

1 **Integrated and systemic management of storm damage by the forest-based sector and public**  
2 **authorities**

3  
4 **Key message**

5 Integrated and systemic management of wind damage risk can help to address decision-making  
6 requirements, mitigate economic impacts of storms and improve collective well-being of the forest  
7 sector. In this context, public authorities should actively act to enable flexible decision-making and  
8 strengthen the resilience of the forest sector facing destructive storms.

9  
10 **Abstract**

11 • **Context:** Destructive storms are among the major threats for forest-based economies in Europe.  
12 Over three decades, the topic has gradually moved to the top of the forest community's agenda  
13 but with little coordination among stakeholders and limited response from public authorities.

14 • **Aims:** The paper's goals are to identify key challenges in the current windthrow management  
15 framework and present a blueprint for how to progress in the settlement of regional strategies.  
16 SWOT analyses are used to highlight relevant issues and opportunities in classical approaches  
17 from both the forest-based sector and public authorities' perspectives.

18 • **Results:** Despite the large body of knowledge that allows decision-makers to react promptly  
19 after huge storms, strategic responses still suffer from too individual and fragmented decisions  
20 and a lack of holistic economic assessments. To tackle these issues, the paper suggests using  
21 systemic and integrated risk management approaches. It also presents the ways to enhance the  
22 forest-based sector's resistance and resilience towards economic shock and supports decision-  
23 making with the help of systemic analysis.

24 • **Conclusion:** This shift of paradigm is one of the key requirements in optimizing the way of  
25 dealing with storm damage, but public authorities should concur with it more actively by  
26 improving decisional and administrative frameworks.

27  
28 **Keywords:** windthrow; risk management; decision-making

29 **1. Introduction**

30

31 Worldwide, windstorms are among the major abiotic threats for planted forests (Payn et al. 2015),  
32 and in Europe they have contributed to more than the half of the total damage to forest resources  
33 since 1950 (Schelhaas et al. 2003). Even though wind hazards are natural drivers of forest  
34 ecosystems (Mitchell 2013), destructive storms that occur over large areas in managed forests  
35 lead to severe economic losses for the forest-based sector (Björheden 2007) and offset benefits  
36 resulting from higher forest productivity (Fares et al. 2015). For example, the total insured losses,  
37 including forestry, due to the storm series of 1999 exceeded €10 billion (Munich Re 2002). The  
38 total economic losses resulting from those events were estimated at around twice as much (Pinto et  
39 al. 2007). From an industrial angle, destructive storms are usually defined as hazards that blow  
40 down 100% or more of the average annual harvest at the scale of industrial supply  
41 (Forestry Commission Scotland 2014). This sudden amount of timber to cope with threatens the  
42 normal functioning of forest-based activities (Valinger et al. 2014), disrupts the classical  
43 management and decision-making processes (Angst and Volz 2002; Broman et al. 2009), and  
44 consequently causes critical situations within public and private organizations (Drouineau et al.  
45 2000; Birot et al. 2009). Regarding timber markets, prices and supply may be heavily impacted  
46 over the long run when several supply areas are experiencing severe damage at the same time  
47 (Costa and Ibanez 2005). From an environmental perspective, wind disturbances may cause a huge  
48 reduction of forest carbon sinks (Lindroth et al. 2009), lead to pest outbreaks (Wermelinger et al.  
49 2013), or weaken the production of goods and services of forests in damaged areas (Lindner et al.  
50 2010). In addition, society is also affected by the consequences of storms, i.e. occurrence of civil  
51 casualties, alteration of landscapes, and of living conditions (Blennow and Persson 2013).

52

53 In light of those potential impacts, active management of storm damage risk should appear logical.  
54 Paradoxically, even though destructive storms have been part of the history of European forests for  
55 a long time (Corvol 2005), this only became obvious in the 1990s, after a succession of shock  
56 events that led to questions regarding major changes in forest management (Birot 2002; Veenman

57 et al. 2009). As a result, literature on risk management in forestry exponentially increased in the  
58 2000s (Yousefpour et al. 2012), and a large body of knowledge is now available. This new  
59 paradigm within the forest community is also driven by several external factors. One of them is the  
60 macro-economic context, particularly the need to stay competitive in a globalized timber market  
61 and thus to limit the costs related to natural hazards (Meyer et al. 2013). Other impulses ensued  
62 from uncertainties linked to expected impacts of climate change on forest storm damage (Spathelf  
63 et al. 2014; Keenan 2015; Schou et al. 2015). Among others, the potential shift in winter storm  
64 frequency and severity (Fink et al. 2009; Schwierz et al. 2010), the continuous increase of the  
65 economic value at risk owing to the capitalization of growing stock (Nabuurs et al. 2007), and the  
66 higher vulnerability of forest stands (Capioli et al. 2012) are expected to increase the risk of  
67 damage. Societal changes also generate increasing economic losses from natural disasters (Barredo  
68 2010). Therefore, in accordance with the “*Risk Society*” concept (Beck 1992), the management of  
69 hazards and insecurities in our modern societies tends to be one of the main preoccupations of  
70 public decision-makers (Brunet 2007). Nowadays, in this new perspective of modernity, politics  
71 are more prone to deal with the after-effects of huge storms and actively take part in the process  
72 (Barthod and Barrillon 2002). Whatever the initial motivation, it is now clear that both the forest-  
73 based sector and the public authorities cannot avoid addressing storm damage risk. The question is  
74 how to do this soundly and effectively?

75

76 Through the years, a methodological framework to address storm damage risk in forestry was  
77 gradually formalized on the basis of the classical theory of risk management (Haimes 2011) and  
78 international standards (ISO 31000), and was used in several papers (Gardiner and Quine 2000;  
79 Kamimura and Shiraishi 2007; Schelhaas et al. 2010; Hanewinkel et al. 2011). This framework  
80 consists of an iterative assessment process that allow decision-makers to quantify risk —where the  
81 term *risk* encompasses the large variety of risks resulting from destructive storms—and implement  
82 mitigation strategies in order to reach the desired level of residual risk. For this latter purpose,  
83 decision-makers have to know what the options are, what the costs and benefits are, and know the  
84 residual risk associated with policy options (Kaplan and Garrick 1981). In a second step, if the

85 residual risk remains too high to be acceptable, tools and procedures to support crisis management  
86 may be developed, such as decision-support systems, contingency plans, trainings, and exercises.  
87 Finally, if the destructive storm occurs, the response phase will be activated. It first consists of an  
88 immediate crisis response period with a special focus on emergency and rescue operations, timber  
89 damage assessment, and safeguarding measures. After the emergency phase, a public strategy  
90 should be implemented to support the forest-based sector. Again, public decision-makers will have  
91 to choose between a set of strategies encompassing the particular interests of stakeholders, and  
92 public constraints. The more efficient the strategy is, the quicker the forest-based sector will  
93 recover from the shock and stabilize to a new equilibrium.

94

95 Despite the methodological improvements and the large body of literature addressing specific  
96 storm-related issues in forestry over the last fifteen years, several papers recently reported the need  
97 to improve decision-making and management of storm damage at the strategic level (Gardiner et  
98 al. 2010; Gardiner et al. 2013; Landmann et al. 2015). However, as indicated previously, storm  
99 damage management is a highly complex, uncertain and ambiguous process, because of the  
100 multiplicity of risks, stakeholders, goals, and beliefs. As it is impossible to eliminate those  
101 elements from the risk management process, new approaches to address them effectively must be  
102 provided to the forest-based sector and the public authorities. Furthermore, the role of public  
103 authorities has to be clarified in regards to the forest community's expectations. Indeed, in the  
104 past, initiatives from the forest community did not always receive the expected responses from  
105 public authorities (Biro et al. 2009). In this context, it seemed relevant to re-open the debate on  
106 how windthrow crisis management may be improved at the strategic level and what the role and  
107 interactions of the forest community and public authorities should be in this effort. The target of  
108 this paper is thus to provide a blueprint for how to progress in the future, identify where the  
109 priorities are, and suggest how some of them should be addressed. The first step is to identify  
110 issues and opportunities for stakeholders, using SWOT analyses based on recent storm experiences  
111 and the relevant literature. The second is to present a holistic approach for addressing storm  
112 damage risk at the regional (or national) level, and describe the way to mitigate risk and support

113 decision-making according to this framework. A focus on the specific role of public authorities is  
114 presented in a third step.

115

## 116 **2. Strategic issues and opportunities**

117

### 118 2.1. Methodology

119

120 SWOT methodology was chosen to identify current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and  
121 threats in the storm damage management process from both the forest-based sector and public  
122 authorities' perspectives. This allows the internal factors that can be handled directly by decision-  
123 makers from both groups to be distinguished, and identifies the external elements they need to  
124 address to build their risk management strategy. It also contributes to highlighting common  
125 features and reveals the inherent relationships between these two types of stakeholders. A broad  
126 literature search focusing on “risk and crisis management in forestry” was done using different  
127 search engines. This resulted in a list of approximately 250 relevant papers. However, few of them  
128 provided a global analysis of storm damage crisis approaches. Therefore, several ex-post crisis  
129 evaluations—either governmental reports or publications by public bodies and private institutions  
130 (see Table 1)—were also reviewed. Analyses of recent storm crises in European countries are  
131 indeed good entryways to identifying limits and failures in classical approaches (Trauman 2002).

132

133 **[Table 1]**

134

### 135 2.2. SWOT analyses

136

137 Table 2 presents the outputs of the two SWOT analyses. Only the most significant topics regarding  
138 strategic decision-making and crisis management were retained after the review process. Tactical  
139 and operational issues are not considered, except as they arose because of strategic concerns. The  
140 results are briefly discussed below.

141

142

[Table 2]

143

144 Forest managers usually have a good perception of the exceptional nature of destructive storm  
145 events, and thus are prone to react quickly after calamities (Direction des Forêts 1987;  
146 Swedish Forest Agency 2006). The downside to this strong empirical knowledge may be a  
147 reluctance to manage actively the risk of storm damage, as stakeholders generally consider  
148 windstorms from a fatalistic perspective (Peyron et al. 1999). At the same time, knowledge about  
149 the operational management of windthrows has strongly increased in the last decades because of  
150 former crisis experiences and an increasing scientific focus on this topic. Numerous technical  
151 handbooks—sometimes released in emergency just after a storm—support decision-makers and  
152 managers (Forest Windblow Action Committee 1988; FAO/ECE/ILO 1996; Pischedda 2004;  
153 Odenthal-Kahabka 2005; OFEV 2008; Oosterbaan et al. 2009). However, the sharing of  
154 knowledge between scientists and practitioners can be problematic. The *Storm Handbook*  
155 (Odenthal-Kahabka 2005; Chtioui et al. 2015), which evolved progressively from a print to an on-  
156 line version, is a good illustration of how information policy about windstorms has changed over  
157 the years to address the lack of accessibility and applicability of information (Hartebrodt 2014).

158

159 As for disaster risk management in general (Gopalakrishnan and Okada 2007), the main flaw  
160 results from the diversity of stakeholders' beliefs, interests, and goals which complicate the post-  
161 storm crisis response. The high fragmentation of forest estates and the multitude of owners, in both  
162 private and public forests, also make it difficult to settle on a common strategy. As an illustration,  
163 the fragmentation of forest estates and the rights of ownership were considered major hindrances  
164 to timber salvage during previous crises (Lesbats 2002). The recurring lack of liquidity also  
165 exacerbates the stakeholders' dependence on public compensation. Therefore, the competition for  
166 public subsidies in the aftermath of windstorms may enhance individualistic behaviour (Brunette  
167 and Couture 2008). As a result, the forest-based sector often implements uncoordinated and  
168 fragmented strategies, which is a major source of inefficiency. Insurance issues also lead to

169 ambiguous behaviours. For instance, too high premiums compared to forest investments often  
170 deter owners from subscribing to insurance (Brunette et al. 2015) and make them dependent on  
171 state aid in case of storm damage. Furthermore, when insurance does exist, it compensates primary  
172 damage on the forest resource, but rarely subsequent damage resulting from complications  
173 (Holec and Hanewinkel 2006).

174

175 In the past, diverging interests between stakeholders have also weakened the sector's credibility  
176 vis-à-vis the public authorities, and complicated negotiations with them (Lesbats 2002). Individual  
177 and sometimes antagonistic strategies contributed to slowing down recovery from storm crises  
178 (GIP ECOFOR 2010), while fragmented approaches have led to a dispersion of financial resources  
179 without knowing whether individual measures are cost-effective (Caurla et al. 2015).  
180 Consequently, public mitigation measures may cause competitive distortion between stakeholders  
181 if the global economic welfare of the forest-based sector is ignored during the decision-making  
182 process (Ananda and Herath 2009). Former experiences revealed that even if public authorities  
183 hold the strategic levers, they lack supporting tools and information to build integrated strategies  
184 (Gardiner et al. 2010). Usually, forest policymaking follows its own logic, based on diverging  
185 interests and values (Winkel and Sofirov 2015). Even though risk awareness is increasing,  
186 significant gaps remain in public risk governance, and public policies do not often encompass risk  
187 as the driver of decision-making processes (Blennow 2008). In a storm crisis context, it results in  
188 unpreparedness, overhasty strategies, and the spread of all possible grants (i.e. harvesting, storage,  
189 replanting, and marketing subsidies) without cost-efficiency assessments. Owing to the emergency  
190 context, crisis management measures are often disconnected from the prevailing macro-economic  
191 context (Bavard et al. 2013) although they are determinants of the forest sector's resistance and  
192 resilience. In fact, without appropriate economic analyses, the pros and cons of mitigation  
193 strategies are not easy to predict. The restricted availability of country-level information on  
194 disturbances can make implementing multi-risk strategies even more difficult (van Lierop et al.  
195 2015).

196

197 Fortunately, new conditions for storm damage management are emerging. The accessibility to  
198 advanced decision support systems (Diaz-Balteiro and Romero 2008; Reynolds et al. 2008;  
199 Marques et al. 2013b; Segura et al. 2014), and the development of powerful Information and  
200 Communications Technology (ICT) solutions (Reynolds et al. 2005) should ease the strategic  
201 management of storm damage by both the forest-based sector and public authorities. Innovation  
202 capacity in the timber industry will open new market opportunities for windblown timber, and  
203 provide favourable market and policy conditions (Buttoud et al. 2011). However, as stated by  
204 Nilsson (2015), forest policy-making is not yet an affair between the sector and the public  
205 authorities, as manifold stakeholders claim interests and rights associated with the forest. Societal  
206 requirements are double-edged elements because even if they increase the role of forest  
207 ecosystems, they also force the public authorities and the forest sector to cope with ideological  
208 expectations (Ananda and Herath 2009). Therefore, storm calamities and associated casualties are  
209 likely to cause overreactions and political claims (Raetz 2004).

210

211 From an economic angle, a slump in market conditions associated with lower financial public  
212 support may threaten the effectiveness of risk management approaches when windstorms occur.  
213 Uncertainties relative to market behaviour and long-term wood procurement (Schwarzbauer and  
214 Rauch 2013) are among those economic issues. From the perspective of decision-making, rigid  
215 administrative and decisional frameworks, as well as uncontrolled ideological issues (Raetz 2004)  
216 may jeopardize rapid support to the forest sector. Finally, the loss of experienced people  
217 (Hartebrodt 2014) and fading memories (Harmer 2012) could make the risk management process  
218 less obvious and urgent for forest-based sector stakeholders. Indeed, although damaging  
219 windstorms occurred on average twice a year at the European scale during the last 60 years  
220 (Gardiner et al. 2010), their frequency is not equally shared at the regional scale. For countries  
221 that did not experience destructive storms for decades, such as Belgium, it could be a major  
222 hindrance to actively manage the risk (Riguelle et al. 2011). Uncertainties linked to climate change  
223 will require flexible and priority-setting approaches on the one hand (Millar et al. 2007), and on  
224 the other hand will require a mixed strategy, including adaptation and mitigation measures (Seidl



225 and Lexer 2013). Even though uncertainties linked to future climate tend to push risk management  
226 issues to the top of the forestry agenda, they remain potentially a major source of inertia (Petr et al.  
227 2014).

228

### 229 **3. Integrated and systemic storm damage management**

230

#### 231 3.1. Advocacy for integrated storm damage management

232

233 Integrated management of risks in forestry is an emerging trend that aims to consider  
234 simultaneously, at each level of decision, every component of the risk management process  
235 together with external constraints, and the expectations and beliefs of various stakeholders (Orazio  
236 et al. 2014). This definition implies that decision-makers must ideally handle together the large  
237 variety of risks that face forests in order to reduce the global threat for the forest sector (Drouineau  
238 et al. 2000). Interactions between risks are crucial to consider because a particular response to a  
239 specific risk may enhance resistance to one damaging agent while increasing susceptibility to other  
240 causes of damage (Jactel et al. 2009). A global vision also allows diversification of the portfolio of  
241 mitigation measures and reduction of the overall residual risk for forest economies (Biro 2002).  
242 Furthermore, one of the key outputs of such integrated risk management approaches is to  
243 understand and combine the desires and beliefs from all stakeholders under external constraints  
244 (Yousefpour et al. 2013; Blennow et al. 2014). As highlighted by previous SWOT analyses, storm  
245 damage management is characterized by a high level of complexity, which is exacerbated by the  
246 manifold stakeholders, economic goals and personal beliefs. Agreeing on a common strategy for  
247 storm damage management is thus very tricky. To tackle this major challenge, we suggest forest  
248 policy and decision-makers should take the plunge and turn from an individual to an integrated  
249 management of storm damage risk.

250

251 Integrated approaches aim to combine several disciplines and involve different stakeholders  
252 operating in their own sphere (or *subsystems*, see below) across different spatial and temporal

253 scales (Figure 1). Within this framework, storm damage risk can be addressed specifically,  
254 provided interactions with other risks (i.e. risk of pest outbreaks, fire or game damage) are kept in  
255 mind (Fermet-Quinet 2013). By analogy with the Integrated Natural Resources Management  
256 (INRM) concept (see e.g. Lal et al. 2002; Sayer and Campbell 2002), an Integrated Storm Damage  
257 Management (ISDM) methodology should thus be built. Nevertheless, because integrated  
258 approaches embrace, by definition, many topics at the same time, decision-makers need  
259 methodological supports to handle this complexity. The main requirements for applying an  
260 integrated framework are generally considered twofold: on the one hand to incorporate  
261 stakeholders requirements; on the other hand to provide decision-support methodologies (Lal et al.  
262 2002).

263  
264 **[Figure 1]**  
265

266 Regarding stakeholders targets, there is no simple method for balancing different concerns when  
267 facing complex situations (Aven 2009). The holistic approach proposed by Aven and Kristensen  
268 (2005) considers risk in its full dimension, taking into account possible consequences and  
269 associated uncertainties. An output-oriented approach (Greiving et al. 2012) could also help to  
270 determine “agreements on objectives” among stakeholders. In this latter approach, dialogue among  
271 experts, stakeholders, and decision-makers is fundamental in order to guarantee inclusion of all  
272 perspectives (values, opinions, and claims) in the risk analysis process. According to Greiving et  
273 al. (2012), a win-win situation among involved stakeholders could emerge with regard to reaching  
274 an agreement on common goals, and actions to achieve them in due course. Furthermore,  
275 participatory approaches could facilitate stakeholders' involvement in the decision-making  
276 processes (Ananda and Herath 2003), and increase the quality of decisions (Beierle 2002). This is  
277 mainly relevant to multi-stakeholder decision-making processes (Garcia-Gonzalo et al. 2013) in  
278 which the willingness to share strategic information is a key factor of success (Marques et al.  
279 2013a). For natural risks, when uncertainty in the decisions made is coupled with a high degree of  
280 conflict among the affected interest groups, combining participatory planning and structuring

281 instruments like multi-criteria decision analysis methods (Mendoza and Martins 2006) could serve  
282 to incorporate the risk preferences of stakeholders for policy-building (Gamper and Turcanu  
283 2009). Previous approaches to reaching common goals about risk management are promising and  
284 should be applied in integrated storm damage management. However, the success of an integrated  
285 storm damage management strategy will also lie in the ability to identify balanced strategies at an  
286 aggregated level of decision-making.

287

### 288 3.2. Towards systemic approaches

289

290 In order to support the ISDM process and identify, in the portfolio of potential crisis measures, the  
291 most efficient way to reach mid and long term collective targets, we suggest a systemic approach  
292 should be used. Indeed, the complexity of storm damage management can be handled by using  
293 *Systems Theory*, since it can be conceptualized in a systemic way. In *Systems Theory* – also known  
294 as *Systems Thinking* – the complexity of these kind of systems can be considered and their  
295 dynamics – the interaction between elements – can be observed through simulations (de Rosnay  
296 1997). According to that, systemic analysis can be used to identify, optimize and control the  
297 system, while taking in account multiple objectives, constraints and resources (Heylighen and  
298 Joslyn 1992). Systemic analysis is thus a powerful tool for specifying different storm damage  
299 mitigation scenarios, together with their associated risks, costs and benefits. However, it requests  
300 to determine first the scale, boundaries, inputs, outputs, and internal processes of the system in  
301 stake.

302

303 Scaling issues are crucial as the strategy might be assessed as being negative at one scale but  
304 positive at another (Sayer et al. 2001). The analytic scale could also restrict the generality and  
305 utility of findings (Lovell et al. 2002). Regarding storm damage management, there is no unique  
306 appropriate level to judge the overall benefits of a strategy; therefore several systemic scales can  
307 be considered, according to the decisional level (supranational, national or regional) or  
308 management level (strategic, tactical or operational). Whatever the scale considered, it is

309 fundamental to conceptualize the system and its relationships with sub- or meta-systems and  
310 remind that decisions at this specific scale can also influence those other systems. Example of a  
311 basic system including a succession of forest operations (salvage logging, transport, storage,  
312 processing), partially bound up with and affected by up- and downstream decisions as well as by  
313 the external context is given in Figure 2. In this example, the system encompasses successive steps  
314 of regional forest-wood chains and is thus composed by several sub-systems (Riguelle et al. 2015).  
315 Its behaviour is influenced by regional, national and supranational (European) factors. Those  
316 external constraints may include political, institutional, financial, environmental, ideological, or  
317 social considerations that directly influence the state of the system.

318

319 **[Figure 2]**

320

321 The systemic approach was already suggested by Blennow and Sallnäs (2005) for active risk  
322 management in forestry. In their view, the forest-based sector is a wide system whose  
323 functioning is influenced by individual behaviours, and which interacts with elements outside of  
324 the system (Blennow and Sallnäs 2005). Systemic approaches were also used to analyze the  
325 impacts of policy reforms on the forest-based sector (Rametsteiner and Weiss 2006a) or to study  
326 innovation in the forest sector (Rametsteiner and Weiss 2006b). Regarding storm damage  
327 management, the *Systems Thinking* concept is also partially applied nowadays. In fact, the first  
328 reaction after the storm is to determine if the event is expected to have critical (regional) or limited  
329 (localized) impacts on the forest-based sector. Experience usually helps to determine threshold  
330 values, expressed in terms of resources impacted by the storm, beyond which the functioning of  
331 the forest-based sector will be disrupted (Nieuwenhuis and O'connor 2001) and crisis management  
332 should be activated. Traditionally, the initial amount of damage is associated with an expected  
333 impact on the timber market and mobilization by comparison to previous windthrow crises.

334

335 This kind of systemic reasoning is valuable but oversimplified because it does not take into  
336 account the ability of the system to withstand the shockwave. In fact, damage threshold values

337 could evolve between two critical events, due to internal changes within the system resulting from  
338 active risk mitigation processes, or external constraints. Thus in a second phase, deeper systemic  
339 analysis would still be needed to depict how the functioning of forest-wood chains will change  
340 according to a brutal disruption, where the bottlenecks are, and what the consequences will be of  
341 strategic action or inaction. Another premise is that within this system, which is a connected  
342 network, any individual element will not be able to reach its optimum state if others struggle with  
343 the crisis consequences. In other words, the global result is curbed by the weakest link in the chain.  
344 From that assumption, it follows that managing storm damage with a systemic approach will  
345 improve well-being at the aggregate level, and then could be profitable for each individual. While  
346 it does not exclude taking tailored measures with a limited scope to improve the functioning of a  
347 specific sub-system (i.e. logging or transport operations) or supporting stakeholders experiencing  
348 heavier storm impacts, it compels decision-holders to think globally. Even though the emergence  
349 of lone-rangers, who will acquire huge benefits from a crisis situation at the expense of others, is  
350 not excluded with this approach, it can be minimized if the crisis management strategy is balanced  
351 and the cooperation thereby enhanced (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).

352

### 353 3.3. Risk mitigation at the systemic level

354

355 Dealing actively with storm damage risk implies the definition of mitigation strategies based on  
356 the level of risk and the risk preference of decision-makers (Gardiner and Quine 2000). At the  
357 individual level, each actor can choose between a set of measures to reduce, spread or manage the  
358 consequences of windstorms on his/her business (see Figure 3). Adaptation and mitigation  
359 strategies are well described, especially in regards to forest management (Heinonen et al. 2009;  
360 Schelhaas et al. 2010; Lagergren et al. 2012; O'Hara and Ramage 2013; Subramanian et al. 2015).  
361 However, the sum of individual strategies does not guarantee the effectiveness of the global  
362 strategy, and systemic mitigation measures should be taken as complementary to them. Figure 3  
363 presents some of the most relevant ways to increase both systemic resistance and resilience  
364 according to the risk-acceptance level of decision-makers.

365

366 The resistance of the system can be defined as its ability to function at close to its normal capacity  
367 and to carry on normal operations with minimal disruption after the storm. Resistance could be  
368 improved by reducing either the vulnerability or the exposure of the forest-based sector (FBS) at  
369 the regional scale (Figure 3). As mentioned in the previous sections, cohesion among stakeholders  
370 is a priority to reduce vulnerability. Another major opportunity to improve systemic resistance is  
371 to identify bottlenecks and find the way to address or avoid them before the next crisis.  
372 Bottlenecks are the weakest links of a system, therefore they are good indicators of its viability  
373 (Bossel 2002). Practically, legislative, technical or financial hindrances may be the cause of  
374 systemic dysfunctions. However, advanced modelling tools are necessary to lead systemic analysis  
375 and identify bottlenecks. From a systemic perspective, increasing the local demand for wood  
376 products could facilitate the absorption of damaged timber and lower the pressure on timber  
377 markets. It could also contribute partially to a better regulation of the forest growing stock at the  
378 regional level, which is a major determinant of the level of damage (Usbeck et al. 2010). More  
379 generally, integrating risks in forest policies will have a positive impact on national resistance  
380 towards unexpected events (Blennow 2008).

381

382

[Figure 3]

383

384 The resilience of the system is its ability to absorb a shock wave in such a way that it can return to  
385 a normal state with the least possible delay and with the least possible dysfunction (IPPC 2012;  
386 Dymond et al. 2015). Ensuring decision-makers have a high level of information and preparedness  
387 corresponds with the enhancement of this systemic resilience. For these purposes, technical  
388 handbooks and contingency plans are key elements. Contingency plans are required to quicken and  
389 coordinate the operational and strategic response. Contingency plans developed in recent years for  
390 the public authorities (Bartet and Mortier 2002; OFEV 2008; Riguelle 2010;  
391 Forestry Commission Scotland 2014; Chtioui et al. 2015) or by the forest-based sector  
392 (Lesgourgues and Drouineau 2009; FIBOIS 2010a) illustrate how windthrow crises management

393 may be optimized. Technical guides also facilitate decision-making after the storm. Another option  
394 to increase resilience is to improve the flexibility of the system. Past events have shown that too  
395 rigid decisional frameworks and administrative procedures (Lesbats 2002) as well as uncontrolled  
396 ideological issues (Raetz 2004), may slow down the recovery after destructive storms. Yet this  
397 must not be underestimated in the systemic approach. The development of timber storage facilities  
398 which can contribute to softening the stumpage prices' variation (Costa and Ibanez 2005) is also a  
399 main option for improving systemic resilience.

400

401 Between these two options, a possible middle path is to spread the risk. A possibility is to transfer  
402 the financial consequences of storms from one party to another. Compensating losses through  
403 insurance is an option for the forest-based sector (Birot and Gollier) but its implementation is  
404 slowed down by several issues (Brunette et al. 2015), including the belief that public subsidies will  
405 always compensate the losses (Brunette and Couture 2008). Indeed, public authorities used to  
406 build rescue funds to pool the risk or mobilize extra budgets to provide financial compensation for  
407 storm damage, and these safety nets may have reduced the sector's willingness to purchase  
408 insurance or invest in risk reduction (Brunette and Couture 2008). Insurability of natural hazards  
409 in forestry has already been identified as a prerequisite for risk mitigation (Birot and Gollier) but  
410 with limited response from both public authorities and insurers in some countries. Nowadays, the  
411 forest-based sector needs clear public commitment about assurance premiums, incentive programs,  
412 and self-insurability (Sauter et al.).

413

414 3.4. Assessing systemic impacts of storms

415

416 Taking decisions according to this integrated and systemic framework is not easy for decision-  
417 makers, as they have to consider simultaneously internal interactions between stakeholders, and  
418 external influences. It implies continuously gathering information during the decision-making  
419 process and identifying barriers or distortions that arise from decisions or the absence of decisions.  
420 To a certain extent, technical handbooks already bring knowledge-based decisional support to

421 decision-makers and can drive decision-making processes. In addition, decision-makers may  
422 request aggregated information and calibrate mitigation strategies at the global level. A main  
423 requirement to address systemic issues is to provide to decision-makers a deeper understanding  
424 about economic knock-on effects of storms. In order to identify expected changes and key levers  
425 before windthrow crises, it is recommended that the long-term effects of policy options and the  
426 economic context on the forest-based sector are assessed as, for instance, Schwarzbauer et al.  
427 (2013) did with a dynamic system model for the Austrian forest sector. Outside the crisis period,  
428 mapping the wood harvesting changes, which result from the salvage harvesting that follows  
429 destructive storms at an aggregated level (Verkerk et al. 2015), could serve to assess potential  
430 economic losses. During the crisis period, from a purely economic angle, the challenge will be to  
431 manage stocks in order to smooth fluctuations and, for this purpose, it is necessary to understand  
432 how the wood markets react to disturbances (Baur et al. 2004). A model of timber market  
433 dynamics after natural catastrophes was also used by Prestemon and Holmes (2004) to explore  
434 how U.S. government spending to mitigate economic losses through timber salvage is related to  
435 the costs of intervention This simulation model illustrates how such an approach could, in time,  
436 support crisis response and a cash-constrained context (Prestemon and Holmes 2004).

437

438 Including the economic dimensions of disturbances in the decision-making processes is a core  
439 requirement (Holmes et al. 2008). First, a thorough understanding of overall economic impacts of  
440 wind hazards, including damage and risk mitigation costs is required (Meyer et al. 2013).  
441 Assessment of storm economic impacts begins with sound damage assessment procedures at the  
442 regional or national level, which is mandatory within the first days to support decision-making  
443 (Honkavaara et al. 2013). Whatever the methodology chosen at regional scale (field inventory,  
444 aerial, or satellite imagery) estimates, which imply a trade-off between accuracy and swiftness,  
445 must only be used to calibrate the crisis response (Riguelle et al. 2011). Indeed, inferring systemic  
446 economic impacts from the initial amount of damage is misleading as secondary and tertiary  
447 damage are not taken in account, nor are the benefits of mitigation strategies. For example,  
448 secondary damage resulting from bark beetles outbreaks in the follow-up to large disturbances



449 (Wermelinger et al. 2002) are responsible, on average, for extra damage of between 10 and 25% of  
450 initial wind damage (Stadelmann et al. 2013). Thom et al. (2013) demonstrated that for every  
451 cubic meter of bark beetle damage in the current year, 0.56 m<sup>3</sup> of additional bark beetle damage is  
452 expected in the following year. This not only means that sanitary concerns must be integrated as  
453 soon as possible in the decision-making scheme (Wermelinger et al. 2013), but it emphasizes the  
454 need for an advanced cost-benefit analysis to inform decisions. For example, it could be useful to  
455 assess the need to make salvage cuttings in partially damage stands in regards to the potential  
456 secondary losses (Bouget and Duelli 2004).

457

458 Economic assessments also implies quantifying in monetary terms the public benefits and  
459 externalities generated from forests' goods and services (Buttoud 2000). As an illustration,  
460 destructive storms in forests can cause a huge reduction of carbon sinks (Lindroth et al. 2009) that  
461 would have been far more costly if created in other ways (Canadell and Raupach 2008). Therefore,  
462 they can cause additional losses for owners if they have to repay emissions units (Moore et al.  
463 2013). Such considerations must be included in decision-making processes. Nonetheless, assessing  
464 the economic effects of disturbances requires models with a considerable scope (Toppinen and  
465 Kuuluvainen 2010). For example, modelling the forest-based sector as a group of interacting  
466 autonomous economic agents would make possible the analysis of the effects of forest-based  
467 disturbances on market dynamics (Schwab et al. 2009). In the ex-post evaluation of the French  
468 state's compensation plan after hurricane Klaus (Bavard et al. 2013), a bio-economic partial  
469 equilibrium model (Caurla et al. 2010) was used to compare a set of alternative management  
470 scenarios through varying output variables, such as prices and timber volume. This approach is  
471 very promising for supporting strategic decision-making, for example, to assess alternative  
472 strategies for timber export and storage (Caurla et al. 2015). In this context, a main challenge is to  
473 improve the reporting of economic data to help ex-post assessments and build models to predict  
474 the economic impact of storms on both individual agents and the forest-based sector as a whole.

475

476

477 3.5. Supporting systemic decision-making

478

479 Those challenges also emphasize the need for a portfolio of decision support systems (DSS) where  
480 decision-makers can find appropriate tips. An illustration of how system analysis can drive the  
481 strategic management of storm damage is presented below. In this example, taking place in  
482 Wallonia (Belgium), a decision-support system based on System Dynamics principle, the WIND-  
483 STORM software (Riguelle et al. 2015), is used to predict how transport capacity and timber  
484 storage may influence the amount of timber lying in forests and industrial log yards during a five-  
485 year period after a destructive storm. Four scenarios have been simulated, on the basis of an  
486 overall damage of 8 million cubic meters: a baseline scenario, for which no specific measure is  
487 taken after the storm (BASE); a second scenario where only the harvesting capacity is boosted by  
488 20 % (SC1); a third in which both harvesting and transport capacities are increased by 20 %  
489 (SC2); and a fourth where 2 million cubic meters of damaged timber are stored for 24 months  
490 (SC3).

491

492

[Figure 4]

493

494 Simulations show that transport capacity is lacking even in the baseline scenario and is therefore a  
495 systemic bottleneck (Figure 4a – BASE). As transport capacity is a limiting factor, efforts to  
496 improve salvage logging have a limited impact as the harvested timber is progressively  
497 accumulating in the forest areas (Figure 4a – SC1), which increases the risk of secondary damage.  
498 Doubling the transport capacity can nullify the stock in forests, but it causes accumulation of  
499 timber in log yards (Figure 4 – SC2). Timber storage is able to alleviate the accumulation of  
500 harvested wood in forests and preserve it from decay; however, as seen in Figure 4b, too rapid  
501 destocking can cause an excessive supply if no measures to limit the upstream offer are taken.  
502 Interested readers should refer to Riguelle et al. (2015) for a thorough description of this type of  
503 DSS and its contribution to systemic analysis.

504

#### 505 4. Recommendations to public authorities

506

507 This paper also offers an opportunity to highlight some of the main challenges for public  
508 authorities in supporting the forest-based sector in the context of integrated storm damage  
509 management. According to Figure 2, public authorities could play an active role and beyond, they  
510 should be the catalysts of this process. Five key challenges are briefly discussed:

511

- 512 - Improving public risk governance and awareness;
- 513 - Developing an integrated policy for forests risk management;
- 514 - Enhancing systemic resilience of the forest-based sector;
- 515 - Facilitating the implementation of decisions;
- 516 - Playing an active role in windthrow crisis management.

517

518 Improving public risk governance and crisis management awareness is a prerequisite to be ready to  
519 cope with exceptional events (Mortier and Bartet 2004). Solutions to promote a risk awareness  
520 culture within public organizations could involve making knowledge of risk management issues a  
521 selection criterion when recruiting high-level officials, conducting risk surveys and audits,  
522 providing trainings and workshops to the staff, and organizing frequent crisis exercises. Moreover,  
523 the need for integrated policy of forest risk management is not only a challenge for the forest-  
524 based sector, but also for the public authorities. They must provide the guidelines according to  
525 which the forest sector develops its own strategy. For example, they must clearly indicate what  
526 losses the policy will cover in case of damage. The challenge is to find the optimal share between  
527 public and private compensation (Nicolas 2009). Some governments used to undertake large  
528 interventions; nowadays, direct financial support to the forest-based sector is likely to be restricted  
529 by the EU's competition law. In addition, public compensation after windstorms may be  
530 counterproductive assuming it curbs stakeholders investing in risk-reducing options at the  
531 individual level (Brunette and Couture 2008). On the other hand, insurance that could help to  
532 alleviate pressures for public compensation in the aftermath of natural disasters

533 (European Commission 2013b) are not widespread in the forest sector. Whether there is any ideal  
534 framework to share the economic risk due to various forest ownership patterns and habits, the  
535 forest-based sector requires a clear view on what they can expect back from public authorities if  
536 they subscribe to insurance or self-insurance programs.

537

538 Public authorities should also take initiatives to improve the systemic resistance and resilience of  
539 the forest-based sector. Whether they have any direct influence on the macro-economic context,  
540 they can act locally by alleviating the constraints with which the forest-based sector struggles. In  
541 parallel, they should identify institutional bottlenecks and try to resolve them in advance by  
542 leading on prospective systemic analyses (Riguelle et al. 2015). The continuous improvement of  
543 the system also requires consistent and systematic ex-post evaluations of public policies (Bisang  
544 and Zimmermann 2006).

545

546 In addition, public authorities should act to facilitate the effective implementation of decisions.  
547 This begins with a flexible decision-making context that can be adapted throughout the crisis  
548 period. It also means simplifying administrative processes and ensuring that all the stakeholders  
549 within the decision-making chains, not only the forest agencies, are aware of their role (Raetz  
550 2004). For instance, ministerial orders or authorizations that are not issued on time have slowed  
551 down recovery in the past (Lesbats 2002; Nicolas 2009). The public authorities must also  
552 communicate on their strategy, the choices made, and the underlying long-term vision to facilitate  
553 the acceptance and the implementation of their strategy (Bavard et al. 2013).

554

555 Finally, public authorities should invest money and human resources actively in windthrow crises  
556 management in order to ease the implementation of strategic decisions. On the one hand, they  
557 should set up contingency plans and improve them continuously following “Plan-Do-Check-Act”  
558 principle. On the other hand, public authorities could play a crucial role in regulating the timber  
559 market, for instance by mutualizing timber sales to stabilize stumpage prices. To be effective,  
560 forest agencies should be first in line to support market facilities, by reducing the public timber

561 offer or postponing payment delays, for instance. The main operational challenge for public  
562 authorities is to anticipate and prepare timber storage operations (Bavard et al. 2013; Birot and  
563 Gardiner 2013). This implies, among other things, identifying potential storage areas and  
564 developing a mutualized management framework to pool the costs and limit the fees for public and  
565 private owners.

566

## 567 **5. Conclusion**

568

569 In this paper, several sources of information were combined to draw a global picture of current  
570 issues and opportunities concerning strategic decision-making and management of forest storm  
571 damage. We reached a conclusion that the forest-based sector has quite often a good perception of  
572 the windthrow phenomenon and is able to handle rapidly its consequences, owing to a strong  
573 empirical knowledge. Saving and sharing this knowledge, through contingency plans for instance,  
574 is essential, even more in countries that did not experience storm damage for decades. However,  
575 storm damage risk management cannot rely only on former crises, since the decisional context is  
576 changing and uncertain. Upcoming threats and opportunities arising from this uncertain context  
577 must be considered in the decisional process, as they will influence the way to deal with storm-  
578 related issues in the future. A way to reduce uncertainty in the aftermath of storms is to strengthen  
579 the resilience and resistance of the forest-base sector towards destructive storms, by addressing the  
580 main issues highlighted in this paper. Although some of these issues have already been addressed  
581 in some countries, this review can contribute to re-open the debate in order to foster the  
582 implementation of good practices and bridge remaining gaps at regional and national levels.  
583 Nevertheless, insofar as it is unrealistic to deliver a tailored solution for storm damage  
584 management, new approaches that could help to reduce the global impact of storm crises are also  
585 needed.

586

587 One way to deal with complexity and uncertainty throughout the risk management process would  
588 be to change perspectives and adopt an integrated management of storm risks, ideally as part of a

589 wider analysis of forests' risks that could help to handle the multiplicity of risks coherently.  
590 However, because integrated approaches embrace many concepts, two prerequisites are  
591 highlighted: firstly, the forest community needs to develop advanced methodologies to deal with  
592 such complex issues and, on the other hand, dialogue among and outside the forest community  
593 must be enhanced. According to that, a systemic approach for storm damage management is also  
594 suggested in this paper to deal with the forest-based sector as a dynamic system. This holistic  
595 approach assumes that the strategy will not be optimal if some individuals are suffering from crisis  
596 conditions within the system. In contrast, a balanced solution for the whole sector will likely  
597 benefit all stakeholders individually. The resulting idea is to evaluate all possible mitigation  
598 scenarios through a systemic perspective, with the help of appropriate decision support systems.  
599 This approach requires, however, identifying the scope (regional, national or supranational) and  
600 the internal and external drivers of the system at stake.

601

602 Finally, we insist on the role of public authorities in supporting windthrow crisis management at  
603 the European, national and regional levels. On the one hand, public decision-makers should foster  
604 the development of an integrated policy about forest risks and take part more actively in the storm  
605 damage management process. Nevertheless, such active involvement requires enhancing risk  
606 culture within politics and public bodies. Furthermore, it is also crucial to ensure the mobilization  
607 of decision-holders (ministers and high-level officials), and not only the institutional players. On  
608 the other hand, high transparency in public policy- and decision-making processes is needed to  
609 build confidence between the forest community and public authorities. Public authorities should  
610 also be the drivers for enhancing cooperation and reducing competition between bordering  
611 countries, which remains a major impediment in post-storm crisis periods. In regards to this  
612 challenge, the European Forest Strategy (European Commission 2013a) targets enhanced  
613 cooperation between member states and facilitates the coherence of forest-related policies in  
614 Europe, whereas the building of an European Forest Risk Facility (Landmann et al. 2015)  
615 illustrates that the forest community actively concurs with the need for a better collaboration  
616 between stakeholders inside the forest sector and with decision-makers.

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## Tables

**Tab. 1** Selection of ex-post evaluations of storm crisis management strategies in Europe

<b>Scope</b>	<b>Storm (Year)</b>	<b>References</b>
United Kingdom	The Great Storm (1987)	MAFF (1988); Grayson (1989); Harmer (2012)
Europe	Selection of storms	Gardiner et al. (2010, 2013)
France	Lothar - Martin (1999)	Drouineau et al. (2000); Barthod and Barrillon (2002) Lesbats (2002); Birot et al. (2009); FIBOIS (2010b)
	Klaus (2009)	Nicolas (2009); Laffite and Lerat (2009) GIP ECOFOR (2010); Bavard et al. (2013)
Germany	Lothar (1999)	Hänsli et al. (2003)
Sweden	Gudrun (2005)	Swedish Forest Agency (2006)
Switzerland	Lothar (1999)	Bründl and Rickli (2002); Hammer et al. (2003) Hänsli et al. (2003) ; Raetz (2004).

**Tab. 2** Overview of most frequent strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats regarding strategic decision-making and management of storm damage by the forest-based sector (FBS) and public authorities (PA)

	<b>Forest-based sector (FBS)</b>	<b>Public authorities (PA)</b>
<b>STRENGTHS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong operational know-how</li> <li>• Strong empirical knowledge</li> <li>• Large body of scientific knowledge</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Financial capacity</li> <li>• Legislative power</li> <li>• Regulatory levers</li> </ul>
<b>WEAKNESSES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reluctance to manage risks</li> <li>• Limited common strategy</li> <li>• Short <i>versus</i> long-term goals</li> <li>• Private <i>versus</i> public behaviours</li> <li>• Lack of financial liquidity</li> <li>• Few long-term impact assessments</li> <li>• Share of knowledge (all levels)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of public risk governance</li> <li>• No integrated policy for forest risks</li> <li>• Unclear storm management strategy</li> <li>• Fragmented and unbalanced approach</li> <li>• Complexity of cost-efficiency analyses</li> <li>• Poor cooperation with other regions/states</li> <li>• Staff, structures and facilities</li> </ul>
<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advanced decision support systems</li> <li>• Innovation capacity</li> <li>• Development of ICT solutions</li> <li>• Higher expectations towards forest</li> <li>• Coordination initiatives</li> <li>• Increasing scientific knowledge</li> <li>• Emergence of new markets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advanced decision support systems</li> <li>• Innovation capacity in the FBS</li> <li>• Development of ICT solutions</li> <li>• Societal expectations towards forests</li> <li>• Increase of societal risk-awareness</li> <li>• Advanced economic impact assessments</li> <li>• Role of forests in climate mitigation</li> </ul>
<b>THREATS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Macro-economic context</li> <li>• Climatic and market uncertainties</li> <li>• Change resistance</li> <li>• Timber market disruption</li> <li>• Reduction of financial support</li> <li>• Inappropriate legislation</li> <li>• Rigid decisional framework</li> <li>• Loss of experienced people</li> <li>• Lack of solidarity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Macro-economic context</li> <li>• Public expectations</li> <li>• Change resistance</li> <li>• Shrinkage of financial resources</li> <li>• Globalization of timber market</li> <li>• EU competition rules</li> <li>• Uncontrolled ideological issues</li> <li>• Emotional management</li> <li>• Uncertain impacts of climate change</li> </ul>



**Captions of figures**


**Fig. 1** Generic framework for implementing integrated storm damage management (ISDM) approach (adapted from Campbell et al. 2002)

**Fig. 2** Systemic representation of a regional forest-wood chain. In this example, scale, boundaries (dash lines), inputs, outputs, internal processes and external drivers of the system are represented


**Fig. 3** Set of strategies to mitigate impacts of storms on the forest sector at the systemic level

**Fig. 4** Example of systemic analysis supporting strategic decision after windstorms. (a) Stock of timber in forest areas; (b) Stock of timber in forest areas


**Figures**




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