (and confrontation) formulae, such as please (< 'if it please you'), you fool!, and a range of “hedging” markers which signal that the Speaker thinks the upcoming text may be socially sensitive in some way (see Jucker 1997 on the history of well in English). Most languages also have a range of taboo vocabulary. In a few languages, such as Japanese, there is in addition a highly nuanced system of Addressee honorifics used to express (non)intimacy with respect to the Addressee. Here lexical items for eating or food may come to be used as indexes of attention being paid to the Addressee, whether or not that individual is referred to in the predicate-argument structure (for an overview, see Traugott and Dasher 2002: Chapter 6).

My focus here is on the type of intersubjective marking involved in the use of expressions to signal agreement-seeking or turn-giving in metalinguistic ways as the discourse unfolds. To date, unlike politeness markers, these have not been singled out as expressions highly subject to socio-cultural ideologies (though they presumably intersect with them). Such metadiscursive uses are of course often hard to identify in earlier historical texts since these are all written. However, data from trials, plays, conversation in novels, and letters tend to represent language relatively close to speech, and can be excellent resources for investigation of such metadiscursive uses (Culpeper and Kytö 2010). I take the position here that if uptake by another interlocutor appears on a regular basis in such texts, then the marker is being used intersubjectively. Surely, discussed in the next section, is an example.

One difficulty in assessing whether a particular expression has been intersubjectified is that most metadiscursive intersubjective markers are multifunctional. Furthermore, they have usually gone through several stages of change from more to less referential meanings. Consider, for example, tag questions. These are a reduced form of questions. On the one hand they can be used to ask a genuine informational question requiring a Yes or No answer. On the other they may have metadiscursive functions. While use of tags for genuine requests for information are rare in Present Day English, in earlier English this function is more widely attested. Using the LION English Drama Collection, Hoffmann (2006: 16) cites:

(4) VVitte('Wit'): Madame stande to your promyse if I wynne I am sped, Am I not?
Science: Yea trulye. (1570 Anonymous (Moralities): The Mariage of Witte and Science)

(5) Cry: Well sir, youle see me considered, will you not?
Pist: I marry will I, why what lighter painit can there be, then consideration. (1592 Anonymous (Elizabethan): Solymon and Perseda)

These tags have not undergone intersubjectification because they do not differ semantically or pragmatically from their source structures. Being questions that seek information, they are intersubjective from the beginning. Most of the tags Hoffmann cites are not information questions, but metadiscursive ones. Some are subjectified expressions in that they express the Speaker’s attitude (solidarity, disapproval) toward something that has been said; they do not invite a response, e.g. (6) (from Hoffman 2001:16):

(6) Oh! what, you are asleep, are you? — I’ll waken you, with a vengeance.
(Knocks with his heel.) (1770 Isaac Bickerstaff: 'Tis Well it’s no Worse)

The rise of what Holmes (1983) calls “facilitative” tags that invite the Addressee to contribute to the discourse (7), and of what Algeo (1988) calls “peremptory” tags that are designed to close off discourse (8), appears to be fairly recent. In (7) the teacher knows the answer and seeks only to involve the student, in (8) Kathleen (unsuccessfully) prompts closure of the topic (examples from Tottie and Hoffmann 2006: 301):

(7) Teacher: Right, it’s two isn’t it?
Pupil: Mn. (BNC-SDEM)

(8) Kathleen: How old’s your mum and dad?
Unknown: (laughs)
Kathleen: He don’t know neither.
Unknown: They’re in their forties anyway, I think.
Enid: That’s what I said.
Kathleen: Well, we come to that conclusion, didn’t we?
Unknown: Me dad’s think me dad’s forty seven. Me mum’s about forty three, forty four. (BNC-SDEM)

Tottie and Hoffmann (2006) compare the use of question tags in British and American spoken English as exemplified in the spoken component of the BNC and in the Longman Spoken American Corpus and find that only 3% of tags are informational questions. While tags are used in spoken British English nine times
more frequently than in spoken American speech, 50% of American English tags are facilitative, but in British English only 36% are. In both varieties only 1% are peremptory. The remainder are subjective uses. In sum, tag questions show that not all turn-givers are intersubjectified. Tags that ask informational questions are intersubjective but not intersubjectified. Intersubjectified expressions are pragmatic and mediascursive, a part of the interpersonal functions of communicative grammar.

Another instructive domain is that of contrastive clause markers that mark countereexpectation, such as concessives. These are best understood as involving a dialogic viewpoint (see Schwenter 2000, drawing on e.g. Roulet 1984, Ducrot 1984, 1996, Verhagen 2005, Traugott 2010b) since they juxtapose states of affairs, whether introduced by another interlocutor or by the Speaker (treating her- or himself as another interlocutor, as in working an argument through, or in free indirect speech). Verhagen (2005) analyzes causal, concessive and contrastive connectives like but, as well as negatives like not, as intersubjective because they contribute to construal management and attempt to ensure that the interlocutor makes correct inferences. However, this leaves little room for the kinds of interactional, mediascursive uses that many of these connectives develop in various languages. If causal and conditional meanings are intersubjective in Verhagen's sense, then they are considerably less so than the later mediascursive uses. Usually causal and conditional meanings are considered to be subjective. Degand and Fagard (2011) for example, discuss the fact that in contemporary French alors has three primary meanings: temporal, causal, and interactional (see also Hansen 2005). Derived from Latin illa hora 'at that hour', in Old French the expression was used as a connective in constructions of the form p alors q, signaling that the reference time of q is dependent on p. In the thirteenth and fourteenth century examples begin to appear with causal and then conditional meanings, and in the twentieth century with mediascursive uses, such as shifts to new topics, or turn-taking signals. Degand and Fagard (2011) treat the shift of temporal alors to causal and conditional connectives as instances of subjectification (Speaker conceptualizes p, q in terms of cause or condition). They suggest that at left periphery alors is subjective and connects to prior discourse, but utterance-finally alors may be used to request confirmation (see also Hansen 1997: 182), an intersubjective use:

(9) L1: alors j'avais trois ans depuis trois ans / et j'en vais avoir quatre-vingt-deux
   alors I was 3 years since 3 years / and I will be 82
L2: ça fait quatre-vingt ans que tu habites ici alors?
  You've been living here for 80 years alors?
L1: oui oui depuis quatre-vingt-ans que j’habite ici
  yes yes since 80 years that I live here

Intersubjective uses of alors are further discussed in Degand (2011), in which it is shown that in conversation (but not in writing) alors may be used turn-initially, i.e. at LP in the same way as it is used turn-finally: to facilitate a response, as in (9).

Like Degand and Fagard, I consider mediascursive, interaction-seeking uses of an expression to be intersubjective, not those that present alternative viewpoints. In other words I distinguish dialogic from dialogal orientations (Schwenter 2000). Markers of dialogal orientation signal the extent to which Speakers contest, refute, or build an argument toward alternative or different conclusions (e.g. but, epistemic modal in fact, and, as will be discussed below, some uses of no doubt). I take them to be oriented toward the Speaker's perspective (contra Verhagen 2005). Markers of dialogal orientation, on the other hand, signal the extent to which turn-taking is facilitated (e.g. facilitating and peremptory question tags, uses of alors at right periphery, and, as will be discussed below, some uses of surely). They are oriented toward the Addressee's stance and participation in the communicative situation.

3. A case study comparing no doubt and surely

I take as my case study the development of modals adverbs no doubt and surely at LP and RP. These are among twenty-two epistemic adverbs of certainty that Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007) list. Of these certainly is the most frequent. It is also the highest on the scale of certainty, while no doubt and surely are weaker, closer to adverbs of probability. Of this class, which they call "surely adverbs", Biber and Finegan say:

'... they serve to invite affirmation and to seclude certain assertions from polite dispute ... By presenting information as if it were obvious, Speakers encourage its acceptance and minimize the need for supporting evidence. (Biber and Finegan 1988: 19)'

Biber and Finegan do not distinguish among adverbs of certainty, nor do they comment on differences in meaning that depend on position. They do, however, treat them as "stance adverbs". For Biber 'stance' refers to "personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments, or assessments" (Biber et al. 1999: 966), a primarily subjective perspective. On the other hand, Englebretson (2007) refers to "stance-taking" as interactional position-taking actively engaged in by language users as
they communicate with each other. Here “taking” implies activity, negotiation, and Englebretson’s is a mainly intersubjective interpretation of stance, highlighting Speakers’ attention to Addressee. My approach is largely consistent with Englebretson’s, but with focus on change.

For purposes of discussion of no doubt and surely, LP and RP are understood to be external to the proposition, i.e. to the clausal predicate-argument structure. The total range of slots available and the constraints on their order at either LP or RP in English remains to be investigated. However, it appears that at LP the two adverbs may follow interjections and connectives like why, and, but, and that, and immediately precede topic-shifters, as in (10):

(10) but surely as far as developers are concerned, wrong answers are a valuable as correct answers when … (http://www.studiosoft.co.uk, accessed July 18th 2011)

Sources of data used here are MED, the Helsinki Corpus (1510–1710), and CLMETEV (1710–1920). The Helsinki Corpus contains data from a large range of text types and is approximately one and a half million words long; it is divided into three sections of equal length, the dates for which are 1500–1570, 1570–1640, and 1640–1710. CLMETEV is based largely on literary texts and totals just under fifteen million words. It is divided into three sections: 1710–1780 (about three million words), 1780–1850 (about five and three quarter million words), and 1850–1920 (about six and a quarter million words).

3.1 No doubt and surely in Present Day English

Discussing data from ICE-GB and FLOB, Simon-Vandenbergen (2007) analyzes no doubt in Present Day British English in terms not only of epistemic certainty but also of rhetorical stance. She notes that it is rare at RP. Here it may be used as an “afterthought. Its perfunctory character is emphasized by its very frequent occurrence in a syntactically incomplete sentence” (subversion, no doubt) (p. 14). She suggests that in this position it may imply “high degree of predictability”, hence ridicule, sarcasm ([re dinner] At the Chelsea Kitchen again, no doubt) (p. 17). It is often used with a following but-clause (it was a shocking thing no doubt, but… where it concedes the truth “in order to posit the counter-argument in a context of dialogic argumentation” (p. 16) and may convey more certainty than other contexts (p. 30).

In several papers, Downing analyzes surely in Present Day British English, both spoken (e.g. 2001 on use with personal pronouns) and as it is represented in crime fiction (2009). Some uses identified are primarily subjective, most notably what she calls an “evidentiality marker” use that indexes the state of the Speaker’s knowledge,2 and a “mirative” use, which marks the Speaker’s coming into awareness, at the moment of speaking, of a “state of affairs of which the SP was up to then unaware” (Downing 2001:277). There are also strongly intersubjective uses. One is a challenging, “fighting word” use (Oh you CAN grate the cheese surely), that Downing finds mainly with second person pronouns (p.265), and that disfavors medial position. The other use seeks agreement or corroboration (Surely he must be worried?) (p.268). Downing finds this meaning associated mainly with first person plural, and third person pronoun subjects. This “agreement-seeking” use is the one most often identified with surely (see e.g. Greenbaum 1969, Biber and Finegan 1988, Swan 1988). The intersubjective uses are exemplified in the literature with surely at both LP and RP.

3.2 No doubt and surely in the history of English

Historically, no doubt and surely are borrowings from French around 1300. Both were used as strong adverbs of certainty in the first few centuries, but by 1710 there is some evidence that both adverbs had undergone weakening, mainly at LP, to ‘probably’. This is part of a general semantic shift involving adverbs of certainty identified in González-Álvarez (1996) and Wierzbicka (2006), and tested in Bromhead (2009). Wierzbicka (2006) attributes the change to a cultural shift in Britain from belief in truth and faith to the search for empirical evidence. However, it should be noted that certainly and undoubtedly were barely affected by this change and are far less multifunctional than no doubt and surely. Indeed, certainly increased dramatically in frequency after other adverbs of certainty weakened or were lost.

Both no doubt and surely are attested at LP. Medially, and in Response from the beginnings, but neither appears at RP until the early eighteenth century, and then only rarely. In CLMETEV no doubt appears at RP in only 3.5% of the instances in the first period, rising to 13.5% in the second part and to just under 15% in the third. Surely appears at RP in less than 2% of the instances in the first period, 2.5 % in the second period, and under 7% in the third. The figures from the third period are relatively consistent with contemporary data. Simon-Vandenbergen and Ajmer (2007) find that uses of no doubt at RP are 4% in ICE-GB and 13% in FLOB. Downing (2001) finds that 6% of surely used with pronoun subjects appear at RP in BNC.

No doubt derives from French sans doute ‘without fear, with certainty’, and ultimately from Latin dubitare ‘to waver’. It is originally not an adverb but an NP, used in a formula such as It is/I have no doubt (that/but):
"A bystander often sees more of the game than those that play," answered (15). Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has more probability than the common hypothesis. But if we consider, on the other hand … (1779 Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion)

No doubt also appears in concessive argumentation, a subjective use which has become a weaker epistemic and is used intersubjectively. It has not developed distinctly intersubjective meanings in any position. Although also an adverb of certainty, surely has had a rather different history. In earlier texts it is used as an epistemic modal. As such it is higher on the epistemic scale than no doubt, and is roughly equivalent to verify, as in (18):

"Surely they shall not see the land which I swear unto their fathers. (1611 King James Bible [HC ceotest2])"

It may also be used to seek agreement, as in (19), which comes from a letter to his daughter by Sir Thomas More when he was imprisoned for treason. Like (14) it illustrates epistemic linking use. Unlike in (14), which is also second person address, up-take appears to be expected — More implies he desires an acknowledgement or even an answer such as ‘I will be strong for you’:

"Surely Megge a fainter hearte than thy fraile father hath, canst thou not haue. (?1537 More, Correspondence [HC cepriv1])"

There are also examples of the use of surely in challenges:

(20) Pray oblige her ladyship. She is your guest surely, sir, you may be freest with your dutiful wife. (1740 Richardson, Pamela)

In CLMETEV I there is an example of surely used in a concessive argument:

(21) there needs nothing more to give a strong presumption of falsehood. Yes, reply I, here are metaphysics surely; but they are all on your side. (1751 Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals)

This is consistent with its early uses as a high certainty adverb, but there are none in the later periods, when surely has become a weaker epistemic and is used increasingly for intersubjective agreement-seeking and challenging. Over time there...
is evidence of increased use of surely for managing interpersonal expectations, particularly for seeking uptake/corroboration by the Addressee, often that something is not true or will not happen. Typically the clause is marked as a question intonationally (by '?'), yet not by syntactic inversion:

(22) "But, you won't take advantage of me, surely, Sir Arthur?" said Mr. Case. 
(1796–1801 Edgeworth, *The Parent's Assistant*)

As a modal adverb, no doubt is essentially oriented inward to the Speaker's inferences and arguments (hence it would be unsuitable in (18)), while surely is essentially oriented outward to the Addressee (hence its unsuitability in concessives). The different orientations are very clear in:

(23) Whereupon, he wished me a good morning and withdrew, disconcerted and offended, no doubt, but surely it was not my fault. (1848 A. Brontë, *The Tenant of Wildfell Hall*)

In (23) while no doubt conveys 'as I think/grant, surely conveys 'please agree with me. Both no doubt and surely underwent subjectification with respect to their original meanings. Surely was further intersubjectified. No doubt is subjective and internally oriented at both LP and RP, while surely may be intersubjective and externally oriented at both LP and RP.

The hypothesis that there is an asymmetry between LP and RP may be globally correct in that LP favors subjective elements, while RP favors intersubjective ones, but the pair of adverbs discussed here confirms that the asymmetry is not categorical. Furthermore, modality can be expressed at either edge. Hansen (2005) shows that French enfin may appear at LP as an intersubjective metadiscursive marker, and Degand (2011) that alors may do so likewise. It should be noted, however, that in these cases intersubjective uses at LP developed late, mainly in conversation, and are very infrequent. This suggests that LP may be somewhat marked for intersubjective uses of expressions.

4. Intersubjectification and grammaticalization

In Traugott (1995) I suggested that the development of discourse markers such as indeed, in fact, and actually at LP (where they serve a reformulation function) out of more concrete expressions is a case of grammaticalization. In 1995 I defined discourse markers narrowly, as expressions of sequential relations that link the upcoming clause to the prior one (see Fraser 1988). Since then it has become clear that a large number of pragmatic linkers including those that have the metadiscursive function of agreement-seeking, have undergone similar histories. The main reason for my proposal that the development of discourse markers/modal linkers is an instance of grammaticalization is that, like modal and aspectual auxiliaries or case markers, they initially derive from referential expressions. As epistemic adverbs they acquire partly "procedural" functions. That is they are abstract, schematic expressions that cue how the Speaker conceptualizes relationships within the clause and between clauses, and how the Addressee is to interpret the clause. When epistemic adverbs are recruited to LP or RP as epistemic linkers, they retain some modal characteristics, but are also used in ways that are even more abstract and "procedural" than epistemic adverbs. Since grammaticalization is essentially a process by which more contentful, referential material becomes more schematic and non-referential, cueing the Addressee to the relationships between elements in a clause and to the Speaker's perspective on what is said, it can be thought of as the development of procedural functions. This view of grammaticalization regards it as functional change, and privileges expansion (Himmelmann 2004).

However, several scholars, starting with Erman and Kotsinas (1993) and Aijmer (1996) have argued that the development of discourse and other pragmatic markers is not a case of grammaticalization, but of pragmatization. This proposal in part reflects a different perspective on what grammaticalization is. Those who argue that the development of discourse markers is a case of grammaticalization assume that grammaticalization is primarily a functional change, i.e. about meaning and about the role of grammatical markers. Those who argue that the development of discourse markers is a case of pragmatization, not grammaticalization, assume that grammaticalization is a formal change, in which reduction and increase in dependency are defining characteristics (cf. Lehmann 1995, Haspelmath 2004). In many European languages pragmatic markers become less dependent (e.g. surely, no doubt, well, I think, and in fact may be intonationally disjunct in their function as pragmatic markers). This violates the criterion of grammaticalization as increased dependency, and so such markers are assumed not to be instances of grammaticalization. However, since many pragmatic markers with similar functions are clitics at RP in Japanese (see Onodera 2004) they do not violate increased dependency, which suggests that no cross-linguistic generalizations can be made about whether or not grammaticalization is involved.

The theoretical differences in perspective of proponents of grammaticalization as functional change on the one hand and as formal change on the other is discussed in Kiparsky (2012) and Traugott (2010c). As Kiparsky points out, these perspectives are in principle not contradictory because they ask different questions, one about how function changes, the other about how form changes. However, the proposal that the development is a case of pragmatization also in part reflects a profoundly different view of what grammar is. For proponents of pragmatization "grammar" is a term usually reserved for "core" structures, whereas in
my view “grammar” is communicative and covers the full range of expressions in a language (see also Di ewald 2011). In a recent issue of Linguistics (D egand and Simon-Vandenbergen 2011) a number of different researchers from different theoretical traditions and discussing different languages concluded that discourse markers (in the broad sense of pragmatic markers) involve grammaticalization and that pragmaticalization is not needed as a separate process. At best, it is a subclass of grammaticalization the members of which have primarily pragmatic meaning (Prévéost 2011).

From a functional perspective on grammaticalization, epistemic linkers are highly procedural grammatical markers. Since intersubjectification is the development of interpersonal meanings, it is strongly pragmatic in function. Those instances of intersubjectification that are paired with changes leading to expressions with procedural function intersect with grammaticalization. Other instances that are paired with changes leading to expressions with contentful function, such as taboo terms, intersect with lexical change.

5. Operationalizing subjectification and intersubjectification

One of the most difficult problems is how to find objective criteria for pragmatics in written corpora, absent information about prosody and absent the ability to ask interlocutors what they meant or to do experiments. Identifying subjectification and intersubjectification is particularly problematic because subjectivity and intersubjectivity are ambient in all communication. Torres Cacoullos and Schwenter (2007) suggested some criteria for subjectification in the specific case of the development of Old Spanish a pesar de ‘to the regret of’ > ‘in spite of’ > ‘although’ (concessive) in the context of que ‘that’. These criteria are increase in coreferentiality of an adnominal argument of a pesar de with the subject (entailing realignment of opposition from external to internal), development of subjunctive uses in the subordinate clause (entailing development association with irrealis meaning), and preposing of a pesar de (entailing scope increase). In the case of surely or no doubt operationalizing subjectification is somewhat easier. The question can be asked where the certainty is located: in a referent that serves as an argument of the proposition, or in the Speaker. In

(24) he who understands those principles … has always, in the darkest circumstances, a star in sight by which he may direct his course surely. (1829 Southey, Sir Thomas More)

surely is an adverb of manner ‘with certainty’ that is not subjectified, since he is the one who is sure in his actions, not the Speaker (who would be sure/infer that something is the case, not be sure/infer how to achieve something). The optimal paraphrase of (24) is (25a) not (25b):

(25) a. by which he may be sure/certain in directing his course
   b. by which I infer that he may direct his course.

Subjectification of surely can be identified with the appearance in texts of new uses such as (18), in which the Speaker’s perspective can or must be interpreted. Such interpretations are of course dependent on context, and on cues, when reliable, such as punctuation.4 In many cases, contexts larger than the immediate clause need to be taken into consideration (see Traugott Forthcoming).

In the case of intersubjectification as I define it, and as it has been applied here to the study of surely, a useful heuristic for identifying the development of intersubjective meaning is the appearance of uses that can be paraphrased as ‘and I hope/want you to agree/understand’. This differentiates it clearly from subjectification.

Another useful criterion, but by no means a necessary or sufficient one, is whether or not there is up-take (where such uptake is possible in a text). Examples of no doubt do not call for a response and normally do not get one. Indeed the Speaker often continues (not only in concessive examples with but but also in examples with conjunction, e.g. and in (16)). This has the effect of blocking off further discussion of the proposition over which no doubt scopes (see (14) in which Matilda does not wait for or seem to expect a response, but rather follows her comment with a question). On the other hand, surely seeks response and prototypically gets one if the Addressee is (presented as being) present. In the case of (23) the Addressee is the imagined reader, and therefore there is no response in the text, but in the case of (22) there is an Addressee and a response. (22) is repeated here in (26) with the beginning of the lengthy response it elicits:

(26) “But, you won’t take advantage of me, surely, Sir Arthur?” said Mr. Case, forgetting his own principles.
   “I shall not take advantage of you, as you would have taken of this honest man…”

See also (27) below. In sum, intersubjective markers, especially when used at RP, can be expected to elicit responses more readily than subjective ones. This criterion by hypothesis holds only for outcomes of intersubjectification that relate to turn-taking, specifically response-eliciting strategies. By hypothesis it is not useful for the kind of social deixis exhibited by Japanese polite styles, which is not related to turn-taking or -giving.
6. Conclusion and suggestions for further research

No doubt and surely arose out of non-modal expressions; they were recruited for use as epistemic adverbs and linkers. Use at RP is a relatively late development, and infrequent. As a modal linker no doubt is subjective at both LP and RP, meaning at first ‘I am sure that’ and later ‘I infer that’. Surely may likewise be subjective, but it may from early times be intersubjective at both LP and RP, meaning ‘I want you to agree’. Therefore no doubt and surely are further examples in addition to Tottie and Hoffmann’s (2006) on tags, and Hansen’s (2005) and Degand’s (2011) on French that counterexample the hypothesis that ‘Expressions at left periphery are likely to be subjective, those at right periphery intersubjective’. However, the hypothesis is stated only as a tendency. As a generalization covering many domains including information-structuring, connectives of various types, turn-takers and turn-givers, it appears to be robust.

This study brings to mind several topics for further research. One is that it seems likely that the correlations hold more strongly for some domains than others. Information-structuring may be more tightly correlated with subjective meanings at LP than more interactive discourse-management markers. A related research question is what counts as “periphery”, “edge” or indeed “initial” and “final”? It appears that the answer may differ depending on the domain investigated. For example, information-structuring markers tend to be aligned to the LP and RP of the proposition (the predicate and argument structure), as shown by Detges and Waltareit’s (2011) discussion of tonic (contrastive) stress on French subject pronouns, illustrated in (1). Topic-restricting markers such as as far as, as for when immediately followed by N have a similar function in English (see Rickford, Mendoza-Denton, Wasow, and Espinoza 1995 for the development of as far as N). A further question concerns what sequences specific “edge” phenomena may occur in. For example, no doubt and surely are LP of the clause, but they follow interjections, address forms, connectives like and, but, why, and that, and occasionally topicalized adverbs, e.g.:

(27) “But with your talents, boy, surely you are not going to throw away your chances of a great name?”

“I care nothing for a great name, father,” said John. “I shall win a greater victory than any that Parliament can give me.” (1897 Caine, The Christian)

They may precede metadiscursive inferential then as in:

(28) Surely then, when his honourable friend spoke of the calamities of St. Domingo … it ill became him to be the person to cry out for further importations! (1839 Clarkson, History of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade)

Although the corpus data do not attest such examples, it is easy to construct ones at RP that precede a tag, e.g. (22) could be modified as:

(29) “But, you won’t take advantage of me, surely, will you, Sir Arthur?”

Most importantly, cross-linguistic research of morphosyntactic phenomena at LP and RP needs to be done to determine how generalizable the findings from European languages are. For example, many Asian languages have a wide array of particles that have developed at RP. This appears to be an areal phenomenon, not a function of word order since it is true of both Japanese (an OV language) and Chinese (a VO language) (see e.g. Yap, Matthews, and Horie 2004). The asymmetric hypothesis discussed here contrasts with analyses of Japanese, in which a more symmetric “layered” model is often adopted. Subjective expressions are modeled in a layer outside of a propositional “core”, and intersubjective ones outside of the subjective layer, permitting both intersubjective and subjective elements to precede or follow the core, but with the intersubjective elements always on the farthest edge (Onodera 2004, Shinzato 2007, and papers in Onodera and Suzuki 2007). Indeed, initial position has been hypothesized to be “best for expressing not only subjectivity but also intersubjectivity” (Onodera 2007: 260).5

Notes

* Many thanks to two anonymous reviewers and especially to Liesbeth Degand for comments on an earlier version. Various aspects of this paper were presented in 2010 at the Universities of Hong Kong, Manchester, and Newcastle, and at the 4th Conference on Language, Discourse, and Cognition in Taipei, and in 2011 at the Workshop on Historical Pragmatics at Gakushuin University, Tokyo and the Pragmatics Association of Japan in Kyoto. I have benefited from discussion of the issues in these venues and especially with Noriko Onodera and Yuko Higashizumi.

1. This is not in itself a disadvantage. I have argued for degrees of subjectification, and there are doubtless degrees of intersubjectification. The problem is that Verhagen does not consider the types of metadiscursive markers discussed here.

2. State of knowledge is usually considered epistemic, however, while “evidentiality” is associated with source of knowledge (Aikhenvald 2004).

3. The term “procedural” derives from Blakemore (1987), but in adopting this term I do not also adopt Relevance Theory. In early work Blakemore made a sharp distinction between “conceptual” and “procedural” expressions, but subsequently the continuum between the two has been recognized (Nicolle 1998).
4. Since current punctuation practices developed only in the late eighteenth century, and have usually been imposed by editors on earlier texts, great caution must be used in relying on punctuation (see Moore 2011 on aspects of editing early English).

5. This is a revision of Onodera’s (2004) hypothesis that LP is associated with subjectivity in Japanese.

Sources

BNC. The British National Corpus, Spoken. 2005. Distributed by Oxford University Computing Services on behalf of the BNC Consortium.


References


Beyond intersubjectification
Textual uses of modality and mood in subordinate clauses as part of *speech-act orientation*

Heiko Narrog
Tohoku University

This paper discusses textual uses of modality and mood forms in English and Japanese and claims that they all represent a shift from subjective through intersubjective to the textual. As the shift towards textual function is difficult to define in terms of either subjectification or intersubjectification, it is suggested that shift towards the textual needs to be acknowledged as equal to the shift towards the subjective and the intersubjective. These three kinds of shifts are understood as together forming the larger tendency of change labeled as ‘speech-act orientation’. Furthermore, the cases discussed in this paper provide evidence for the fact that textual functions, which have often been conceived as an intermediate stage in change towards subjective and intersubjective elements, are in fact sometimes the endpoints of grammatical change, beyond subjective and intersubjective functions.

1. Introduction

1.1 Basic concepts

There are currently two main competing concepts of ‘subjectification’ in linguistics, one proposed by Langacker (1990, 1998), and another one proposed by Traugott (1995, 2003, 2010). In contrast, there is only one developed concept of intersubjectification, namely that by Traugott (2003, 2007, 2010), despite the fact that there are at least three competing concepts of intersubjectivity. But Verhagen’s (2005, 2007) notion of intersubjectivity has not yet been explored in its potential diachronic dimension, and Nuyts’s (2001a, b) concept of intersubjectivity is unlikely to ever have such a dimension (but see Nuyts this issue), since ‘intersubjectification’ in Nuyts’s sense would be the opposite of subjectification, and there is general consensus that subjectification is a well-attested and unidirectional tendency in semantic change.
Heiko Narrog posited a ‘textual’ component as an independent target of change. This and related
cannot be fully subsumed under the labels of either subjectification or intersubjec-
tion, and orientation towards the hearer (intersubjectification) already
that at least a third type of change must be acknowledged, namely orientation to-
exhaust the range of an increased speaker-orientation in a wide sense.

In my own writing on this topic, which has centered on the semantic and
grammatical domain of modality (Narrog 2005, 2007, 2010, to appear), I have
centered on Traugott’s concept of (inter)subjectification, in contrast to its
competitor, first and foremost for its solid empirical (bottom-up) instead of conceptu-
ist top-down) orientation (cf. Narrog 2010:392). By doing so, I also ac-
cepted Traugott’s stance that speech itself, and change, as an aspect of
it, are tilted towards (or centered on) the speaker, that is, speaker and hearer are
not total equals in language production. Nevertheless, I have preferred a more
loose way of speaking than Traugott, by choosing the term ‘speaker-orientation’
instead of the pair of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ (and correspondingly,
‘subjectification’ and ‘intersubjectification’). Speaker-orientation was defined as
orientation towards the speaker and the speech situation, potentially including
the hearer (Narrog 2005:685, 692). Its dynamicization would mean an increase of
speaker-orientation in a certain form or construction. One reason why I preferred
a more loose way of speaking than Traugott, by choosing the term ‘speaker-orientation’
instead of the pair of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ (and correspondingly,
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orientation towards the speaker and the speech situation, potentially including
the hearer (Narrog 2005:685, 692). Its dynamicization would mean an increase of
speaker-orientation in a certain form or construction. One reason why I preferred
a more loose way of speaking is that I found it unclear what would be concretely
involved in an increased orientation towards the speech situation. It is an open
question indeed whether the obvious speaker-orientation in a narrow sense (sub-
jectification), and orientation towards the hearer (intersubjectification) already
exhaust the range of an increased speaker-orientation in a wide sense.

The argument that I am presenting here is that it probably doesn’t. The idea is
that at least a third type of change must be acknowledged, namely orientation to-
dards speech, i.e. discourse or text, itself. This orientation towards discourse itself
cannot be fully subsumed under the labels of either subjectification or intersubjec-
tification, unless these concepts are taken in an extremely broad sense.

There are predecessors to this kind of thinking. First of all, concerning the ne-
necessity of a textual dimension, Traugott herself, at an earlier stage of her thinking,
posited a ‘textual’ component as an independent target of change. This and related
research will be the topic of the next section. Secondly, especially since Herring
(1991), there have been hints in the literature that there is change towards ‘textual’
elements, especially in the formation of complex sentence structures, that may
even involve a decrease in ‘subjectivity’ as it is usually understood.1 This is an issue
that in my view has not yet been resolved in Traugott’s line of research. I suggest
that (re-)establishing a textual dimension that can go beyond subjectification and
even intersubjectification, as shown in this paper, may be the appropriate remedy
for this issue.

1.2 Textual/discourse-orientation

In 1989, Traugott proposed three major tendencies of semantic change. These are,

(1) Tendency I: Meanings based in the external described situation > meanings
   based in the internal (evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) described situation
(2) Tendency II: Meanings based in the external or internal described situation
   > meanings based in the textual and metalinguistic situation
(3) Tendency III: Meanings tend to become increasingly based in the speaker’s
   subjective belief state/attitude towards the proposition (Traugott 1989:34–5)

These three tendencies presuppose a layering of speech into three domains, namely
a propositional domain, including both external and internal described situa-
tions, a textual domain and an interpersonal domain. They represent the culmina-
tion of a stage in Traugott’s thinking on semantic change that was first formulated
even more daringly and straightforwardly as the following unidirectional chain of
meaning shifts.

(4) propositional > textual > expressive (cf. Traugott 1982:253, 256)

As is well-known, this presumptive shift between domains (or ‘components’) of
language was inspired by the distinction of an ‘ideational’ vs. ‘textual’ vs. ‘interper-
sonal’ component of clause structure in Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar.

Traugott’s (1989) Tendency I can also be perceived as a case of subjectifica-
tion, but if so, it mostly concerns lexical meanings. Therefore, it did not play a
major role in later writings on (inter)subjectification, whose focus was mostly on
grammar. Likewise, for some reason, Tendency II receded into the background in
Traugott’s later writings and the main stream of research in this area. It tempo-
arily became part of the definition of subjectification as “the tendency to recruit
lexical material for purposes of creating text and indicating attitudes in discourse
situations” (Traugott 1995:47). One can find it mentioned indirectly in Traugott
& Dasher (2002), when they refer to “explicit markers of SP/W attitude to the re-
lationship between what precedes and what follows, i.e. to the discourse structure;
many aspects of discourse deixis are included here” as one factor of ‘subjectivity’ (not subjectification) (ibid.: 23). Furthermore, when reviewing Tendency II in the same book (ibid.: 96), ‘subjectification’ is mentioned as being involved in this tendency. However, as Traugott & Dasher state immediately afterwards (ibid.: 96), “Tendency III is the dominant tendency”. Thus, it was Tendency III, concerning core areas of grammar, which took center-stage, and became practically equivalent to the concept of ‘subjectification’. That the former Tendency II is now subsumed under it can also be seen in the description of connectives in Section 2 of Traugott’s contribution to this volume. Later, Traugott (2003) proposed the tendency of intersubjectification, which is not an additional tendency, but essentially a further elaboration on and specification of Tendency III. The reason was that Traugott turned her attention to the observation that Halliday’s ‘interpersonal’ (her ‘expressive’) function had both a speaker- and a hearer-oriented aspect (cf. Traugott 2010: 31, 60). This was in fact already noticed much earlier by Heine et al. (1991: 190–1) but Traugott did not focus on this issue yet at that time.

The question addressed in this paper is whether Tendency III, comprising subjectification and intersubjectification, indeed covers ‘increased speaker-orientation’, or whether there is more to it. I am specifically concerned here with the development of discourse-, or text-oriented functions of forms and constructions, which featured in Traugott’s former Tendency II. It will be investigated whether Tendency II can indeed be considered simply as part of the ‘(inter)subjectification’ parcel.

At least three scholars have voiced similar concerns before. Breban (2006: 259–63), analyzing the development of adjectives of comparison in English, suggested that a ‘textual’ element is an important and indispensable part of changes associated with subjectification. However, unlike the stance taken in this paper, she argued for a broader definition of subjectification that would explicitly include the “creation of text”. Ghesquière (2010) advocated a return to Traugott’s (1982) chain of meaning shifts, which include the textual function, but argued for a further differentiation of both the ‘textual’ and the ‘expressive’ component into ‘subjective’ and ‘intersubjective’. Furthermore, Visconti (to appear) advocates a separation of the development of textual functions from subjectification as part of an effort to narrow down the definition of subjectification to the semantic shift from propositional to non-propositional meaning. According to her, the development of textual functions, in contrast, typically belongs to a later stage in grammaticalization, since the acquisition of textual functions is typical for higher textual units.

The hypothesis pursued in this paper is that the acquisition of discourse-regulating or ‘textual’ meanings and functions is not a sub-tendency of subjectification, contrasting with intersubjectification, nor is it superordinate to subjectification and intersubjectification, but it rather constitutes a tendency on equal standing to subjectification and intersubjectification. In particular, I suggest that the data presented in the following sections show that at least some of the ‘textual’ meanings are more closely related to ‘intersubjective’ than to ‘subjective’ meanings. It may eventually turn out that these ‘textual’ meanings as a whole are indeed best to be subsumed under either ‘subjectification’ or ‘intersubjectification’, but it seems to me that this would be a premature conclusion at the present point and more research on the place of ‘textual’ meanings in semantic change is required.

The proposal made here, presented in the last row of Table 1, is to acknowledge three types of changes that form part of a larger tendency that I wish to label as ‘speech-act orientation’ (rather than simply ‘speaker-orientation’ in a broad sense, as I did previously). Furthermore, I am suggesting to keep these three kinds of changes apart and treat them on an equal basis, at least until their mutual relationship is really clarified.

### Table 1. Subjectification and related changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Type of change</th>
<th>Change toward the textual</th>
<th>Change toward the expressive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traugott (1989)</td>
<td>Change toward internally described situation</td>
<td>change toward the textual situation</td>
<td>change toward the expressive (→ subjectification, intersubjectification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breban (2006), (Traugott (1995–))</td>
<td>subjectification</td>
<td>(change toward the textual + ‘narrow’ subjectification)</td>
<td>intersubjectification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghesquière (2010)</td>
<td>Change toward internally subjective meanings</td>
<td>Change toward the textual (both subjective and intersubjective)</td>
<td>Change toward the expressive (both subjective and intersubjective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This paper</td>
<td>speaker-orientation (subjectification)</td>
<td>discourse/text-orientation</td>
<td>hearer-orientation (intersubjectification)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the row summarizing Traugott’s (1989) ideas, subjectification and intersubjectification are kept in brackets because Traugott did not use these terms yet, but later (2010: 31) explained that the ‘expressive’ (‘interpersonal’) element stood for both subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Breban’s (2006) stance probably corresponds to Traugott’s own stance of (1995) and later, but this is not entirely clear because in 1995 Traugott did not yet have the categories of intersubjectivity and intersubjectification and later it was not explicit part of her definition of subjectification.

The proposal made here, presented in the last row of Table 1, is to acknowledge three types of changes that form part of a larger tendency that I wish to label as ‘speech-act orientation’ (rather than simply ‘speaker-orientation’ in a broad sense, as I did previously). Furthermore, I am suggesting to keep these three kinds of changes apart and treat them on an equal basis, at least until their mutual relationship is really clarified.
1.3 The place for textual/discourse-orientation

One likely reason for the backgrounding of the ‘textual’ element in Traugott’s writing on (inter)subjectification is that its place in relation to subjectification and intersubjectification became uncertain. This particularly concerns the ordering of changes. Initially, Traugott’s hypothesis confidently foresaw unidirectional change from the ‘textual’ to the ‘expressive’ (subjective/intersubjective), as in the following quote:

“If there occurs a meaning-shift which, in the process of grammaticalization, entails shifts from one functional-semantic component to another, then such a shift is more likely to be from propositional through textual to expressive than in the reverse direction.” (Traugott 1982:256)

An example given by Traugott for shift from ‘textual’ to ‘expressive’ is the shift from ‘identifying –self’ to ‘exclusive –self’, expressing some degree of ‘remarkability’ in Indo-European (ibid.). The most typical textual markers, of course, are connectives, that is, adverbs and conjunctions serving to indicate logical relations between clauses or parts of discourse, which in English are normally recruited from the ‘propositional’ domain (see Traugott 1982:258–63). Here again, an erstwhile lexical element, once appropriated for grammatical purposes as a connective, could develop further subjective (expressive) uses. This is what Traugott (1995:47) stated for the development of *while* from clause-combining (textual) to concessive (subjective).

However, later, potential examples for shift from the expressive to the ‘textual’ came up, and her understanding of the ‘textual’ component changed (cf. Traugott 1995:47). Also, it is not clear whether Traugott took notice of it, but Heine et al. (1991; ch. 7.2.4) suggested examples for change from the ideational via the interpersonal towards the textual. In Traugott’s own thinking, as she stated in hindsight (2010:31), the ‘textual’ includes both content purpose items, such as relativizers and complementizers, and procedural items expressing the speaker’s attitude, such as topicalizers, discourse markers, and “many connectives have dual function (e.g. *and*, *then*, *in fact*).”

Interestingly, Halliday’s theory itself does not offer any hint for a directionality between the ideational (propositional), interpersonal (expressive), and textual domain. These concepts are metafunctions that cut across layers in grammar and contribute to the creation of utterances in parallel, simultaneously (cf. Halliday 2004; ch. 2.7; Butler 1996:10–11, 14; Butler & Taverniers 2008:694–8). There is no hierarchical ordering between them. If anything has a special status, then it is the textual metafunction as it had an ‘enabling’ function with respect to the other components: only by creating text, ideational and interpersonal meanings can be expressed (see Butler 1996:21). Furthermore, in Halliday’s theory there is in fact a second metafunction that can be called ‘textual’, and that is in fact part of Traugott’s broader ‘textual’ component, namely the ‘logical’ metafunction (cf. Halliday 2004:ch. 2.7; 7). This logical function is involved in the formation of ‘clause complexes’, and is closely related to the ideational metafunction. It thus differs from the textual metafunction, which is mainly concerned with the expression of information structure. The ‘logical’ function mainly includes what Traugott (2010:31) labeled as ‘content purpose items’, but Halliday’s label ‘logical’ does not entail at all an absence of subjective or procedural meaning. It is not that in Halliday’s terminology ‘procedural’ elements would be ‘textual’, and ‘content’ elements ‘logical’. In any case, in Halliday’s theory, there is no reason to assume that ‘logical’ elements are either synchronically or diachronically somehow lower than or subordinate to the interpersonal or the ‘textual’ (information structure) elements.2

In line with the idea that textual elements, including those labeled as ‘logical’, are not necessarily subordinate to interpersonal elements, but may at least sometimes be superordinate to them, I am presenting examples here that suggest a shift from the subjective and intersubjective to the textual, rather than the reverse. In the following Section 2, I will present uses of English *may* (2.1), English imperatives (2.2), and Japanese imperatives (2.3), which lead to just this conclusion.3

2. Functions of modality in complex sentence structures

2.1 May: subjectification, intersubjectification, and discourse-orientation

*May* in Modern English has been described in the literature as being overwhelmingly if not totally subjective (cf. Coates 1983:133; van der Auwera & Plungian 1998). However, there are uses of *may* in Modern English that I suggest are not only subjective but beyond that intersubjective and even ‘textual’, or ‘discourse-oriented’, in the sense that they serve to construct logical coherence in complex sentences, and beyond that, discourse.4 More specifically, I am referring to a group of constructions in which *may* has been labeled as ‘concessive *may*’ (e.g. Palmer 1990). Concretely, the following uses have been distinguished.5

1. Use in the protases of overtly marked hypotactic concessive constructions, namely in ‘universal concessive conditionals’ (cf. Haspelmath & König 1998), *although*-concessives (e.g. Declerck 1991:445), and *as*-concessives with proposed predicates (cf. Quirk et al. 1985:1098), as in (5), (6) and (7):

(5) *Whatever one may think of Kenneth Williams, I thought he did a very good rendering* (LLC 2)
There is even a fourth overtly marked concessive pattern with **while**, as in (8), which is not mentioned in the literature, but which I found in 10 sentences (out of 662 instances of **may** overall) in the ICE-AUS.

(8) **While some Aborigines may baulk at the idea of cultural fusion, there is no doubt that non-Aboriginal society would greatly benefit from the trading of modes of artistic expression.** (ICE-AUS; G)

2. Use in the first clause of a coordinated construction, in which the second clause is marked with **but**, as in (9):

(9) **We may have our differences from time to time, but basically we trust another's judgement.** (Quirk et al. 1985: 224)

(10) **So we built an Opera House. A fine building it may be but, as one of Australia's most famous landmarks, I find it sad that it was devoted to the pursuit of an art form that bears little relevance to the real Australia, the land of eucalypt and wattle.** (ICE-AUS; G)

This is syntactically a paratactic construction but is nevertheless usually labeled as 'concessive.'

The use of **may** in these concessive patterns has in common that, at least from a synchronic perspective, it is based on, or related to, the epistemic meaning of **may** ('epistemic possibility') rather than the deontic or dynamic one (cf. Collins 2009: 93). In terms of subjectivity, the epistemic sense of **may** is often held to be 'subjective' (e.g. Verstraete 2001: 1525). However, this epistemic sense is weakened, or backgrounded, in favor of a concessive function, relating two propositions to each other. The proposition marked by **may** is admitted by the speaker/writer as a possibility or even a fact, and a second proposition that seemingly contradicts the first proposition is introduced as a fact as well. Thus, Quirk et al. (1985: 224) suggest that (11) is a valid paraphrase of (9).

(11) **I admit that we have our differences from time to time, but basically we trust another's judgement.**

Likewise, Collins (2009: 93) claims that concessive **may** "is more accurately interpreted as involving a type of pragmatic strengthening [...] in which the speaker concedes the truth of the proposition, rather than expressing a lack of confidence in it." Thus the clause in (10) containing concessive **may** "is equivalent to the un-modalized clause 'although the timing is uncertain'."

The function of **may** in these complex sentences can be described at least partially as 'textual.' The label 'concessive' may be misleading in a sense that **may** in these clauses apparently does not mark concession alone (cf. Souesme 2009). Instead, it appears in patterns together with overt connectives, and qualifies the assertion in the antecedent, while in turn giving up some of its epistemic modal meaning. One can argue, like Papafragou (2000; ch. 3.3.2) that **may** in all cases still retains its possibility sense, but if so, then only rhetorically, because there are clear examples where the proposition marked by **may** is factual, as in (12).

(12) **He may be a university professor, but he is sure dumb** (Sweetser 1990: 70).

Now, a crucial point here is that this 'textual' use of **may** does not only presuppose some degree of subjectification, but even more, some degree of intersubjectification.

The protases of concessives often accommodate a proposition and a point of view that is in opposition to the speaker/writer's own assertion in the matrix clause. This proposition may be coming either directly from an interlocutor, or from the speaker/writer him- or herself, preempting an imaginary objection by the interlocutor. This is in fact what has been shown in research on concessives in spoken language, where two or more interlocutors co-construct sequences of three propositions X — Y — X. X is an utterance by a speaker A, which is resumed by speaker B as X' and then relativized through Y (cf. Barth 2000; Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2000). According to Barth (2000), the core concessive sequence X' — Y itself may directly deal with the preceding proposition X (especially in the case of **but**), or (especially in the case of **although**) serve to restrict a previous claim, introduce additional information, or forestall a possible objection (an X that has not been directly mentioned in the discourse so far)? If we follow this research on spoken language and discourse, and assume that the grammaticalization of complex sentences has at least some of its roots in spoken language and discourse, grammaticalized concessives can be viewed as 'condensed' concessive discourse, or, in König's (1992) words, as 'syntacticized discourse.' Decisively, the first part of the concession typically accommodates a proposition actually held and uttered by, or ascribed to an actual or imaginary interlocutor, and the construction as such is thus typically intersubjective. As Mitchell (2009: 75) put it, "[c]oncession is part of negotiation. In (45) [i.e., an example with **may** in the antecedent of a concessive] speaker and hearer are co-operating to negotiate a mutually satisfactory description [...] , composed of agreed propositions."

This sort of intersubjectivity is often an obvious feature in the use of **may** in the antecedents of concessives, and has in fact already been indirectly indicated by earlier researchers, who have ascribed a 'politeness' or 'softening' function to concessive clauses with **may** (e.g. Coates 1983: 136; Quirk et al. 1985: 224). Beyond the strong 'intersubjective' component, this use also has a discourse- or text-building
function that creates textual coherence within a series of propositions associated with different discourse participants.

I wish to point out here that the intersubjective feature of may is already present in sequences where may is not yet integrated in a complex concessive clause, but is used in an independent clause that serves as a concession in discourse beyond the sentence. The following example from the Survey of English Usage (now LLC) was already offered by Coates (1983:136):

(13) And a lot of people don’t want to be bothered to organize their holidays at all. You may be right. You may be wrong.

Coates commented that ‘[i]n this […] example, the disclaimer applies to the addressee’s remarks, and is a way of acknowledging the other person’s point of view before contradicting it.” She calls this use ‘pragmatic’ in contrast to the ‘concessive’ use, but one may as well regard it as a syntactically independent form of the ‘concessive’ use, as in both cases the speaker is using the concession to downtone his rejection of the interlocutor’s argument. There are numerous such examples in the LLC that explicitly refer to the addressee’s point of view, whether only imagined or actually uttered.9 The following two are interesting in a number of respects.

(14) B: Jake is useless, absolutely bleeding useless (A laughs). He is feeble, he is weak. He is totally unorganized.
A: Yes, that may be so. But I’m sure he is capable of lifting… few pieces of furniture from the van.
B: I wouldn’t trust him with lifting that desk out, which is heavy. (LLC 4)

(15) … such is the general overall picture of the effect of expansion of of the effect of inflation upon universities, which I’m trying to draw tonight. Now you may say, well, really, this is a most craven speech […] Well, I have this to say, first of all this seems to be a view which is now held by the present Secretary of State for Education. And you may say, “Well, if he holds that view, isn’t it up to you to change his mind?” Well, what should universities do about trying to change his mind? (LLC 11)

In (14), the …may…but… pattern is apparently spread across two independent sentences in spoken language, which in written language would probably be integrated into one sentence. (15) represents a whole sequence in a monologue where a speaker presents his own point of view, followed by the addressee’s/reader’s imagined point of view marked by may.

Similar examples can also be found in written discourse.

(16) [The film Crocodile] Dundee may not boast the hi-tech stuff of George Lucas. It lacks the violence of Rambo. Its characters are few and budget meagre next to

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Here, a but introducing the writer’s point follows only after a certain stretch of discourse, perhaps corresponding to the fact that written language can require longer spans of attention from the reader.

Besides ‘concessive’ may, there are other clearly hearer-oriented (intersubjective) or polite patterns of usage of may, which are, however, not textualized to the same degree. These include uses in legal language where speakers “ascribe [their] own point of view to the addressee, as a way of influencing his or her opinion” (e.g. And your lordship may think that she indulged to some extent in fantasy; Coates 1983:136); the use in ‘hedged performatives’ (Fraser 1975; e.g. May I ask you one question now? (LLC)), which seems to be derived from the deontic rather than the epistemic sense; and its use in making suggestions (Some of the things that you may consider prior to your retirement are… (ICE-AUS: A). For lack of space, I will not discuss them further here, but the existence of such intersubjective patterns of may should be beyond reasonable doubt.

Instead, I wish to look into the history of may in order to establish the compatibility of the above synchronic observations with the diachronic facts. May (OE magan) goes back to a Germanic verb that meant something like ‘be strong/able’ or ‘have power’. In OE and ME it is still documented in this use (cf. OED may, v.1, B I, 1). At the earliest stage, it was already one of the most frequently used predecessors of the Modern English modals. It expressed mainly ability and, to some extent, circumstantial possibility, but the former use was initially dominant (cf. Visser 1969:1754–6; Goossens 1987:218–22; Standop 1957, ch. 1). The rise of epistemic meanings is generally attributed to Middle English, around the 13th century (Visser 1969:1756; OED, may, v.1, B II, 5). Visser states that potential examples in this period are often ambiguous between circumstantial (‘objective possibility’) and epistemic (‘eventuality’) readings. “When a person has the opportunity or is free to perform a certain action, there automatically arises an element of uncertainty about the actual performance of the action.” (Visser 1969:1756). He locates the rise of permission (deontic) readings later than that of the epistemic readings (pp.1756, 1765), while the OED (may, v.1, B II, 4) locates it earlier. The domain of permission was originally occupied by motan, but an ‘absence of prohibitive conditions’ is already part of the circumstantial reading. Thus it is a matter of interpretation whether such circumstantial readings are already viewed as deontic.

In any case, it appears that both the deontic and epistemic reading arose from the circumstantial reading. ‘The first concessive’ use is given by Visser for the late 14th century (Chaucer). Interestingly, though, he also gives a possible lone forerunner from Old English, a juxtaposition of two clauses that can be rendered as ‘Heaven
and earth may die/pass away; my word will never die‘ (Heofon ond eorðe mag gewitan, min word næfre ne gewitað (Blickl. Hom. 245; Visser 1969:1771). Note, though, that the relationship between the two propositions is contrastive rather than concessive. Also, the first proposition cannot be interpreted as the admission of a proposition brought up by an interlocutor. However, this contrastive use may indeed be seen as a predecessor of later concessive uses. The first examples with explicit concessive marking (namely but) are found in the 16th century.\(^\text{10}\)

Due to the ambiguity between older and newer uses when newer uses arise, the historical data are less clear than one would wish. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, it should be uncontroversial that magan/may underwent subjectification in acquiring circumstantial, and then epistemic and deontic uses from the original ability meaning. This is a process that became conspicuous in Middle English. The acquisition of permission uses and of epistemic uses admitting the validity of propositions brought up by an interlocutor can be viewed as intersubjectification. This intersubjectification must have accompanied subjectification by occurring in hearer-oriented contexts of those subjectified uses. The integration of intersubjective uses into concessive patterns, then, seems to have occurred in Early Modern English. The seeds of subjective, intersubjective, and textual uses may all be seen already in Old English, but the order in which they became conventionalized is subjective > intersubjective > textual/connective.

2.2 Imperatives forming conditionals in English

In Modern English, complex sentences consisting of an imperative clause connected by the coordinating conjunction and to a declarative clause (or sometimes another imperative clause), as in (17) and (18), both from Quirk et al. (1985:832), can function as conditionals.

(17) Make a move and I’ll shoot.

(18) Give him enough rope and he’ll hang himself.

The imperative is clearly intersubjective in being directed at the addressee. If it is used to relate two propositions and imply conditionality between them, corresponding to a connective, it acquires a textual (logical) function. Thus, I suggest that the conditional use of imperatives (also known as ‘pseudo-imperative’; e.g. Franke 2005), constitutes another example of an extension from intersubjective to textual function.\(^\text{11}\)

This ‘conditional’ use of imperatives is apparently still in the process of grammaticalization with various stages between a relatively weak implicature and the most grammaticalized use (which in my view (17) and (18) represent). In fact, the interpretation of the whole construction, and of the first sentence either as a ‘real’ imperative or a ‘pseudo-imperative varies with context and the evaluation of the propositions, as (19) and (20), both from Quirk et al. (1985:832), show:

(19) Sit next to Joan and she’ll explain what you have to do.

(20) Finish your homework and I’ll give you some ice cream.

In sentence (19) the first clause is an imperative, and the second describes an event following in sequence. Both clauses do not evoke a specific evaluation, and the implicature of conditionality is weak. In (20), the first clause is also interpreted as an imperative but a stronger implicature of conditionality is working, presumably because of the strong positive evaluation of the consequent clause. In constructions with or instead of and, the imperative force is usually retained as well.

(21) Don’t eat so much or you’ll be sorry. (Quirk et al. 1985:832)

In constructions with or, the prerequisite for conditional interpretation is a strongly negative evaluation of the second proposition, and the construction as a whole serves to convey threats or warnings (Declerck & Reed 2001:402). As van der Auwera (1986:210) noted, the actual conditional implication in this construction is \(-p \rightarrow q\), that is, based on the negative of the antecedent imperative.

Overall, the construction in (17) and (18) is arguably the most advanced (or grammaticalized), as the imperative has lost its illocutionary force here and may be interpreted purely as the antecedent of a conditional. This interpretation apparently depends on a strongly negative evaluation of the second clause, and the use of the conjunction and (not or). Other languages, such as Russian (Wade 1992:328), Lithuanian (Ambrazas 1997:774), and Dutch (Fortuin & Boogaart 2009) have similar constructions. In a comparison of English, Dutch and Russian, Fortuin & Boogaart (2009:643, 654–5, 671) argue that these constructions inherit intersubjectivity (“the speaker asks for special attention from the hearer”) from the imperative construction and conditionality from the paratactic ‘and’-construction.

Another type of speech act that is possibly involved in the formation of conditionals are interrogatives. Jespersen (1940:374) was the first to bring up the idea that some asyndetic conditionals may be based on mini-dialogues with question-answer sequences. This idea has been broached in the literature repeatedly (e.g. Traugott 1985:294–5). However, Van den Nest (2010) recently argued on the basis of historical data that in English and German a sequence of two declarative clauses, the first of which had V1 order, is the more plausible diachronic source for such conditionals. Nevertheless, whether the actual source structures of the protases of such conditionals are interrogatives or declaratives, they have likely developed out of dialogic sequences.
2.3 Imperatives forming concessive conditionals in Japanese and other languages

The last case presented here concerns imperatives again, but this time functioning as antecedents in concessive conditionals. English grammars do not describe such a pattern although it may be possible to construe such sentences on the spot as the following example by Haspelmath & König (1998: 583) shows:

(22) Go to Kilkenny, to Dublin or even to London — I won't leave you.

What English grammars do note are conditional-concessive patterns with the subjunctive, which is, however, in most cases indistinguishable from the imperative.

(23) Rain or shine, we're having our party outside today. (Quirk et al. 1985: 1101)

(24) Be that as it may, … (Quirk et al. 1985: 1102)

In contrast, Japanese has a fully grammaticalized use of imperatives in conditional concessives of the so-called 'alternative' and the 'scalar' type (Haspelmath & König 1998: 563). Imperatives as such were already grammaticalized in the earliest periods of Japanese language history. In contrast, the concessive conditional use of imperatives in Japanese is first documented in the Classical period (9th~12th century) (Narrog 1999: 76). In Middle Japanese (12th~17th century) it became more common. The first documented examples all have stative predicates (adjectives, nominal adjectives) and a light verb (cf. Iwai 1970: 16), as in (25):

(25) Asi.ku=mo ar.e, ika=ni=mo ar.e, tayori ar.aba,
awkward-adv-foc be-imp how-adv-foc be-imp opportunity be-con
yar-am.u.
send-fut-fnp

'Whether it is awkward or whatever, if there is an opportunity, we’ll send [him] [the poem]' (lit. 'Be it awkward, be it whatever, if…') (Tosa Nikki (10th ct) 37, 15)

Subsequently, the contexts in which the imperative was used concessively increased. The following example (26) from Middle Japanese shows a construction which is already different from the one above. The imperative predicate is preceded by the same predicate in the hypothetical conditional form, and the connection between the sentences is relatively loose.

(26) Ina=wa saikai=no nami=no soko=ni sidum.aba sidum.e,
now-top western-sea-gen wave-gen bottom-all sink-con sink-imp,
sanya=ni kabane=wo saras.aba saras.e, u.ki
mountain-LOC corpse-ACC expose-CON expose-IMP fleeting-ADN
yo=ni womoi~wok.u koto sadrawazu.
world-DAT think-PUT-ANTP thing be-NEG

'Even if I should sink to the bottom of the Western Sea, or get my corpse exposed on the hills, I don’t care anymore about the fleeting world. [lit.: If I should sink to the bottom of the waves of the Western Sea, let me sink! If I should expose my corpse on the hills let it be exposed — I don’t care anymore about the fleeting world]' (Heike Monogatari (13th ct) 2, 405)

In Modern Japanese, the use of imperatives in concessive conditionals has receded. In spoken language, this construction is restricted to a small number of predicates, most commonly the imperative form of ‘do’, as in (27) (scalar) and (28) (alternative).

(27) Ippan kyoosyo enzetu=no tyokugo=wa itiziteki=ni s.eyo
general message speech-gen immediately.after-top temporary-DAT do-IMP
daitooryoo sizi-ritu=ga agar.u=no=ga tuurei=da.
president support-rate-NOM rise-NPS-NMZ-NOM common-COP(-NPS)

'Even if it is only temporarily, it is common that the approval rating of a president rises after the State of the Union address.' (Mainichi Newspaper; 2003)

(28) Neko-ni s.eyo, inu=ni s.eyo, okor.u taimingu=ga muzukasi-i.
cat-dat do-imp dog-dat do-imp get.angry-NPS timing-NOM difficult-NPS

'Whether cats or dogs, the right timing for getting angry with them is difficult.'

As can be seen from the examples above, the grammaticalization of imperative sentences as antecedents of concessive conditionals is not only obvious from the semantic relationship between the imperative and the following clause. Additionally, the imperative subordinate to a matrix clause often contains predicates that are stative, or not controllable, and thus would be infelicitous, or at least on the borderline of being felicitous, as ‘real’ imperatives.

In any case, the important point with respect to the topic of this paper is that again a clearly intersubjective, addressee-oriented construction acquired a textual use of the ‘logical’ type, in Halliday’s terminology. Integrated into concessive conditional sentences, the imperative serves to connect two or more propositions in discourse and indicate semantic relationships between them.13

Japanese is not the only language that has grammaticalized imperatives as antecedents of concessive conditionals. In Lithuanian, for example, the imperative mood has the same function. According to Ambrazas (1997: 775), the predicate of the first clause is often comprised of two verb forms the second of which is
repeated by the negative prefix, as in (29). The second clause contains a predicate in the present or future tense form, less commonly in the imperative mood.

(29) Prasį-k ne-prasį-k – sūrio ne-gáu-s-i
beg-IMP NEG-beg-IMP cheese(gen) NEG-get-FUT-2SG
'You may beg or not (IMPER) you won’t get any cheese' (Ambrazas et al. 1997: 776)\(^4\)

The conventionalized use of imperatives as antecedents of concessive conditionals in both Japanese and Lithuanian, and the nonce example from English (22) show that apart from the structural make-up of a language, cross-linguistically imperatives another pragmatically available option as a discourse pattern for speakers to express a conditional concessive relationship.

### 2.4 Commonalities between these constructions

Three constructions have been discussed in which main clause modal or mood marking was integrated into the formation of complex sentences, namely the modal may in concessives (2.1), the imperative in conditional concessives (2.3), and the imperative in conditionals (2.2). I suggest that they have in common that they serve to accommodate the point of view of the addressee, or at least a point that differs from, and usually contrasts with, the speaker’s stance. This is most obvious in the case of the concessives (2.1), and perhaps least obvious in the case of the conditionals (2.2), but even there, arguably a motivation to accommodate and preempt hearer’s/addressee’s stances that differ from those of the speaker is at work in at least some cases. In (17), for example, the speaker does not suggest to the addressee to “make a move”. On the contrary, this is a possible action or thought of the addressee that the speaker wants to preempt. With respect to the conditional concessive examples as well, the ideas that something is bad (25), that the speaker may die (26), or that the addressee may beg (29), are presented as someone else’s (typically the addressee’s) viewpoint, or as a possible objection which the speaker finally rejects by presenting them as irrelevant in the consequence of the construction.

An attractive explanation has been offered by Leuschner (1998, 2005a, b), who, inspired by Herring (1991) and König (1992), referred to the integration of interrogatives into the antecedents of concessive conditional as “rhetorical dialogues”, that is, feigned dialogues in written and spoken discourse that express ‘polyphony’ in the sense of Ducrot or Bakhtin (cf. Gévaudan 2008). “The speaker integrates another’s contribution into her own. [...] By setting up an apparent dialogue around an interlocutor’s potential intervention, a speaker may foresee and avoid an actual exchange, indeed hide behind another’s ‘voice’ in order to make all the more effectively her own rhetorical move” (Leuschner 1998: 169).

Similarly, Haspelmath & König (1998: 580), referring to concessive conditionals as well, have proposed that “[t]he wide variety of expressive devices found in English and other languages in addition to the more syntactized forms [...], i.e., imperatives, expressions of volition, permission and agreement suggest that this circumstantial relation [expressed in concessive conditionals] has its origin in a negotiation between speaker and hearer over permissible instantiations of variables in a conditional schema [...].”

Following these authors, I suggest that the constructions presented in the preceding sections can be viewed as rhetorical dialogues in which a speaker anticipates propositions potentially entertained by the hearer, e.g. “Dundee does not have the high tech stuff” (16), “I’ll move and get out of this” (17), “this will be awkward” ((25)), etc. (S)he admits the existence of the hearer’s objections, but backgrounds them by integrating them as the antecedent to a consequent whose superior validity (s)he emphasizes.

Crucially, these constructions are all examples of textual integration on top of intersubjectivity/intersubjectification. This is the main point of this paper, which will be taken up again in the following summary.

### 3. Summary

Meanings and functions of linguistic forms shift towards the speaker and the speech situation itself. The question is how this generalization can be further specified and differentiated. While in Traugott’s (and many other authors’ thinking), there is currently a main contrast between subjectification and intersubjectification, with intersubjectification being based on subjectification, I have argued here that at least three elements should be distinguished, namely increased orientation towards the speaker, increased orientation towards the hearer, and increased orientation to discourse/text itself. I have presented three examples of modal constructions used in different languages which suggest that orientation to discourse/text itself can be the final stage of development. In all these examples, the orientation towards discourse/text itself even presupposed intersubjectification (hearer-orientation), which in turn presupposes some degree of subjectification (speaker-orientation). The presumably first stage of subjectification was only discussed with respect to may-concessives (2.1), while in the case of the imperatives (2.2, 2.3), it is difficult to reconstruct historically. Overall, then, the following chain of changes seems to have taken place.
(30) (subjectification) > intersubjectification > text/discourse orientation

The resulting conditional, concessive, and conditional concessive constructions are primarily textual in the sense of connecting propositions. That is, they primarily instantiate Halliday’s ‘logical’ metafunction. Additionally, they contrast propositions entertained by the speaker with propositions potentially or actually entertained by others, typically the addressee/reader. They therefore constitute cases of grammaticalized polyphonic (diachronic) structures, rendering voices of two or more discourse participants. On the other hand, the more such constructions get conventionalized and ‘bleached’ semantically, the more they may lose their original discourse motivation and become pure conditional/concessive connectives in Halliday’s ‘logical’ sense. This is a possibility which needs in-depth study of historical data, and could not be discussed in this paper for lack of space. However, the corpus data for Modern Japanese imperative concessive conditionals, which are not only fairly grammaticalized but beyond that almost fossilized, contain many examples, as in (28), which are difficult to interpret as a polyphonic structure. The intersubjective element is accordingly bleached out, or only remains at a very abstract level. The result is full ‘synctacticization’ of former pragmatic structures, as proposed early in grammaticalization studies (Givón 1979). As Ariel (2008: ch. 5) argues, when linguistic structures assume a new function, there is usually a motivation in discourse. However, once the new function is fully grammaticalized, this original motivation may get lost. For grammar it is enough to be functional and not to be motivated.

If in contrast to the stance advanced here, shift towards textual/discourse function is viewed as part of the tendency of ‘subjectification’ (cf. Breban (2006) and Traugott (1995)), the changes discussed here would instantiate the sequence of developments as in (31).

(31) (subjectification) > intersubjectification > subjectification

One could claim, then, that there can be multiple stages of subjectification and intersubjectification that follow each other. However, I believe that by introducing the ‘textual’ dimension as a variable it is possible to come to a more differentiated analysis that avoids the appearance of circularity.

Furthermore, recently Ghesquière (2010) has convincingly argued for change from the ‘textual’ to the ‘expressive’ in the domain of adjectives modifying nouns. It seems absolutely possible that change towards the ‘textual’ occurs in different domains of grammar at different stages. There is certainly still much left to discover if different domains of grammar are scrutinized. Thus, as I have suggested before, it may be premature to assume a single directionality (e.g. subjective > intersubjective > textual; subjective > textual > intersubjective; etc.) to which all items in all domains would obey.

In any case, I hope to have drawn attention to the fact that in the modal domain there are shifts from the intersubjective further to the textual, which is the end stage of change. I have furthermore made the case that it may be useful to regard this shift towards textual/discourse function at least for the time being as a shift on a par with subjectification and intersubjectification within a broad tendency of change that may be labeled as increased speech-act orientation.

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Notes


2. Thus, the idea of unidirectional extension of meanings across Halliday’s domains is originally Traugott’s, and it is doubtful whether it is even compatible with the idea of metafunctions as intended by Halliday. There are in fact two other functional theories of grammar which propose a hierarchical layering that are therefore more compatible with Traugott’s idea of directional change across different domains than Halliday’s. These are Role-and-Reference Grammar and Functional Discourse Grammar. However, in Functional Discourse Grammar, the core of Halliday’s ‘textual’ elements are included in the ‘interpersonal’ level (cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: ch. 2.7.2), so that between these two domains no specific directionality is posited.


4. Note that the intersubjective use of may discussed here was already mentioned in more brevity in Traugott & Dasher (2002: 115).

5. Examples are taken either from the extant literature on the topic, or from the ICE Australia (ICE-AUS) and London–Lund (LLC) corpora, which I investigated for this study. As most research on this topic has focused on British, and partly Australian English, where these patterns are presumably more frequent than in American English, the materials presented here are also
from these varieties of English. *Might* was not included in the materials, although it sometimes has a function similar to *may*.

6. Sawada (2006: ch. 15) argues for a distinction between two types of *may* in *may* (clause 1) ... *but*...(clause 2) constructions: speech-act level *may* presenting factual information in the proposition of a concessive clause, and epistemic *may*, presenting non-factual information as a possibility. They can be distinguished by a *perhaps*-insertion test (only in clauses with genuinely epistemic *may* can *perhaps* be inserted).

7. König & Siemund (2000: 356–7) further improved on this scheme by proposing that Y is in fact not a reaction to X itself but to an inference Z based on X.

8. This idea can be traced back to Givón (1979: ch. 5).

9. Note that I have removed all prosodic etc. markings from the LLC text.

10. The OED has no entry for the concessive uses. Interestingly, the ‘subjective possibility’ use is paraphrased as ‘admissibility of a supposition’ (*may*, v.1, B II, 5) but the entry has no example of a concessive use.

11. This was already suggested by Heine et al. (1991:191) who cited the use of imperatives in conditionals as a possible example for extension from the ‘hearer-oriented component of interpersonal function’ to textual function. However, Heine et al’s (1991) idea apparently remained largely overlooked in the scholarship on grammaticalization and semantic change.

12. Grammaticalized patterns can also be found in a number of other languages of Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia (cf. Dobrushina 2008: 133–4).

13. For a different view of this development, see Shinzato (2007:196–198), who presented the extension from imperatives to concessive conditionals primarily as a case of desubjectification. Traugott (2007:303–304) argued against this view on the grounds that it is the imperative clause in its literal core meaning that participates in the subordinating construction and not the speech-act level utterance as a whole.


References


Notions of (inter)subjectivity*

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This paper compares a few notions of 'subjectivity' (vs. 'objectivity' or 'intersubjectivity') circulating in the current functional and cognitive linguistic literature.

It aims to demonstrate that, in spite of some points of contact in the analysis of certain linguistic issues, e.g. in the sphere of the modal categories, these notions actually refer to substantially different phenomena and should therefore not be confused.

1. Introduction

The topic of this special issue is 'intersubjectivity'. This notion, however, formally contains, and semantically implies, as more basic, a notion of subjectivity, to which it is somehow related or contrasted. Hence a discussion of intersubjectivity is not really possible without at the same time — and even in the first place — discussing the concept of subjectivity.

In fact, especially the notion of subjectivity — and only through it the notion of intersubjectivity — has been a problem lately in functional and cognitive semantics. Several 'versions' of it are circulating in the literature, some of them contrasted to or complemented by a notion of intersubjectivity, but others to/by a notion of objectivity. But the relationship between these different 'versions' is not always obvious: do they refer to the same concept of subjectivity or not? and if not, what is the difference between them precisely? This situation may cause — and probably quite often is causing — terminological and, even worse, conceptual confusion (in spite of earlier attempts to relate/disentangle them — see below).

This paper is an attempt to contribute to a further clarification of this issue, by discussing the relationship between several of these 'versions' of subjectivity. I will thereby take my own notion of (inter)subjectivity — henceforth '[(inter)subjectivity]N' — as a vantage point, and I will use this as an opportunity to further specify and elaborate the latter. This will, most notably, include a correction of
some extent at the ‘linguistic surface.’ The fact that they are denoted by the same terms, then, is no more than a somewhat unfortunate coincidence. Each of these notions deserves its own place in a conceptual and/or linguistic semantic theory.

2. Subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity/objectivity in modal categories

2.1 Why the traditional distinction between subjective and objective modality is problematic

The notion of (inter)subjectivity introduced in Nuyts (1992, 2001a:33ff, 2001b) was put forward in the context of an attempt to grasp a ‘semantic’ property of modal expressions (in the first place epistemic modal ones, but by extension also other types — see below) which is very prominent intuitively, hence has been observed numerous times before in the literature, but the precise nature of which was/is apparently hard to pinpoint or identify. The property at stake is probably best evoked by contrasting examples such as (1) and (2).

(1) Given the instability in the country it is likely that the army will intervene

(2) In such an unstable situation I think the army will intervene

The italicized expressions in both (1) and (2) express epistemic modality: in both cases they indicate that the chances that the state of affairs applies are high. Yet one will immediately ‘feel’ intuitively, that they do so in a different way. In the modal literature, this intuitive feeling was/is usually ‘translated’ scientifically as being a matter of a distinction between subjective and objective modal evaluations (cf. e.g. Lyons 1977, Coates 1983, Palmer 1986 — see below). The notion of (inter)-subjectivity, then, was/is meant as a reaction to this notion of subjectivity vs. objectivity in the literature, inspired by the conviction that the latter is begging the question in a number of respects.

The major problem with the traditional distinction was that it hardly ever managed to supersede the level of ‘impressions’: most authors (may be with the exception of Lyons — see below) used it in a completely intuitive way, without providing a clear definition, let alone operationalization criteria which would allow one to determine unequivocally when a modal expression is subjective and when it is objective. As a consequence the notion was used in a very inconsistent way between authors. Thus, many or most authors do seem to assume a fixed connection between the two poles of the binary distinction and specific (epistemic) modal expression types. In other words, they assume that certain form types always express objective modality and others always express subjective modality. (Not
all authors share this assumption, however, Lyons probably being among those who do not — see below.) But there is no agreement whatsoever among those authors about which expression types express which pole, witness the quite different analysis of the status of, e.g., the modal auxiliaries in Lyons (1977), Palmer (1979) and Coates (1983), or of modal expressions more in general in, e.g., Perkins (1983), Kiefer (1984), Watts (1984), and Hengeveld (1988). Also the basic status of the category of subjectivity vs. objectivity remains very unclear in the work of most authors. Some explicitly consider it a matter which is inherent in the modal categories themselves, thus assuming separate semantic categories of subjective epistemic modality and of objective epistemic modality, and of subjective deontic modality and of objective deontic modality (e.g. Hengeveld 1988, and probably also Lyons 1977). Most authors, however, leave this issue entirely open.

One of the few authors who did make an attempt to pull the subjective vs. objective distinction out of the realm of intuition and to define it in somewhat clearer terms is Lyons (1977:797ff). And here, then, came in another element leading to the formulation of the notion of (inter)subjectivity\(^N\), viz. the conviction that the way Lyons has formulated the distinction is misdirected in terms of how it explicates the nature of the property at stake.

In Lyons' formulation (focusing on epistemic modality — but Lyons also explicitly extends this distinction to deontic modality), subjective\(^E\) epistemic modality involves a purely subjective guess regarding whether the state of affairs under consideration is true or not, while objective\(^E\) epistemic modality expresses an objectively measurable chance that it is true or not. Thus, when uttering a sentence like (3),

(3) Alfred may be unmarried

the speaker can either indicate that (s)he simply feels uncertain about the (hypothetical) fact that Alfred is unmarried — i.e. subjective\(^E\) modality. Or (s)he may mean to indicate that there is a mathematically computable chance that Alfred is unmarried, for example because (s)he (the speaker) knows that Alfred belongs to a community of ninety people, of which there are thirty unmarried, hence there is one chance in three that he is unmarried — i.e. objective\(^E\) modality. This definition of subjectivity\(^E\) vs. objectivity\(^E\), then, essentially draws on a difference in the quality of the evidence leading to the modal judgment.

Note that Lyons here assumes that one and the same utterance (such as (3)) can express either ‘value’, the context being the only criterion to decide which is at stake. This signals the fact that (Lyons is aware that) the distinction so defined is hard to operationalize in terms of ‘objective’ criteria which allow one to decide whether a modal form is objective\(^E\) or subjective\(^E\), if one hears an actual instance of it in real life, or if one looks at one in a corpus (see also Nuyts 2001b for empirical evidence to this effect — see also Section 2.2 below). Turning around the perspective, however, this would also mean that speakers do not explicitly signal this distinction in their use of modal markers. And this then of course makes one wonder whether this issue is really at stake at all as a dimension in a speaker’s planning of an epistemically (or deontically) modalized utterance.

In fact, at the same intuitive level of analysis which characterizes large parts of the literature on this subject matter, at least the author of the present paper does not have the feeling that quality of the evidence is at stake in any way when a speaker uses an expression such as (3) — all that matters is that there is a possibility that this state of affairs applies, no less and no more. And some further reflection and enquiry soon reveals that there are indeed good ‘objective’ arguments in support of this view.

Note, though, that none of the foregoing is meant to suggest that quality of the evidence never plays a role in one’s assessment of (specifically) the existential status of a state of affairs — it obviously does, beyond any doubt. The point is that if it is at stake, then this is probably not expressed via (epistemic) modal expressions of the type in (1)–(3), but via other linguistic means. I will return to this at the end of Section 2.2.

2.2 (Inter)subjectivity\(^N\)

There may, in fact, be something completely different behind the — as such uncontestable — intuition (illustrated in examples such as (1) and (2) above) that modal expressions may be more or less subjective. If one takes a little distance from the matter and throws a ‘thoroughly functionalist’ look at it, i.e. from the perspective of what speakers do when they communicate modal qualifications of states of affairs, one might realize that there is a way to interpret this intuitive feeling which is actually much more in line with the common sense meaning of ‘subjectivity’. This interpretation concerns the matter of who is ‘responsible’ for the modal evaluation, as seen from the perspective of the ‘subject’ or ‘source’ of that evaluation, i.e. what I will call the ‘assessor’ (typically, but not necessarily the speaker him/herself — see below). The assessor always is, but the relevant question is whether others are (presented as being) too. This alternative concept was labeled ‘subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity’ (cf. Nuyts 1992, 2001a:33ff, 2001b), on the one hand in order to avoid confusion with the traditional notions of subjectivity vs. objectivity as discussed above, and on the other hand because this label better matches what the present concept is about (‘objectivity’ in particular is not at stake at all, in any relevant sense of the word, in the present view).

Its definition, then, is as follows:
A modal evaluation is 'subjective\textsuperscript{IN}' if it is presented as being strictly the assessor’s sole responsibility.

A modal evaluation is 'intersubjective\textsuperscript{IN}' if it is presented as being shared between the assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but not necessarily) including the hearer.

In other words, in these terms this distinction is a matter of indicating whether the modal judgment is common ground between the assessor and others.\textsuperscript{4} One would typically expect a marking of subjectivity, then, in communicative circumstances in which the assessor feels like (s)he should not imply anyone else in his/her modal evaluation, e.g. because (s)he does not know about the position/view of others, or in situations in which the assessor’s position is clearly in opposition to the view of others (directly or indirectly) involved in the discourse. And one would typically expect marking of intersubjectivity, either if the assessor wants to indicate, contra the hearer, that his/her (the assessor’s) position is not an isolated, strictly personal (hence possibly arbitrary) one, or if the assessor assumes (s)he and the hearer are in mutual agreement and wishes to indicate so. In actual practice, then, this dimension will no doubt often be used as a ‘discursive’ tool, i.e. as an element in the ‘negotiation’ of the mutual positions of the interlocutors in a conversational interaction.

It is actually important not to confuse intersubjectivity\textsuperscript{IN} in this sense with ‘absence of commitment’ on the part of the assessor. As already indicated above, even in an intersubjective\textsuperscript{IN} modal expression the assessor remains an assessor (jointly with other assessors), who is thus fully (co-)responsible for the modal evaluation. In other words, this dimension of subjectivity\textsuperscript{IN} vs. intersubjectivity\textsuperscript{IN} should not be confused with that between (respectively) performativity vs. descriptivity (Nuyts 2001a: 39ff), which concerns the question whether a modal expression will no doubt often be used as a ‘discursive’ tool, i.e. as an element in the ‘negotiation’ of the mutual positions of the interlocutors in a conversational interaction.

In other words, in this analysis the dimension is not present in all individual expressions of the different modal categories. And that of course lies perfectly in the nature of the present definition of the category: speakers will want to code (inter)subjectivity\textsuperscript{IN} in modal expressions only if it is conversationally necessary, and so it is only normal that the language offers means to express the modal categories in nature (cf. also Section 3.1), they signal that the interlocutor(s) is/are ‘struggling’ with the status of things in the world, e.g. in terms of whether they exist or not, or are acceptable or desirable or not. And so it is only to be expected that in actual interactions this inherently brings up the issue of whether the interlocutors agree or not on an assessment — i.e. of intersubjectively sharing views vs. putting up different subjective positions against each other.

But the advantage of this formulation is also that, unlike Lyons’ notion, it can be linked to formal properties of the modal expressions, hence it is operationalizable in corpus data. Or in other words, it seems speakers do (or at least can — see below) overtly signal the status of a modal expression in terms of this dimension, and this is of course a clear sign that the issue is at stake for the speaker in the planning of a modal expression. As is demonstrated elaborately (for epistemic modal expressions in particular) in Nuyts (2001a, b), the coding of the dimension is not actually due to the modal marker itself, but to the syntactic pattern in which the latter appears (and as such it is indirectly due to the modal marker, since it triggers these syntactic conditions). Specifically, expression of the category depends on the possibility to code the issuer of the evaluation on the modal marker, i.e. it is particularly linked to predicative (verbal or adjectival) modal expression forms. In these predicative forms, then (for the sake of simplicity focusing on performative cases, i.e. when the assessor is the speaker), a first person subject codes subjectivity\textsuperscript{IN} (cf. (2) above), an impersonal subject intersubjectivity\textsuperscript{IN} (cf. (1) above). Adverbial and grammatical (auxiliary) modal expression forms, however, cannot code the dimension (since they do not bring or control a/the subject), hence they are in principle neutral. Cf. (4), which offers examples for both epistemic (epi) and deontic (deo) modality:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{I think they left already} \hspace{1cm} = epi subjective\textsuperscript{IN}
\item \textit{I really regret that they left already} \hspace{1cm} = deo subjective\textsuperscript{IN}
\item \textit{It is quite probable that they left already} \hspace{1cm} = epi intersubjective\textsuperscript{IN}
\item \textit{It is unacceptable that they left already} \hspace{1cm} = deo intersubjective\textsuperscript{IN}
\item \textit{They probably left already} \hspace{1cm} = epi neutral
\item \textit{Unfortunately they left already} \hspace{1cm} = deo neutral
\item \textit{They may well have left already} \hspace{1cm} = epi neutral
\item \textit{They must leave right away} \hspace{1cm} = deo neutral
\end{enumerate}

In other words, in this analysis the dimension is not present in all individual expressions of the different modal categories. And that of course lies perfectly in the nature of the present definition of the category: speakers will want to code (inter)subjectivity\textsuperscript{IN} in modal expressions only if it is conversationally necessary, and so it is only normal that the language offers means to express the modal categories
As shown in Nuyts (2001b), then, at least for the epistemic expressions, the actual ‘behaviour’ of the different alternative expression types in corpus data (in terms of the types of contexts in which they are being used) is perfectly compatible with this analysis. In fact, the behavior of the forms in real life data seems much better explicable along these lines than along the lines of Lyons’ definition of subjectivity\(^{1}\) vs. objectivity\(^{2}\): in terms of quality of the evidence for the modal assessment.

It is important to stress once again (cf. Section 2.1 in fine), however, that nothing in the foregoing analysis implies that quality of evidence is not a relevant dimension in assessing the status of a state of affairs. On the contrary, it would be completely counterintuitive to deny that assessors can have better or worse evidence, in particular for assessing the existential status of a state of affairs, and may sometimes want to signal this. And if so, then one may expect the language to offer means to express this. But, first of all, this observation as such offers an extra dimension in assessing the status of a state of affairs, and may sometimes want to signal this. And if so, then one may expect the language to offer means to express this. But, first of all, this observation as such offers an extra element against Lyons’ analysis of subjectivity\(^{1}\) vs. objectivity\(^{2}\): while quality of evidence undoubtedly figures in the assessment of the epistemic/reality status of a state of affairs, it is far less obvious whether this is also true for assessing the deontic/moral status of a state of affairs (in spite of Lyons’ application of his distinction also to deontic modality). What should ‘having better or worse evidence’ mean there? In other words, it is far from obvious that the distinction in the way Lyons is making it can be applied to deontic expressions at all (pace his own attempt to do so). In contradistinction, the notion of (inter)subjectivity\(^{3}\) as defined above no doubt is relevant for deontic assessments as well (judgments regarding the moral acceptability of a state of affairs are no doubt also subject to a concern on behalf of the assessor with the question whether his/her interlocutors are in agreement with him/her), and also in this respect it thus appears to match better what is actually behind the intuition that attitudinal statements, also deontic ones, can be more or less subjective (cf. (4)).\(^7\)

Secondly, if the issue of the quality of the evidence is at stake in assessing the existential status of a state of affairs, and is relevant enough to be communicated, the question is how this is expressed linguistically. Maybe it has some effect on the marking of (inter)subjectivity\(^{3}\) in relation to an epistemic expression, in the sense that one can imagine, e.g., that if a speaker has only vague evidence for the epistemic evaluation, about which (s)he has not thought much, (s)he is more likely to indicate subjectivity on the epistemic expression. But this is then obviously an indirect effect: in direct terms the marking is still about whether the evaluation is shared or not. But many languages probably also have more direct means to express this, though not via an epistemic expression: after all, inferential evidential expressions would precisely seem to serve this function. They not only code that

2.3 The semantic status of (inter)subjectivity\(^{3}\)

What is the semantic status of the concept of (inter)subjectivity\(^{3}\), then? First of all, its definition — including the facts that it is not necessarily present in modal statements (which means that if it does not matter the speaker will not mark it), and that it is relevant for several semantic categories (at least all attitudinal ones) — strongly suggests that it is not inherent in (or ‘part of’) the (different) modal categories as such. In other words, contrary to what is often assumed in the literature regarding the traditional notion of subjectivity vs. objectivity in modality (see Section 2.1), it probably involves a separate semantic category.

But if so, then what kind of semantic category is it? As argued in Nuyts (2001b), it would seem akin to, hence it might form a semantic group with, a few other categories proposed in the literature, including DeLancy’s (1997, 2001; see also Aikhenvald 2004) ‘mirativity’ (short for ‘admirativity’), or Slobin and Aksu’s (1982, Aksu-koç and Slobin 1986) ‘prepared vs. unprepared minds’, which code the fact that the information provided in the clause is new and surprising or unexpected for the speaker. (See also, e.g., DeLancy 1986, Nichols 1986, Woodbury 1986, Lee 1993, Choi 1995 for other related categories.) (Inter)subjectivity\(^{3}\) is not entirely the same as mirativity, of course, at least in the sense that the former does not code ‘being new and surprising’ to the speaker in any direct sense. (At best, subjectivity\(^{3}\) holds the potential of coding something which is new and surprising to the hearer.) But, although the exact semantic relationship is in need of further investigation (beyond the scope of the present paper), they somehow do share the property of marking (an aspect of) the status of the information in the utterance (the state of affairs) in terms of the assessor’s ‘position in the (discursive) world’. (Admittedly, this is a vague characterization, for lack of better knowledge at this point.) And as such their semantic status would appear to differ from that of qualification categories such as evidentiality or epistemic modality.

In fact, in the original formulation of the category of (inter)subjectivity\(^{3}\) it was characterized as a type of evidentiality (cf. Nuyts 2001b). Mirativity too has been characterized as ‘an odd appendage to evidentiality’ (DeLancy 2001:370), the postulated state of affairs is inferred/deducted. Probably more importantly, they also code the degree of confidence with which the speaker makes the inference (cf. the fact that inferentiality is a scalar category, just like epistemic modality). Or in other words, they code the degree of reliability of the information on the basis of which the existence (or non-existence) of the state of affairs is hypothesized: e.g., seemingly or it seems indicate low confidence/reliability, apparently or it appears code medium confidence/reliability, and clearly or obviously mark high confidence/reliability.\(^8\)
and specifically to inferentiality. But DeLancy also admits that the semantic nature of mirativity is actually quite different from that of (inferential) evidentiality, witness the fact that he had to use quite different 'elicitation strategies' to evoke evidential vs. mirative forms in informants during fieldwork on Tibetan and Athapaskan languages. The same is true for (inter)subjectivity; this category, like mirativity, is really not about kinds of sources of evidence, or about the 'reliability' of the source information, for postulating a state of affairs (as is the case in inferentials). Even more generally, these categories do not concern assessing the existential status of the state of affairs (unlike epistemic modality and inferentiality), and they are not about the extent to which the assessor can commit him/herself to the state of affairs (in terms of its existence, or its moral status, etc., as is the case in 'attitudinal' categories such as inferentiality or epistemic and deontic modality). As mentioned, they rather concern the position/status of the assessor (vis-a-vis others, at least in the case of (inter)subjectivity), with relevance to the state of affairs. Or in other words, they are more about the individuals behind expressions about states of affairs than about those states of affairs themselves.

This different status no doubt also explains the very different 'behavior' of linguistic expressions of (inter)subjectivity as compared to expressions of attitudinal categories. While in general there are heavy restrictions on the co-occurrence of attitudinal categories in a clause (e.g. of deontic and epistemic forms, or of epistemic and inferential forms; see Nuyts 2009), expressions of (inter)subjectivity freely and frequently combine — in a very integrated way, cf. 2.2 — with any of the attitudinal categories. And this even appears to be their predominant 'habitat', i.e. (inter)subjectivity prototypically behaves as an 'extra' assessment (if one can call it such) on top of an attitudinal one.9

So, while DeLancy (2001) still assumes that mirativity is a category roughly of the same kind as (even if different from) evidentiality and modality, there are good arguments to assume that categories such as mirativity and (inter)subjectivity are really different from the latter, hence occupy a separate position in a conceptual-semantic theory of 'qualifications' of states of affairs. I'll return to this issue in Section 3.1.

3. Subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity/objectivity beyond modality

3.1 Traugott’s notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity

So far, we have discussed concepts of subjectivity figuring in the literature on modal and related notions, but as mentioned, the in the current cognitive and functional linguistic literature most cited concepts of it have actually been introduced in other contexts (even if they also often refer to modal notions). So let us now turn to the question of the relationship between the notion of (inter)subjectivity and the two most important of these other notions.

The first one to consider is the notion of (inter)subjectivity — or, more accurately, of 'subjectivity' vs. 'objectivity' and of 'intersubjectivity', see below — implied in the diachronic processes of subjectification and intersubjectification as pioneered by Traugott (1989, 1995, 2010, Traugott and Dasher 2002; cf. also López-Couso 2010). By subjectification, Traugott and colleagues refer to the observation that in diachronic language change linguistic forms (most typically, but far from exclusively, grammaticalizing ones) often show a strong tendency to evolve from meanings pertaining to the description of the 'objective world' (in a broad sense) towards meanings that pertain to the expression of the speaker's personal position vis-a-vis the 'objective world', i.e. that "encode and调节 attitudes and beliefs" (Traugott 2010:35). (Traugott explicitly refers among others to epistemic meanings as being strongly subjectified.) Traugott thus assumes that meanings of linguistic elements, quite in general, can be more objective or more subjective — and this is not a black-and-white issue but a gradual distinction.

Intersubjectification in Traugott's analysis then concerns the further evolution whereby linguistic forms are "recruited to encode meanings centered on the addressee" (Traugott 2010:35), i.e. whereby they become markers of the speaker's interactive stance towards the hearer. This should then be taken in a very broad sense, involving uses of forms to do with the regulation of the interaction between the speaker and the hearer (including, e.g., discourse particles, politeness markers, etc.), but also uses coding textual functions. This principle is thus based on the assumption that meanings (or uses) of linguistic elements can also be intersubjective. The 'also' is important here: in Traugott's analysis, intersubjective is not incompatible with or opposed to subjective, it implies some degree of subjectivity (cf. e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002:31)

From the above characterization alone it may be obvious that Traugott's notions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity do not correspond in any direct way to the notion of (inter)subjectivity as discussed in Section 2.2 (the same point is made by Traugott 2010:34). This is clearly signaled by the fact that Traugott's concept actually involves three 'values' rather than two, viz. objective, subjective and intersubjective, whereby there is some sort of opposition (even if not a binary one) between the former two values, but — quite unlike the situation in (inter)subjectivity — not at all between the latter two. The question remains, however, how they differ precisely, and whether there is any kind of relationship between them.

A difficulty when trying to answer this question is that (quite like the traditional modality-related notions of subjectivity) Traugott's notions (as she indicates herself, cf. Traugott 2010:56) are formulated in very general and rather vague
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A comparable semantic scope relationship exists between (any combination of) the other qualificational dimensions, and these relationships moreover appear stable across examples, and across languages. And in these terms, then, one can postulate a semantic scope hierarchy of the kind in (6), in which the different qualificational categories are ordered from low to high in terms of increasing scope (i.e., higher in the hierarchy means wider scope, hence categories do have semantic scope over those below them, but not over those above them).12

(6) > evidentiality
   > epistemic modality
   > deontic modality
   > time
      > quantitative (frequency) aspect / dynamic modality
      > phasal aspect
      > state of affairs

But in what way is this semantic scope hierarchy relevant for our understanding of Traugott’s notions of subjectivityET vs. objectivityET and intersubjectivityET, and of the diachronic processes of (inter)subjectification, then? The answer emerges as soon as one realizes what the hierarchy in (6) actually stands for. As argued in Nuyts (2009), this hierarchy may actually be taken to reflect (no doubt in a non-simplistic way though) the relative position of the different categories in it in our conceptualization of the world. And from that perspective, there appears to be a much more fundamental cognitive rationale behind the hierarchy, of which the semantic scope relations as emerging at the linguistic surface (in utterances such as in (5)) are probably just a fairly superficial reflection or emanation.

In abstract and summary terms (see Nuyts 2009 for detailed discussion), climbing up the hierarchy involves a gradual widening of the perspective on the state of affairs: qualifications at the bottom offer additional specifications, in concrete terms, of the internal constitution of the state of affairs (phasal aspect specifies the internal state of deployment of the state of affairs), those in the middle situate the state of affairs in the ‘surrounding real world’ (time, e.g., situates the state of affairs on the time axis), those at the top involve abstract characterizations of the status of the state of affairs in the language user’s reasoning about the world (e.g. deontic modality in terms of its desirability, epistemic modality and evidentiality in terms of its existence).

Correspondingly, climbing up the hierarchy involves an increasing role for knowledge external to the state of affairs proper: ‘doing’ a qualification low in the system requires (hardly) anything beyond knowledge of the state of affairs itself (e.g., determining the state of deployment — phasal aspect — of a state of affairs only requires knowledge of that state of affairs), those high up in the system are
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exclusively based on information external to the state of affairs proper (e.g., assessing the epistemic status of a hypothetical state of affairs requires reasoning from other bits and pieces of knowledge about the world to postulate the state of affairs).

As such, then, climbing up the hierarchy also implies an increasing role for the ‘qualifying subject’, i.e. the assessor: the higher up in the hierarchy, the more the assessor has to do in terms of interpreting the situation, hence the more room there is for creative involvement on his/her part in coming to the qualification of the state of affairs. It is in this sense, then, that — correlated with the increasing scope of the categories in (6) — this hierarchy can be said to reflect increasing subjectivity. And Traugott’s notion of subjectification can thus be defined as the process by which the meaning of a linguistic element climbs up (historically) in this hierarchy.13

However, the notion of subjectivity involved here then refers to the extent to which the cognizing/speaking/qualifying subject has a personal impact on — or, in a way, is personally present or has personally ‘invested’ in — the meaning at stake: little in ‘objectiveET’ meanings, a lot in ‘subjectiveET’ meanings. And this concerns an inherent feature of the meanings in the hierarchy. As such, then, this notion refers to something very different from what is involved in (inter)subjectivityIN. To take up the discussion of the status of the latter in Section 2.3 again, (inter)subjectivityIN (exactly like mirativity, for that matter) does not refer to any inherent feature of the qualificational categories in (6). It refers to some kind of ‘semantic qualification’ itself, even if of a kind different from the categories contained in the hierarchy in (6). The latter all concern the status of the state of affairs as such, not that of the assessor — but, as argued in Section 2.3, (inter)subjectivityIN (like mirativity) is more about the position of the speaker than about the status of the state of affairs. Therefore it probably does not belong in this hierarchy directly, in the sense that it would just be an extra layer in it, somewhere — but nevertheless it is a semantic category which is closely associated with the hierarchy. (Admittedly, this is again fairly vague, for lack of a better understanding of the matter at this point.)

Of course, the notions of subjectivityET and of (inter)subjectivityIN do ‘meet’, notably in the ‘attitudinal’ categories in the hierarchy (deontic and epistemic modality and inferential evidentiality), in the sense that these are highly subjectiveET categories which at the same time typically (even if not necessarily) attract marking of (inter)subjectivityIN. There is no doubt even a link between the two dimensions here: it is precisely because of the fact that these attitudinal categories are so highly subjectiveET, i.e., depend so strongly on the assessor’s interpretation and consideration (they even explicitly concern the question to what extent the assessor can be committed to the state of affairs, along deontic or epistemic lines), that they often invite concern on the part of the assessor whether others might share his/her interpretations and considerations or not, i.e. what is involved in (inter)subjectivityIN. But this does not change the fact that the two notions refer to really different matters or phenomena.

But what about intersubjectivityET? To continue our attempt above to operationalize the concept of (inter)subjectification in diachronic change, intersubjectification can be defined (admittedly more vaguely than subjectification) as a process whereby a linguistic element ‘semantically leaves’ the qualificational hierarchy in (6), to assume a function in the realm of interaction management, e.g. as an illocutionary marker, a politeness marker, a sentence connector, etc. In fact, as already mentioned, the hierarchy in (6) may be taken to reflect a dimension of our conceptualization of the world. In other words, in terms of a language processing model, it is an aspect of conceptual-semantic representation. But illocutionary functions, or textual coding devices, belong in very different areas of a language processing model: they have nothing to do with our (representation of our) ‘knowledge of the world’ as such, they concern the way we plan and organize our communication about that knowledge with interlocutors in actual circumstances (see Nuyts 2001a; cf. also Nuyts 2008 specifically on the theoretical status in a cognitive model of the qualificational notions in the hierarchy in (6) versus illocutionary dimensions).

As such, then, there is no relationship whatsoever between the notion of intersubjectivityET (at least in this interpretation of it) and the dimension of (inter)subjectivityIN — they refer to two entirely different things.14 Hence, not surprisingly, there also does not seem to be any ‘affinity’ at all between intersubjectiveET expressions and the marking of (inter)subjectivityIN, in the way it exists in the subjectiveET attitudinal categories.15

3.2 Langacker’s notion of subjective vs. objective construal

Another notion often referred to in the current literature on subjectivity is Langacker’s concept of ‘subjectiveET vs. objectiveET construal: Although Langacker (1990, 1999: 297ff) has also applied it to the diachronic processes of subjectification and grammaticalization (see also several contributions in Athanasiadou et al. eds. 2006), his notion is originally, and essentially, part of his analysis in the framework of Cognitive Grammar of one aspect of the properties of conceptualization, viz. of how humans can conceptually construe a state of affairs in alternative ways by adopting different perspectives on it (cf. Langacker 1987: 128ff). SubjectiveET vs. objectiveET construal, as one ‘type’ of perspectivization, has to do with the question to what extent the perceiver/conceptualizer is ‘on- vs. offstage’ in the conceptualization of the object of perception (an entity or a scene or state of affairs).

In (what Langacker calls) the ‘optimal viewing arrangement’ the conceptualizer is entirely offstage or implicit, i.e. (s)he is not part of the conceptualization and the focus of attention is entirely on the perceived object. The conceptualizer
is then said to be maximally subjectiveRL and the perceived object is maximally objectiveRL. When the conceptualizer gets onstage and becomes an explicit part of the conceptualization, however, i.e. when (s)he is bringing him/herself also into the focus of attention, as ‘part’ of the perceived state of affairs, (s)he becomes less subjectiveRL/more objectiveRL and the perceived object (the state of affairs) gets less objectiveRL/more objectiveRL. Langacker’s (1990, 1999) notion of subjectification is then obviously also defined in these terms, but the details are of no further import now (see also López-Couso 2010).

Langacker (1990:16) still suggested that his notion of diachronic subjectification is a special case of Traugott’s concept of subjectification (he calls Traugott’s a ‘broad’ definition and his own a ‘narrow’ definition) — and if so then also their notions of subjectivity vs. objectivity might be expected to be closely related. But in the mean time several authors have stressed the profound difference between both notions of subjectification (e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002:97–99, López-Couso 2010:145; and also Langacker 1999:393–394 has come to believe that they are entirely complementary, non-overlapping notions).

Correspondingly, also the notions of subjectivity vs. objectivity involved are very clearly profoundly different. Unlike Traugott’s, Langacker’s notion has nothing to do with the nature of the meaning per se of a linguistic element, i.e. with the degree of subjectivity involved in the cline in (6), in the sense explained in Section 3.1. Instead, it has to do with the question how any semantic element, irrespective of whether it is high or low in this hierarchy, and including the state of affairs itself, is presented by the speaker, notably in terms of the extent to which the speaker ‘surfaces’ in its presentation. As such, Langacker’s dimension is, in a way, orthogonal to the cline in (6), hence to Traugott’s notion of subjectivityJL vs. objectivityJL (cf. also De Smet and Verstraete 2006:370).16

And as such subjectiveRL vs. objectiveRL construal is also profoundly different from (inter)subjectivityJN. To repeat (cf. Section 3.1), even if it is probably not actually part of the hierarchy in (6) but related to it in a looser way, (inter)subjectivityJN is nevertheless a conceptual semantic category of its own, just like the notions in the hierarchy. And so Langacker’s notion is orthogonal to it, too.

Langacker’s and my own notions again do ‘meet’ in the range of the attitudinal categories, in the sense that subjectiveJL vs. objectiveJL construal is ‘used’ for marking subjectivityJN (in particular) in the presentation of, e.g., an epistemic evaluation. In fact, as mentioned in Section 2.2, subjectivityJN is (at least in performative cases) expressed by explicitly marking the first person subject in a predicative (full verbal or adjectival) expression of (e.g.) epistemic modality (cf. (4a) in Section 2.2). In Langacker’s words, then, it is marked by means of an ‘objective’ construal of the speaker/assessor (since (s)he is on stage in the presentation) and a not entirely objective construal of the ‘object’, i.e. the epistemic assessment. Neutral

and intersubjective epistemic expressions (and descriptive subjective ones), on the other hand, are realized (cf. (4b–d) in Section 2.2) by means of a fully ‘backstaged’ speaker/assessor, hence an entirely objective construal of the epistemic assessment. And there does not seem to be any difference anymore among these ‘values’ in terms of Langacker’s dimension — in other words, distinguishing between neutral and intersubjective expressions is not done by means of subjectiveRL vs. objectiveRL construal anymore. So the correlation between the two notions even in the range of the attitudinal categories is only very partial.

But, again, even to the extent that there is a correlation, this in no way changes the fact that the two notions refer to very fundamentally different phenomena, with very different positions/roles in a theory of the cognitive organization and processing of language.

4. Conclusion

The conclusion of this (selective) overview of notions of subjectivity must be that they (or most of them) are referring to really different phenomena. Lyons’ notion of subjectivityJL vs. objectivityJL and my own notion of (inter)subjectivityJN are still fairly close in the sense that they are meant to cover roughly the same range of linguistic facts but analyze and explain them in fairly different ways — so to a large extent they are competitors for the same ground. But the empirical facts addressed by (inter)subjectivityJN are fundamentally different from those addressed by both Traugott’s notions of ‘subjectivityET’ vs. ‘objectivityET’ and ‘intersubjectivityET’ and Langacker’s notion of subjectiveRL vs. objectiveRL construal, just like the ground covered by the latter two is mutually fundamentally different — so they are not competing for the same ground in any way. This conclusion should not surprise us, of course, given that Traugott’s, Langacker’s and the modality related notions originate in different areas of linguistic investigation, hence were meant to do different things from the beginning.

Surely, these different notions are sometimes and to some extent ‘co-applicable’, in the sense that they can be used alongside each other in the account of one and the same linguistic phenomenon. This is notably (but no doubt not exclusively) true in the range of the attitudinal qualificational categories and their expressions. And, as I hope to have shown, their ‘coincidence’ there is even motivated, in the sense that there is a ‘logical’ reason why they would co-apply. But the coincidence is usually only partial, and, even more importantly, it concerns different aspects or dimensions of the phenomenon at stake. And so even when there is co-applicability we should not be trapped into the fallacy to equate them: even then these notions do concern essentially different empirical phenomena.
All of this also means, however, that these notions are not mutually exclusive either, and that, pace what what is sometimes the case in the literature, we should not be trapped into attempts to determine which of them is better, and to go for just one of them in doing linguistics. We probably need (some variant of) all of them, jointly, in a linguistic theory, be it in different ‘parts’ of it. And, as indicated, for the analysis of some phenomena — such as the modal/attitudinal categories — all of them may be useful or even indispensable, alongside each other, to account for different aspects of the subject matter. Thus, in the analysis of the attitudinal/modal categories, we do need (something like) the notion of (inter)subjectivity\textsubscript{IN} to explain some of the usage properties of the alternative expressive devices in a ‘semantic paradigm’ such as the epistemic or deontic one — i.e. we need it to account for some of the differences among the epistemic or the deontic variants in (4) in Section 2.2. And we do need (something like) the notion of ‘subjectivity\textsubscript{ET}’ vs. ‘objectivity\textsubscript{ET}’ to explain the basic semantic nature/status of the different attitudinal categories, mutually and relative to other semantic dimensions such as those ‘lower’ in the hierarchy in (6) in Section 3.1, and to explain (some of) their linguistic properties, including the fact that they easily attract codings of (inter)-subjectivity\textsubscript{IN}. And we can use (something like) the notion of subjective\textsubscript{ET} vs. objective\textsubscript{ET} construal to explain (in part) how the marking of (inter)subjectivity\textsubscript{IN} in the attitudinal categories is realized.

Langacker (1987: 28) has already warned us against the ‘exclusionary fallacy’ in linguistic/scientific argumentation — the field of notions of subjectivity is a clear case in point.

In the light of the foregoing, it is of course very unfortunate that these different notions to a considerable extent use the same terminology (most notably, the notion of ‘subjectivity’ is shared by all of them). This is bound to cause confusion, even in those who are well aware of the differences. And it is highly inconvenient for those who happen to need two or more of these notions simultaneously in their work.\textsuperscript{17} But experience tells that one cannot change established terminology easily — and so for many years to come we are probably bound to rely on our conscious scientific awareness to keep these different notions apart.

Notes

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involved in the expressions in (4) (which express degrees of moral acceptability without this also involving anything in terms of ‘directivity’). ‘Directivity’ is an illocutionary category (exactly the same one as involved in imperatives), while ‘true’ deontic modality is a (qualificational) category (marking the conceptual status of a state of affairs) quite like (e.g.) epistemic modality. In this light, it remains a fact that Lyons’ distinction in terms of quality of evidence does not seem to apply to ‘real’ deontic modality, while my distinction does. Neither distinction appears to apply to directive cases — but that may be another argument in favor of separating directivity and deontic modality.

8. The above should not be misinterpreted as involving the assumption that inferentiality actually is the same thing as epistemic modality — as I have argued elsewhere (Nuyts 2005a), it is not. But the above does demonstrate how the two relate, and it explains why they are so close together, semantically: they both pertain to assessing the existential status of a state of affairs. Also, given the above observation that quality of evidence would only seem relevant to assess the epistemic/reality status of a state of affairs, but not the deontic status, it is not surprising to find that there is only inferential evidentiality pertaining to ‘existential’ judgments, not to moral ones.

9. An interesting question is in which semantic conditions marking of (inter)subjectivity can and/or do occur: attitudinal categories appear to be the major/preferential context, but it is certainly not the exclusive context. This is an issue for further investigation.

10. Traugott (e.g. 2010) has indicated repeatedly that her notion of subjectivity vs. objectivity in particular is strongly inspired by Lyons’ notion of it. But she thereby refers to Lyons’ use of the notion in his analysis of (e.g.) deixis — and as indicated in Section 2.1 already, this is probably not (entirely) the same as the (more specific) notion of subjectivity vs. objectivity which Lyons has introduced in the modal sphere.

11. There are actually several versions of this concept in the literature, going under different names — cf. e.g. Foley and Van Valin (1984) (probably the oldest version), Bybee (1985), Hengeveld (1989), Dik (1997), and Van Valin and LaPolla (1997). See Nuyts (2001a) for discussion.

12. The foregoing presentation strongly simplifies the situation, in several respects. First of all, the hierarchy in (6) is not complete and only features the most important qualificational dimensions. Secondly, there are several factors which complicate the picture suggested in (6). One of them is the distinction between performative and descriptive (‘reporting’) uses of (among others) deontic and epistemic expressions (see Section 2.2, and cf. Nuyts 2001a: 39f, 2009) — only applies to performative qualifications. Another one is the fact (already hinted at in Section 2.3) that there are restrictions on the co-occurrence of certain categories (notably, the attitudinal ones, viz. deontic and epistemic modality and evidentiality), which have nothing to do with their semantic scope but are due to other semantic or cognitive factors (cf. e.g. Nuyts 2009). The latter fact then also complicates the assessment of the precise hierarchical ordering among these attitudinal categories — see Nuyts (2009) for arguments for the order given in (6). These issues are not crucial for the present discussion, however.

13. The recent suggestion by Visconti (in print) that Traugott’s notion of subjectification may be ‘sharpened’ by formulating it as a change from propositional meanings (sentence meaning which is ‘evaluable’) to non-propositional meanings (meanings involving the evaluation of propositional meaning) is roughly going in the same direction of course (although drawing a black-and-white distinction between propositional and non-propositional meanings would seem hard to do, and is not necessary in the present proposal, which assumes a gradual cline). As Visconti indicates, however, accepting such a definition excludes some semantic changes which have also been covered under the label of subjectification, such as the development of negative (pejorative) or positive (ameliorative) connotations, these latter facts being considered 'deontic' by Traugott (as a conceptual one).

14. The characterization of (inter)subjectivity in Section 2.2 might make one wonder whether this is not actually an intersubjective category: as mentioned there, it is likely that the marking of (inter)subjectivity will often be used to achieve certain interactive purposes. Yet, in spite of the latter, the answer is ‘no’ — see Section 3.1 already. This is an issue for further investigation.

15. In the present interpretation of intersubjectivity (and of subjectivity) one may actually wonder whether it is adequate to consider intersubjective expressions to be simply subjective, too (as Traugott does). But discussing this matter is beyond the present scope.

16. Langacker’s characterization of subjective vs. objective construal as being a matter of how humans conceptualize the world would suggest that his dimension should nevertheless be brought to bear somehow on the hierarchy in (6), since, as mentioned in Section 3.1, the latter is also supposed to reflect an aspect of conceptual-semantic representation. As I have argued elsewhere (cf. e.g. Nuyts 2001a: 287ff, 2005b), however, e.g. with regards to the conceptual representation of epistemic modality, it is far from obvious that matters to do with alternative construals or perspectivizations of the same concept or conceptual configuration, quite in general, are inherent to conceptual representation (at least if the latter term is to be used in its common sense meaning, i.e. referring to the format in which we store our world knowledge in long-term memory). They arguably rather pertain to a matter of the context-specific adaptation of conceptual representation to the requirements of actual action contexts. In language use, for example, there are a matter of how the conceptual state of affairs to be presented for the purpose of a specific communicative act, such that the resulting utterance is contextually adequate. One might call this a ‘linguistic semantic’ issue (pace Langacker’s assumption that there is no such thing; cf. e.g. Nuyts 2002: 452ff). The fact — see below — that in the range of attitudual categories subjective vs. objective construal is, so to speak, used (at least in part) to mark (inter)-subjectivity (as a conceptual dimension) is of course entirely in line with this view.

17. This is the case in my own work, e.g.: next to the notion of (inter)subjectivity I also often need the ‘Traugottian notions of subjectivity and of intersubjectivity’ (cf. e.g. Nuyts in print a). It is not surprising, then, that readers will get confused about what I mean by ‘subjectivity’ (cf. Narro 2010b).
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1. Introduction

The phenomenon of intersubjectivity in language (Traugott & Dasher 2002) has been of increasing interest in recent years to both historical linguists and discourse analysts, though for slightly different reasons. As this dual appeal suggests, it can be approached from two different but complementary perspectives: grammatical/pragmatic and discoursal. The former is typically centred around choices within the clause, with a particular interest in the ways in which (groups of) linguistic forms, such as certain discourse markers, develop intersubjective meanings through diachronic shift in the process of intersubjectification, seen as closely related to grammaticalization (Davidse et al. 2010). The latter works primarily at the level of text and explores the range of ways in which intersubjectivity is realized in discourse, focusing on how relevant meanings are expressed, potentially by a variety of forms, rather than taking specific forms as the starting point. This perspective has most often been synchronic in nature, partly no doubt because the focus of analysis is generally less sharply defined in terms of discrete surface forms which persist over time with changes in meaning, and it is therefore more difficult to
track diachronic development. Each of these two approaches highlights different aspects of the phenomenon, and I would argue that a more rounded description of language change and use emerges when both are taken into account. In this article, I will focus on the discoursal perspective on intersubjectivity, and I will follow the general trend in concentrating on contemporary texts.

What I aim to do in this article is to illustrate, through an examination of a small corpus of UK newspaper editorials, the ways in which the concept of intersubjectivity can be applied in the exploration of how certain groups of texts mean — and in particular of how writers exploit intersubjective choices to enact interaction with their intended audience. I will demonstrate that viewing intersubjectivity from this angle permits an investigation of the ways in which choices from different linguistic resources work together in texts to complement and reinforce each other in constructing discoursal roles for writers and readers; and that identifying the patterns of intersubjective choices in a number of texts makes it possible to advance more secure claims about the assumptions that different newspapers make about their own socio-cultural role and about the characteristics of their target audience.

2. A discoursal perspective on intersubjectivity

As noted above, I believe it is possible and useful to distinguish between grammatical/pragmatic and discoursal perspectives on intersubjectivity. The discoursal perspective broadly involves viewing discourse as dialogistic: constructed fundamentally in terms of exchanges between interactants in communicative events in which each interactant shapes their message to accommodate and affect the other. Bakhtin argues that every utterance (whether a single turn in a conversation or a lengthy written text) responds to previous utterances: "Every utterance must be regarded as primarily a response to preceding utterances ... Each utterance refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies upon the others, presupposes them to be known, and somehow takes them into account" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91). At the same time it anticipates potential future responses: "the speaker talks with an expectation of a response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth (with various speech genres presupposing various integral orientations and speech plans on the part of speakers or writers)" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 69). Thus, in the most general terms, all discourse can be seen as inherently intersubjective, with specific, identifiable traces of this characteristic.

It is true that this all-encompassing view appears to go against Traugott’s relatively restrictive circumscribing of what counts as intersubjective:

However, this list reflects grammatical/pragmatic concerns, in that it is strongly oriented towards formal elements, the changes in usage of which can be tracked diachronically. The discoursal perspective is in line with the more open-ended characterization of intersubjectivity in Traugott (2003: 128): "Intersubjectivity is the explicit expression of the SP/W’s [speaker/writer’s] attention to the ‘self’ of addressee/reader in both an epistemic sense (paying attention to their presumed attitude to the content of what is said), and in a more social sense (paying attention to their ‘face’ or ‘image needs’ associated with social stance and identity)". There have been proposals to expand the list offered by Traugott (2007): for example, Breban (2010) makes a strong case for including determining elements, since they are one of the means by which "the speaker negotiates the tracking and interconnecting of discourse referents by the hearer" (Davidse et al. 2008: 142). Furthermore, if one takes a dialogistic perspective on discourse, a number of other linguistic resources which are traditionally regarded as subjective can be more illuminatingly seen as intersubjective. For example, evaluative expressions are not (just) subjective outpourings of self-oriented feeling, but function intersubjectively: “declarations of attitude are dialogically directed towards aligning the addressee into a community of shared value and belief” (Martin & White 2005: 95). This is particularly evident in the case of invoked, or implicit, evaluation. Here, the addresser offers information which is not explicitly marked as evaluative, but which is designed to evoke an evaluative response in the addressee, thus creating a communicative space for the addressee to collaborate in the construction of the discourse by recognizing and accepting the evaluative potential of the information. In example (1), the reader of the blog is projected as sharing with the writer the culturally-specific belief that for men to wear socks with sandals is a sartorial blunder:

1 (1) But I really shouldn’t care about that stuff, he’s a great guy. But really...socks with sandals...all the time?

Similarly, epistemic modality is not seen purely in terms of assessment of truth value or of self-oriented degrees of speaker certainty but as a resource for interpersonal negotiation. Thompson & Zhou (2000: 130) point out that: "As Halliday (1994: 89) puts it: ‘you only say you are certain when you are not’ — or, in a broader and perhaps more accurate wording, saying explicitly that you believe something to be true admits the possibility of it not being believed to be true by everyone.” There appears to be a cline from cases where the speaker is genuinely (un)certain, as in example...
(2), to those where the modality is intersubjectively oriented to the addressee, in that it does not signal the speaker’s uncertainty but their willingness to entertain, at least provisionally, a belief potentially held by the addressee, as in example (3):

(2) I did turn that on and it may have helped, I’m not sure.

(3) Avoid fast food. … Fast food may be handy, but often is high in fat and calories.

Although the intersubjective aspects are less salient in examples like (2), even here the speaker can be seen as offering the proposition ‘it helped’ but leaving it open for the addressee to validate (compare the discussion of the “dialogic expansiveness of modality and evidentiality” in Martin & White 2005: 104–108). The example is taken from an online forum where people can seek advice about computer problems, and the writer appears to be using modality not only to show uncertainty but to project himself as less knowledgeable than the expert to whose advice he is responding: that is, the modality contributes to constructing the roles of both interactants in the exchange in (2) as much as in (3).2

One way of investigating the phenomenon of intersubjectivity in this broader sense is through the concept of ‘reader-in-the-text’ (Thompson & Thetela 1995).3 Other terms which are used for this concept in different approaches include ‘ideal reader’ (e.g. Culler 1982), ‘ideal subject’ (e.g. Talbot 1992) and ‘implied reader’ (Iser 1972); but the admittedly clumsy formulation of ‘reader-in-the-text’ has the advantage that it makes absolutely explicit that the focus is on evidence in the text itself. This virtual entity, which haunts all discourse, is construed by configurations of linguistic choices which reflect the writer’s expectations about what the addressee may bring to the text and the kinds of response that the text will elicit from the addressee. These choices project a reader with certain attitudes, knowledge, assumptions, status, etc. and assign roles for that reader to play in the unfolding of the discourse. The extent to which any individual ‘real-world’ readers fit themselves into the semiotic shape moulded for them by the text is, of course, unpredictable: these readers may adopt a compliant stance (even if on a provisional basis) or a resistant one — or may switch between these at different stages of the reading.

It is worth noting that the distinction between responding to previous utterances and formulating one’s present utterance in anticipation of reactions from addressees is less salient in this perspective, since the reader-in-the-text may be construed both as one of the (potential) sources of propositions to which the writer is responding, as in example (4), and as reacting in a particular way to the writer’s propositions, as in (5) — the propositions attributed to the reader-in-the-text are highlighted.

(4) It has been argued that most libraries have Internet access. However, many people with disabilities, especially those in rural areas, do not have access to accessible transportation and cannot get access to information available on Internet.

(5) I mean, at first glance, it might appear that this was all completely my fault, but really, it’s not.

Indeed, in many cases the two possibilities may be simultaneously in play: for instance, in example (3) above the proposition ‘fast food [is] handy’ can be seen as an objection which the writer anticipates that the reader-in-the-text will raise in response to her command to avoid fast food precisely because she is aware that this proposition has been previously uttered by people like the reader-in-the-text. It should also be stressed that, in analysing discourse, even the absence of expressions of modality, attitude, etc. is intersubjectively significant. Such absence indicates, broadly, a decision not to negotiate with the addressee at that point in the discourse, which in itself indicates that the writer construes the reader-in-the-text as, for whatever reason, not needing to be ‘managed’ at that point.

The range of features which contribute to the intersubjective construal of the reader-in-the-text is considerably more extensive than those suggested in Traugott (2007), and it is difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at an exhaustive list. Some of the areas which have proved illuminating to explore, within and between clauses, are: interactant pronouns (Kim 2009); non-declarative mood choices (Thompson & Thetela 1995); modalization (Martin & White 2005; see example (3) above); polarity (Jordan 1998); evaluation (Martin & White 2005); unattributed/general mental and verbal processes (Thompson 2001; see example (4) above with the verbal process it has been argued); concession (Thompson & Zhou 2000); and Hypothetical-Real (Winter 1994; see example (5) above).4

It is unsurprising that dialogistic intersubjectivity tends to be more salient in persuasive texts, which are inherently shaped with the persuasae in mind. Earlier studies have explored the notion of reader-in-the-text in texts such as advertisements (Thompson & Thetela 1995) and academic writing (Thompson 2001), as culturally significant exemplars of persuasive discourse. In the present article, I will focus on newspaper editorials, as another prime instance of frequently-encountered texts which aim to engage directly with their readership in order to encourage persuasion and affiliation: as Wahl-Jorgensen (2008:67) notes “It is in editorials that newspapers speak both for and to their audience” (see also Le 2010 on the contribution of editorials to the construction of the socio-cultural context in which media position themselves). One reason for selecting this text type is that the diversity of stances found in the press allows comparisons which bring out the fact that, within the same genre, different writers may construe different
kinds of reader-in-the-text, and which thus help to highlight the choices that have been made. I will compare editorials from two contrasting UK newspapers: one, the Guardian, represents the ‘quality’ press, and advances broadly liberal views in social and political matters, while the other, the Sun, is categorized as ‘popular’ and is, often stridently, right-wing in its political views and conservative on social issues. I will examine the ways in which these three representative sets of linguistic resources — interactant reference, response-expecting speech functions and modality — are deployed in the editorials to construct different kinds of readers-in-the-text which reflect the different expectations of the audience (in both senses: the groups that the newspaper writers expect to be writing for, and the values, attitudes, knowledge, etc. that readers expect to be catered for in the newspaper).

3. Data and methods

The data consists of two sets of editorials, one from the Sun and the other from the Guardian, downloaded from the internet. All the editorials are from the period between December 2008 and January 2011. The Guardian texts are explicitly tagged as 'Editorials', while those from the Sun are found in a section labelled 'Sun Says'. The two corpora each total almost exactly 10,000 words, allowing some comparisons to be made directly. The Guardian data comprises 558 message units, while the Sun data has 778. A message unit (MU), as the term is used here, may be made up of a traditional T-unit — an independent clause with its own mood choice, and any clauses dependent on it — or of a stretch of text orthographically marked off as a separate sentence. The latter type, amounting to 8% of the MUs (101 out of 1336 units) includes elliptical stretches with no mood as in (6) and dependent clauses punctuated as separate units, as in (7).

(6) All well then? Far from it. [guardian]

(7) Especially when both are bristling with state-of-the-art navigation gear. [sun]

No attempt was made to match topics. This possibility was considered, but there was very rarely any overlap — the issues which the two newspapers assume to be of interest to their readers are almost entirely different. As a crude indication of the different foci, out of the content words which appear in the 100 most frequent words in each corpus (24 in the Guardian, 21 in the Sun), only 5 are the same: Mr., year, yesterday, country and government. The other content words in the 100 most frequent in the Guardian include public, sector, policy, spending, coalition, Osborne (the current finance minister), law, case and bonuses, reflecting a heavy emphasis on economic policy and legal issues, while those in the Sun include people, home, life, pay, Britain, Labour, Brown and Miliband (the past and current Labour Party leaders), reflecting an emphasis on matters affecting ordinary individuals (‘human interest’) as well as the newspaper’s repeated attacks on Labour and Labour politicians. Another marked surface difference is in the length: the Guardian corpus comprises 17 editorials, with an average of 587 words, whereas the Sun corpus includes 72 editorials, with an average of 137 words. These differences do not directly impact on the kinds of issues that I will be investigating, but, as will be shown, they do contribute to the effects by making certain of the options on which I will focus available or even preferred.

The analysis was carried out manually, using the UAM CorpusTool (available free from http://www.wagsoft.com/CorpusTool/download.html) to keep a record of coding decisions. For certain features under investigation — e.g. pronouns and modal verbs — automation of the initial identification would be possible, but for others — e.g. third-person reference to interactants and the speech function of grammatically ‘incomplete’ message units — it would be difficult to implement; and I preferred to have all the analyses in the same format, especially since CorpusTool allows easy cross-tabulation between, for example, speech function and interactant reference.

4. Results and discussion

4.1 Reference to interactants

Perhaps the most explicit resource available to the writer to construe the reader-in-the-text — and the counterpart, the writer-in-the-text — is the use of interactant pronouns, or, more generally, the forms used to refer to the two interactants (including third-person forms). As Fortanet (2004: 45) notes, these represent "an important indicator of how audiences are conceptualized by speakers and writers". Table 1 shows the overall patterns of use in the data.

It is immediately clear from Table 1 that the Sun draws far more frequently on the resource of interactant reference than the Guardian: nearly six times as many occurrences in the same overall number of words. The differences in the distribution of the three main categories are of only slight statistical significance (df = 2, χ² = 6.375, p < .05), but potentially revealing patterns can be detected at more delicate levels of analysis.

The most obvious difference in the use of interactant pronouns is in we/us/our: whereas the Guardian has only 12 instances of inclusive we referring to writer and reader as included in people in general, the Sun has 86 instances — see examples (8) and (9):
Table 1. Interactant reference in the two corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Type</th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Sun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>we/us/our</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inclusive</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exclusive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>you/your</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reader</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd party individual</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newspaper</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"(8) We are living too long and saving too little for the existing public sector schemes to remain viable." [guardian]

"(9) So with bankers sticking two fingers up to the rest of us again over massive bonuses, it's hardly surprising that — for once — we are all cheering the taxman." [sun]

The Sun therefore appears much more concerned to project explicitly the reader's participation in a community with the writers. The traits of this community are also more clearly delineated than in the Guardian. The we constructed by the Guardian is mostly a relatively undefined group: we 'are living too long and saving too little'; we have become a 'nation of layabeds'; we 'are told' about the Prime Minister's policy; we 'still do not know what will happen to control orders' ('control orders' are sanctions for those found guilty of antisocial behaviour). We are represented as ordinary members of the society, with a generalized interest in political issues. In the Sun, on the other hand, we are often represented as part of specific groupings with clear opinions and feelings: we want to 'put the thugs behind bars'; we 'will miss' a celebrity who recently died; we 'have FOUR sides chasing Europe's greatest [football] trophy'; we 'wanted a world-class health service'; we are 'famed for our love of animals'; we 'are doing our best' to keep our nerve in the financial crisis; we 'insist [our soldiers] are properly armed and protected'; and we are concerned about 'our hero soldiers' or 'Our Boys' who fight for 'us'. It is also noticeable that the groups projected in the Sun are frequently aggrieved at what is happening in the society: we are driven off the road by exorbitant taxes on petrol; 'whale-sized' single mothers on benefits are allowed to keep over-eating 'all paid for by us'; we, the tax-payers, 'pay the feeless and careless'; 'our innocent children' are stalked by sly perverts; we are 'robbed of justice'; the European Commission is 'kicking us when we are down'; fanatics have 'declared war against our way of life'.

Unlike in the Guardian, the Sun reader-in-the-text is thus typically constructed as a member of various fairly well defined groups — car drivers, animal lovers, football fans, law-abiding citizens, supporters of the Armed Forces, people in employment, tax payers, opponents of the last Labour government and supporters of the current coalition government. The implication is that there are others who are not members of these groups, which increases the sense of affiliation of the reader-in-the-text. This is sometimes made explicit — e.g. in (9) bankers are set against the rest of us.

This kind of specific categorization extends into third-person reference to the audience. The Guardian has only 10 third-person references which potentially include the reader-in-the-text, and they are all generalized, as in (10). These include two occurrences of one — a usage which does not appear in the Sun at all.

"(10) Much of the material is of the sort that a commonsense well-informed person would assume is the stock in trade of diplomacy." [guardian]

As will emerge from the discussion below, the phrase 'a commonsense well-informed person' in fact captures rather neatly the reader-in-the-text constructed in the Guardian. On the other hand, in the Sun there are 34 third-person instances, of which 25 refer to the audience either as Sun readers, as in (11), or in terms of one of the groups mentioned above, as in (12):

"(11) It won't surprise Ken that Sun readers think Mrs May is right." [sun]

"(12) It's not just rocketing petrol prices that make life a misery for Britain's motorists." [sun]

No hard evidence is given for the claim about Sun readers' views in (11): the Sun is able to state the opinions of its readers (in this case that 'anti-social yobs' should be sent to prison) because of the assumption that the audience forms a definable group with particular characteristics such as taking a hard line on crime. This set of characteristics can be seen as representing mainstream normality in the world of the Sun. It is also worth noting that the focus on a readership of 'ordinary' people mentioned above in relation to the topics covered is reflected as well in the way that the possessive determiner our is used with national and economic entities: for example, four out of ten references to the economy in the Sun refer to 'our economy', whereas none of the four references in the Guardian do this. We also find 'our [national] debts', 'our recovery from Labour's recession', 'our public services', 'our political system', 'our motor trade', etc. — again, this kind of cozy personalization is completely absent from the Guardian.
In addition, the Sun has 18 exclusive uses of we referring to the newspaper, which is also referred to 12 times as The Sun — there are no comparable instances of exclusive self-reference in the Guardian.

(13) As we reveal today, the MoD officially logged 285 UFO sightings last year [sun]
(14) What leaves The Sun incredulous is that workers on such money would risk their jobs by striking when so many are unemployed. [sun]

This does not play a direct role in the intersubjective aspects of the data, of course; but choosing to make oneself visible in the text in this way does contribute to construing the discourse as being an exchange between specific individuals: a discoursal I/we presupposes an addressed you.

There is also a difference in the use of you/your in the two corpora. There are 8 occurrences in the Guardian against 20 in the Sun; but it is in the referents of you that the clearest differences appear. In the Guardian, these are all generic pronouns, as in (15):

(15) Wherever you are in the spectrum another party stands immediately to the left or the right, splitting your vote. [guardian]

Kitagawa & Lehrer (1990) call instances such as (15) ‘impersonal you’, but this is a rather misleading label. However generically you is used, it still contrasts with other possible ways of referring to people in general such as they, people, everyone. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, a you is a you is a you; its use always acts as a sign of the writer’s awareness of the addressee. In (15), for example, the writer is talking about political parties in Italy — a grouping which clearly does not include the intended audience of the text. However, if you/your is replaced by they/their (which would be equally appropriate in purely referential terms), not only is the generality of the claim lost, but the loss of the sense of the addressee is very marked. Thus even such uses of you project the reader-in-the-text into the state of affairs being described, although the effect is relatively muted. On the other hand, the Sun is markedly more overt in using you interactively: only one of the instances in the Sun is generic. Seven refer directly to the audience, as in (16), while twelve refer to a specific individual, as in (17):

(16) Do you think crime levels are lower than in 1997? [sun]
(17) Thank you, Jimi. Your life was an inspiration. [sun]

Both of these function dialogically, though in different ways: while the first serves as direct address, the second constructs the newspaper as addressing a third person on behalf of the audience. The latter might at first sight appear to contribute less obviously to the intersubjectivity of the text; but in fact it has an equally powerful, albeit subtle, role in shaping a semiotic mould for the reader-in-the-text, in that it enacts speech functions as if performed by the reader-in-the-text jointly with the writer.

Thus, overall, while the Guardian is relatively sparing in exploiting the resource of interactant reference, and opts not to construe a clearly delineated, non-generalized reader-in-the-text by this means, the Sun constructs a much more distinctly characterized and dialogically involved reader-in-the-text, using the pronouns, amongst other purposes, in helping to normalize a set of beliefs and values which are projected as shared between the newspaper and the audience. In many ways, this contrast between the comparatively distancing stance adopted by the Guardian and the more overtly engaging interaction of the Sun is central to the general patterns of the intersubjective positioning of the audience, and is reflected in the other system of choices to be explored below.

4.2 Speech functions

Choices of speech functions which inherently construct a responding role for the addressee (questions, commands and offers, as opposed to statements) are a further resource which plays an important part in projecting the reader-in-the-text. Thompson & Thetela (1995) refer to these as ‘enacted roles’: by asking a question, for example, the writer may enact the role of demander of information (Halliday 1994) and simultaneously creates a communicative slot for someone else — potentially the reader-in-the-text — to fill the role of offering the information.

The results for the two corpora in terms of speech functions of the 1336 MUs are shown in Table 2 (there were no offers).

The differences in the distribution of the three categories between the two corpora are statistically significant overall (df = 2, $\chi^2 = 15.485$, $p < .001$). If the commands are compared with the totals of the rest of the functions, the difference is also significant (df = 1, $\chi^2 = 8.103$, $p < .005$). The proportion of questions show only a marginally significant difference (df = 1, $\chi^2 = 6.344$, $p < .05$); but, as will be seen below, there are variations in the ways in which both questions and commands are used.

Table 2. Speech functions in the two corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Sun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>statements</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>questions</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commands</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Looking in more detail first at commands, at the least delicate level the two corpora are closely matched in terms of who is represented as the ‘obligation-imposed’ entity (Kim & Thompson 2010): in both corpora, around three-quarters are aimed at third parties and a quarter at the audience. Potentially revealing differences emerge, however when more delicate options are brought into the picture (although any conclusions can only be tentative, since the raw frequencies for the Guardian are too small to allow statistical tests). Within the group of commands directed at a third party, the obligation-imposed may be specified, as in (18), or left unspecified, as in (19):

(18) Don’t count your chickens too soon, Mr Hague. [sun]
(19) It is important that the public policy response is as objective and focused as possible. [guardian]

It is worth noting that, whereas only two of the 25 third-party commands in the Guardian are addressed to specified individuals, no less than 29 of the 64 in the Sun are. Such commands do not directly construct an interactional slot in the dialogue, since the reader-in-the-text is not expected to respond. However, like the third-party directed uses of you discussed above, they contribute to the impression of a dialogue carried out in the presence, and on behalf, of the audience — particularly those where an individual is named, and even more where the command is realized as an imperative addressed to the individual — e.g. (18) above. Fourteen of the third-party commands in the Sun are imperatives, whereas there are none in the Guardian. The preference in the Guardian for unspecified third-party commands like (19) construes a more face-saving imposition of obligation: the implication is that those whose responsibility it is to perform the action (in this case the public policy response) will recognize that they are the ‘obligation-imposed.’ The Guardian thus construes the audience as appreciating the value of negotiation on their behalf being carried out in a diplomatic way.

The relative frequencies of commands directed to the audience are not statistically significant: 9 in the Guardian (all realized by imperatives) compared with 18 in the Sun (of which 16 are realized by imperatives). What is noticeable, however, is that all but one of the Guardian commands are what might be termed ‘discourse-oriented.’ That is, they relate to the reader-in-the-text’s processing of the unfolding line of argument:

(20) Put aside the economic arguments for a second. [guardian]

In the Sun, on the other hand, all but two of the commands are to do with real-world actions:

(21) So for breaking news, just tune in [sun]

Thus, on the relatively few occasions when the Guardian writers direct the reader, they are more concerned with the reader-in-the-text as reader of the text, being guided through the discourse: this is a small indication of attention to a more developed line of argumentation (and, of course, the greater length of the Guardian editorials makes such development more possible and the guidance thus more useful). For the Sun’s reader-in-the-text, the discourse is more directly connected with external goings-on, in a way which is characteristic of face-to-face dialogue.

Whereas in this kind of text commands are invariably issued by the writer, and the text does not need an overt linguistic undertaking in response in order to be perceived as coherent, with questions the issue arises of who is constructed as asking and answering, and how the answers are fitted into the text. Thompson & Thetela (1995) found that, in advertisements, questions are most often addressed by the writer to the reader, and the text then continues as if the reader-in-the-text has provided the appropriate response. Less often, a question is construed as asked by the reader-in-the-text, with the writer providing the answer; and in a small number of cases a question addressed by the writer to the reader is left unanswered (usually at or near the end of the advertisement). In academic writing (Thompson 2001), the overwhelmingly most frequent type of question is one in which the writer brings to the surface the underlying dialogic nature of text by constructing the reader-in-the-text as asking a question which the writer assumes will arise at this point in the text (Hoey 1988), and which s/he plans to answer, normally immediately: “[s]ince writers make assumptions about the questions that might plausibly be asked by the reader and construct the text to provide answers, there is obviously the option of expressing the questions explicitly in the voice of the reader-in-the-text” (Thompson 2001: 61). This type is essentially text-structuring, involving the audience in the construction of the discourse, with the question serving as an interactional signal of the direction that the discussion is about to take. It thus shares some functions with the ‘discourse-oriented’ commands mentioned above.

The patterns of question use in the two corpora in the present study are unlike those in the registers described above; and, as with commands, it is in the more delicate sub-types that potentially significant variation is found between the corpora (again the numbers are too small for statistical tests to be applied). Both newspapers use rhetorical questions: these form the largest single group in the Guardian (6 out of 16, or 38%), while they are a less dominant feature of questions in the Sun, though still with a higher absolute frequency (11 out of 45, or 24%). Rhetorical questions are interrogatives which function as statements and are typically found in argumentative discourse (Ilie 1994). The value added to the rhetorical effect in comparison with statements realized congruently as declaratives is a degree of intersubjective coercion, in that they are designed to simulate the interactional information-seeking nature of questions while at the same time...
imposing an ‘answer’ (at least for the compliant reader — which the reader-in-the-text is, of course). The reader-in-the-text is projected as contributing to the construction of discourse coherence by interpreting the apparent question as a statement (the absence of a separate answer would otherwise be discursively inappropriate). This process of interpretation typically involves the extra communicative work of reversing the polarity. In (22), for example, the proposition being advanced is that there is no justice in this law, and in (23) that there is no reason for sport to be different:

(22) Where is the justice in a law widely abused to settle personal scores and to discriminate against minorities? [guardian]

(23) Why should sport be different? [sun]

The largest group of questions types in the Sun (19 occurrences, or 42%) comprises questions which are not answered in the text. These fall into two groups. The first, much more common in the Sun (17 instances), are those in which the people who could answer them are not constructed as part of the potential readership, as in (24):

(24) Immigration Minister Phil Woolas keeps blustering that Gurkha cases are being reviewed. But when? Why the delays, the incompetence, the insensitivity? [sun]

In the great majority of these instances (15 of the 17), specific individuals are explicitly named as the target of the questioning — e.g. Phil Woolas in (24). These are similar to the third-party commands: they are enacted on behalf of the audience, who are projected as accepting that these questions need to be answered by the responsible parties. The Sun is thus representing itself as the spokesperson for the law-abiding citizens, supporters of the Armed Forces, opponents of the last Labour government, etc. who make up the reader-in-the-text. This is especially salient when an individual is directly addressed, as in (25):


An editorial is clearly not written for an individual, even if, as in this case, it simulates that situation. The effect is to project an in-group — those asking the question — and an out-group — those who can answer it (though not within the present communicative event); and the reader-in-the-text is constructed as part of the first group.

This kind of unanswered question does not occur at all in the Guardian. However, the second type does occur in both corpora, though infrequently (three times in the Guardian and twice in the Sun): questions to which no answer is really possible or expected. These are mainly (3 out of the 5) found as the final sentence in an editorial, inviting the reader-in-the-text to ponder the issues raised in the preceding text, in a way that is similar to unanswered questions found at the end of advertisements. In (26), the writer rounds off an editorial condemning a recent assassination in Pakistan by asking:

(26) Benazir Bhutto, Salaman Taseer, who is next? [guardian]

The remainder of the questions in the Sun (15 instances, or 33% of the questions) are those which are addressed by the writer to the reader-in-the-text. Again, these fall into two sub-groups. The first (7 instances, though 6 of these occur in the same editorial) are yes-no questions or question tags which are left to the reader-in-the-text to answer:

(27) Well, we didn’t really need to be told, did we? [sun]

(28) Do you think Labour really has been ‘tough on crime’? [sun]

Although the answers are not entirely predictable, the discourse is designed to constrain the response (and is therefore similar to the most common kind of questions found in advertisements). This is particularly evident in the case of example (28): the preceding text is sarcastically dismissive of government statistics purporting to show that crime rates are lower; and, after a series of five questions to the reader on the same lines as (28), the editorial concludes “We’ll bet the answer, every time, is No.” There are no instances of this kind of question in the Guardian.

The second sub-group of questions addressed to the reader-in-the-text are immediately answered by the writer. This might make them appear to be questions projected in the voice of the reader-in-the-text, since in many cases the appearance of an answer is criterial for this category (Thompson 2001). However, the effect in the editorials is of the writer inviting the reader-in-the-text to guess the answer and then revealing the truth. This is a common gambit in face-to-face conversation, which is used to highlight the information in the answer and mark it as unexpected, and usually undesirable. The reader-in-the-text, by entering into the dialogic guessing game, is constructed as accepting the unexpectedness and undesirability. In (29) the writer has outlined promises made by a politician before the election and invites the reader-in-the-text to guess what has happened now that the politician is in power. In (30) the gambit is developed further: having invited the original guess, the writer suggests various desirable possibilities that the reader-in-the-text might think should be the case before revealing that the JobCentrePlus staff have gone on strike despite the economic situation.

(29) So what does he do? Backtrack. [guardian]

(30) SO, on the day when unemployment hits 2.5million, what do thousands of JobCentrePlus staff do?
Offer to work harder to help people who find themselves on the dole?
Volunteer to give up their weekends off to assist the fellow citizens who have fallen on hard times? Nah. [sun]

One probe to identify this type of question is that it is possible to insert ‘do you think?’ without radically altering the rhetorical effect of the question — e.g.

(29’) So what do you think he does? Backtrack.

The Sun has 8 of these questions, while the Guardian has two.

The final group of questions, found only in the Guardian (5 instances, or 31%), are in the voice of the reader-in-the-text, with the writer supplying the answer immediately— see (31):

(31) Why does this matter? For two reasons: one economic, the other political. [guardian]

As noted above, such questions involve the reader-in-the-text in the construction of the unfolding organization of the text. Although the frequency is low, the use of interactional resources with a text-structuring function is similar to that of the ‘discourse-oriented’ commands discussed above; and it is noticeable that these two features are characteristic of the Guardian (11 occurrences all together) but not of the Sun (2 occurrences). This suggests that the Guardian’s reader-in-the-text is constructed as able to handle text with relatively complex organizational patterns and as aware of text as text.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the figures given above for the various sub-types of commands and questions. They provide a basis for the general overview of the results below; but they are also intended to highlight the very low frequencies involved, especially for the Guardian, as a reminder that the discussion of the implications must be tentative.

The overall impression created by the mood choices in the editorials is that the Guardian, in line with what emerged from the analysis of interactant reference, is less overtly interactional, and more interpersonally ‘subdued’: it is noticeable, for example, that all the third-party commands are realized not by imperatives but by declaratives with deontic modality, which in principle allow more shades of negotiation over the imposition. When the reader-in-the-text is directly addressed, through commands or questions, there is a tendency for the focus to be the organisation of the discourse: this suggests that the reader-in-the-text is constructed as relatively sophisticated in terms of textual competence, aware of text as artefact rather than just as a transparent vehicle of meanings. On the other hand, the Sun is more interpersonally exuberant, with instructions as to how the addressee should behave in the world, questions left for the reader-in-the-text to answer, and conversational invitations to guess what has happened. Again, this chimes in with the use of interactant reference in the Sun to construct dialogic engagement with the audience. A synthetic conversation is built up, with communicative spaces left for the reader-in-the-text to participate — in a way which is, of course, closely controlled. The Sun is also more ‘in-your-face’ in dealing with third parties, issuing commands (a number of which are direct imperatives) and asking questions of them, often explicitly naming the person at whom the command or question is directed. The effect is to construct the readers-in-the-text as complicit in the other-directed interaction: accepting the Sun as able to give voice to their opinions and reactions (and thus, of course, allowing the Sun to project those opinions and reactions onto them as their own).

4.3 Modality

As noted in Section 1, epistemic modality — or more broadly modalization in Halliday’s (1994:89) terms — can be seen as interactional, opening up spaces for negotiation over propositions with the reader-in-the-text in various ways (Martin & White 2005). The other major category of modality, modulation (Halliday 1994:89),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Types of command in the two corpora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 3rd party specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to 3rd party unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to reader, discourse-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to reader, real-world oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Types of question in the two corpora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhetorical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invite reader, answer given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from reader, answer given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
corresponding roughly to deontic modality in traditional accounts, typically realizes commands and is thus inherently interpersonal, as discussed in 4.2 above.

The simplest way of comparing modality in the two data sets is to count the numbers of modal expressions — modal verbs, modal adjuncts such as perhaps and what Halliday (1994:355) calls explicit subjective or objective modality — realizing modalization and modulation.5

Table 5. Modal expressions in the two corpora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guardian</th>
<th>Sun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>modalization</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modulation</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 suggests that the Guardian is slightly more oriented towards modalization, while the Sun makes relatively greater use of modulation. However, the difference is only of moderate statistical significance (df = 1, $\chi^2 = 5.19$, p < .05), and, more importantly, the figures take no account of how the modality functions in context. It seems more revealing to look at the distribution of MUs in each of three broad categories: unmodalized MUs, MUs with modalization and MUs with modulation. Some MUs include more than one modal expression, but the coding is based on the presence and type of a modal expression in the dominant clause. The distribution of these three categories is shown in Table 6 (10 imperatives in the Guardian, and 32 in the Sun, are excluded since these cannot include modality).

This confirms the results of counting modal expressions; but claims can now be made on a more secure basis, since the differences are statistically significant (df = 2, $\chi^2 = 15.066$, p < .001). If the imperatives are included with modulated MUs, so that we have three functional groups — categorical propositions, modalized propositions and proposals (Halliday 1994:71) — the differences are even more significant (df = 2, $\chi^2 = 20.386$, p < .0001). Thus, in very broad terms it can be argued that the Guardian appears more concerned with negotiating the validity of the information that it presents, while the Sun is more strongly oriented towards telling people what to do and what the world should be like.6

This impression is reinforced by some of the details of how modality is realized. For example, the Guardian makes greater use of explicit objective modalization, such as There is mounting evidence in (32): 26 instances compared with four in the Sun.

(32) There is mounting evidence that trade is not as busy as all the window-shopping might lead one to believe [guardian]

(33) He [Miliband] must stop fudging and provide a detailed alternative recovery plan. [sun]

What this suggests in term of intersubjectivity is that, in comparative terms, the reader-in-the-text in the Guardian is constructed as a person who expects to be persuaded by reasoned argument, with the possible factors and alternatives taken into account (involving the use of modalization) before a conclusion or recommendation is arrived at. The greater length of the editorials in the Guardian in itself contributes to this: the reader-in-the-text is constructed as being aware that socio-cultural and political issues are typically complex, and as valuing careful, considered negotiation over the most appropriate outcomes. Space (and copyright) precludes the inclusion of a full example to illustrate, but a representative editorial discusses an on-going government spending review: it reports the claims that the finance minister has made about the fairness of the planned cuts in spending, and then presents evidence that contradicts each of his claims in turn. Example (34) gives a taste of the measured tone:

(34) By all means let us have a debate about fairness — but an austerity plan which lets the bankers off lightly while hitting those on disability benefits hard, which squeezes families with children but continues to spray money at better-off pensioners (free bus passes, winter fuel allowances), would not be considered fair by many. [guardian]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Modal MUs in the two corpora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unmodalized MUs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>+ modalization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>+ modulation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The reader-in-the-text is invited to align with the many who do not consider this fair, but this view is not imposed as taken for granted. A small but perhaps revealing feature is that it is only in the Guardian that instances of modalization used to accommodate the reader-in-the-text’s opinions occur (6 cases) — see (35), and also might lead one to believe in (32) above:

(35) The battlefield may not be a place that lends itself to the preservation of evidence, but sheer lack of official interest is infectious. [guardian]

The reader-in-the-text is here treated as someone who has views of their own which merit consideration, even if the writer goes on to disagree.

The Sun’s reader-in-the-text, on the other hand, is constructed as comparatively uninterested in reasoning, and more oriented towards demands (for information or action) from others, in the form of modulated proposals or imperatives. The editorials show a strong tendency to describe a situation (often undesirable in some way) and then move immediately to recommendation(s) or evaluation, with no argumentation. For instance, one editorial offers a list of things that Ed Miliband “must” do (see (33) above): no basis is given for the recommendations, apart from a comparison with the positively evaluated policies of David Cameron, the current Prime Minister. Similarly, in the editorial which starts as shown in example (30), the writer goes on to explain that the JobCentrePlus staff went on strike over working conditions and then finishes with the terse evaluation “Unbelievable”. No explanation of, or justification for, this evaluation is felt to be necessary for the reader-in-the-text. The Sun’s reader-in-the-text is not looking to be persuaded but — in the majority of cases — to be offered an opportunity for communal enjoyment of righteous indignation or helpless hand-wringing at the state of things, with already-formed opinions on what is wrong and what should be done to improve matters. The appropriate attitude towards the events described and towards the actions that must be taken is, with very few exceptions, projected as unquestioningly shared with the writer: anyone who is told the facts will feel the same way.

5. Conclusion

It has often been noted (e.g. Bell 1991:107) that, where there is a choice (as in which news media to consume), real-world readers tend to opt for discourse which moulds itself to fit comfortably their knowledge and views; and this tendency is exploited by the producers of such discourse. The present analysis has explored how this is manifested in two contrasting sets of UK editorials. By drawing on the intersubjective linguistic resources outlined above, amongst others, each newspaper in this study constructs a reader-in-the-text, of very different character, with whom the real-world reader is invited to “converge” (Thompson & Thetela 1995: 111). The constructed persona is naturally designed to appeal to the market at which the newspaper is aimed. Thus the Guardian not only offers its audience views on politics and society which are compatible with their own, but flatters the audience by projecting them as ‘commonsense well-informed’ people who do not wish to be too rigorously pigeonholed or have opinions thrust upon them. Interaction with the writer is evident but relatively restrained and apparently non-coercive, as befits a relationship constructed as being between peers in the socio-political enterprise. The Sun aims more at projecting intimacy with a writer-in-the-text (just as much a product of the discourse as the reader-in-the-text) who belongs to the same social groupings as the audience, and not only engages in conversational interaction with them but is able to put their thoughts and feelings into words — thus, happily, confirming the validity of their opinions. In this case, the appeal is through comforting complicity with a like-minded, but more articulate, crony. To extrapolate rather crudely, the Guardian reader-in-the-text is intersubjectively construed as an independent-minded member of the audience at a lecture on the socio-political situation; the Sun reader-in-the-text is in the pub enjoying a grumble about the world with friends. These contrasting characterisations map neatly — as one would expect — onto the readership as described on the audience demographic webpages of the two newspapers aimed at potential advertisers: Guardian readers are described as “young and affluent … arts lovers … engaged, influential and well-connected” with the great majority classed as AB/C1 (managerial and professional/supervisory and clerical), while the majority of Sun readers are classed as C1/C2/DE (supervisory and clerical/skilled manual/unskilled manual and unemployed). What is set up is — for the interactants, at least — a benign circle of expectations and roles.

What I have set out to do in this study is to illustrate how the concept of intersubjectivity may be applied at the level of text. My main argument, following Bakhtin, is that texts are more or less effectively shaped to take account of the actual or potential utterances of others, particularly the addressee. This means that a text can be viewed as deploying linguistic resources to project onto the addressee certain characteristics which, if they match those of the actual reader, or if this reader is willing to accept the projection even if just for the duration of the reading, will make the text appear comfortably adapted to the reader’s world view and thus potentially more effective in achieving the persuasive and affiliative goals of the writer. This perspective therefore operationalizes at discourse level the definition of intersubjectivity as “crucially involv[ing] SP/W’s attention to AD/R as a participant in the speech event” (Traugott & Dasher 2002: 22).
Notes

1. Examples 1–5 were found using Google”, in order to ensure that they illustrated the relevant points as clearly and simply as possible. The remainder are from the data gathered for this study.

2. There is clearly a basic disagreement on this point, brought out in Traugott’s (2010: 34) suggestion that Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) term ‘interpersonal’ corresponds to ‘subjectivity’ in her approach, and that Halliday & Hasan have no equivalent for her ‘intersubjective’. Like Halliday, I take the ‘inter-’ in ‘interpersonal’ as fundamental to this aspect of language: from this angle, language is seen as “enacting social relationships” (Halliday 1994:36), which must involve at least two interactants.

3. From this point on, the focus will be on written data, and the terminology will therefore reflect this; but in principle the same considerations apply to spoken discourse.

4. In a different tradition, studies of textual polyphony explore very similar areas, with similar conclusions. For example, Fløttum & Stenvoll (2009) examine negation and concession as resources for bringing another voice into the discourse.

5. Halliday (1994:355) uses the term ‘explicit modality’ to refer to instances in which the modality is expressed in a separate clause, rather than by an element of the modalized clause such as a modal operator. Explicit subjective modality covers cases where the source of the modality is overt, as in I think or we’ll bet, while with explicit objective modality the source is covert, as in it is likely that or there is mounting evidence that.

6. For the purposes of this analysis, I am not taking into account the distinction within deontic modality made by Nuyts et al. (2010) between obligation (associated with directives) and desirability (associated with the expression of attitude). While the distinction is certainly valid, both meanings convey that an attempt is being made to impose a view of how the world should be, which is the most relevant aspect in the present analysis.

References


“What I want you to remember is…”

Audience orientation in monologic academic discourse*

Annelie Ädel
Stockholm University, Sweden

This article offers some background on notions related to intersubjectivity in applied linguistics, specifically as studied in EAP. The study takes a reflexive approach to metadiscourse, investigating audience orientation in three monologic academic genres: advanced student writing, published academic prose and spoken lectures. Specifically, audience orientation involving second person you is examined from the perspective of the discourse functions in which the word is involved. A randomly selected dataset of 150 examples from each of the three genres was coded for metadiscursive functions, applying Ädel’s (2010) taxonomy. The results showed that the distribution of discourse functions was similar in the three registers; however, the highest frequency of metadiscourse was found in the spoken lectures, not in the written modes.

1. Introduction

To interact with others is arguably the most fundamental use of language. This use has been conceptualised in slightly different ways in different functionalist accounts of language: as the ‘directive’ and ‘phatic’ functions in the Jakobsonian framework (e.g. Jakobson 1990), as the ‘interpersonal’ function in a Hallidayan framework (e.g. Halliday 1994), and as ‘facework’ (e.g. Brown & Levinson 1987) or ‘rapport management’ (e.g. Spencer-Oatey 2008) in pragmatic and politeness frameworks, to mention a few. These functions are so pervasive in human communication that even the most monologic, impersonal and ‘objective’ types of discourse draw on them: “a monologue, written or spoken, may be regarded as a dialogue in which the reader/listener’s questions or comments have not been explicitly included but which retains clear indications of the assumed replies of the reader” (Hoey 1994: 29). The notion that the speaker/writer always posits and...
Annelie Ädel

seen a paradigm shift in the way in which academic discourse, and in particular special attention to the study of dialogism in language. The past two decades have...
of metadiscourse not only in written text but also in spoken material. The rationale for this is that what is of interest is the workings of dialogic features in general, not those in written text per se (cf. Ädel 2010).

2. Metadiscourse

Much of the work on interpersonal meaning and features in academic discourse has centred on phenomena such as stance, hedging and metadiscourse. Our concern here is specifically metadiscourse, often referred to as ‘discourse about discourse’. When speaking or writing, we add commentary to the ongoing discourse, which may be ‘pointers as to how the discourse is organized, markers indicating what the main message to be communicated is, statements on the (in)appropriateness of a specific wording, or signals that indicate how we wish the audience to respond to the content’ (Ädel in press). The purpose of metadiscourse has been said to be ‘to secure successful communication between text participants’ (Taavitsainen 2000: 193), which also shows that the traditional focus of research in this area has been on written text; what has been stressed is the important role played by metadiscourse in guiding the reader through the written text and in creating a writer persona.

Research into metadiscourse began with the ‘interactive’ approach (see Ädel & Mauranen 2010), which was ‘triggered by the perceived neglect, in studies of text, of anything that was not propositional, or related to the content itself, and by a wish to prove false the notion of academic writing as consisting exclusively of impersonal and factual statements’ (Ädel in press). Vande Koppel (1985) included a set of categories as ‘metadiscourse’ which have been widely used in modified form by Crismore et al. (1993), Hyland (e.g. 1998, 2005), and others. These correspond approximately to the following linguistic features: stance markers (unfortunately; I agree; surprisingly), expressions of certainty (definitely; it is clear that) and doubt (might; perhaps; possible), connectives (but; thus; and), self mention (I), ‘engagement markers’/‘commentary’ (consider; note that; dear reader), references to other texts (according to NAME; (NAME, 1990)), as well as clearly reflexive categories such as ‘ilocution markers’ (to conclude; briefly stated), ‘code glosses’ (namely; in other words), ‘sequencers’ (firstly; secondly), ‘announcers’ (as we shall see in Chapter 5), and ‘reminders’ (as noted above). In this approach, textual interaction — interaction between writer and reader — is seen as so fundamental that a very broad definition of metadiscourse is used, one encompassing not only attribution and stance, but also all sentence connectors.

A more recent approach to metadiscourse is the ‘reflexive’ one, which considers the fundamental aspect of metadiscourse to be reflexivity in language — the self-reflective use of discourse; this approach therefore uses a narrower definition than the interactive approach. Proponents of this approach have criticised the interactive approach for being overly inclusive and for not taking the ‘meta’ perspective more seriously (see e.g. Ädel & Mauranen 2010). The first study in applied linguistics to take a reflexive approach was Mauranen (1993), although several studies of similar phenomena had been carried out in general linguistics under various labels (e.g. Schiffrin (1980) on ‘metatalk’).

The specific reflexive approach adopted in the present study is based on Ädel (2006: 27ff), whose model of metadiscourse is based on three of Jakobson’s six functions of language: the metalinguistic (focusing on the discourse or language), the expressive (focusing on the writer/speaker), and the directive (focusing on the audience). Specifically, metadiscourse is defined as ‘reflexive linguistic expressions referring to the evolving discourse itself or its linguistic form, including references to the writer-speaker qua writer-speaker and the (imagined or actual) audience qua audience of the current discourse’, following Ädel (2006). The definition is accompanied by a set of criteria developed in an attempt to reduce the fuzziness of metadiscourse (Ädel 2006: 27ff). The ‘explicitness’ criterion (based on Mauranen 1993) refers to the fact that it is the explicit commentary on the discourse as discourse that is of interest. The ‘world of discourse’ criterion states that the action takes place in the world of discourse (discourse-internal) rather than in the ‘real world’ (discourse-external). The ‘current text’ criterion (based on Mauranen 1993) states that it is references to the current, ongoing text that constitute metadiscourse; references to other texts, meanwhile, constitute intertextuality. The criteria ‘speaker-writer qua speaker-writer’ and ‘audience qua audience’ apply to personal (and not impersonal) metadiscourse, which includes reference to the discourse participants. They state that the current addressee be talked about or referred to in their roles as discourse participants — that is, in the world of discourse — rather than, in their roles as ‘experiences in the real world’ (for examples, see Ädel 2010).

This means, among other things, that not all occurrences of discourse participant pronouns are considered metadiscursive in the reflexive approach (see e.g. Ädel 2006; 2010). Although you typically marks general ‘involvement’ (Chafe 1982), it does not necessarily also mark specific audience orientation taking place in the world of discourse. In the following example (from published academic writing in the BNC; see Section 3), the you unit generally contributes to involvement but does not show any awareness of the discourse as discourse.

...income is a flow of disposable (spendable) money, while wealth refers to fixed assets such as land, shares, buildings or durable possessions. Wealth thus seems to mean the same as “property”, but “property” is a term commonly used to refer to
anything from Henry Ford II’s car company to the clothes you are wearing. Both of these count, in legal terms, as private property, and...

2.1 Analytical model

The taxonomy from Ädel (2010: 83ff) applied in this study can be seen as a first attempt at creating a comprehensive taxonomy covering both written and spoken metadiscourse. The taxonomy is intended to be applicable to both personal and impersonal metadiscourse. Note that the present study is concerned with personal metadiscourse only — specifically, instances involving second person you — and does not examine impersonal metadiscourse. The subcategories of the taxonomy all testify to the speaker/writer’s attention to the audience as participating in the speech event (cf. Traugott & Dasher, quoted above), for example in predicting possible linguistic difficulties for the audience; making the discourse structure more transparent; making the speaker/writer’s actions more explicit; and calling for the audience’s attention in various ways. The present study fits within a research tradition which studies specific discourse functions, or pragmatic acts, served by metadiscourse (e.g. Ädel 2006; Kuo 1999; Pérez-Llantada 2010; Sanderson 2008; Vassileva 1998). This involves an interest in examining the larger units in which, for example, I appears, instead of simply seeing it as ‘self mention’. Thus, the model promotes a more contextually based and functionalist view of metadiscourse units than that of the interactive approach, in which occurrences of you would simply be labelled ‘engagement markers’, or possibly also ‘announcers’ and ‘reminders’ in the case of expressions such as you will see in Chapter 4... and you may have noticed...

A primary distinction is made between ‘Metatext’, which is oriented toward the code/discourse itself, and ‘Audience interaction’, which is oriented toward the audience (Ädel 2006: 36ff; cf. the distinction between ‘textual’ and ‘interpersonal’ types of metadiscourse in the interactive approach). ‘Metatext’ is divided into three different categories: Metalinguistic comments, Discourse organisation and Speech act labels. Meanwhile, ‘Audience interaction’ consists of only one category, labelled References to the audience. These categories each include three or more discourse functions, listed in Figure 1 and described in 4.1 below. ‘Discourse function’ essentially refers to the rhetorical function that the metadiscursive expression performs in its immediate discourse context (cf. Ädel 2006: 57ff). Note that classification work of this type brings with it certain inherent difficulties — most prominently, the need to choose one primary function, despite the fact that discourse is typically multifunctional. Also note that the taxonomy, based thus far on a limited set of data types, is likely to be expanded as it is tested against a wider variety of data types.

The purpose of the taxonomy is not only to break down the general category of metadiscourse into its component parts based on functions, but ultimately also to be able to pin down variation in the use of metadiscourse, for example across different language-cultures, disciplines, or genres. There is a growing body of research that shows that metadiscourse is likely to vary across language-cultures (e.g. Crismore et al. 1993; Mauranen 1993; Vassileva 1998; Dahl 2004; Pérez-Llantada 2010). However, this factor has been shown in some recent work to be trumped by academic discipline; for example, in a study of constructions involving I and we in three languages (English, French, Norwegian) and disciplines (economics, linguistics, medicine), it was found that “economists and linguists clearly interact explicitly with their readers to a larger extent than do medical authors” in...
all three languages (Fløttum et al. 2006). Decisions made by members of academic disciplines concerning features such as degree of authorial presence, as indexed by I and we, are "closely related to the social and epistemological practices of their disciplines" (Hyland 2001: 224).

2.2 Pronominal signalling of audience orientation

There has been a wealth of EAP research demonstrating that personal pronouns serve a number of important functions in academic discourse (e.g. Harwood 2005; Hyland 2001, 2010; Kuo 1999; Vassileva 1998). While considerable attention has been paid to first person reference, second person reference has attracted surprisingly little attention. One reason for the scarcity of research into second person pronouns is that they tend to be relatively uncommon in academic writing; for example, Hyland (2010: 125) found that second person pronouns were rare in research articles, while inclusive we was comparatively frequent. The preference for we in research articles is said to derive from the fact that "it identifies the reader as someone who shares a point of view or ways of seeing with the writer", thus sending "a clear signal of membership" (Hyland 2010: 125). Nevertheless, if we consider overall frequencies of first and second person pronouns in a large, general corpus of academic writing (Biber et al. 1999: 334), we find that we is the most common (some 3,000 occurrences per million words), followed by I (some 2,000 occurrences) and then you (some 1,000 occurrences). In other words, the frequency of second person you is considerably lower than that of the first person, but it is not at all marginal.

Another reason for the lack of research is likely to be that the second person represents a highly complex type of reference. Grammatical descriptions represent you as the form used for second person singular and plural reference, and “present as primary the deictic referential use of this form to identify a specific addressee or group containing the addressee” (Stirling & Manderson 2011: 3). Generic you is, of course, also a major category of you-use. However, in cases in which you has specific reference to individuals identified in the discourse situation (even if they are imagined), it is not always clear whether the reference is to one or more people. Since second person pronouns in modern English do not encode a singular/plural or T/V distinction, present-day material does not lend itself to the study of addressee honorifics (as in Traugott 2007). There are, however, ways in which to make the dual/plural reference more explicit, through expressions such as you two and you all (cf. Biber et al. 1999: 330), or as in you’ve all heard this, said in a lecture.

Even the personal pronouns of English have their distinct and prototypical uses, it is also the case that “any pronoun can be used for any person” (Mühlhäusler & Harré 1990). The plasticity of the system can be illustrated by a subtype of generic you, which is used in the context of recounting personal experience, forming “a choice set with I” (Stirling & Manderson 2011: 1581–2), as in:

[... I used to just lay there and look up on the- up on the roof or on- [...] you’d turn your head, [...] and you can see this picture and [...] you’d imagine you were inside that picture [...]. [from interview with woman describing her experience of radiotherapy treatment for breast cancer; pauses and backchanneling excluded here]

This example illustrates a quality of “implicit egocentricity” in you — a notion to which Bolinger (1979: 205) has drawn our attention, observing that “the deeper we go into impersonal you, the more personal it seems”. Even clearly generic uses of the second person (in which substitution is possible by other pronouns such as we, us, one, or anybody) have been said to retain some hint of the pronoun’s personal addressee reference (Biber et al. 1999). It can be difficult to distinguish between specific (or definite) and generic (or indefinite) reference for you (see e.g. Wales 1996: 79).

With regard to generic or specific reference in the case of metadiscourse involving you, it appears generally to be the case that generic examples are non-metadiscursive. However, it is not entirely that simple. Consider, for example, metalinguistic comments such as if you like and if you will; their fixedness leads to difficulty in employing substitution tests (such as one or anyone for generic uses, or possibly you, the audience for specific uses). Furthermore, several examples of managing terminology (examples 3 and 4 below) were found to involve generic you. In these examples — despite the absence of explicit, specific audience orientation — the reflexivity is strongly present in the units as a whole, such that they still clearly qualify as metadiscourse. For personal types of metadiscourse, it becomes clear that the criterion ‘speaker-writer qua speaker-writer’ and/or ‘audience qua audience’ does not necessarily have to be met in order for a given example to qualify as metadiscourse; it would be overly strict to state this as a rule, at least as far as you is concerned (but possibly also for we). It is interesting to note that the present study was undertaken on the assumption that you in general would prove a largely reliable indicator of audience address — that is, marking specific reference. Indeed, this is what tends to be emphasised in the literature: “Reader pronouns offer the most explicit ways of achieving proximity by bringing readers into a discourse, and [...] you and your are actually the clearest way a writer can acknowledge the reader’s presence” (Hyland 2010: 125). However, having examined several hundred examples involving you, its function of addressing the audience emerges as considerably less reliable and clear, especially in the case of the many examples not classified as metadiscourse here. By comparison, vocatives such as dear reader and imperative forms such as consider seem less unambiguously audience-oriented.

2nd proofs
3. Material and method

Instances of you were retrieved for the study by means of a concordancer (WordSmith Tools; Scott 2007). Since a great deal of manual analysis would be required, the size of the data had to be restricted, which is why random samples of 150 examples per corpus were used. This must therefore be seen as an exploratory study which includes relatively small samples of you occurrences. Note that the form your(s) was not considered for this study. A total of 450 examples were drawn from three monologic sets of data:

- Advanced A-grade senior undergraduate and graduate student writing from the Michigan Corpus of Upper-level Student Papers (MICUSP; see e.g. Ådel & Römer 2012), amounting to 2.6 million words. [Wr_stud]
- Published academic prose4 (drawn from e.g. books and research articles in different subject areas) from the British National Corpus (BNC; see e.g. Aston & Burnard 1998), amounting to approximately 28 million words. [Wr_pub]
- Transcripts of large lectures from the Michigan Corpus of Academic Spoken English (MICASE; see Simpson et al. 1999), amounting to 255,000 words or 33 hours of recordings. [Sp_llec]

The material represents discourse with different primary audiences. The unpublished student papers are assessed and graded by the student writer’s teacher. The published academic texts have a range of different types of readers, some of whom are other professionals, but some of whom form some portion of a non-specialised population. The spoken lectures are given by university lecturers to their students, who are mostly at the undergraduate level. We can conclude that the power relations and social roles of the speakers/writers and the audiences vary considerably. Put in terms of expert or novice communication, the student writing represents novice-expert communication (that is, novice writer and expert reader), the published writing represents both expert-expert and expert-novice communication, and the lectures represent expert-novice communication.

Considering the fact that the discourse participants constitute precisely one of the factors which define specific types of discourses (see e.g. Biber & Conrad 2003: 175), it is reasonable to assume that overt reference to the audience takes different forms depending on register and genre. As an illustration of audience address functioning as a genre marker, consider the classic dear reader of the early novel, Dear Sir/Madam in business solicitation letters, fellow Americans in US presidential addresses, and to whom it may concern in recommendation letters. In addition to vocatives, other forms of second person address can be marked for genre and register, as in the case of the imperatives frequently used in academic writing (see and consider, but not read on), or expressions such as what I want you to remember is…. in spoken lectures, or if you look at… in university textbooks.5

Although you is somewhat rare in academic writing, it is certainly not absent in the data — neither from the student writing, nor from the general collection of academic writing in the BNC. The spoken lecture data have considerably higher frequencies. The normalised frequency of you per million words in the three corpora or corpus sections is 631 for the student writing, 377 for the published writing and 21,349 for the spoken lectures. A great many of the instances of you, however, occur in quoted material, such as interview data, instructions for an assignment, and literary quotes. Since such instances do not relate to the relationship between the current writer/speaker and audience, a considerable effort was made to check the context of the examples to make sure that they represent the current writer/speaker’s own discourse and do not occur in quoted material. As an illustration of how commonly you occurs in discourse produced not by the current writer, consider the fact that the starting point of the study was a random sample of 500 from the corpus of student writing, of which only 150 examples were found to be the current writer’s own text. Once 150 relevant examples from each of the three corpora had been collected, instances of you were analysed from the perspective of meta-discourse, specifically examining the discourse function in which they occurred.

4. Results

In this section, 4.1 presents an overview of the categories of the taxonomy, which is followed by descriptions of the discourse functions and examples from the dataset. 4.2 presents the frequency distribution of the discourse functions.

4.1 Discourse functions involving you

This overview of the discourse functions follows the order in which they occur in Figure 1.

4.1.1 Metalinguistic comments

The category of Metatext referred to as Metalinguistic comments includes the discourse functions Repairing, Reformulating, Commenting on linguistic form/meaning, Clarifying and Managing terminology. Repairing refers to both self- and other-initiated suggestions or alterations which correct or cancel a preceding contribution. No such examples were found in the current dataset, but an example of this function in which I is used is “they are deeply dependent on, and bound by, I’m sorry bound to the state…” (Ådel 2010: 84; from spoken lectures in

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“What I want you to remember is…”
MICASE). Repairing is rare, if not non-existent, in highly edited, written types of material. Cases in which a preceding contribution is not seen as erroneous, as in Repairing, but rather when an alternative term or expression is offered because of the added value of expansion, are labelled Reformulating.

**Reformulating**
(1) *...was there as a backdrop to drama, melodrama if you like, and that drama...* [Wr_pub]

Commenting on linguistic form/meaning includes metalinguistic references to linguistic form, word choice and/or meaning. The following example, although quite similar in form to (1) above, was not classified as Reformulating, as no alternative form is given and the expression *if you will* essentially functions as a hedge, which is strengthened by the scare quotes used to mark the *not-completely-appropriate* term.

**Commenting on linguistic form/meaning**
(2) *ES can be broken down into two different *styles*, if you will — pessimistic and optimistic.* [Wr_stud]

Clarifying is used to spell out the addresser’s intentions in order to avoid misinterpretation. It involves examples of the addressee wishing to specify what he or she is saying (or not saying) in order to avoid misunderstandings, as in *“I should note for the sake of clarity that this distinction...”*. No such examples were found using you, however. Managing terminology typically involves giving definitions and providing terms or labels for phenomena that are talked about. The following example is considerably less fixed in form than the *if you like/will* examples above:

**Managing terminology**
(3) *Community colleges have also been known as junior colleges, although you will rarely see the term *junior college* in journal articles today* [Wr_stud]

(4) *there's too much diversity in how we go about fulfilling those needs, that you cannot anymore talk about simply consumption is, the fulfillment* [Sp_lec]

Overall, metalinguistic comments were quite rarely found to be involving you.

4.1.2 Discourse organisation

Discourse organisation includes a number of discourse functions having to do with topic management: Introducing topic (used to open the topic); Delimiting topic (used to explicitly state how the topic is constrained); Adding to topic (used to explicitly comment on the addition of a topic or subtopic); Concluding topic (used to close the topic); and Marking asides (used to open or close a digression). It is often necessary to analyse the context in quite some detail to be able to determine exactly which of these functions is the best match for a given example. Only two examples of Managing topics were found in the current datasets: one introducing the topic (5) and the other concluding the topic (6).

**Managing topics**
(5) *The purpose of this report is to provide you with our findings, conclusions, recommendations, and supporting documentation.* [Wr_stud]

(6) *Constructivism, at least in my eyes, was saved. So, there you have it. My position of metaphysical constructivism is neither...* [Wr_stud]

Note that example (6) is not strongly reflexive in its surface form; for example, there is no verbum dicendi. However, the function of the unit still appears to be organisational, marking a break in the discourse; specifically, initiating a topic conclusion. As we are dealing with a fuzzy category, the criteria cannot always be applied strictly (as the ‘explicitness’ criterion in this case).

Topic management rarely involved you, but Discourse organisation also includes a series of discourse functions having to do with phorics6 management, where you was somewhat more common. The first of these, Enumerating, is used to show how specific parts of the discourse are ordered in relation to each other.

**Enumerating**
(7) *we’ll talk about that a little later, but the final framework you might think about, when you consider motivation, is putting in...* [Sp_lec]

Endophoric marking is used to point to a specific location in the discourse; it refers to cases in which it is not clear or relevant whether what is referred to occurs before or after the current point (unlike Previewing and Reviewing), as for example when the audience is instructed to look at a table, or turn to a specific point in a handout.7

**Endophoric marking**
(8) *From this figure, you can see that all of the CIR defects occur when using supplier B.* [Wr_stud]

(9) *...but if you are new to this area you would do better to wait until you have read ch. 9.* [Wr_pub]

(10) *um you will see on your handout question two...* [Sp_lec]

(11) *if you’ll take a look at the second book of Kings chapter one...* [Sp_lec]

Note the prevalence of verbs of seeing in the examples and the references to different units in the discourse, ranging from figures to chapters.

Previewing points forward in the discourse, while Reviewing points backward in the discourse; these are used by the speaker/writer to announce what is to
come, or remind the audience about something which has already taken place in the discourse.

**Previewing**

(12) *I’ll show you some patterns of its distribution later.* [Sp_lec]

In (12), *you* occurs in the object position, while the subject position is represented by the first person, so the two are combined. Time adverbials such as *later* and place adverbials such as *below* frequently occur in this function. **Previewing** is characterised by strong lexico-grammatical patterning, which often involves the verbs *recall* and *remember*, typically in the frame [as] you *may recall/remember.*

**Reviewing**

(13) *This is, as you may recall, just a simple matter of underdetermination of Physics.* [Wr_stud]

(14) *You may remember that we discussed the distinction between…* [Wr_pub]

(15) *now, uh, as you remember from the very beginning of class…* [Sp_lec]

Judging from these examples, the audience is more often involved in reviewing, being asked to cast their minds back to previous discourse. **Previewing**, by contrast, is typically framed as the task of the speaker/writer — the manager of the current discourse — and is thus less commonly presented in connection with you.

Finally, Organising Discourse also includes the discourse function **Contextualising**, which is used to comment on (the conditions of) the situation of writing or speaking, and thus contains traces of the production of the discourse. Here, we typically find spelled-out justifications for choices made in planning or organising the discourse, as in "In keeping with the intended scope of this project, I have decided to…” (cf. Ädel 2010: 88). The following example is from the opening paragraph of a student essay (a report) and offers some background on why the discourse was produced. Note that this particular example is somewhat similar to **Concluding topic**, especially if it had been located in the closing paragraph of the text.

**Contextualising**

(16) *… you have solicited our company’s help in investigating this claim.* Specifically, you have asked us to find the COP of cooling and heating for a VCC cart that you provided us with under three different compressor frequencies (30Hz, 45Hz, and 60Hz). In addition, you requested that we document the thermodynamic cycle on a temperature-entropy diagram with uncertainties at each state (using SI units). Lastly, you have asked that we report any other considerations that are important in determining the unit’s ability to heat or cool efficiently and recommend whether they should be included in your testing of the technicians. *We have completed these tasks. The purpose of this report is to…* [Wr_stud]

The example is addressed to a reader who is also a customer — whether real or imaginary. The *you* is not inclusive of all readers, but specific to the customer (or possibly the teacher) who ordered the report. It should be noted that this is not a case of **Reviewing**, since we are not offered a review of the current discourse, but rather that of a discourse preceding the writing of the report.

**Speech act labels**

**Speech act labels** includes the discourse functions **Arguing**, which is used to stress the action of arguing for or against an issue; **Exemplifying**, which is used when explicitly introducing an example; and a general category of **Other speech act labelling** for speech acts — such as giving a hint; suggesting; emphasising — which have not been sufficiently frequent to have their own label, at least not in the empirical material examined so far.

**Arguing**

(17) *… needs to be different in the agreeing and agreementless forms. You could claim that the structure in (14) is present, where the…* [Wr_stud]

**Exemplifying**

(18) *let me give you another example of bottlenecks.* [Sp_lec]

These discourse functions are typically performed by the first person, who is the organiser of the message, which explains why very few examples were found in the current data.

**References to the audience**

The final category of metadiscourse, called **References to the audience**, includes five discourse functions. This is, not surprisingly, the category in which we find the most examples in the *you* dataset. The function **Managing comprehension/channel** is used to ensure that the addresser and addressee(s) are ‘on the same page’. It checks or at least refers to participants’ understanding and uptake in relation to the channel.

**Managing comprehension/channel**

(19) *Just in case you happened to miss the point in the first ten pages of the opinion, this made it clear that…* [Wr_stud]

(20) *… no more here than set down general guidelines. If you have any specific queries you should feel free to…* [Wr_pub]

(21) *does that make sense? are you following me now?* [Sp_lec]
Among the discourse functions, this particular one perhaps most clearly illustrates how speaker-writers attend to the principle that "discourse is communicatively successful only if speakers pay attention to audience needs" (Traugott 2010: 32).

**Managing audience discipline** refers to cases in which the audience is directly addressed and typically reprimanded or complimented for their metalinguistic behaviour, such as when they are directed to pay attention to the channel (as in alright, can i get your attention please? from the spoken lectures). No such examples involving you were found in the current dataset, although note the occurrence of your in the example above.

**Anticipating the audience’s response** refers to attempts to predict the audience’s reaction to what is said, often by attributing statements to the audience as potential objections or counterarguments. It shows the speaker/writer’s concern with the audience’s reception and processing of it, and is thus an important function in the evolving discourse.

**Anticipating the audience’s response**

(22) At this point you might wonder whether I still need to say something in order to show that there is a truth that is contingent a priori. You might even think that I am too stubborn in aiming at this same spot once again. [Wr_stud]

(23) From the planet’s surface you might think there is an eastward force, but there... [Wr_pub]

(24) ...find out how much it is likely to cost, if necessary by one of the high street printing chains. You will probably find you are very surprised by how little that cost may be. [Wr_pub]

(25) you might not think that’s unusual, until you hear what happens when normal cells... [Sp_luc]

(26) and their view on childbirth, as you might anticipate, was that... [Sp_luc]

(27) you’re all thinking what handouts? [Sp_luc]

Quite generally, this category involves a highly explicit type of second-guessing of the audience’s communicative needs and bears witness to a dialogic type of argumentation (cf. the quote by Hoey in the Introduction). As Thompson (2001: 58) puts it, "proficient writers attempt to second-guess the kind of information that readers might want or expect to find at each point in the unfolding text, and proceed by anticipating their questions about, or reactions to, what is written". The examples above demonstrate that such behaviour is evident not only among writers, but also among speakers in a monologic setting. Some of the examples found in this category introduce a proposition that is assignable to the imagined audience, in order to argue against it (Thompson 2001: 62). Some form of hedging, often in the form of modal verbs, often occurs in this category, due to the fact that (a) the speaker/writer cannot know what the audience is actually thinking, and (b) directly ascribing reactions or knowledge (or lack thereof) could be face-threatening. As with reviewing, this category appears to exhibit strong patterning in lexicogrammatical form, such as the construction you might [ask/think/wonder/find/argue].

**Managing the message** is typically used to emphasise the core message that is being conveyed; as such, it tends to provide the big picture, or at least state what the addressee wishes the audience to remember or experience based on the discourse. It also refers to cases in which the addressee explicitly comments on the desired uptake.

**Managing the message**

(28) um, the basic thing that we’re gonna try to do here today is get you to understand why Karl Marx matters, uh in the area of media studies [Sp_luc]

(29) now that’s a very powerful theory but what i want you to remember is, it’s one of many theories, that exist, for how you motivate behavior. [Sp_luc]

It is typically presupposed that the audience will take the writer’s perspective, which is in contrast to the function **Anticipating the audience’s response** above.

**Imagining scenarios** asks the audience to see something from a specific perspective, often in an engaging fashion, and often adding a narrative flavour. It is a rhetorical device that allows speakers and writers to make examples or descriptions more vivid and pertinent to the audience, often using a hypothetical, ‘picture this’ technique (cf. Ädel 2006: 76). While the process of discovery of the academic writer is typically not laid bare in the text, the imagined reader can be projected as “going through the process of discovery, as moving from relative ignorance or error to enlightenment” (Thompson 2001: 70). This is the least reflexive of the functions, but it can be thought of as a mutual thought experiment between the speaker/writer and the audience, which takes place in the shared world of discourse rather than in the ‘real world’. In other words, these examples do not necessarily point to a specific ‘real world’ event, but rather to an imagined event that is made use of in the current discourse. Together with the speaker-writer, the audience is asked to collaboratively imagine a scenario, or to take a specific perspective on a topic under discussion. Cognition verbs such as imagine and think about are often used to make the audience picture a specific situation.

**Imagining scenarios**

(30) Imagine that, for some terrible accident you lose your tongue. [Wr_stud]
(31) Consider this scenario: you are in a casino with a friend. […] You reply to your friend, “I think she won the jackpot.” [Wr_stud]

(32) How safe would you feel if you were living in a home in which your grandmother doused her own son in gasoline and burnt him?! [Wr_stud]

(33) just imagine being twenty-two and s- having somebody say to you do you want this job?… [Sp_lec]

(34) if you think back to the steam engine, the principle there was…. [Sp_lec]

This is an interesting category that does not appear to have been discussed much in the literature, except for ‘life drama’ narratives involving generic and impersonal you and present/progressive verb forms, as in you are in Egypt admiring the pyramids… (Kitagawa & Lehrer 1990: 749).

4.2 Distribution of discourse functions

Table 1 shows the distribution of the individual discourse functions in the three datasets. The totals for the metadiscursive and non-metadiscursive units are also given.

Table 1. Uses of units involving you in the three samples: Frequency of individual discourse functions and totals for both metadiscourse functions and non-metadiscourse units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uses of units involving you</th>
<th>Wr_stud</th>
<th>Wr_pub</th>
<th>Sp_lec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>METADISCURSIVE FUNCTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metalinguistic comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repairing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformulating</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commenting on linguistic form/meaning</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarifying</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing terminology</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing topic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimiting topic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding to topic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding topic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking asides</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enumerating</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is necessary to be cautious when interpreting these figures, as they are based on small samples. Any patterns of distribution found will need to be verified or falsified in future studies based on larger datasets. Another important caveat is that the classification has been done by a single analyst. Considering that we are dealing with a fuzzy category — and despite attempts at spelling out criteria for inclusion — there are always likely to be cases that are not clear-cut.

While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to account for those you units that were not classified as metadiscourse, it may prove illuminating to briefly consider a relatively large subset of excluded units, involving directives referring to actions taking place in the ‘real’ world (example 35) as well as ‘instruction manual’ types of generic you (example 36).
Annelie Ädel

(35) Sometimes, a conveyancer may be asked to accept a vesting assent as a root of title, but this is not very satisfactory. Having located a good root of title, you then need to form a chain of title from the date of that document right up to the present time. Having selected the deeds and documents from the deeds packet, you then need to photocopy them, and pin them together with a front sheet, which is entitled “Epitome of Title”. [Wr_pub]

(36) IMs are instantaneous — they take less than a second to be sent to the other person, so conversations move as fast as one can type. Furthermore, you can have multiple IM conversations at once by having more than one IM window on your computer screen. [Wr_stud]

In these examples, although the description of how something works is given from the perspective of the practitioner or user, the discussion is not a mutual thought experiment between the writer-speaker and audience taking place in the world of discourse. The impersonal one preceding you in (36) and the anonymous and general “a conveyancer” in (35) show that the audience is not explicitly invited to imagine or share something, as is the case in Imagining scenarios. That said, the greatest difficulty in the analysis stage of this study was deciding exactly where to draw the line between Imagining scenarios and non-metadiscursive examples.

With these caveats in mind, we can proceed to consider similarities and differences in the distribution of the data. Quite generally, a relatively large proportion of the data was found to function as metadiscourse: approximately half of the tokens of the word you examined (with slightly higher numbers in the spoken lectures). With respect to the use of metadiscourse, the three samples exhibit generally similar distributions of discourse functions. Considering that previous research has found differences in the functions of I and we (e.g. Flottum et al. 2006; Hyland 2008), this may indicate that discourse functions involving you are more stable across genres. With respect to the four overarching types of functions, you rarely occurs in Metalinguistic comments or Speech act labels. There is a minor exception in the professional writing, which happens to have several occurrences of Commenting on linguistic form/meaning; however, this appears to be rather accidental, having to do with the fact that the material is on linguistic topics to a large extent. It is hardly surprising that Speech act labels are rarely offered in the second person, as it is the first person who is, after all, in charge of the discourse. You is slightly more common in Discourse organisation units, especially Endophoric marking, Reviewing and Contextualising (although not equally in all three groups).

Discourse organisation units are used more often in spoken lectures than in the two written modes, which would be an interesting pattern to examine in future research. The lower figure for the professional writing may be due to the fact that the BNC material consists of text extracts and not full texts; this may result in fewer occurrences of Discourse organisation, which is likely not to be distributed evenly throughout written texts (cf. Ädel 2006: 138). The comparably high number for Contextualising in the student writing sample appears to be due to an outlier in the form of a single report with several occurrences forming a sequence (example 16 above). Finally, References to the audience ended up being the most frequent type involving you; this is probably what should be expected for a second person pronoun, which often targets the audience. In this subcategory, we find a rather even distribution of Anticipating the audience’s response and Imagining scenarios across the three samples, but greater frequencies of Managing comprehension/channel and Managing the message in the spoken lectures. This confirms a pattern found in previous research (Ädel 2010), which can be explained by (a) the physical presence of an audience and (b) genre. Considering that the audience is present in the spoken material but not in the written material, it is predictable (see e.g. Chafe 1982) that we would find higher frequencies of Managing comprehension/channel in the spoken data. With respect to genre, the only material that represents an audience that consists entirely of non-experts or non-experts is the spoken lectures, in which the higher frequencies of Managing the message is likely to be attributed to lecturers adopting a more authoritative role, telling their audience what to take special note of.

A final, important observation to make is that the higher overall frequency of metadiscourse found in the spoken material is surprising if one considers the fact that the great majority of studies into metadiscourse have exclusively targeted written discourse. Now that it has been established that written academic discourse is not ‘faceless’, it is time we moved on and studied metadiscourse also in spoken discourse,11 which is where it appears, in fact, to be most frequently used — at least when you is involved.

5. Conclusion

The results of this study showed that approximately half of the 450 examples sampled functioned as metadiscourse. The discourse functions were found to be distributed similarly in the three academic registers. Where the discourse functions are concerned, occurrences of you were unevenly distributed across the four types of functions, with you being rarely involved in Metalinguistic comments or Speech act labels, slightly more common in Discourse organisation, and most common in References to the audience. Within this last category, a rather even distribution was found for Anticipating the audience’s response and Imagining scenarios across the three samples, while the presence of the audience and...
the power relations between the discourse participants were found to contribute to higher frequencies of managing comprehension/channel and managing the message in the spoken lectures.

The present work is both small-scale and exploratory, so future studies are necessary to verify the patterns found here — such studies need to be based on more data and involve more coders. It is hoped that the taxonomy can be used in future work examining variation, such as that across different populations or registers. Another interesting topic for future work concerns the patterns of correlation between discourse functions and different pronouns (I, we and you). There are strong indications that the first person is favoured for some discourse functions, while a second person is favoured for others. Comparison of uses of we and you are of particular interest in the light of claims made to explain the preference of we over you in written academic discourse. For example, it has been said that politeness and persuasion based on peer solidarity may play a role: with we, the "writer is simultaneously projecting and sharing a position for the reader" (Thompson 2001: 63; emphasis added) and "it identifies the reader as someone who shares similar understandings to the writer as a member of the same discipline" (Hyland 2010: 11).

This study has pointed to some of the ways in which metadiscourse is used to orient to the audience, so it has hopefully brought us one small step closer to an understanding of the 'meanings that are centred on the audience'. There is a certain amount of overlap between the phenomenon of metadiscourse and the vague notion of audience orientation, even though the latter certainly does not necessitate any self-reflective use of language, which the reflexive approach to metadiscourse requires. This study has been limited to an examination of metadiscourse involving pronouns (and only second person pronouns at that). However, since pronouns are not necessarily used in the realisation of the discourse functions of the taxonomy, future work will also need to investigate impersonal metadiscourse — those cases in which no reference to the discourse participants is made.

This research also has potential applications in the EAP classroom. It would be possible to use the taxonomy (Ädel 2010), together with examples appropriate for a specific target genre, to help raise students’ awareness of audience orientation. After all, audience awareness is a central skill needed for effective communication — not least in writing (see e.g. Thompson 2001: 58). By laying bare discourse functions in the way this study has done, conventions concerning audience orientation are likely to become more transparent to novice academics. Furthermore, with examples of typical phraseology for the different discourse functions, students would also receive input on how to perform such functions in conventionally accepted ways (cf. Thompson 2001: 68). With respect to the phraseology of metadiscourse, the present study has pointed to some co-occurrence patterns involving you (for reviewing and anticipating the audience’s response), but a larger dataset is needed to spot such patterns in a systematic way. It would be valuable to include also possessive your in future lexicogrammatical work. Your is of interest also because it may be more likely than you to indicate an attribution of some statement or belief to the imagined audience (possibly included to be refuted by the speaker-writer; cf. Thompson 2001).

I hope to have shown that this type of investigation of metadiscursive functions is a relevant approach for all forms of monologic discourse, not only written ones. Historically, metadiscourse has been discussed almost exclusively in terms of writer-reader relations, and its use has predominantly been examined in writing (see details in Ädel 2010). With this in mind, perhaps the most interesting finding in the present study is that the highest frequency of metadiscourse involving you was in the spoken lectures and not in the two written modes. Despite the monologic setting, we still find signs of the dialogism which has been discussed extensively in the literature on writer-reader interaction during the past couple of decades. Speaker-writers depict forms of interaction between themselves and the audience, such that even when 'real life’, flesh-and-blood members of the audience are not present — or they are present, but their role is primarily to listen — the imagined audience and their imagined contributions to the discourse still affect the discourse. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the audience has much power in the monologic setting; even though there is an orientation toward the audience, it is still seen from the speaker/writer’s perspective. It is the first person that provides the starting point for a discourse, the first person being the manager of the message in these monologic genres. The results of this study suggest that it is time we changed perspectives from an exclusive focus on written interaction to interaction in all monologic discourse, whether written or spoken. What we need is comparative investigations of how interaction of this type is performed similarly or differently in written versus spoken monologic discourse.

Acknowledgements

* I am grateful to the editors for inviting me to contribute to this special issue and to two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on the paper.

Notes

1. This characterisation is from Geertz (1983) and specifically refers to writing in the hard sciences.
2. In a recent edited volume on ‘interpersonality’, ‘the interpersonal component of texts’ is defined as “the ways in which the writers project themselves and their audience in the discourse” (Lorés-Sanz et al. 2010: 1).

3. The form you of course represents both the nominative and accusative forms (as well as both singular and plural), but the occurrences of me and us are so marginal that they do not seriously affect the overall numbers.

4. See Lee (2001) for a description of the types of academic writing in the BNC.

5. In fact, this expression is so common in textbooks that it qualifies as a lexical bundle, that is, a highly frequent recurrent word sequence (Biber et al. 2004).

6. Phorics point to various locations and portions in the current discourse (see Ådel 2006:101ff). They can be referred to as the ‘road signs’ of discourse.

7. The label ‘endophoric marker’ is also used by Hyland (1998: 443), where it includes types which are referred to here as Reviewing and Previewing.

8. Note that cases in which the audience is directed to look at tables and handouts fall into the category of Endophoric marking, as it is more to do with organising the discourse than managing the audience.

9. Even early work on metadiscourse included “Anticipating the reader’s reaction” (Crismore 1989) — though note the bias towards written discourse.

10. This is statistically significant according to a Chi-square test, for which the Chi-square value equals 6.43 and p equals 0.04.

11. But see e.g. Ådel (2010), Luukka (1994), Mauranen (2001), Thompson (2003) for previous studies on spoken metadiscourse in academic English.

References


Intersubjectivity and intersubjectification

Typology and operationalization

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In this paper we present our views on intersubjectivity and intersubjectification with reference to case studies on adjectives, hedges, tags, honorifics, etc. Building on Diessel’s notion of “joint attention” and Traugott’s approach to intersubjectivity, we propose a distinction between three types of intersubjectivity: attitudinal, responsive, and textual. We evaluate and propose formal recognition criteria to operationalize this essentially semantic typology, such as left versus right periphery and prosodic features. In addition, we address the issue of directionality between subjectification and intersubjectification. Rather than seeing subjectivity as a prerequisite for intersubjectivity, we argue that in our typology intersubjective meanings of constructions may diachronically precede subjective ones.

1. Introduction

As the contributions to this special issue clearly show, the term intersubjectivity has received a variety of interpretations and definitions in different linguistic frameworks and has accordingly been used to capture a wide range of — sometimes very divergent — phenomena. Building on the available functional, cognitive grammar and applied linguistics literature, but with a focus on Traugott’s understanding of the notion, we will present our view of intersubjectivity in this paper. In Section 2, we will introduce our definition of intersubjectivity and try to set up a preliminary typology. Taking Traugott’s definition of intersubjectivity as our starting-point, we will propose a distinction between three types of intersubjectivity: attitudinal intersubjectivity, responsive intersubjectivity and textual intersubjectivity. Section 3 is devoted to the problem of operationalizing intersubjectivity. Possible formal recognition criteria of the semantic notion of intersubjectivity will be discussed and assessed in terms of their generalizability and cross-linguistic validity. First, in terms of position, (inter)subjectifying elements have been claimed to be used in increasingly peripheral positions. The validity of this linearization claim will be evaluated in Section 3.1. Second, intersubjectivity and intersubjectification will be argued to be strongly linked to directionality. It is generally assumed that diachronically intersubjective meanings develop later than and typically derive from subjective meanings (Section 3.2). Third, for spoken language, prosody can be identified as a possible diagnostic of intersubjectivity (Section 3.3). Finally, Section 4 briefly summarizes the main claims and arguments put forward in this paper.

2. A typology of intersubjectivity

2.1 Notions of intersubjectivity

In the literature, there seem to be three main notions of intersubjectivity, namely Traugott’s essentially diachronic notion, Verhagen’s notion grounded in the theory of Cognitive Grammar, and Nuyts’s understanding of shared meanings.

First, the Traugottian notion of intersubjectivity is perhaps the most widespread one and is typically understood to refer to meanings coded attention to the social self of the hearer (e.g. Traugott and Dasher 2002), the prime example of which are Japanese addressee honorifics. For Traugott and Dasher (2002: 22) and Traugott (2003, 2010, this issue) intersubjectivity is closely connected to and cannot be defined without reference to subjectivity. Both synchronically and diachronically, intersubjectivity is considered a prerequisite for intersubjectivity. While subjective expressions index speaker attitude or viewpoint, markers of intersubjectivity in this view, also index the speaker’s “attention to AD[ressee]/R[eader] as a participant in the speech event, not in the world talked about” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 22).

Second, building on the Cognitive Grammar framework developed by Langacker (1991), Verhagen (2005, 2007) has proposed an account of intersubjectivity in terms of cognitive coordination between speaker and hearer. In intersubjective constructions, the hearer is more explicitly foregrounded as the active interpreter of utterances of the speaker. In this view, the hearer is thus not only a passive addressee guided by the speaker to focus on a given conceptual content, but crucially an active conceptualizer. Importantly, in Verhagen’s view, this cognitive coordination task of speaker and hearer is omnipresent in communication, but it is coded more explicitly in some constructions than others, e.g. negation patterns. He (1995) gives the example of She is not happy versus She is unhappy, where only the former sentential negation not happy takes into account the presence of another perspective than that of the speaker’s, which is then negated. The morphological negation unhappy does not bring in a distinct viewpoint.
Third, Nuyts (2001a, 2001b, this issue), on the basis of his research into the expression of modal meanings, has developed yet another view on intersubjectivity as referring to meanings "presented as being shared between the assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but not necessarily) including the hearer" (Nuyts this issue) (e.g. intersubjective Given the instability in the country it is likely that the army will intervene vs. subjective In such an unstable situation I think the army will intervene).

As the short characterizations of these three notions show, they are all different and cannot be used interchangeably. For a number of reasons, we take Traugott’s framework as the starting-point for our thinking on intersubjectivity. Firstly, Traugottian intersubjectivity refers to the semantics of constructions, i.e. to (encoded) meanings. Verhagen’s and Nuyts’s understandings of intersubjectivity are more pragmatic in nature, referring not to meanings per se but to the rhetorical representation of meaning. For Nuyts (this issue), for instance, intersubjectivity is a "discursive tool" enabling the speaker to represent meaning as shared rather than as restricted to one speaker. Secondly, Traugott’s framework is the only one that is well-developed both in its synchronic and diachronic dimensions and that is generally applicable to a wide range of phenomena. The Cognitive Grammar notion of intersubjectivity put forward by Verhagen (2005, 2007) has not (yet) been developed diachronically. Nuyts has developed a framework that can account both for intersubjectivity and intersubjectification, but that is strongly linked to the domain of modality. At the moment, we do not see how it could easily be extended to other domains of language. In our view, Traugott’s notion is best suited to account for synchronic variation as well as for diachronic processes of change, and is general enough to account for phenomena from a variety of domains including modality, the verb phrase, the noun phrase, discourse markers, etc. We therefore take this notion as our starting-point for further theorizing.

2.2 Pragmatic versus semantic intersubjectivity

In recent years, Traugott has increasingly emphasized the importance of distinguishing pragmatic intersubjectivity from semantic intersubjectivity. She states that in a general sense the very fact of communicating with another person entails general intersubjectivity. The ‘I’ is constituted in part by conceptualizing the other member of the communicative dyad ‘you’ (Benveniste 1971; Lyons 1994) and discourse is communicatively successful only if speakers pay attention to audience needs, and if ‘mutual manifestness’ or ‘mutual management’ is worked on (Schiffrin 1990; Nuyts 2001; Verhagen 2005). (Traugott 2010: 32)

It has repeatedly been pointed out that all communication pays heed to a real or imagined interlocutor and is essentially polyphonic in nature (see Benveniste 1971; Bakhtin 1981; Bhatia 1993; Clark 1996; Biber et al. 1999; Adel, and Thompson this issue). Thompson, with reference to Bakhtin, states that from a discoursal perspective on intersubjectivity all discourse is "constructed fundamentally in terms of exchanges between interactants in communicative events in which each interactant shapes their message to accommodate and affect the other." (this issue: XX)

As stated in Section 2.1 and argued in Traugott (2010), the semantic rather than pragmatic nature of intersubjectivity is, among other things, what distinguishes her notion of intersubjectivity from other interpretations such as that of Nuyts (2001a, 2001b, this issue) and Verhagen (2005, 2007), which “assume audience interpretation and understanding” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 23). In this sense, pragmatic intersubjectivity refers to “the ambient context in which linguistic change takes place and to which linguistic change contributes” (Traugott 2010: 32). Accordingly, Traugott (2010, this issue) also distinguishes between the intersubjective use of linguistic elements, i.e. pragmatic intersubjectivity, and intersubjectified elements, i.e. elements in which the intersubjective meaning is not only pragmatically inferred but semantically encoded. The boundary between these pragmatic and semantic subtypes of intersubjectivity is, in our view, gradual and indiscernible and cannot always be unequivocally determined (cf. Thompson, this issue). In an example such as He was kind of a jerk last night, kind of serves to hedge the negative and possibly offensive semantics of jerk, and in that sense can be labelled attitudinally intersubjective. However, how can one prove that this meaning is semantically coded in kind of? One can imagine a context in which the same speaker continues by saying he really is a jerk. Authors such as Traugott would then conclude that the hedging meaning of kind of is cancellable and therefore pragmatic in nature only. Particularly in cases of currently ongoing change the distinction between pragmatic and semantic intersubjectivity cannot always be very sharply drawn. In the remainder of this paper, we will refrain from making any claims concerning the pragmatic or semantic nature of the intersubjective meanings discussed.

2.3 Subtypes of intersubjectivity

According to Traugott (this issue) there are two types of language functions most likely to give rise to intersubjective meanings, namely politeness and particular metadiscursive functions. First, politeness refers to the encoding of the Speaker’s appreciation and recognition of the Addressee’s social status” and as such fits well with the following definitions of intersubjectivity:
Intersubjective meanings crucially involve social deixis (attitude toward status that speakers impose on first person — second person deixis). They impact directly on the self-image or ‘face’ needs of SP/W or AD/R. (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 23; SP/W refers to speaker/writer and AD/R to addressee/reader)

Intersubjectivity is the explicit expression of the SP/W’s attention to the ‘self’ of addressee/reader in both an epistemic sense (paying attention to their presumed attitudes to the content of what is said) and in a more social sense (paying attention to their ‘face’ or ‘image needs’ associated with social stance and identity). (Traugott 2003: 128)

The prototypical example of such intersubjective meaning is that of Japanese addressee honorifics, such as Modern Japanese -mas-u-, which “started out as a morphologically complex main verb *mawi-ir-as-uru ‘let come (humilitive)’ in Old Japanese, came to be used as a [subjective] suffix verb indicating humility without lexical content, and finally became the modern [intersubjective] honorific addressee marker” (Narrog 2010: 387). Other prime examples are T/V pronouns (tu/vous), which code politeness or social distance, and hedging uses of discourse markers such as sort of or well in (1).

1. ‘And you didn’t feel guilty about it afterwards?’ ‘Well, he might have lost his girlfriend, but at least I gave him a good time!’ (WB — brbooks)

We propose to classify such meanings which code the speaker’s image of (his/her relation to) the hearer, and attention to the face needs and social self of the hearer as expressing ATTITUdINAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY.

Besides politeness, Traugott (this issue) identifies “metadiscursive functions such as turn-giving or elicitation of response” as a second likely source of intersubjectivity. Examples are turn-taking devices and question tags soliciting a response by the hearer such as clause-final right? in (2) and is it not? or isn’t it? as in (3).

2. ‘I’ve seen your name in the paper … that diplomat who’s been sentenced to death, right?’ ‘Yeah.’ (WB — brbooks)

3. Wei strokes his chin. ‘This is an imaginary cat, is it not?’ Julie nods. (WB — brbooks)

The above constructions, unlike the attitudinally intersubjective ones, do not primarily code attention to the social self of the hearer or serve as face-saving strategies. Rather, they convey a type of metadiscursive or RESPONSIVE INTERSUBJECTIVITY, eliciting a certain action or behaviour on the part of the hearer thereby aiding discourse continuity.

Among researchers adopting Traugott’s definitions, the attitudinal and responsive meanings discussed above are generally considered to be intersubjective. Although we agree on the intersubjective nature of these meanings, we want to consider whether other meanings could also be included under the heading of intersubjectivity. More specifically, we believe that certain textual meanings, understood as meanings whose interpretation requires setting up a referential relation to some stretch of discourse, may also plausibly be argued to be intersubjective in nature.

The position of textual meanings in the objective — subjective — intersubjective continuum is a debated issue in recent literature. Narrog (this issue) argues that textual meanings cannot be fully subsumed under the labels of either objectivity or (inter)subjectivity. Textual meanings are, in his view, best understood as occupying a distinct position in the language system, on a par with subjective and intersubjective meaning. Whereas subjectivity then roughly corresponds with speaker-orientation and intersubjectivity with hearer-orientation, textual meanings entail “orientation toward speech, i.e. discourse or text, itself” (Narrog this issue). By contrast, Breban (2010: 115) views all textual meanings as intersubjective as they “contain a prominent hearer-oriented aspect, that is, they invoke speaker-hearer negotiations and in the end all aim at facilitating the interpretation by the hearer”. We would like to propose a more nuanced view, in which some, but not all, textual meanings may be intersubjective.

Traugott (1982, 1989) has convincingly shown that textual elements can convey both objective and subjective meanings. One example is the conjunction while, which has developed from the Old English phrase þæs mannes sawul is belocen on his lichaman þa hwile þe ‘at the time that’, as in (4). In Present Day English, while can function either as a temporal connective, as in (5), or as a concessive, as in (6).

4. þæs mannes sawul is belocen on his lichaman þa hwile þe he lybynde þep. ‘Man’s soul is locked in his body while so long as he is alive.’ (Traugott 1995: 40)

5. While he was laughing the door opened. (OED Besant, 1882, All Sorts of Men II. xv. 15)

6. While I quite like that kind of tiling, I don’t care enough for it to buy any. (Traugott 1982: 254)

Þa hwile þe ‘at the time that’, as in (4), “refers to a temporal situation viewed as part of a verifiable state-description and in this sense is propositional” (Traugott 1989: 31). The temporal phrase has ideational, propositional meaning. As a temporal connective, as in (5), while in the sense of ‘during’ signals a cohesive time relation not only between two events but also between two clauses, and therefore has a textual as well as a temporal function” (Traugott 1989: 31). In other words, temporal connective while serves a linking function whereby the established connection pertains to the propositional level and, as such, conveys objective textual
meaning. In contrast, concessive while, as in (6) “combines cohesion [i.e. textual meaning] with the speaker’s attitude as to the nature of the relation between the two facts expressed” (Traugott 1982: 254). As a concessive, while thus conveys subjective textual meaning, involving the speaker taking a stance with respect to a stretch of discourse.

On the one hand, textual elements can thus be objective, viz. when they rely on a textual linking relation or cross-reference between different parts of a sentence that does not require stance-taking on behalf of the speaker (e.g. relativizers, complementizers, subject-verb agreement). On the other hand, textual meanings can also be subjective, viz. when they “serve to express the speaker’s attitude to the textual strategy being adopted” (e.g. topicalizers such as as far as and so as in So, our speaker tonight is Bella Johnson [Traugott and Dasher 2002:96]). In addition, we believe, like Breban (2010) and Carlier and De Mulder (2010), that textual elements can possibly also convey intersubjective, hearer-oriented meanings. Likely candidates are focus and backgrounding devices and elements creating a joint focus of attention (Diessel 1999, 2006) between speaker and hearer:

Joint attention is a complex phenomenon that involves three basic components: the actor [speaker], the addressee, and an object of reference. In order to communicate, actor and addressee must jointly focus their attention on the same entity or situation. To this end, the actor directs the addressee’s attention to a particular reference object in the surrounding situation [e.g. by means of demonstratives]. If the communicative act is successful, the communicative partners focus their attention on the same referent. (Diessel 2006:465).

Following Ghesquière (2009, 2010, 2011) and Ghesquière & Van de Velde (2011:792–793), we consider the creation of joint attention as inherently hearer-oriented and thus intersubjective. Importantly, the focus of attention can be situated not only in the surrounding situation, but also in the surrounding context:

Joint attention is not only important to coordinate the interlocutors’ attentional focus in the speech situation, it also plays an important role in the organization of discourse (Diessel 2006:476).

Elements steering the interpretation of the hearer by pointing his attention to a particular discourse referent intended by the speaker may then be labelled textually intersubjective. In their discourse use, demonstratives, for instance, have “text-internal reference” focusing the hearer’s attention on elements in the ongoing discourse, namely noun phrases and propositions (Diessel 1999:93–94). Building on Diessel’s observations, such textual elements convey intersubjective meaning, because they are used by the speaker to negotiate discourse referent tracking for the hearer (e.g. in the case of (complexes of) primary and secondary determiners), and to ensure joint attentional focus of speaker and hearer (cf. Ghesquière 2009, 2010; Breban 2010; Carlier and De Mulder 2010). This does, however, require a more liberal interpretation of intersubjectivity than traditionally argued for. As Carlier and De Mulder (2010:269) put it, intersubjectivity then “is not limited to the encoding of attitudinal aspects; it also concerns more globally items that materialize the strategic interaction between speaker and hearer and reflect the active role of the speaker to orient and to guide the hearer in his interpretational tasks”.

The possibility of some textual meanings being intersubjective is also recognized in studies of metadiscourse, which Hyland (2005:27) defines as follows:

Metadiscourse is the cover term for the self-reflective expressions used to negotiate interactional meanings in a text, assisting the writer (or speaker) to express a viewpoint and engage with readers as members of a particular community.

The above citation shows that in applied linguistics, metadiscourse is typically interpreted very broadly and captures subjective as well as intersubjective phenomena (cf. Ådel this issue). Interestingly, a key role is given to reader-writer interaction and the discourse-organizational, textual dimension of this interaction and its evaluative, attitudinal dimension are explicitly acknowledged (cf. Hyland and Tse 2004). Thompson and Thetela (1995) have labelled this interactive and interactional metadiscourse respectively. The interactive dimension groups together elements that “help to guide the reader through the text”, whereas the interactional dimension is concerned with elements designed to “involve the reader in the text” (Hyland 2005:49). The former could be understood to include the elements that we have called textually intersubjective, the latter is explicitly understood as comprising amongst others hedges, which fall under the category of attitudinal intersubjectivity. The distinction between more attitudinal and more textual hearer-oriented elements has thus been noted across frameworks.

In this section, we have tried to clarify our view of intersubjectivity, a label used in the literature to capture a wide range of phenomena. To see the wood for the trees, we believe it may be useful to distinguish three types of intersubjectivity, namely attitudinal, responsive and textual intersubjectivity. Attitudinal intersubjectivity refers to meanings coding the speaker’s image of (his/her relation to) the hearer. Responsive intersubjectivity is conveyed by linguistic items eliciting not just a cognitive operation on behalf of the hearer but a certain (speech) act or behaviour promoting discourse continuity or discourse cooperation. Textually intersubjective elements are specifically oriented toward steering the hearer’s interpretation. Importantly, we do not consider the proposed subtypes to be distinguished by discrete and strict boundaries and acknowledge that one linguistic element or construction can convey different types of intersubjective meaning. A case in point are English question tags. While these serve primarily as responsive-intersubjective
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‘my analog receiver has to work at least for 5 years, if you ask me.’

That wasn’t too bad, was it?

Erm but it’s an interesting point. I don’t know.

We’ll have to find out what our listeners think shall we?

Okay Arnold. Thanks for raising that one. (WB — UK spoken)

In these examples, two functions are expressed simultaneously:

This sector’s saving can be distributed between investing and increasing deposits or putting money in the bank. Maybe we’ll call it D shall we?

Deposit change delta an increase in D. (WB — UK spoken)

A We’ll have to find out what our listeners think shall we?

B Yes okay.

A Okay Arnold. Thanks for raising that one. (WB — UK spoken)

In these examples, two functions are expressed simultaneously:

There are also examples where one element can express different types of intersubjectivity in different contexts. An example is Dutch toch. On the one hand, as a question tag, toch can request a response by the hearer and express responsive intersubjectivity, as in (9). On the other hand, as in (10), toch has counter-expectational meaning (see Daalder 1986), and as such acknowledges the potentially divergent opinion of the addressee. In the latter use, it comes close to a hedge and conveys attitudinal intersubjectivity.

That wasn’t too bad, was it?

My analog receiver must work minimally 5 years.

‘my analog receiver has to work at least for 5 years, if you ask me.’

3. Operationalizing intersubjectivity

The importance of form-meaning correlations has long been recognized in recent functional, cognitive and constructional accounts (Croft 1991, Fischer 2007, Traugott 2010: 45). Accordingly, any semantic understanding of intersubjectivity, irrespective of its precise definition, should ideally be supplemented with formal diagnostic criteria (see López-Couso 2010: 127, Cuyckens et al. 2010: 5, Traugott this issue). As a strictly semantic-pragmatic phenomenon, intersubjectivity may seem to sometimes be applied on purely intuitive grounds. With honorifics, their attitudinally intersubjective, hearer-oriented character is intuitively plausible and generally accepted. The intersubjective nature of definite and indefinite articles, by contrast, is more a matter of debate. As they help the addressee to cognitively access the intended referent, they have been argued to be (textually) intersubjective in nature by e.g. Breban 2010 and Ghesquière 2011. Traugott, on the other hand, would most likely classify them as subjective only in nature and Narrog (this issue) probably views them as textual, discourse-oriented, and distinct from both subjective and intersubjective meanings. And what to think of vocatives, interrogative illocution, imperatives and prohibitives, wh-question words, and speech-act conditionals? All of these are addressee-oriented, but are they all intersubjective and, if so, do they all convey the same type of intersubjectivity? In order to get a better handle on intersubjectivity and make it a generally applicable notion in linguistics, it should be made clear how it can be diagnosed and operationalized (see also Traugott 2010: 56, 58, 59; this issue).

The problem of operationalization has already featured prominently in research on subjectivity. Several scholars have pointed out that at least for some types of subjectivity there are formal correlates of the semantic notion: subjectified elements do not allow pronominal substitution; they cannot be brought under the scope of negation; they resist focussability, submodification and gradability; they cannot be used predicatively; they are likely to diachronically undergo leftward movement and scope expansion; they resist agent-control; they are banned from certain subordinate clauses; and they are typically non-truth-conditional (see Hengeveld 1988; Company 2006a, b; De Smet & Verstraete 2006; Van de Velde 2009: 148–149, 160–164). These formal characteristics are typical of what De Smet & Verstraete (2006) call “interpersonal subjectivity”, which they distinguish from non-semantically encoded “pragmatic subjectivity” and non-interpersonal “ideational subjectivity”.

The question now is whether (certain types of) intersubjectivity correlate with formal properties as well. Can we find structural features that are symptomatic of intersubjectivity, and that can serve as tests to distinguish intersubjectivity from non-subjective semantics on the one hand and from subjective semantics on the other hand?

Unequivocally intersubjective elements like the Japanese honorifics or addressee-oriented discourse particles seem to display some of the same properties as those established for subjective elements, that is, non-truth-conditionality,
non-focusability, etc. This is characteristic of linguistic elements involved in the expression of procedural (as opposed to conceptual) meaning in general. Of course, the validity of these diagnostics is dependent on how (broadly) intersubjectivity is defined. If some deictic determiners are (textually) intersubjective, then the criteria of non-focusability, pronominal substitution, and resistance to negation cannot be maintained. English demonstratives, for instance, can easily be questioned, focused and negated.

The problem then arises how to set off intersubjectivity from subjectivity. If subjective and intersubjective meanings share (some of) the same recognition criteria, how can we distinguish between these two notions? In her overview article, López-Couso (2010) frequently uses the label (inter)subjectivity, with the parentheses around ‘inter’ suggesting that the two notions can be conflated to some extent. Use of an overarching label that does not clearly distinguish between subjectivity and intersubjectivity may be motivated by the observation that vagueness or fuzziness pervades language: non-subjectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity are not distinguished by discrete boundaries and shade into each other. Furthermore, in Traugott’s account, intersubjectivity always entails subjectivity (but not vice versa) (see also Narrog 2010: 386), so that the two phenomena are at least co-dependent, and in this sense not entirely distinct, in those approaches.

Moreover, it may prove challenging to find cross-linguistically valid formal correlates of intersubjectivity. Current typological research reveals that there is less universality in grammar than was assumed in the 20th century (see Evans & Levinson 2009). Linguistic categories are not only language-specific, but also construction-specific. As Bickel (2010) shows, for instance, some languages are ergative in their case morphology, but accusative in their verbal agreement morphology, so that the notion of ‘subject’ cannot be defined in a cross-constructionally valid way. What does this mean for intersubjectivity? We hypothesize that intersubjectivity can play out differently in different languages, and within one and the same language may be formally encoded in different ways in for instance noun phrases and verb phrases. Yet, attempts have been made at defining recognition criteria of intersubjectivity in a cross-linguistically valid and falsifiable way. In the following sections, three possible recognition criteria of intersubjectivity and intersubjectification will be discussed, namely linearization, directionality, and prosody.

3.1 Linearization

It has been observed that there are systematic correspondences between (inter)subjectivity and linearization, or the position of a(n) (inter)subjective unit within a clause or noun phrase. Degand (2011) has observed a functional division between the left periphery and the right periphery, the latter being primarily oriented towards addressee-accommodation. If intersubjectification can be defined in terms of addressee-orientation (see Traugott 2007: 300; Narrog this issue), it seems that intersubjectivity correlates with right peripheral linearization. This claim has been put to the test by Traugott (this issue), who concludes that there is indeed a tendency — though not a hard and fast rule — for such a division of labour between the left and right periphery.

Interestingly, this tendency may hold cross-linguistically. Right-peripheral elements are observed in a wide range of languages, including Dutch, Norwegian, German, French, Italian, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, and cross-cutting SOV vs. SVO distinctions. Japanese is SOV and Chinese is SVO, but both make use of right-peripheral particles for intersubjective meanings (see Van der Wouden & Foolen 2011). Examples of clause-final right-peripheral markers for intersubjective meaning are easily provided:

- English question tags (see McGregor 1995, Tottie & Hoffmann 2006 and Kims 2007 for a pragmatic assessment of different types), as in (11):
  
  (11) It is the twenty fourth of September isn’t it? (BNC)

- the particle vo in Makhuwa, reinforcing the illocution by focusing the attention of the addressee to the importance of the message (Van der Wal, ms.), as in (12):
  
  (12) m-mail-î vo
  
  2PL.SM-be.quiet-opt vo
  
  ‘be quiet’

  situation: urging the children to be quiet (but not angry, as opposed to va)

- the Mandarin ‘relevance marker’ or ‘actuality marker’ de, signalling the explanatory value of the proposition (Sybesma 2010: 10–11), as in (13):
  
  (13) tā n:n-pénghou zhù zài nàr de
  
  her friend lives prep there de
  
  ‘her friend lives there, you see’

- The Yurakaré clausal enclitic interactional ‘adaptive’ marker =ye, marking information that the addressee should know, but has no demonstrated knowledge of (Gipper 2011: 60–61), as in (14):
  
  (14) anaj niy achi ka-tûtü-jî ò-tiba bëshëë i-tiba=ya=ye
  
  how NEG like that 3SG.OBJ-be-HAB 1PL.Poss-pet entity PV-PET=IRR=ADAPF
  
  ‘Look, when we raise animals as pets they also stay with us like that.’

- The Korean sentence-final particle -tanikka for ‘you-know’ emphasis (Rhee 2010: 3), as in (15):
  
  (15)
rain-nom come

“It’s raining, you know! (How many times should I tell you? Don’t you trust me? ...)

The functional motivation behind this tendency might be that the right periphery is the place where the speaker hands over his/her conversational turn, and wants to accommodate the addressee so as to ensure the steady flow of discourse (see also Degand 2011: 337, 347 and references cited there). As in a relay-race, the smooth transfer of the handoff in between the different legs is crucial in obtaining success in the overall race.

It goes without saying that claims about linearization depend on the specific operationalization of (inter)subjectivity. Future research will also have to see whether linearization tendencies are the same for attitudinal, responsive and textual intersubjectification. In addition, the notion of ‘periphery’ is far from unambiguous and may be defined in various ways. Moreover, while there are cross-linguistic tendencies, linearization generalizations need to be tailored to the particular languages. Even within one language, different patterns may emerge depending on the grammatical subsystem concerned. Pragmatic markers in English, for instance, are well-known for dissociating themselves from the structural context, but other types of intersubjective units may very well behave differently.

3.2 Directionality

Several authors have looked into the relation between (inter)subjectivity and diachronic directionality. Directionality then pertains either to the relative chronological order of subjectification and intersubjectification or to the observation that (inter)subjectification is paralleled by a positional shift of the expression concerned within the noun phrase or clause. The latter can be seen as the diachronic penchant of linearization tendencies, as discussed in Section 3.1. For the noun phrase, for instance, Adamson (2000: 44, 54) has argued that there is “a link between leftmost position and the speaker-oriented element” (i.e. linearization) and that, accordingly, the subjectification of prenominal elements is accompanied by leftward movement (i.e. directionality). An example is the English adjective lovely which has shifted from a descriptive use as in a lovely lady to an intensifier as in lovely long legs. As we have noted earlier, for many authors intersubjectivity and especially intersubjectification always presuppose subjectivity and subjectification. This conceptual dependence is in its turn reflected in specific claims about the relative chronology or directionality of subjectification and intersubjectification.

Firstly, the view that subjectification always precedes intersubjectification is illustrated by Degand and Fagard (2012: 159) when they say that “interactional [intersubjective] elements are necessarily subjective, while the reverse is not true; in other words, intersubjectification presupposes subjectification”. Working with Traugott’s definitions of (inter)subjectivity, they illustrate their claims by means of a case study of the French connective parce que, which first appears with a subjective meaning (16) and later with intersubjective meaning (17) (Degand & Fagard 2012: 161):

(16) mort me fis en mi la voie por ce que trop grant fain avoie (Roman de Renart, early 13th c)

‘I played dead in the middle of the road, because I was terribly hungry’

(17) Bon, vous me racontez. Qui conduisait votre taxi ? — Que je vous explique.

J’ai un ami, Toni, enfin un copain. Parce que, vé, on est pas intimes, vous comprenez (Contemporary French; Izzo, 1995)

‘Ok, you tell me. Who was driving your cab? — Let me explain. I have a friend, Toni, well, a buddy. Because, y’see we aren’t intimate, you understand’

These two uses correlate with so-called external and internal causal conjunctions respectively, as distinguished for instance by Verstraete (1998). Whereas the former causally links to states of affairs (16), the latter (17) gives grounds for a specific reasoning and interacts with the illocutionary level.6 Other case studies in which subjective uses of constructions precede intersubjective ones can be found e.g., in Traugott & Dasher (2002), Traugott (2010, this issue), Narrog (2010), Nuyts (this issue). Examples typically subsume honorifics and hedges in Traugott’s and Narro’s work and modal auxiliaries in Nuyts’s.

Of course, unidirectionality claims crucially depend on the particular definition of (inter)subjectivity employed by the authors. Nevertheless, different strands of research, most notably Traugott’s and Nuyts’s, adhere to strict unidirectionality between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which makes this directionality by far the predominant one in the literature. As also indicated by Narrog (2012), the restricted definition of intersubjectivity in Traugott’s work for instance incorporates a specific directionality and this makes it impossible to test directionality as an independent factor.

However, if intersubjectivity is defined independently of subjectivity, the diachronic directionality between subjectivity and intersubjectivity becomes more lenient. With reference to Diessel (2006: 465), Ghesquière (2011) for instance views meanings which serve to establish joint attention between speaker and hearer as intersubjective. By this definition, intersubjectiver determiner uses of prenominal adjectives such as such (18) can be shown to precede subjective, emphasizing uses (19) (see Ghesquière 2011, Ghesquière & Van de Velde 2011):

(18) you have a real community, the sort where people make soup for sick neighbours and know whose cat has gone missing. Joining such a community, however,
comes with responsibilities—making the time to take part, sit on a local committee, bake a cake for the fete, buy raffle tickets, raise funds. (WB — times)

(19) She’s such a happy, friendly gregarious person and very, very responsible (WB — times)

Working mainly with Nuyts’s approach to (inter)subjectivity infused with some of Traugott’s insights, Cornillie (2008: 56) similarly argues that intersubjective uses of constructions may chronologically precede and give rise to subjective ones. His case study looks at Spanish semi-auxiliaries parecer and resultar. He also notes that tendencies to do with directionality between subjectivity and intersubjectivity may depend on the grammatical subsystem at hand. Whereas parentheticals and discourse markers seem to comply with the shift from subjective to intersubjective meaning, his evidential and epistemic constructions go against it.

Both from the point of view of more traditional understandings of (inter)subjectivity and less conventional ones, we would claim that the chronological link between subjectified and intersubjectified uses is better described as multidirectional. Shifts from subjective to intersubjective meaning may be the default pathway, but the opposite evolution, from intersubjective to subjective, likewise occurs. An added complication to this multidirectionality is the distinction between subtypes of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, as proposed by Ghesquière (2011) as well as in the present paper. Further research will have to show whether systematic directionalities can be distinguished between these subtypes. Such directionalities between subtypes of intersubjectivity might then parallel those found for types or degrees of subjectivity, i.e. ideational versus interpersonal (cf. De Smet and Verstraete 2006). In any case, it seems that textually intersubjective items may develop from responsively intersubjective ones (p.c. Hendrik De Smet). Van Olmen (2010), for instance, has studied imperatives such as English look and its Dutch counterpart kijken. These originally directive and hence responsively intersubjective elements have developed textually intersubjective focusing uses as in (20). In this example, look does not request a real action (directive) or speech act (turn-taking device) on behalf of the hearer. As Van Olmen (2010: 230) notes “[t]he offer that A makes is a complete turn and calls for a positive or a negative response by the addressee. Speaker B is thus not interrupting anyone but makes use of ‘look’ to draw A’s attention to the conflicting fact that she does not really like banana bread”.

(20) A Have some banana bread.
B Look. I'm not that much of a banana bread eater. (Van Olmen 2010: 230)

Whereas most authors see some linear link between such concepts as objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity, others, such as Narrog (this issue), use these three levels of meaning differently. He distinguishes a type of change towards textual meanings, i.e. discourse-oriented, which does not link up sequentially with subjectification, i.e. speaker-orientation, or intersubjectification, i.e. hearer-orientation, but rather is an additional pathway parallel to the latter two. In this view, change towards hearer-, speaker-, and discourse-orientation are three different ways of increasing speech-act orientation.

In generative grammar, grammaticalization is seen as upward movement in the syntactic tree (see Roberts & Roussou 2003), which is comparable to leftward movement in subjectification processes in functionalist approaches (see Van de Velde 2010). If intersubjectification is the next stage after subjectification, we do expect to find intersubjective elements higher up in the syntactic hierarchy than subjective elements, which is confirmed by a study on West-Flemish particles by Haegeman & Hill (2011). The same idea that subjectivity differs from intersubjectivity in its position in the syntactic structure is found in other grammatical frameworks. Working within Functional Discourse Grammar (see Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, 2010), Hengeveld (2010) argues that subjectification is the semantic side of a rise in the layered structure of the clause. As elements climb up the hierarchical layering, their scope increases and they become increasingly involved in interpersonal matters. In Functional Discourse Grammar, the top layers deal with discourse-interactional issues (Move, Discourse Act), and if the latter are best characterized as intersubjective (as opposed to subjective notions at the lower interpersonal layers of the Communicated Content, e.g. adverbs like supposedly), the rise in the hierarchical structure in Hengeveld’s account maps well onto Traugott’s (2003: 134) non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective cline.

3.3 Prosody

For spoken language, prosody is another likely candidate (see also Wichmann et al. 2010; Cornillie & Cabedo 2011) for diagnosing intersubjectification. Prosody, notably intonation, is one of the main devices for signaling illocutionary distinctions (Hengeveld 2004: 1198–1199), which may qualify as intersubjective: interrogative or imperative illocution is especially geared towards the addressee.

The use of intonation as a marker for intersubjectivity can be illustrated by looking at English tags again, which are commonly assumed to have rising intonation, see (21) (from Kimps 2007: 283), though other patterns are not excluded.

(21) A ^When w’as it# ^on . ^on the _four!t’teenth# . — ^d/o you#
B Fourteenth — - -
A ^You [f] ^you f’inish# ^on . ^on the _four!t’teenth# . — ^d/o you#
B Yes — - yeah —
(LLC — conversation between equals)
In Dutch as well, rising intonation or high pitch seems to be more oriented towards the addressee. Kirsner et al. (1994) note that high boundary tone in Dutch indicates an ‘appeal’ from the speaker to the addressee. Indeed, both interrogative mood and intersubjective particles are often realized with rising intonation or high pitch, as in (22)–(23), with particles toch en nietwaar, which are used for seeking addressee consent, acknowledgement or agreement.

(22) eigenlijk moest die ook gewassen worden, toch? (CONDIV, IRC-NL, #cafe_3)
iners that also washed be PRT
‘That one in fact also has to be washed, no?’

(23) klinkt als de ideale lunch, nietwaar? (CONDIV, IRC-NL, #dutc_2)
sounds like the ideal lunch, PRT
‘sounds like the ideal lunch, doesn’t it?’

A functional motivation can tentatively be provided for the association between rising intonation and the addressee-oriented function of intersubjective elements. Ohala (1983, 1984, 1994) has intriguingly argued that rising intonation goes back to a (biological) marker of submission, as pitch height inversely correlates with the size of an aggressor (predator or kin), and hence with the potential danger they present (see also Haan 2002 on Dutch). Species as diverse as rhinos, frogs and tits use intonational signals in this sense.

Interestingly, there seems to be some sort of correlation in Dutch between the left-right distinction and falling vs. rising intonation, as illustrated in (24)–(27). In (24)–(25), the leftPeripheral particle hè [he] with falling intonation conveys annoyance on the part of the speaker, and can be said to belong to the domain of subjectivity. In (26)–(27), on the other hand, the homophonous rightPeripheral particle hè with rising intonation is a marker that seeks consent of the addressee, as it strongly invites a positive response.

(24) hè dat bedoel ik nou dan wil ik er eens één use
PRT that mean I now then want I there once one
gebruiken … (CGN, fna000250__111)
‘Well that’s what I mean — now that I want to use one of these …’

(25) hè wat vervelend nu voor jullie. (CGN, fna000425__403)
what annoying now for you
‘Darn that’s annoying for you guys’

(26) Evelien was er niet hè? (CGN, fna000260__124)
Evelien was there not PRT
‘Evelien was not there, was she?’

(27) zo gaat dat bij de gemeente hè (CGN, fna000265__148)
so goes that with the municipality PRT
‘That’s the way it goes with the municipality, no?’

This is in line with Haegeman & Hill (2011), who note that West-Flemish particles wé and zé express speaker-oriented meaning (evidentiality), whereas rising intonation zé and né are addressee-oriented (attention seeking), and this leads them to codify the difference in the syntactic structure, with different projections. In their account the addressee-oriented perspective dominates the speaker-oriented perspective. When particles with rising and falling intonation co-occur in the right-periphery, the particle with falling intonation precedes the particle with rising intonation. This can be seen as conforming to Traugott’s process of intersubjectification (non-subjective > subjective > intersubjective).

4. Conclusions

In this paper we have presented our views on intersubjectivity and intersubjectification amidst the variety of uses found in the literature. Building on Diessel’s (2006) notion of “joint attention” and taking Traugott’s approach to intersubjectivity as our starting point, we have proposed a distinction between three types of intersubjectivity: attitudinal, responsive, and textual. First, attitudinal intersubjectivity refers to meanings which code the speaker’s image of (his/her relation to) the hearer, and attention to the face needs and social self of the hearer (e.g. hedges, T/V pronouns). Second, responsive intersubjectivity involves the elicitation of a certain (speech) act or behaviour on the part of the hearer thereby aiding discourse continuity or cooperation (e.g. turn-taking devices, question tags soliciting hearer response such as isn’t it). Third, textual intersubjectivity captures meanings that are specifically oriented toward steering the hearer’s interpretation (e.g. focus and backgrounding devices and elements creating a joint focus of attention). In addition to the typology, we have proposed and evaluated formal recognition criteria to operationalize the essentially semantic notion of intersubjectivity. We recognize three potential criteria for intersubjectivity, namely prosody, linearization and directionality, which have all been argued to have potential cross-linguistic validity and which can be functionally motivated. We have also discussed the limitations of these criteria.

The typology and recognition criteria of intersubjectivity presented in this paper are the result of only preliminary investigation of the issue. Further research may warrant positing yet other types of intersubjectivity or point to specific hierarchical relations between the subtypes distinguished so far. As suggested in
Section 3.2, textual intersubjectivity is perhaps better treated as a specific subtype of responsive intersubjectivity rather than as a separate type. And in Section 2.2 it was shown that attitudinal and responsive intersubjectivity may overlap.

Also, future research will hopefully reveal additional formal criteria of intersubjectivity. These criteria will not necessarily be restricted to "purely" linguistic phenomena like scope issues or prosody, but may also draw on insights from neurolinguistics and other related fields. If intersubjectivity is understood as a cover term for addressee-oriented phenomena, findings from for instance interactional discourse studies should also be taken into account. Intersubjective markers are deployed to facilitate the conversation, and in principle, it is possible to measure whether an alleged intersubjective element performs this function: if it is artificially added or erased from a stretch of discourse, does this yield an effect on reaction times on the part of the addressee?

Another avenue in future work may be the integration of the functionally oriented approach to intersubjectivity — to which all the contributors to this special issue implicitly or explicitly subscribe — with related work in formal linguistics. There has been a growing tendency in formal frameworks to integrate pragmatic, interpersonal notions such as illocutionary force into the syntactic structure (see Rizzi 1997; Cinque 1999; Speas & Tenny 2003), and given the insistence on structural criteria in formal theories, the operationalization of a semantic-pragmatic notion like intersubjectivity can be advanced by looking closely at the micro-syntax of intersubjective markers. Observations by such 'formalists' like Sybesma, Haegeman and Hill have proved to be useful to this paper (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3, respectively), even though the terminological and conceptual apparatus used differs greatly.

Future work may also elucidate why certain languages are more deeply invested in the expression of intersubjectivity than others. Eastern-Asian languages, which are characterized by their heavy use of right-peripheral intersubjective particles and honorifics, seem to be particularly preoccupied with attitudinal intersubjectivity. Compared to other, closely-related languages like German, English excels in the use of 'advanced organisers,' expressing textual intersubjectivity, and can thus be said to be more dialogically organized (Clyne 1987, with reference to earlier work by Galtung). It is currently unclear what determines a language's affection for certain kinds of intersubjectivity. Maybe, cultural determinants can be held (partly) responsible, as argued by Wierzbicka (1986) for attitudinal markers, but the language structure itself may also be involved. Whereas Polish (Klimaszewska 1983: 69–70) and Spanish (Butler 2008: 227–229) are keen on using their diminutive/augmentative morphology for the expression of interpersonal meaning, this hardly occurs in English with its near-absence of a morphological system for diminution.

Furthermore, research on intersubjectivity highlights the importance of looking closely at conversational data and can benefit from a wider availability of spoken corpora and from the recognition that structurally spoken discourse can be fundamentally different from written language.

Corpora

CONDIV: see Grondelaers et al. (2000).
WB: WordbanksOnline corpus. This synchronic corpus is stratified in terms of register, medium and region and subsumes 12 subcorpora, which are listed in the examples. UK spoken refers to transcribed informal conversations between speakers from various parts of Britain; br-books refers to (non-)fiction books printed in the UK; times refers to editions of the Times and Sunday Times published in London.

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Notes

1. Note that Traugott & Dasher (2002) consider T/V pronouns to be subjective but not intersubjective and Traugott (this issue) categorizes instances of well as in (1) as pragmatically but not semantically intersubjective.

2. See the list of corpora at the end of the article.

3. Interesting, Tobin (2010: 185) argues to study literary modernism in terms of "a reflection on what happens when joint attention is frustrated in its operation." She (2010: 186) similarly states that "[t]he experience of focusing jointly with another person on some external object is a foundational facet of intersubjectivity."

4. These three subtypes are to some extent reminiscent of McGregor’s (1997: 66) distinction between attitudinal, illocutionary and rhetorical modification in interpersonal grammar.
Attitudinal modification for McGregor is subjective in nature, as illustrated by luckily in Luckily, he didn’t come. Illocutionary modification indicates how the speaker intends his message to be taken interactively. Rhetorical modification signals how a message is integrated in “the framework of knowledge, beliefs, expectations, etc. of the interactants in the speech situation” (McGregor 1997:66), e.g. the expression of counter-expectation by already in It has already started to rain.

5. At this point, we haven’t been able to find examples of intersubjective markers that combine all three functions. This may suggest that textual intersubjectivity is another subtype altogether, whereas attitudinal and responsive intersubjectivity are more closely related. On the other hand, textually intersubjective elements may historically derive from responsively intersubjective elements (see Section 3.2), suggesting a close link between the latter two types.

6. De Smet and Verstraete (2006) would probably label both (16) and (17) as subjective.

7. Kips (2007:283): “Prosodic marking in the LLC examples: ^ onset; # end of tone unit; / rise; \ fall; = level tone; — brief pause; — unit pause of one stress unit; > heavy stress; ! booster higher than preceding pitch prominent syllable; ] partial words or phonetic symbols; {} subordinate tone unit; * simultaneous talk; ( ) incomprehensible words, VAR various speakers.”

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