

1 FULL TITLE

2 “Don, doff, discard” to “don, doff, decontaminate” – FFR and mask integrity and inactivation of a  
3 SARS-CoV-2 surrogate and a norovirus following multiple vaporised hydrogen peroxide-, ultraviolet  
4 germicidal irradiation-, and dry heat decontaminations

5

6 SHORT TITLE

7 Mask and respirator integrity and viral inactivation after multiple-cycle decontamination

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25 Non-standard abbreviations: FFR: filtering facepiece respirator; SM: surgical mask; SARS-CoV-2:

26 severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; PRCV: porcine respiratory coronavirus; MuNoV:

27 murine norovirus; UVGI; ultraviolet germicidal irradiation; VHP: vaporised hydrogen peroxide; DH:

28 dry heat; BFE: bacterial filtration efficiency

29 ABSTRACT

30 Background

31 As the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic accelerates, the supply of personal protective equipment remains under  
32 strain. To combat shortages, re-use of surgical masks and filtering facepiece respirators has been  
33 recommended. Prior decontamination is paramount to the re-use of these typically single-use only items  
34 and, without compromising their integrity, must guarantee inactivation of SARS-CoV-2 and other  
35 contaminating pathogens.

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37 Aim

38 We provide information on the effect of time-dependent passive decontamination (infectivity loss over  
39 time during room temperature storage in a breathable bag) and evaluate inactivation of a SARS-CoV-2  
40 surrogate and a non-enveloped model virus as well as mask and respirator integrity following active  
41 multiple-cycle vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI), and dry  
42 heat (DH) decontamination.

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44 Methods

45 Masks and respirators, inoculated with infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus or murine norovirus,  
46 were submitted to passive decontamination or single or multiple active decontamination cycles; viruses  
47 were recovered from sample materials and viral titres were measured via TCID<sub>50</sub> assay. In parallel,  
48 filtration efficiency tests and breathability tests were performed according to EN standard 14683 and  
49 NIOSH regulations.

50

51 Results and Discussion

52 Infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus and murine norovirus remained detectable on masks and  
53 respirators up to five and seven days of passive decontamination. Single and multiple cycles of VHP-,  
54 UVGI-, and DH were shown to not adversely affect bacterial filtration efficiency of masks. Single- and  
55 multiple UVGI did not adversely affect respirator filtration efficiency, while VHP and DH induced a  
56 decrease in filtration efficiency after one or three decontamination cycles. Multiple cycles of VHP-,  
57 UVGI-, and DH slightly decreased airflow resistance of masks but did not adversely affect respirator  
58 breathability. VHP and UVGI efficiently inactivated both viruses after five, DH after three,  
59 decontamination cycles, permitting demonstration of a loss of infectivity by more than three orders of  
60 magnitude. This multi-disciplinal approach provides important information on how often a given PPE  
61 item may be safely reused.

62

63 INTRODUCTION

64 As the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic accelerates, the  
65 supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) remains under severe strain. In particular, the surging  
66 global demand for disposable surgical face masks (SMs) and filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs),  
67 identified as incremental for source control and prevention of onward transmission from infected  
68 individuals (SMs) and protection of health-care personnel during aerosol-generating procedures and  
69 support treatments (FFRs) [1–4], by far exceeds current manufacturing capacities.

70

71 To combat critical shortages, and in a departure from the prevailing culture of throwaway living [5] and  
72 a shift towards an eco-efficient circular economy within the healthcare industry [6], repeated re-use of  
73 typically single-use only items has been recommended [1,2,7,8]. Prior decontamination is paramount to  
74 safe PPE re-use; SM and FFR reprocessing techniques must guarantee not only the complete inactivation  
75 of SARS-CoV-2 and other contaminating respiratory or oral human pathogens (the US Food and Drug  
76 Administration recommends a robust proof of infectious bioburden reduction of three orders of  
77 magnitude for viral pathogens [9]), but must do so without compromising the integrity of the items  
78 themselves.

79

80 In the context of a limited re-use strategy, CDC-issued recommendations include storage of SMs or  
81 FFRs at room temperature (in a breathable paper bag) for a minimum period of five days of passive  
82 decontamination prior to re-use [10]. However, SARS-CoV-2 room temperature survival rates have  
83 been subject to much debate, with earlier reports of an only short persistence (three or four days on  
84 porous and non-porous surfaces, respectively [11,12]) succeeded by more recent ones of significantly  
85 longer viability (21 days on PPE [13] and up to 28 days on various common surfaces [14]). While  
86 reported differences are likely dependent on multiple variables, including fluctuations in ambient  
87 temperature, relative humidity, light influx, and virus input, they certainly also reflect differences in the  
88 surfaces or carrier matrices themselves [15], necessitating targeted assays to evaluate and mitigate the  
89 individual risk of transmission via fomites in general and SMs or FFRs in particular.

90

91 Various studies have investigated active SM or FFR decontamination with regard to either biocidal  
92 efficacy (modelled utilising a wide range of organisms and matrices) [12,16] or the impact of repeat  
93 cycles on functional performance of SMs or FFRs [8,17–20]. Few studies, however, offer a consolidated  
94 data set examining both viral inactivation as well as SM and FFR integrity subsequent to multiple-cycle  
95 decontamination [21]. Current recommendations governing SM and FFR re-use are thus based on  
96 extrapolations from various sources describing assays performed under vastly differing experimental  
97 conditions and necessarily include not inconsiderable degrees of uncertainty [22–24].

98

99 Amongst the various SM or FFR reprocessing techniques under investigation, vaporised hydrogen  
100 peroxide (VHP), an industry standard chemical decontaminant implemented in medical-,  
101 pharmaceutical-, and research facilities, has garnered attention as a cost-effective and practical option  
102 for SM and FFR decontamination [8,9,17,21,22,25]. Two physical decontamination methods,  
103 ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) [18,19] and the application of dry heat (DH) [12,18], have  
104 further shown promise as SM or FFR reprocessing techniques.

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106 We previously demonstrated efficient single-cycle VHP, UVGI, and DH decontamination of SMs and  
107 FFRs inoculated with two *in vitro* cultivable BSL2 pathogens. Inactivation of the infectious SARS-CoV-  
108 2 surrogate porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) [26–30] demonstrated virucidal activity of all three  
109 methods against enveloped coronaviruses [31]; decontamination of hardier non-enveloped human  
110 respiratory or oral pathogens, which can equally contaminate SMs or FFRs [9,32], was investigated  
111 using the notoriously tenacious murine norovirus model (MuNoV) [33–36].

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113 Here we verify PRCV and MuNoV survivability rates on SMs and FFRs and investigate multiple-cycle  
114 active decontamination of coronavirus- or norovirus-inoculated SMs and FFRs, demonstrating that  
115 VHP, UVGI, and DH efficiently inactivate both viruses after several rounds of decontamination, all  
116 three methods inducing a loss of viral infectivity by more than three orders of magnitude in line with  
117 the FDA guidelines [9]. In addition, an investigation into filtration efficiency and breathability of treated  
118 face coverings demonstrated that the cumulative use of UVGI, VHP, or DH did not adversely affect SM  
119 integrity following up to five decontamination cycles. Similarly, FFRs retained their integrity  
120 subsequent to five iterations of UVGI or VHP treatment; DH, however, was found to significantly alter  
121 the characteristics of FFRs when exceeding three decontamination rounds. Our multi-disciplinary,  
122 consolidated approach, wherein both virus inactivation and SM and FFR integrity are investigated  
123 subsequent to multiple decontamination cycles, provides important information on how often a given  
124 PPE item may be safely reused. This data provides a measure of security to health-care personnel and  
125 the general public; it can help close the currently existing gap between PPE supply and demand and can  
126 contribute to the development of circular economy policies in a post-Covid-19 era healthcare sector.

127

## 128 MATERIALS AND METHODS

129

130 An overview of the workflow summarising the SM or FFR decontamination techniques, the number of  
131 applied cycles, and the tests to evaluate PPE integrity or virus inactivation, is provided in Figure 1.

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133 ---

134 **Figure 1.** Experimental set-up of filtering facepiece respirator (FFR) and surgical mask (SM)  
135 decontamination assays. (A) Natural virus degradation over time. (B) Integrity testing after multiple-

136 cycle vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI), and dry heat (DH)  
137 decontamination. (C) Multiple-cycle decontamination of porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV)- and  
138 murine norovirus (MuNoV)- inoculated SMs/FFRs.

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#### 141 **Surgical masks and filtering facepiece respirators**

142 All FFRs and SMs were verified to be from the same respective manufacturing lot. Manufacturers (and  
143 models): KN95 FFR - Guangzhou Sunjoy Auto Supplies CO. LTD, Guangdong, China (2020  
144 N°26202002240270); surgical mask (Type II) - Hangzhou Sunten Textile Co., LTD, Hangzhou, China  
145 (SuninCare™, Protect Plus).

146

#### 147 **Decontamination techniques**

##### 148 **Vaporised hydrogen peroxide**

149 Vaporised hydrogen peroxide decontamination of masks and FFRs was performed using the low-  
150 temperature and low-pressure V-PRO maX Sterilization System (STERIS, Mentor, OH) which uses  
151 59% liquid hydrogen peroxide to generate vapor and is intended for use in the sterilisation of heat- and  
152 moisture-sensitive metal and non-metal medical devices [37]. Surgical masks, FFRs, and a chemical  
153 indicator were placed in individual Mylar/Tyvek pouches within the sterilization chamber together with  
154 a biological indicator (*Geobacillus stearothermophilus*). Vaporous hydrogen peroxide treatment was  
155 then performed following a three-stage 28-minute non lumen cycle consisting of conditioning (5 g/min),  
156 decontamination (2.2 g/min; 19 min 47 sec) and aeration (7 min, 46 sec). During the decontamination  
157 stage, VHP was injected in four separate sterilisation pulses and was removed from the chamber through  
158 a catalytic converter. After each cycle, packaged masks were cooled to room temperature. STERIS has  
159 shown devices to be sterile at the normal sterilant concentration of 8.6 mg/L VHP as well as at a lower  
160 concentration of 6.0 mg/L VHP following cycling. Equipment and medical devices reprocessed in V-  
161 PRO maX are considered ready for immediate use, with toxic VHP residue levels having been shown  
162 to be well below established residue limits by STERIS (greater than 9 to 800 fold lower than the  
163 allowable residue limit for internal tissue contact established in accordance with ISO 10993-17); off-  
164 gassing was therefore not further evaluated in our study.

165

##### 166 **Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation**

167 Surgical masks and FFRs were individually irradiated using a LS-AT-M1 (LASEA Company, Sart  
168 Tilman, Belgium) equipped with 4 UV-C lamps of 5.5W (@UV-C). Hung vertically on a metal frame,  
169 masks and FFRs were inserted into a safety enclosure. A 2 min UV-C treatment (surgical masks) led to  
170 a fluence of 2.6J/cm<sup>2</sup> per mask (1.3J/cm<sup>2</sup> per side). Power and irradiation time (120 s) were monitored  
171 and recorded throughout. Following irradiation, surgical masks and FFRs were unloaded and placed in  
172 individual bags.

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### **Dry heat**

Surgical masks and FFRs hung horizontally on a metal frame were inserted into an electrically heated vessel (M-Steryl, AMB Ecosteryl Company, Mons, Belgium) for 60 min ( $\pm$  15 min) of heat treatment at 102°C ( $\pm$  4°C) following the “Guidance for the reprocessing of SMs and FFRs during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Public Health Emergency” by the Belgian Federal Agency for Medicines and Health Products. Temperatures inside the heated vessel were recorded throughout to ensure correct exposure conditions. After termination of the treatment cycle, masks and FFRs were allowed to cool and then bagged individually.

### **Surgical mask integrity testing**

Integrity of decontaminated SMs was determined via initial macroscopic observation followed by EN 14683 standard filtration efficiency and breathability tests. Three SMs were used to analyse bacterial filtration efficiency (BFE), five to measure breathability.

### **SMs - Macroscopic observation**

All SM performance testing was carried out at the Centexbel Textile Research Centre (Belgium). An initial visual inspection of SMs was carried out to verify their integrity; particular attention was paid to potential signs of degradation such as discoloration or deformation.

### **SMs - Bacterial filtration efficiency**

BFE employs a ratio of upstream bacterial challenge to downstream residual concentration to determine filtration efficiency of SM materials against droplets. It is a required quantitative test method for SM clearance by the United States FDA and the European Medical Device Directive 93/42/EEC (BFE  $\geq$  98% according to EN 14683 for Type II and ASTM F2100 for Level 2 SMs). Briefly, SMs were conditioned at 85  $\pm$  5 % relative humidity and 21  $\pm$  5 °C prior to testing. BFE was measured using unneutralized *Staphylococcus aureus* bacteria contained within an aerosol droplet with a mean particle size of 3  $\mu$ m diameter and a standard deviation of 2.9  $\mu$ m. The aerosol sample was drawn through an unfolded SM clamped to the top of a 6-stage Andersen impactor with agar plates for collection of the bacteria particles at a flow rate of 28.3 L/min for 1 min as per FDA guidance and ASTM F2101 method (challenge level of 1500 and 3000 colony-forming units (CFU) per test). Following removal and incubation of the culture plates, colonies were counted to determine total CFU and BFE. A positive control without a test filter sample clamped into the system was used to determine the number of viable particles used per test. A negative control with no bacteria in the airstream was performed to determine the background challenge in the glass aerosol chamber prior to testing.

### **SMs - Breathability**

210 Breathability of SMs, defined as the measure of differential pressure required to draw air through a  
211 measured surface area at a constant air flow rate, was measured according to EN 14683 + AC:2019  
212 (breathability  $< 40 \text{ Pa/cm}^2$  for Type I and II;  $< 60 \text{ Pa/cm}^2$  for Type IIR) [38]. Briefly, a constant airflow  
213 of 8 L/min was applied through a 25 mm diameter holder ( $4.9 \text{ cm}^2$  total surface area at orifice) to a SM  
214 test specimen. A mass flow controller was used to measure the flow rate and the the air exchange  
215 pressure of the SM material was measured using two manometers positioned upstream and downstream  
216 of the airflow. Measurements were performed on five SMs and five different locations per unfolded  
217 mask (top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right, and middle). The differential pressure per mask,  
218 expressed in  $\text{Pa/cm}^2$  and obtained by dividing pressure difference by surface area, was reported as the  
219 average of all twenty-five measurements (5 measurements per mask; 5 masks tested).

220

### 221 **Filtering facepiece respirator integrity testing**

222 In the field of protective equipment, the nomenclature and standardisation pertaining to FFRs and their  
223 accreditation differ from one continent to another and even from one country to another. FFRs are  
224 generally referred to as FFP masks in Europe, KN95s in China, and N95s in the United States; the EN  
225 149 + A1:2009 standard (primarily) and an ISO 16900 standard (to a lesser extent) are applied in Europe,  
226 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) procedures are invoked in the United  
227 States. While the different methods do not always have the same standardisation limits, the utilised  
228 techniques are generally the same. In the present study, filtration efficiency and breathability tests of  
229 FFR materials were performed following NIOSH procedures. Three FFRs were used per test condition  
230 (assays performed in triplicate).

231

### 232 **FFRs - Macroscopic observation**

233 All FFR performance testing was carried out at the Nelson Laboratories (USA). An initial visual  
234 inspection of FFRs was carried out to verify their integrity; particular attention was paid to potential  
235 signs of degradation such as discoloration or deformation.

236

### 237 **FFRs - NaCl filtration efficiency**

238 Filtration efficiency of FFR materials was measured using the NIOSH sodium chloride (NaCl) aerosol  
239 method employed for certification of particulate respirators with an efficiency of  $\geq 95\%$  (42 CFR Part  
240 84). Briefly, FFRs were pre-conditioned at  $85 \pm 5\%$  relative humidity and  $38 \pm 2.5^\circ\text{C}$  for  $25 \pm 1$  hr prior  
241 to measurements. A NaCl solution was aerosolized (by atomising an aqueous solution of the salt and  
242 evaporating the water) to a mean particle diameter of  $0.075 \mu\text{m}$  with a standard deviation  $< 1.86 \mu\text{m}$ ,  
243 charge neutralized, and then passed through the convex side of the FFRs. The concentrations of NaCl  
244 aerosol upstream and downstream of the FFR were measured at 85 L/min flow rate using a flame  
245 photometer, allowing for precise determinations in the range  $< 0.001\%$  to  $100\%$  filter penetration.

246

247 **FFRs - Breathability**

248 FFR breathability was assessed using inhalation and exhalation breathing resistance measurements  
249 according to NIOSH 42CFR Part 84. Inhalation and exhalation resistance was tested according to  
250 NIOSH Standard Test Procedures (TEB-APR-STP-0007 and TEB-APR-STP-0003 [39]); results in mm  
251 H<sub>2</sub>O were recorded and evaluated against NIOSH performance criteria for FFR approvals (35 mm H<sub>2</sub>O  
252 for inhalation and 25 mm H<sub>2</sub>O for exhalation) at approximately 85 ± 2 L/min airflow.

253

254 **Virus inactivation testing**

255 Virus infectivity losses at room temperature (passive decontamination) as well as the efficacy of VHP,  
256 UVGI, and DH in inactivating infectious PRCV or MuNoV after multiple SM or FFR decontamination  
257 cycles (active decontamination) were assessed using experimentally inoculated SMs and FFRs.

258

259 **Viruses and cells**

260 The continuous swine testicle (ST) cell-line, grown from testicular foetal swine tissues as described by  
261 McClurkin and Norman (1966) [40], was maintained in MEM (GIBCO), supplemented with 5% foetal  
262 calf serum (FCS) (Sigma), 1% sodium pyruvate 100x (GIBCO), and antibiotics (100U/ml penicillin,  
263 0.1mg/ml streptomycin and 0.05 mg/ml gentamycin).

264

265 PRCV strain 91V44 [41] was passaged three times on confluent ST monolayers. Titres were determined  
266 via the tissue culture infective dose (TCID<sub>50</sub>) method; ST cells were seeded in 96-well plates and infected  
267 with 10-fold serial dilutions of PRCV and incubated for four days at 37 °C with 5% CO<sub>2</sub>. Four days  
268 after inoculation, monolayers were analysed for the presence of cytopathic effect by light microscopy.  
269 Titres, expressed as TCID<sub>50</sub>/ml, were calculated according to the Reed and Muench transformation [42].  
270 PRCV stocks with a titre range of 2.00×10<sup>7</sup> to 2.00×10<sup>8</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL were used in subsequent steps.

271

272 The murine macrophage cell line RAW264.7 (ATCC TIB-71) was maintained in Dulbecco's modified  
273 Eagle's medium (Invitrogen) containing 10% FCS (BioWhittaker), 1% 1 M HEPES buffer (pH 7.6)  
274 (Invitrogen), and 2% of an association of penicillin (5000 SI units/ml) and streptomycin (5 mg/ml) (PS,  
275 Invitrogen) at 37 °C with 5% CO<sub>2</sub>.

276

277 Stocks of MuNoV isolate MNV-1.CW1 were produced by infection of RAW264.7 cells at a multiplicity  
278 of infection of 0.05. Two days post-infection, cells and supernatant were harvested and clarified by  
279 centrifugation for 10 minutes at 4000 x g after three freeze/thaw cycles (- 80°C/37°C). Titres were  
280 determined via the TCID<sub>50</sub> method; RAW 264.7 cells were seeded in 96-well plates, infected with 10-  
281 fold serial dilutions of MuNoV, incubated for three days at 37 °C with 5% CO<sub>2</sub>, and finally stained with  
282 0.2% crystal violet for 30 minutes. Titres, expressed as TCID<sub>50</sub>/ml, were calculated according to the



283 Reed and Muench transformation [42]. MuNoV stocks with a titre range of  $2.00 \times 10^6$  to  $1.12 \times 10^7$   
284 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL were subsequently used.

285

286 **Passive decontamination and multiple-cycle active decontamination of porcine respiratory**  
287 **coronavirus- or murine norovirus- inoculated surgical masks and filtering facepiece respirators**

288 Assays investigating time-dependent effects of virus degradation at room temperature (passive  
289 decontamination), were performed using new SMs or FFRs. Per time point (0 hour, 1 day, 2 days, 3  
290 days, 4 days, 5 days, 7 days, 14 days, and 21 days) and per virus (PRCV or MuNoV), one SM or FFR  
291 was inoculated. The workflow followed previously described protocols for SM and FFR inoculation and  
292 virus elution [31,33]. Briefly, per SM or FFR, 100 µl of undiluted viral suspension were injected under  
293 the first outer layer at the centre of each of three square coupons (34 mm x 34 mm) previously outlined  
294 in graphite pencil on the intact SMs or FFRs. In addition to inoculation of the *de facto* SMs or FFRs,  
295 100 µl of viral suspension were pipetted onto both elastic straps. SMs and FFRs thus inoculated were  
296 allowed to dry for 20 minutes at room temperature in a class II biological safety cabinet and were then  
297 incubated in the dark (to limit any effect light might have on viral decay) at laboratory room temperature  
298 (average 20°C) for the specified time points.

299

300 Assays investigating cumulative effects of multiple-cycle VHP and UVGI on SM or FFR  
301 decontamination (active decontamination), consisted of either one or four decontamination cycles  
302 applied prior to PRCV or MuNoV inoculation and subsequent decontamination, thus resulting in an  
303 overall total of two and five decontaminations per SM or FFR. Since cumulative DH treatments were  
304 found to significantly alter the characteristics of FFRs when exceeding three decontamination cycles  
305 (see below), assays investigating cumulative effects of multiple-cycle DH decontamination, consisted  
306 of either one or two FFR decontamination cycles applied prior to PRCV or MuNoV inoculation and  
307 subsequent decontamination, resulting in a maximum number of three DH decontaminations. Per  
308 decontamination method and type of face covering within the respective assays, one negative control  
309 SM or FFR (uncontaminated but treated), three treated SMs or FFRs (PRCV- or MuNoV-contaminated  
310 and treated), and three positive controls (PRCV- or MuNoV-contaminated but untreated) were utilised.  
311 Per treated or control SM or FFR, 100 µl of undiluted viral suspension were injected under the first outer  
312 layer at the centre of each of three square coupons. In addition to inoculation of the *de facto* SMs or  
313 FFRs, 100 µl of viral suspension were pipetted onto one elastic strap per contaminated SM or FFR. SMs  
314 and FFRs were allowed to dry for 20 minutes at room temperature in a class II biological safety cabinet  
315 before final decontamination via UVGI, VHP, or DH.

316

317 Upon completion of the different decontamination protocols, PRCV or MuNoV was eluted from three  
318 excised coupons and one severed elastic strap per SM or FFR (in the case of passive decontamination  
319 assays both straps) via maximum speed vortex (2500 revolutions per minute in a VWR VX-2500 Multi-

320 Tube Vortexer; 1 minute- or 20 minute vortex for PRCV- and MuNoV inoculated SMs or FFRs,  
321 respectively) into 4 mL elution medium consisting of MEM or DMEM (Sigma) supplemented with 2  
322 % of an association of penicillin (5000 SI units/mL) and streptomycin (5 mg/mL) (PS, Sigma); for  
323 elution from VHP-treated SMs or FFRs, 20% FCS and 0.1%  $\beta$ -mercaptoethanol were added to the  
324 medium. Titres of infectious PRCV or MuNoV recovered from individual coupons and straps were  
325 determined via TCID<sub>50</sub> assay. Back titrations of inoculum stocks were performed in parallel to each  
326 series of decontamination experiments.

327

### 328 **Data analysis and statistics**

329 Statistical analyses of differences in infectious viral titres were performed using GraphPad Prism 7  
330 (Graph-Pad Software) and P-values were computed by using a two-sided independent sample t-test,  
331 where \*\*\*\*P<0.0001, \*\*\*P<0.001, \*\*P<0.01, \*P<0.05, and ns is P $\geq$ 0.05.

332 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

333

334 **Infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus is recovered up to five and seven days after inoculation**  
335 **of SMs and FFRs; murine norovirus remains detectable after seven days of passive SM or FFR**  
336 **decontamination.**

337 To combat PPE shortages provoked by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, repeated re-use of both SMs and  
338 FFRs has been recommended [1,2,7,8]. [1,2,7,8] (1,2,7,8) (1,2,7,8) (1,2,7,8) Prior decontamination of  
339 SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory or oral human pathogens is paramount to SM or FFR safe re-use  
340 and may be achieved either passively via storage of items or via active SM and FFR reprocessing.

341

342 To validate CDC-issued limited re-use recommendations for passive decontamination by storage [10],  
343 we evaluated time-dependent persistence of PRCV, an infectious SARS-CoV-2 surrogate, and MuNoV,  
344 a notoriously tenacious small non-enveloped oral pathogen, on SMs and FFRs. Infectious PRCV was  
345 detectable for up to five days post inoculation on SM coupons ( $1.52 (\pm 0.38) \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$ ) and three  
346 days post inoculation on SM straps ( $0.88 (\pm 0.11) \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$ ). The recovery of PRCV from FFRs  
347 was similar to that of SMs, with coupon virus levels near the assay LOD between days three and five  
348 post inoculation and  $1.04 (\pm 0.42) \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$  detected at day seven post inoculation; no infectious  
349 PRCV was recovered from straps past day one post inoculation (Figure 2). Infectious MuNoV remained  
350 detectable after seven days of passive SM or FFR coupon decontamination ( $1.88 (\pm 0.38)$  and  $0.97$   
351  $(\pm 0.14) \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$ , respectively) and was also elutable from SM and FFR straps at this time ( $1.43$   
352  $(\pm 0.53)$  and  $1.18 (\pm 0.18) \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$ , respectively) (Figure 3).

353

354 ---

355 **Figure 2.** Recovery of porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) after elution from filtering facepiece  
356 respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) kept at room temperature (20°C) over time. PRCV  
357 infectivity was analysed in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was  $0.80$   
358  $\log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$  ( $6.31 \times 10^0 \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$ ).

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360 **Figure 3.** Recovery of murine norovirus (MuNoV) after elution from filtering facepiece respirators  
361 (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) kept at room temperature (20°C) over time. MuNoV infectivity was  
362 analysed in RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was  $0.80 \log_{10} \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$   
363 ( $6.31 \times 10^0 \text{TCID}_{50}/\text{mL}$ ).

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365

366 We confirm passive room temperature SM and FFR decontamination to be effective for both PRCV and  
367 MuNoV inactivation. However, we show that CDC-issued recommendations of a five-day room  
368 temperature storage [10] may be too short as they do not allow for total degradation of high virus loads

369 on all SM and FFR materials (this in line with recent observations on other PPE items [13,14]).  
370 According to our observations, the storage period should ideally be extended to at least seven days for  
371 safe coronavirus inactivation and to a minimum of 14 days for decontamination of non-enveloped  
372 viruses such as noroviruses.

373

374 **Up to five cycles of active VHP and UVGI decontamination do not visually affect SMs or FFRs;**  
375 **up to five and up to three DH cycles do not affect the physical appearance of SMs and FFRs,**  
376 **respectively.**

377 In high-throughput environments that necessitate a ready PPE availability (hospitals, nursing homes,  
378 and other public facilities), an extended storage and turnaround time of one or even two weeks may not  
379 be feasible, necessitating the implementation of fast-acting active decontamination techniques. Active  
380 decontamination must guarantee not only the inactivation of SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens, but  
381 must do so without compromising the integrity of the SMs or FFRs themselves. Decontaminating  
382 treatments are known to have inherently detrimental side effects that may compromise the integrity of  
383 decontaminated objects [43]; while VHP, UVGI, and DH decontamination have previously been shown  
384 to not significantly impact performance of polypropylene-based SMs or FFRs following single cycle  
385 decontamination [17–19,21], the maximum number of decontamination cycles may be limited [43]. To  
386 validate repeated safe reuse of SMs and FFRs, we investigated SM integrity subsequent to one and five,  
387 and FFR integrity subsequent to one, two, and five cycles of VHP, UVGI, and DH decontamination.

388

389 **Visual appearance of SMs and FFRs following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination**

390 After one VHP, UVGI or DH decontamination cycle, no abnormalities were registered at visual SM or  
391 FFR inspection. After multiple decontamination cycles VHP- or UVGI- treated SMs and FFRs remained  
392 physically unaffected, this in line with previous studies [44,45]. Only FFRs subjected to five cycles of  
393 DH showed signs of degradation or burning which manifested as brown discoloration of FFR elastic  
394 straps and disassociation of the metal noseband from FFR fabrics; as a consequence, five cycles of DH  
395 treatment were abandoned in further analyses and were, uniquely for DH, replaced by tests performed  
396 after three treatment cycles.

397

398 **Single and multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH decontamination do not adversely affect SM**  
399 **BFE. Single- and multiple UVGI decontamination does not adversely affect FFR NaCl filtration**  
400 **efficiency, while VHP and DH treatments induce a slight decrease in filtration efficiency after one**  
401 **or three decontamination cycles.**

402

403 **SM BFE following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination**

404 To investigate whether one and five and one, two, and five (three for DH) cycles of decontamination  
405 affect SM and FFR integrity, respectively, SM BFE testing was performed according to EN14683 and

406 FFR filtration efficiency was investigated using the sub-micron NaCl aerosol method (NIOSH 42 CFR  
407 Part 84). Both SMs and FFRs surpassed minimum filtration efficiency requirements before (99.50%  
408 ( $\pm 0.08$ ) BFE and 97.01% ( $\pm 0.56$ ) NaCl filtration efficiency) decontamination. SM BFE remained  
409 consistently higher than 98% after single- and multiple-cycle decontamination (Figure 4 A).

410

#### 411 **FFR NaCl filtration efficiency following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination**

412 FFR filtration efficiencies remained above the required  $\geq 95\%$  (i.e.  $< 5\%$  penetration) following DH and  
413 UVGI single-cycle treatments, however dropped to 91.02% ( $\pm 8.38$ ) post VHP exposure (this owing to  
414 the aberrant value of 79.2% for a single FFR). Following two, three (for DH), or five decontamination  
415 cycles, filtration efficiency of UVGI- and VHP-treated FFRs remained above 95%, but dropped to  
416 94.16% ( $\pm 1.02$ ) after three cycles of DH decontamination (Figure 4 B). VHP (which is FDA-authorized  
417 for FFR decontamination) is typically not destructive to polypropylene FFRs [8,22] and has previously  
418 been shown to not negatively affect FFR performance after single or multiple decontamination cycles  
419 in assays similar to ours [44,46]. Since neither two nor five cycles of decontamination caused a drop in  
420 filtration efficiency, it seems likely that the single aberrant result after one VHP cycle may have been  
421 due to an issue with the item itself rather than the decontamination. It follows that all three methods are  
422 suitable for single-cycle FFR decontamination and reuse and that UVGI- and VHP decontamination  
423 may safely be applied to FFRs for up to five cycles. DH at 102°C should only be used for a maximum  
424 of three iterations; for more than three DH decontamination cycles, only temperatures that preserve the  
425 filtration characteristics of pristine FFRs ( $< 100^\circ\text{C}$ ) are to be recommended [18,46].

426

427 ---

428 **Figure 4.** Filtering facepiece respirator (FFR) NaCl filtration efficiency- and surgical mask (SM)  
429 bacterial filtration efficiency (BFE) testing after single-cycle or multiple-cycle decontamination using  
430 dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI).  
431 Horizontal dashed lines represent the NaCl filtration efficiency requirement of  $\geq 95\%$  according to  
432 NIOSH 42 CFR Part 84. Untreated FFRs (n=3) surpassed the minimum NaCl filtration efficiency,  
433 achieving 97.01% ( $\pm 0.56$ ) as a baseline before treatment. Horizontal dotted lines represent the bacterial  
434 filtration efficiency (3  $\mu\text{m}$  droplet size) requirement of  $\geq 98\%$  according to EN 14683 for Type II and  
435 ASTM F2100 for Level 2 SMs. Untreated SMs (n=3) surpassed the minimum BFE, achieving 99.50%  
436 ( $\pm 0.08$ ) as a baseline before treatment.

437 ---

438

#### 439 **Multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH decontamination decrease airflow resistance of SMs but** 440 **do not adversely affect FFR breathability.**

441 Breathability, or resistance to airflow during inhalation and exhalation, is an indication of the difficulty  
442 in breathing through SMs or FFRs and as such is important to wearer comfort. Breathability of SMs was

443 measured via differential pressure (pressure drop) test according to EN 14683 + AC:2019 [38], while  
444 breathability of FFRs was assessed by inhalation and exhalation resistance tests according to NIOSH  
445 Standard Test Procedures (TEB-APR-STP-0007 and TEB-APR-STP-0003).

446

#### 447 **SM breathability following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination**

448 Untreated SMs (n=5) reached 52.08 ( $\pm 0.99$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> differential pressure before treatment, while  
449 differential pressures were only slightly elevated following single-cycle DH (54.88 ( $\pm 3.00$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup>) and  
450 VHP (59.2 ( $\pm 3.88$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup>) decontamination, but exceeded the limit of 60 Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> post UVGI treatment  
451 with a measurement of 63.72 ( $\pm 7.05$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> (Figure 5). Following five decontamination cycles,  
452 pressure drop test results consistently exceeded the prescribed maximum of 60 Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> (Figure 5), with  
453 mean values of 66.82 ( $\pm 2.88$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> (DH), 69.04 ( $\pm 3.88$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> (VHP) and 59.78 ( $\pm 1.47$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup>  
454 (UVGI). Such elevated results should exclude the tested SMs from use following multiple-cycle  
455 decontamination via all three methods according to EN 14683 + AC:2019; however, it should be noted  
456 that mean differential pressure results have been shown to vary depending on the SM type analysed [46].  
457 Hence, values exceeding the 60 Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> limit in this study may have been artificially elevated by high  
458 SM baseline values prior to decontamination rather than the decontamination procedures themselves,  
459 which have, in other studies, been shown to retain high SM performance even after multiple treatment  
460 cycles [46,47]. In Belgium, where SMs may be marketed and used in the Covid-19 crisis situation  
461 according to an “Alternative Test Protocol” issued by the Belgian Federal Agency for Medicines and  
462 Health Products that sets the maximum differential pressure limit at  $\leq 70$  Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> [48], all treated SMs  
463 met current breathability requirements.

464

465 ---

466 **Figure 5.** Surgical mask (SM) breathability testing after single-cycle or multiple-cycle decontamination  
467 using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal irradiation  
468 (UVGI). Horizontal dotted lines represent the maximum allowed differential pressure in following  
469 standards:  $< 40$  Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> according to EN 14683:2019 Annex C for Type I and II masks and  $< 60$  Pa/cm<sup>2</sup>  
470 for Type IIR. Untreated SMs (n=5) achieved 52.08 ( $\pm 0.99$ ) Pa/cm<sup>2</sup> differential pressure as a baseline  
471 before treatment.

472 ---

#### 473 **FFR breathability following single- and multiple-cycle decontamination**

474 FFR inhalation and exhalation resistance measurements remained far below the recommended  
475 maximum limits of  $\leq 35$  mmH<sub>2</sub>O in inhalation and  $\leq 25$  mmH<sub>2</sub>O in exhalation maintaining acceptable  
476 respirability according to applicable standards and regulations both before (inhalation: 12.43 ( $\pm 0.69$ )  
477 mmH<sub>2</sub>O; exhalation: 11.9 ( $\pm 0.86$ ) mmH<sub>2</sub>O) and after single or multiple decontamination cycles (Figure  
478 6), echoing other published results [46,49].

479

480 ---

481 **Figure 6.** Filtering facepiece respirator (FFR) breathability testing after single-cycle or multiple-cycle  
482 decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal  
483 irradiation (UVGI). Exhalation (A) and inhalation (B) breathing resistances after decontamination.  
484 Horizontal dashed (above) and dotted (below) lines represent the following breathing resistance  
485 standards: Exhalation:  $\leq 25$  mmH<sub>2</sub>O and Inhalation:  $\leq 35$  mmH<sub>2</sub>O for FFRs according to NIOSH 42 CFR  
486 Part 84. Untreated FFRs (n=5) achieved inhalation and exhalation resistance of 12.43 ( $\pm 0.69$ ) mmH<sub>2</sub>O  
487 and 11.9 ( $\pm 0.86$ ) mmH<sub>2</sub>O, respectively.

488 ---

489

490 A limitation of this work pertains to the fact that filtration efficiency and breathability assays may not  
491 be directly clinically applicable and should ideally be evaluated in a real-use context where SM or FFR  
492 fit to face impacts measurements. While comparative fitted filtration efficiencies (FTEs), combining  
493 intrinsic filtering efficiency of materials and efficacy of fit to face recently showed unchanged fitted  
494 filtration efficiencies of more than 95% for sterilised FFRs, SMs were shown to have relatively lower  
495 FTEs [50].

496

497 **Infectious porcine respiratory coronavirus is recovered at high titres from positive control SM-**  
498 **and FFR coupons, at lower titres from straps, and remains under the limit of detection following**  
499 **two (VHP, UVGI, DH), three (DH-treated FFRs) or five (VHP, UVGI, DH (SM)) active**  
500 **decontamination cycles.**

501

#### 502 **PRCV recovery from SM and FFR positive controls**

503 Back titrations of virus inoculums performed in parallel to each series of experiments confirmed PRCV  
504 inoculum titres to be within a range of 7.30 to 8.30 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL for all experiments. The cell culture  
505 limit of detection (LOD) was 0.8 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL for all assays. An initially observed VHP cytotoxicity  
506 and correspondingly elevated LOD of 1.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL of VHP-treated coupon eluates was  
507 corrected via  $\beta$ -mercaptoethanol and FCS supplementation of elution medium; elevated cytotoxicity of  
508 VHP-treated strap eluates (SM and FFR) could not be neutralised and remained at 1.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL.  
509 Values below the LOD were thus considered as  $\leq 0.80$  log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL or  $\leq 1.80$  log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (VH-  
510 treated straps). Comparable high levels of infectious virus were recovered from once-, twice- (DH-  
511 treated FFRs) or four-times treated, PRCV-inoculated left, right and middle coupons of all SMs and  
512 FFRs within a range of 4.27 ( $\pm 0.50$ ) to 6.07 ( $\pm 0.29$ ) log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (Supplementary Figure 1).  
513 Recovery values for infectious PCR from SM and FFR straps were also similar between experiments,  
514 however they were lower than coupon recovery values, with mean values ranging from below the LOD  
515 to 4.44 ( $\pm 0.74$ ) log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (Supplementary Figure 1).

516

517 **Multiple cycle decontamination of PRCV-inoculated SMs**

518 Following two cycles of SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all PRCV titres remained below  
519 the respective LOD of the assay (with the exception of UVGI treated straps), showing a total loss of  
520 infectivity of more than five orders of magnitude for UVGI-treated coupons (5.05 log<sub>10</sub> reduction) and  
521 four orders of magnitude for VHP- and DH-treated coupons (4.83 and 4.39 log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively),  
522 this in line with previous publications [49,51]. Titres of PRCV recovered from SM straps following two  
523 treatment cycles were reduced by over two orders of magnitude post UVGI, VHP and DH treatment of  
524 SM straps (2.48, 2.22 and 2.85 log<sub>10</sub> reduction) (Figure 7).

525

526 ---

527 **Figure 7.** Porcine coronavirus (PRCV) inactivation following multiple cycle surgical mask (SM)  
528 decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal  
529 irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case of DH)  
530 decontamination treatments on PRCV-inoculated SM coupons and straps. PRCV infectivity was  
531 analysed in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL  
532 (6.31×10<sup>0</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM straps (1.80 log<sub>10</sub>  
533 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>1</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated,  
534 decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in  
535 parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log<sub>10</sub>  
536 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-  
537 sided independent sample t-test, where \*\*\*\*P<0.0001, \*\*\*P<0.001, \*\*P<0.01, \*P<0.05, and ns is  
538 P≥0.05.

539 ---

540

541 Following five cycles of SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all PRCV titres remained below  
542 the respective LOD of the assay (with the exception of UVGI treated straps), showing a total loss of  
543 infectivity of more than five orders of magnitude for UVGI-treated coupons (5.37 log<sub>10</sub> reduction) and  
544 more than four orders of magnitude for VHP- and DH-treated coupons (4.64 and 4.69 log<sub>10</sub> reduction,  
545 respectively); titres of PRCV recovered from treated SM straps were reduced by over one order of  
546 magnitude post UVGI (1.59 log<sub>10</sub> reduction) and for VHP-treated straps (2.02 log<sub>10</sub> reduction), and by  
547 almost four orders of magnitude for DH- treated straps (3.94 log<sub>10</sub> reduction) (Figure 7).

548

549 **Multiple cycle decontamination of PRCV-inoculated FFRs**

550 Decontamination treatment effects followed a similar pattern of PRCV inactivation for FFR coupons  
551 decontaminated twice via DH, VHP, and UVGI reducing viral titres by more than three and four orders  
552 of magnitude (3.71, 4.45 and 4.62 log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively), supporting previous observations [31].  
553 The impact of two-cycle decontamination could not be measured for DH-treated FFR straps due to



554 insufficient recovery of infectious virus in the corresponding controls. Virus recovery from both SM  
555 and FFR straps has been shown to be highly variable both in our hands [31] and in those of others [52]  
556 (and indeed, probably for this reason, strap decontamination is rarely assessed). Without enough proof  
557 of inactivation, we cannot recommend safe decontamination of SM or FFR straps and suggest treating  
558 straps separately using a disinfecting wipe or similar approach. Two-cycle UVGI and VHP treatment of  
559 FFR straps resulted in a reduction of infectious PRCV loads by 1.46 and 0.63 log<sub>10</sub> reduction,  
560 respectively (Figure 8).

561

562 ---

563 **Figure 8.** Porcine coronavirus (PRCV) inactivation following multiple cycle filtering facepiece  
564 respirator (FFR) decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and  
565 ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case  
566 of DH) decontamination treatments on PRCV-inoculated FFR coupons and straps. PRCV infectivity  
567 was analysed in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log<sub>10</sub>  
568 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>0</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated FFR straps  
569 (1.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>1</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated,  
570 decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in  
571 parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log<sub>10</sub>  
572 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-  
573 sided independent sample t-test, where \*\*\*\*P<0.0001, \*\*\*P<0.001, \*\*P<0.01, \*P<0.05, and ns is  
574 P≥0.05.

575 ---

576

577 Following five cycles of FFR UVGI, VHP, and DH, all PRCV titres remained below the respective LOD  
578 of the assay, reducing viral titres by over four orders of magnitude (4.48, 4.22 and 4.30 log<sub>10</sub> reduction,  
579 respectively). These results are in line with our own and others' prior publications regarding  
580 decontamination of SARS-CoV-2- or surrogate-contaminated FFRs [31,51] and confirm that all three  
581 methods yield rapid and efficient virus inactivation even after multiple-cycle FFR decontamination. The  
582 impact of decontamination could not be measured for DH-treated FFR straps due to insufficient recovery  
583 of infectious virus in the corresponding controls. UVGI and VHP treatment of FFR straps resulted in a  
584 reduction of infectious PRCV loads by 1.81 and 0.18 log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively (Figure 8).

585

586 **Infectious murine norovirus is recovered at high titres from positive control SM- and FFR**  
587 **coupons, at lower titres from straps, and remains under the limit of detection following two**  
588 **(VHP, UVGI, DH), three (DH) or five (VHP, UVGI) decontamination cycles.**

589

590 **MuNoV recovery from SM and FFR positive controls**

591 Back titrations of virus inoculums performed in parallel to each series of experiments confirmed MuNoV  
592 inoculum titres to be within a range of 6.30 to 7.05 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL for all experiments. The cell culture  
593 limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL for all assays except for those concerning VHP-  
594 treated SM- or FFR straps and UVGI-treated FFR straps (1.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL). Comparable high  
595 levels of infectious virus were recovered from once-, twice- (DH-treated FFRs) or four-times treated ,  
596 MuNoV-inoculated left, right and middle coupons of all SMs and FFRs within a range of 4.55 (±0.60)  
597 to 5.38 (±0.25) log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (Supplementary Figure 2). Recovery values for infectious MuNoV  
598 from SM and FFR straps were also similar between experiments, however they were lower than coupon  
599 recovery values, with mean values ranging from 1.80 (VHP LOD) to 5.22 (±0.14) log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL  
600 (Supplementary Figure 2).

601

### 602 **Multiple cycle decontamination of MuNoV-inoculated SMs**

603 Following two cycles of SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all MuNoV titres remained below  
604 the respective LOD of the assay, showing total loss of infectivity of over four orders of magnitude for  
605 UVGI-, VHP- and DH-treated SM coupons (4.47, 4.33, and 4.15 log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively). Titres  
606 of MuNoV recovered from treated SM straps were reduced by less than three orders of magnitude post  
607 two cycles of UVGI and VHP treatment (0.96 and 2.55 (below the LOD) log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively)  
608 and by over four orders of magnitude post two-cycle-DH treatment (4.43 log<sub>10</sub> reduction (below LOD))  
609 (Figure 9).

610

611 ---

612 **Figure 9.** Murine norovirus (MuNoV) inactivation following multiple cycle surgical mask (SM)  
613 decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and ultraviolet germicidal  
614 irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case of DH)  
615 decontamination treatments on MuNoV-inoculated SM coupons and straps. MuNoV infectivity was  
616 analysed in RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL  
617 (6.31×10<sup>0</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM straps (1.80 log<sub>10</sub>  
618 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>1</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated,  
619 decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in  
620 parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log<sub>10</sub>  
621 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-  
622 sided independent sample t-test, where \*\*\*\*P<0.0001, \*\*\*P<0.001, \*\*P<0.01, \*P<0.05, and ns is  
623 P≥0.05.

624 ---

625

626 Following five cycles of SM UVGI, VHP exposure, and DH treatment, all MuNoV titres remained  
627 below the respective LOD of the assay, showing total loss of infectivity of over four orders of magnitude

628 for UVGI and DH-treated coupons (4.65 and 4.29 log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively), while titres of MuNoV  
629 recovered from VHP-treated coupons showed a loss of infectivity of almost four orders of magnitude  
630 (3.96 log<sub>10</sub> reduction). Titres of MuNoV recovered from treated SM straps were reduced by 0.88, 2.39  
631 (below the LOD), and 3.84 log<sub>10</sub>, respectively, post UVGI, VHP- and DH-treatment (Figure 9).

632

### 633 **Multiple cycle decontamination of MuNoV-inoculated FFRs**

634 Decontamination followed a similar pattern of MuNoV inactivation for FFR coupons decontaminated  
635 twice via DH, reducing viral titres by over three orders of magnitude (3.96 log<sub>10</sub> reduction), and by over  
636 four orders of magnitude for VHP- and UVGI-treated FFR coupons (4.42, and 4.44 log<sub>10</sub> reduction,  
637 respectively). UVGI- and DH-treatment of FFR straps reduced infectivity by 0.06 log<sub>10</sub> (not significant),  
638 and 3.15 log<sub>10</sub> (from 3.63 (±0.76) log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL to below the LOD), respectively. Loss of infectivity  
639 could not be demonstrated subsequent to MuNoV elution from twice-VHP-treated FFR straps owing to  
640 poor virus recovery (Figure 10).

641

642 ---

643 **Figure 10.** Murine norovirus (MuNoV) inactivation following multiple cycle filtering facepiece  
644 respirator (FFR) decontamination using dry heat (DH), vaporised hydrogen peroxide (VHP), and  
645 ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). Titrations were performed after two or five (three in the case  
646 of DH) decontamination treatments on MuNoV- inoculated FFR coupons and straps. MuNoV infectivity  
647 was analysed in RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL  
648 (6.31×10<sup>0</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP- and UVGI-treated FFR straps  
649 (1.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>1</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL)). Per decontamination method, nine PRCV-inoculated,  
650 decontaminated coupons (n=9) and three inoculated, decontaminated straps (n=3) were analysed in  
651 parallel to inoculated, untreated, positive control (c+) coupons (n=9) and straps (n=3). Mean log<sub>10</sub>  
652 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL and standard errors of the means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-  
653 sided independent sample t-test, where \*\*\*\*P<0.0001, \*\*\*P<0.001, \*\*P<0.01, \*P<0.05, and ns is  
654 P≥0.05.

655 ---

656

657 Decontamination followed a similar pattern of MuNoV inactivation on FFR coupons after five iterations  
658 of UVGI, VHP, and DH treatments, reducing viral titres by over four orders of magnitude for UVGI-  
659 and DH-treated coupons (4.33 and 4.22 log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively), and by less than three orders of  
660 magnitude for VHP-treated FFR coupons (2.84 log<sub>10</sub> reduction). UVGI and DH-treatment of FFR straps  
661 reduced infectivity by less than one and over three orders of magnitude (0.65 (not significant) and 3.10  
662 (not significant) log<sub>10</sub> reduction, respectively); Loss of infectivity could not be demonstrated subsequent  
663 to MuNoV elution from VHP-treated FFR straps after five decontamination cycles owing to poor virus  
664 recovery (Figure 10).

665

## 666 CONCLUSION

667 In conclusion, we showed that PRCV and MuNoV remain detectable on SMs and FFRs for up to five  
668 and seven days of passive decontamination at room temperature, necessitating either longer  
669 decontamination periods than currently recommended by the CDC or active decontamination techniques  
670 that can decontaminate PPE within a matter of hours. Three such active decontamination techniques  
671 were evaluated in this study with respect to their effect both on SM and FFR integrity and on the  
672 inactivation of the enveloped SARS-CoV-2 surrogate PRCV and non-enveloped human norovirus  
673 surrogate MuNoV. Single and multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH were shown to not adversely  
674 affect bacterial filtration efficiency of SMs. Single- and multiple UVGI did not adversely affect FFR  
675 filtration efficiency, while VHP and DH induced a slight decrease in FFR filtration efficiency after one  
676 or three decontamination cycles. Multiple cycles of VHP-, UVGI-, and DH decreased airflow resistance  
677 of SMs but did not adversely affect FFR breathability. All three active decontamination methods  
678 efficiently inactivated both viruses after five decontamination cycles, permitting demonstration of a loss  
679 of infectivity by more than three orders of magnitude. This multi-disciplinal, consolidated approach,  
680 wherein both SM and FFR integrity and the inactivation of a coronavirus and a hardier non-enveloped  
681 norovirus are investigated subsequent to multiple decontamination cycles thus provides important  
682 information on how often a given PPE item may be safely reused. The knowledge gained here will help  
683 close the existing gap between supply and demand and provide a multi-faceted measure of security to  
684 health-care personnel and the general public both during the Covid-19 pandemic and beyond, when  
685 established protocols for re-use of single-use only items may be upheld for environmental reasons.

686

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843 SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURE CAPTIONS

844

845 **Supplementary Figure 1.** Recovery of porcine respiratory coronavirus (PRCV) after elution from  
846 filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) decontaminated either once or four  
847 times (twice in the case of DH assays) prior to virus inoculation. Infectious PRCV recovery was analysed  
848 in swine testicular cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>0</sup>  
849 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM or FFR straps (1.80 log<sub>10</sub>  
850 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>1</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL)). Similar levels of virus recovery were detected for left, right and  
851 middle (L, R, M) (n=3) coupons of FFRs and SMs; recovery efficacy of infectious virus from straps (S)  
852 (n=3) deviated significantly in all analyses from the mean of all coupons and remained below the LOD  
853 for assays performed on DH-treated FFR straps. Mean log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL and standard errors of the  
854 means are represented. P-values were computed by using a two-sided independent sample t-test to  
855 calculate differences between individual coupon values and differences between mean values of all  
856 coupons and straps, where \*\*\*\*P<0.0001, \*\*\*P<0.001, \*\*P<0.01, \*P<0.05, and ns.

857

858 **Supplementary Figure 2.** Recovery of murine norovirus (MuNoV) after elution from filtering  
859 facepiece respirators (FFRs) and surgical masks (SMs) decontaminated either once or four times (twice  
860 in the case of DH assays) prior to virus inoculation. Infectious MuNoV recovery was analysed in  
861 RAW264.7 cells. The cell culture limit of detection (LOD) was 0.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL (6.31×10<sup>0</sup>  
862 TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL) for all analyses except those concerning VHP-treated SM- or FFR straps and UVGI-treated  
863 FFR straps (1.80 log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL ((6.31×10<sup>1</sup> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL)). Similar levels of virus recovery were  
864 detected for left, right and middle (L, R, M) (n=3) coupons of FFRs and SMs; recovery efficacy of  
865 infectious virus from straps (S) (n=3) deviated significantly in all analyses from the mean of all coupons  
866 (except from DH-treated straps). Mean log<sub>10</sub> TCID<sub>50</sub>/mL and standard errors of the means are  
867 represented. P-values were computed by using a two-sided independent sample t-test to calculate  
868 differences between individual coupon values and differences between mean values of all coupons and  
869 straps, where \*\*\*\*P<0.0001, \*\*\*P<0.001, \*\*P<0.01, \*P<0.05, and ns.