Franz Brentano’s works are not just full of deep and innovative insights into mind, world and values. His views also turned out to be highly influential upon several generations of students, who made them the basis of their own philosophical investigations, giving rise to what is known as the Brentano School (Albertazzi et al. 1996; Fisette & Fréchette 2007). In this chapter, I give a bird’s eye view of the Brentano School from a rather historical perspective. My leading hypothesis is that one crucial factor explaining the rise of the school is Brentano’s unique strategy, within the academic context of the time, to promote the revival of philosophy as a rigorous science. After a brief introduction, I reconstruct the three main phases in the school’s development, namely Brentano’s teaching in Würzburg (1866-73), his teaching in Vienna (1874-95), and Anton Marty’s teaching in Prague (1880-1913).

1. Introduction

On a merely factual understanding, the ‘Brentano School’ encompasses all the philosophers who, at a certain stage of their academic path, were Brentano’s students or students’ students. There is evidence that the notion of “school” was used by Brentano and his students in a self-referential fashion at least from 1873 onwards. In his correspondence with Carl Stumpf, Brentano occasionally refers to what he calls “our overall philosophical orientation” or “our school” (Brentano 1989: 44, 128). It is not rare for his students themselves to talk about the ‘Brentano School’, be it to express their debt to Brentano’s teaching or to distance themselves from what they take to be sheer Brentanian orthodoxy.\(^1\)
The question as to whether the phrase ‘Brentano School’ may be understood in a stronger sense, to name a group of authors whose ‘philosophical orientation’ was roughly the same, is disputable and is better left unanswered at the outset. My own contention is that most of the members of the school do share some key assumptions about what philosophy is and how it should be carried out (see CHAP. 30). The rise of the school, however, can hardly be traced back to a common doctrinal content, which would be endorsed without exception by all its representatives. There are many reasons for that.

First of all, Brentano’s views mostly spread through his courses, his correspondence and his personal discussions with his students. This makes his influence difficult to pin down by drawing solely on his publications, all the more so because the picture of Brentano which emerges from the rather occasional works he had published during his life doesn’t exactly fit with the picture that emerges from the unpublished materials (Eisenmeier 1918: 473; Kraus 1919: 1-3; Utitz 1954: 74). Since we still don’t have, to date, a critically accurate edition of Brentano’s works, including his course notes and letters, the access to the primary sources is not without difficulties.2

Next, the views endorsed by Brentano in his main book, the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, have been subject to more or less substantial revisions or supplementations during the subsequent years. To be sure, Brentano never renounced his theory of inner consciousness (see CHAP. 5) or his classification of mental phenomena (see CHAP. 9), for which he even provided new arguments in the second edition of his *Psychology* (Brentano 1911). However, he did come to develop a number of new theories. One of the most notable change is his so-called ‘reist’ turn, according to which only *realia* or particulars may be the direct objects of a presentation (see CHAP. 15). But a more comprehensive list of Brentano’s mature views should include at least his theory of double judgment, his theory of modes of presentation (*direct vs. oblique* presentations), his theory of individuation, and his theory of continua—to name but a few (see, e.g., Kraus 1919: 22 sq.).
Furthermore, Brentano’s students developed some of his views in various, more or less diverging directions, thereby creating a number of highly diversified ramifications within the school. Importantly, some of these ramifications became schools on their own: This is the case of the school of object theory founded by Alexius Meinong in Graz (see Albertazzi et al. 2001), the phenomenological movement initiated by Edmund Husserl in Göttingen (see Spiegelberg 1994), or the school of polish philosophy initiated by Kasimir Twardowski in Lviv (see Coniglione at al. 1993). This situation created an ambiguity as to what should be considered as the external borders of the Brentano School. To remove the ambiguity, it has been customary to distinguish between the “broad” school, which includes the above-mentioned ramifications plus Carl Stumpf, and the “narrow” school, which centers around Brentano himself and Anton Marty (Kraus 1919: 17). I will briefly address the Prague “orthodox” branch of the school in §3. For now, the most promising way to reconstruct the rise of the school is to start with Brentano’s teaching activities in Würzburg.

2. Brentano in Würzburg 1866-1873

The story of the school begins somehow with Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, which reads: “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences” (Brentano 1968: 136). We know that the eighteen-year-old Carl Stumpf met Brentano at the public defence of the latter’s habilitation theses at Würzburg on 14 July 1866 and decided to attend his courses the next semester. He was joined by Anton Marty, who came to Würzburg after having read Brentano’s doctoral dissertation (Brentano 1862). Both Stumpf and Marty felt most attracted by the conception of philosophy that underpinned the fourth thesis (Brentano 1968: 30; Kraus 1919: 19; Utitz 1954: 73). They gave converging statements to the effect that Brentano’s position was suggestive of “a new, incomparably more deep and serious way of conceiving philosophy” (Stumpf 1919: 88). As Marty put it in his personal diary: “A new world opened up to me” (Kraus 1916: 4).
To understand what was ‘new’ in Brentano’s conception of philosophy, it might be helpful to recall that one fundamental challenge, at the time Brentano began his teaching activities, was to overcome the so-called ‘identity crisis of philosophy’ (Schnädelbach 1984: 5; Beiser 2014: 188-92). The crisis began soon after Hegel’s death in 1831 and is usually regarded as the result of a clash between two opposite trends: On the one hand, the speculative approach to the world which was illustrated by the representatives of German idealism; on the other, the appeal to observation and experimentation made by the natural sciences. The clash, of course, was to the disadvantage of the idealist systems, which came to be regarded as mere speculations beyond any empirical justification and, therefore, void of any scientific value (see Freuler 1997). In the 1860s, several strategies began to rise in order to restore the lost confidence in philosophy and rehabilitate the latter as a scientific discipline. There is strong evidence that Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis may precisely be seen as containing the outlines of a rehabilitation strategy of his own.4

If philosophy has to be scientific, Brentano thinks, it has to take the path the natural sciences have taken in their own area. This means, first, that philosophy has to be based on observation or, at least, on experience. As Brentano puts it later on in his inaugural lecture in Vienna: “In the philosophical things, too, there can be no other teacher than experience” (Brentano 1968: 85).5 This also means that philosophy, like the specialized sciences, has to tackle each philosophical issue one by one, rather than trying to grasp the overall structure of reality by means of unwarranted ‘intuition’, as in the speculative systems. In sum, the philosopher, like the natural scientist, should (i) proceed to his investigations from an empirical standpoint and (ii) endorse the ‘divide and rule’ method. In his habilitation book, dedicated to Aristotle’s theory of the noûs poietikos, Brentano added another important claim which is obviously part of the conception of philosophy he worked with. He maintained that (iii) logic—along with all the other departments of philosophy—has to be “rooted” in “the soil of psychology”, which is bound to provide the philosophical sciences with the “food” they need to grow up (Brentano
Claims (i)-(iii) arguably display the core of the rehabilitation strategy launched by Brentano in order to overcome the ‘identity crisis of philosophy’.

Let us now turn to Brentano’s teaching activities at Würzburg. Stumpf reports that, between 1866 and 1873, Brentano mostly taught history of philosophy and metaphysics, along with a course on Comte’s positivism and another on deductive and inductive logic (Stumpf 1919: 97-107; 131-7). Stumpf and Marty both attended Brentano’s courses from 1867 up to 1870. Neither was able to attend Brentano’s first course dedicated to psychology, which took place during the summer semester of 1871. Still, we know Brentano provided them with up-to-date information and, sometimes, made his course notes available to them. In any case, both Stumpf and Marty were well-informed about the content of Brentano’s courses and adopted his ‘philosophical orientation’ in their own writings.

On Brentano’s advice, Carl Stumpf wrote his doctoral dissertation under the supervision of Hermann Lotze in Göttingen, where he graduated in 1868 before going back to Würzburg. He taught in Prague, Halle, München and Berlin, where he founded a psychological laboratory. In his book On the Psychological Origin of the Presentation of Space (Stumpf 1873), he argues against Kant’s claim that space is an “a priori form of intuition”, maintaining instead that the status of space is that of a “partial presentation” (Teilvorstellung), that is, a presentation which is necessarily experienced as part of a broader presentation. A similar line of thought was adopted in his important article “Psychology and Theory of Knowledge”, where he maintains that psychological analysis is central to philosophical and epistemological investigations (Stumpf 1892). That said, Stumpf is best known for having introduced the notion of “state of affairs” (Sachverhalte) in his logic courses in Halle (see Stumpf 1924: 36) and, above all, for being the father of the Psychology of the Sound. The two-volume book he published under this title (Stumpf 1883-90) offers a comprehensive analysis of our judgments related to acoustic sensations and contains numerous references to Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. However, Stumpf disagreed with Brentano on several points—the most
important disagreement being probably about Stumpf’s interpretation of pain and pleasure as “affective sensations” (see Stumpf 2015; also Chap. 32).

Anton Marty, in turn, is best known for his works in the philosophy of language. After his dissertation on The Origin of Language under Lotze’s supervision (Marty 1875), he made his habilitation in Vienna on The Historical Development of the Sense of Colour (Marty 1879) and eventually obtained a position at the university of Prague (1880). He then published, between 1884 and 1895, two important series of articles in which he mainly addresses the relation between grammar, logic and psychology. His major book, the Investigations for the Foundation of a General Grammar and Philosophy of Language, is dedicated to Brentano for his 70th birthday and contains extensive discussions of views held by Brentano and other Brentanians. Marty distinguishes between autosemantical and synsemantical expressions. One of his main claims is that the classes of autosemantical expressions—names, sentences and “expressions which arouse interest”—are in line with Brentano’s three classes of mental phenomena (Marty 1908: 224-79; see Chap. 9, 31). Even though Marty counted among Brentano’s most faithful followers, he disagreed, e.g., with Brentano’s reist turn.

Other significant works by former students of Brentano at Würzburg include Georg von Hertling book on Aristotle (Von Hertling 1871), Hermann Schell’s doctoral dissertation on the unity of mental life (Schell 1872), Jakob Mohr’s On the Foundations of Empirical Psychology (Mohr 1882), and Johannes Wolff’s Consciousness and its Object (Wolff 1889). Despite the fact that Brentano was not in a position to supervise dissertations before his appointment as extraordinarius in May 1872, his influence can be detected in all these works. For reasons tied to his withdrawal from priesthood, he nevertheless renounced the status of extraordinarius in 1873 and designed the project to be appointed at the university of Vienna, where a full-professor position was vacant since April 1872. Whereas his Würzburg colleagues were rather hostile towards his philosophical orientation (see Stumpf 1919: 120), he nevertheless succeeded in having Stumpf as his successor in
Würzburg and was appointed ordinarius at the University of Vienna on the 22\textsuperscript{th} of January 1874.

3. Brentano in Vienna 1874-1895

When he arrived in Vienna, Brentano had already written the \textit{Psychology from en Empirical Standpoint}, published the same year. He arrived “at a time one was clearly aware of the emptiness of doctrinal systems filled with gas like balloons, but where the seeds of genuine philosophy were almost completely missing” (Brentano 1895a: 10). Facing this situation, Brentano considered that his own mission was to initiate the rise of scientific philosophy in Austria (\textit{ibid.}; see also Husserl 1919: 161).

In his inaugural lecture on “The Reasons of the Discouragement in the Field of Philosophy” (22 April 1874), he offered his own diagnosis of the identity crisis of philosophy. Drawing on Auguste Comte’s idea of a “natural order” among the sciences, he maintains that the only reason why philosophy hasn’t reached yet the stage of scientific maturity is that it requires \textit{psychological} investigations, which in turn are dependent upon \textit{physiology}. Since physiology and psychology are emerging as full-blown scientific disciplines, Brentano writes in 1874, all the conditions are now created to enable the rise of scientific philosophy. This diagnosis gave Brentano the occasion to reiterate his confidence that philosophy can and must be scientific, on the condition that it follows the method of the natural sciences. Here is the description he gives of the attitude adopted by the natural scientist:

\begin{quote}
[The researcher in the natural sciences] never starts from the principle that he has to penetrate the genuine essence of things. He never demands that the inner How and Why of a causal connection would be grounded. He observes the natural phenomena and their succession, seeks to establish similarities between the various cases and wants thereby to discover general and unchanging relations between the phenomena, that is, laws of their connection. (Brentano 1968: 89)\textsuperscript{7}
\end{quote}

Again, thus, one crucial idea behind Brentano’s position at the beginning of his teaching activity in Vienna is that philosophical issues are best tackled by adopting
the empirical and inductive method of the natural sciences. In his correspondence, Brentano reports how the audience, which was rather hostile at first sight, eventually met his inaugural lecture with great enthusiasm.

During his first years in Vienna, Brentano taught history of Greek philosophy, psychology, logic, practical philosophy and metaphysics. The ‘first wave’ of students (1874-1880) include Thomas Masaryk, Alexius Meinong, Aloïs Höfler, and Christian Ehrenfels—to name just the most prominent figures.

Thomas Masaryk, who later became the first president of Czechoslovakia, attended Brentano’s courses from 1874 to 1876. He did his doctoral dissertation (The Essence of the Soul in Plato. A Critical Study from the Empirical Standpoint) in 1876 under Brentano’s supervision (Capek and Masaryk 1995: 7, 80), and obtained a position as ordinarius at the Czech University of Prague in 1882. His main contribution to the scientific production of the Brentano School certainly is his Essay of Concrete Logic, in which he argues against Comte’s classification of sciences (Masaryk 1885). Whereas the title of Masaryk’s dissertation clearly is reminiscent of the empirical orientation of Brentano’s philosophy, Masaryk distanced himself from the Brentanian views (see Haller 1992: 13).

Alexius Meinong attended Brentano’s courses from 1875 to 1878. In 1878, he presented his habilitation on Hume (Meinong 1969: 1-73) and obtained a position as lecturer at the university of Vienna. During the subsequent period, he published a number of papers on psychological, epistemological and axiological issues. In his major book, On Assumptions (Meinong 1977), first published in 1902, he challenges Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena, claiming that assumptions form an intermediary group of phenomena which is neither reducible to the class of presentations nor to that of judgments (see Chap. 33). He also argued against Brentano’s view that self-evidence (Evidenz) doesn’t admit of degrees, by maintaining that one can recollect something, for instance, in a way which is more or less evident (see Meinong 1971: 185-209). Both the assumption theory and the theory of evident presumptions were rejected by Brentano (1969: 55; 1995a: 284-
5) and Marty (1906; 1908: 242-71). In 1882, Meinong were appointed extraordinarius at the university of Graz, where he founded the first psychological laboratory of Austria in 1894 and laid down the foundations of the so-called object theory. His students in Graz include, e.g., Rudolf Ameseder, Vittorio Benussi, Ernst Mally, Eduard Martinak, and Stefan Witasek.

During their studies at the university of Vienna, Alois Höfler and Christian Ehrenfels attended both Brentano’s and Meinong’s courses. While they acknowledged their debt to Brentano’s, the philosophical positions they adopted in their writings were closer to Meinong’s, under the supervision of whom they both graduated in Graz in 1885. In 1887, Ehrenfels presented his habilitation *On Feeling and Volition* at the university of Vienna, where he was appointed lecturer the next year. He later moved to Prague. One central goal of his habilitation was to argue, against Brentano’s classification, that feelings and volitions are distinct phenomena which cannot be put in one and the same class (Ehrenfels 1988: 15-97; see CHAP. 34). Alois Höfler also habilitated at the university of Vienna. He obtained a position as professor of pedagogy at the university of Prague (1903-07) and, then, at the university of Vienna (1907-22). Among other things, he authored a huge handbook of *Logic* (1890, dedicated to his “master and friend Alexius Meinong”) and another one of *Psychology* (1894), which are full of Brentanian and Meinongian views. Höfler’s *Logic* is arguably the source of the distinction between content and object of presentation (see Höfler 1922: 33)—a distinction which will be the basis of Kasimir Twardowski’s habilitation in 1894.

In 1880, Brentano married Ida Lieben and consequently renounced his position as ordinarius (see Brentano 1895). This is the beginning of a new period (1880-1895), during which Brentano was not allowed to supervise dissertations and sent his students to Stumpf or Marty. At the same time, several changes occurred in Brentano’s philosophical views. First of all, he introduced the distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology, which form the two branches of scientific, empirical psychology. While genetic psychology seeks to explain mental phenomena, descriptive psychology just aims at describing them by identifying their
distinctive features (see Brentano 1995b; see Chap. 3). Furthermore, in his courses on practical philosophy, Brentano came to transpose the distinction between blind and evident judgments onto the emotional domain, thus distinguishing evidently correct emotions from blind emotions (Stumpf 1919: 137). He presented his theory of the correctness of emotions and preference in 1889 in his famous lecture on *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong* (Brentano 1969; see Chap. 23).

These views were not without resonance in the ‘second wave’ of Brentano’s students, among whom the leading figures were Franz Hillebrand, Edmund Husserl, and Kasimir Twardowski. (Other students of Brentano at that time include Alfred Berger, Benno Kerry, Josef Kreibig, Hans Schmidkunz and Norbert Schwaiger.)

Franz Hillebrand attended Brentano’s courses in the early 1880s and graduated in Prague under Marty’s supervision in 1887. In 1891, back in Vienna, he presented his habilitation on *The New Theories of Categorical Reasonings*, a book which elaborates Brentano’s ‘idiogenetic’ theory of judgment and tries to show its implications for the reform of traditional logic (Hillebrand 1891). In the second edition of his *Psychology*, Brentano mentions Hillebrand’s book as a reference on that score (Brentano 1995a: 230, 232). In 1896, Hillebrand was designated extraordinarius at Innsbruck, where he founded a psychological laboratory (see Göller 1989). Under the influence of Ernst Mach and Ewald Hering, who had been his teachers alongside Marty in Prague, he conducted several investigations in the field of the psychology of the senses (e.g., Hillebrand 1918; 1929). In 1905, he was joined by another Marty student, Emil Arleth, who also obtained a position at the same university—an event which is usually seen as a ‘consolidation’ of the Brentanian orientation at Innsbruck.

Edmund Husserl was Brentano’s student from 1884 to 1886 and presented his habilitation *On the Concept of Number* in Halle under Stumpf’s supervision. His project of a *Raumbuch* bears the marks of both Brentano and Stumpf (see Husserl 1983). His major book, *Logical Investigations*, is dedicated to Stumpf and contains, among other things, a critique of Brentano’s distinction between inner and outer
perception (Husserl 2001: 335-48; see Bergmann 1908; Katkov 1937). While Husserl, in the first edition, still conceived his own phenomenology as a “descriptive psychology” in Brentano’s sense, he later advocated a strong distinction between the two, maintaining that his ‘pure’ phenomenology had nothing to do with the empirical recording of individual facts (see Chap. 35). Brentano didn’t really read Husserl’s books and restricted himself to answer the charge of psychologism that had been raised in the Logical Investigations (see Brentano 1995: 306-7).

Kasimir Twardowski arrived in Vienna in 1885. He attended Brentano’s courses and those of Robert Zimmermann, through whom he became acquainted with Bolzano’s Theory of Science. His dissertation, Idea and Perception (Twardowski 1892), was devoted to Descartes. His major work is his habilitation, On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation, which he presented in Vienna in 1894 (Twardowski 1977) before being appointed at the university of Lemberg (today “Lviv”). Twardowski’s habilitation was a major source for Husserl's theory of intentionality and Meinong’s theory of objects (see Meinong 1971: 481-530).

4. Marty and the Prague Circle

Despite a promises from the ministry of education, Brentano never regained his full professorship (see Brentano 1895b). In 1895, he eventually resolved to leave Vienna and move to Italy. Before leaving Austria, he published his book on the Four Phases of Philosophy, in which he offered a still broader diagnosis for the ‘identity crisis’ of philosophy. On his view, Kant and German idealists are the representatives of the extreme phase of decadent philosophy. By contrast, ‘ascending’ philosophical investigations are to be conducted according to “a purely theoretical” interest and a method “fitting the nature of things” (naturgemäße) (Brentano 1895a: 8). This idea, again, is reminiscent of the fourth habilitation thesis. Actually, it is probably not unfair to see the publication of the Four Phases as an attempt to secure the proposed rehabilitation strategy and strengthen the view that philosophers may escape both
scepticism and speculation on the condition that they follow in the natural scientists’ footsteps.

One remarkable change that occurred, after Brentano’s departure from Vienna, is that Prague, where Marty was teaching from 1880 onwards, became somehow the “center of the school” (EHRENFELS 1922: 95; KASTIL 1951: 20; see chap. 37). Not only has Marty, in his correspondence with Brentano, generated critical discussions on a number of issues in the field of descriptive psychology, but he also played a major role in the dissemination of Brentanian thought among the second generation of students (the so-called Enkelschüler). We know that he gave in particular a series of courses on genetic and descriptive psychology in which he drew on Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena (see MARTY 2011).

Marty’s students in Prague include Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil, Emil Arleth, Emil Utitz, Josef Eisenmeier, Hugo Bergmann, and Otto Funke. They used to meet at the Café Louvre and became known as the Louvre Circle. Brentano himself sometimes refers to the existence of the Prague “philosophical club” made up of Marty’s students (BRENTANO 1946: 109).

Among the members of the Prague circle, Kraus probably deserves a particular place. He first became acquainted with Marty during the winter semester of 1890-91, when he was nineteen years old. He describes his encounter with him as a “metamorphosis”: Marty, Kraus writes, “freed me from my earlier materialist and pessimistic positions” (KRAUS 1929: 5). Kraus is best known for his work in philosophy of law and philosophy of values (see, e.g., KRAUS 1937). He was Marty’s successor in Prague and edited Marty’s complete works alongside Eisenmeier and Kastil. In 1931, he also founded, with Masaryk’s financial support, the Prague Brentano Society, whose main aim was to preserve Brentano’s manuscripts and to promote Brentanian studies.

Kraus and Kastil regarded as their own task to preserve Brentano’s views from the “distortions” introduced by his students (UTITZ 1954: 79). For that reason, they have sometimes been charged of disseminating a Brentanian “propaganda”
through their own writings (ibid.: 74). This attitude was at the origin of a divide within the school, between the “secessionists” of the Graz school and the supporters of Brentanian “orthodoxy”. The main point at issue was the content-object distinction systematized by Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl, along with the autonomy of the so-called intentional object (see Kastil 1909). On Brentano’s mature view, indeed, the proponents of the object theory tend to reify universals and go back to a kind of “Platonism”, which had been eschewed by psychological analysis (see Brentano 1995: 367-8; Utitz 1954: 87, 89).15

Kraus taught in turn several students who became active members of the Brentano School. Among them, the most important probably is Georg Katkov. Katkov graduated in 1929 with a thesis on the analysis of consciousness, in which he maintained, against Husserl and Meinong, that the notions of ‘relation’, ‘intentional object’ and ‘state of affairs’ are not required to account for the acts of consciousness and, consequently, should be eliminated from the psychological description thereof (Katkov 1930). Katkov worked at the Brentano Archives until the Nazi occupation of Prague in 1939, when Kraus and him fled to London with Brentano’s manuscripts.

Conclusion

The Brentano School had a significant place in the philosophical landscape at the beginning of 20th century. As a matter of fact, most of the philosophical chairs in Austrian universities at that time were occupied by Brentano’s students or students’ students (Höfler 1917: 325; Kraft 1952: 1).16 Another general observation which may be made on the basis of the foregoing sketch is that the literary production of the members of the school covers virtually all the fields of philosophy, from the psychology of the senses (see, e.g., Stumpf 1883-90; Eisenmeier 1918; Hillebrand 1918; 1929) to ethics and value theory (Ehrenfels 1888; Meinong 1968; Kraus 1937), logic and theory of science (Hillebrand 1891; Masaryk 1885), philosophy of language (Marty 1908; Martinak 1898; 1901), theory of knowledge (Bergmann
1908; Stumpf 1939), Aesthetics (Utitz 1908; 1914-20), and history of philosophy (Arleth 1896).

I have suggested that the post-idealism ‘identity crisis’ context illuminates the attractiveness of Brentano’s philosophical program, as expressed for the first time in his fourth habilitation thesis. Stumpf’s inaugural lecture at the university of Berlin on the “Renaissance of philosophy” offers further support for this reading. Stumpf indeed suggests that all the tentative rehabilitations of philosophy which took place at the end of the 19th century may be divided into two trends, namely that of the “a priori philosophy”, which is illustrated by the proponents of the Back-to-Kant movement, and that of the “experience-based philosophy”, which obviously corresponds to Brentano’s (Stumpf 1907: 169). Interestingly, Stumpf establishes a sharp contrast between the two, presenting them as two rival strategies.

Again, the key to understanding what makes the two strategies so different lies in the way philosophy is connected to the natural sciences and, more pointedly, to psychology. Proponents of the Back-to-Kant movement initiated by Otto Liebmann (Liebmann 1865) tried to rehabilitate philosophy as a rigorous science by conceiving it, at least in its most fundamental part, as a higher-order science, a science of the sciences. This overall strategy results in disconnecting philosophy from the other, first-order sciences, and from the empirical method that had proved so successful for them. In contrast, the proponents of the “experience-based philosophy” maintain that philosophy should use the same method as the natural sciences and be kept connected with them, rather than claiming a higher-level position. This holds especially for the philosophy-psychology relationship: “Psychology”, Stumpf writes, “is one the fundaments on which the new philosophy must be build” (Stumpf 1907: 185). This last claim is, arguably, one of the leading principles for the philosophical investigations conducted within the Brentano School (see Chap. 29).
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1 The latter holds not only for Alexius Meinong and his followers (Meinong 1977: xix; Höfler 1921: 15; Ehrenfels 1922: 95), who form the dissident branch of the school, but for Edmund Husserl as well, who declares about Brentano: “I couldn’t stay a member of his school” (Husserl 1919: 164).

2 In their posthumous editions of Brentano’s works, Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand followed the will of Brentano, who wished that his manuscripts were handled the way Étienne Dumont handled those of Jeremy Bentham (letter to Kraus of 13th January 1916; cf. Mayer-Hillebrand 1963: 150). It is known that Bentham gave Dumont his half-finished manuscripts, on the basis of which the latter wrote the Traités de législation civilé et pénaile by freely compiling Bentham’s notes from various periods, filling in the gaps, developing some ideas and omitting others. Kraus, Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrand did the same in compiling and re-writing Brentano’s texts.

3 Given the historical significance of such ramifications, it has sometimes been suggested that a table of Brentano’s students and student’s students would “come close to embracing all of the most important philosophical movements of the twentieth century on the continent of Europe” (Smith 1994: 21).

4 This reading is not only supported by Brentano’s inaugural lecture at the university of Vienna, in which he explicitly addresses the identity crisis of philosophy—or, as he puts it, the “discouragement” in the field of philosophy—and presents the idea underpinning the fourth thesis as a way out of the crisis (Brentano 1968: 85-100). As we will see, the proposed understanding of the fourth thesis is also in line with the overall picture Carl Stumpf offered, later on, in his inaugural lecture at the university of Berlin (Stumpf 1907).

5 “Experience alone is my teacher”, Brentano writes in the preface of his Psychology (Brentano 1995a: xxvii).
This idea contrasts with the claim that logic should be raised to the level of a philosophical science by being connected, not to psychology, but to the “theory of knowledge”—a claim which had been made by Eduard Zeller in his inaugural lecture at the university of Heidelberg (Zeller 1862) and which will be at the foundation of the neo-Kantian rehabilitation strategy.

The claim that the scientist is not interested in the ‘hidden essence’ of things, but only in the connections between the phenomena, is in line with Auguste Comte’s conception of ‘positive science’. See Brentano 1869: 19, 23-24, 27-28.

This idea can be traced back to Mill’s System of Logic (Book III, i, 1). On Mill’s View, “all discovery of truths not self-evident, consists of inductions, and the interpretation of inductions” (Mill 1974: 283).

See Brentano’s letter to Schell of 22 December 1885 (Hasenfuss 1978: 44).

An exhaustive list of Brentano’s courses is given in Werle 1989: 155-62.

Höfler’s habilitation was titled Some Laws of Incompatibility between Judgments (a revised version was published as Höfler 1917), and Ehrenfel’s Size-Relations and Numbers. A Psychological Study.

From 1916 onwards, he worked as professor of ‘pedagogy and philosophy’.

Arleth and Kastil succeeded to Franz Hillebrand at the university of Innsbruck. Emil Arleth is a historian of philosophy (see, e.g., Arleth 1896) who studied with Marty and Stumpf in Prague and with Brentano in Vienna. Kastil edited some posthumous works by Brentano and wrote an overall presentation of Brentano’s philosophy (Kastil 1951). Emil Utitz was the successor of Ehrenfels in Prague and wrote mainly about aesthetics (Utitz 1908; 1914-20).


Kraus talks about a “Copernican turn” in Brentano’s late philosophy (Kraus 1934: 62-76).

The members of the school also occupied important positions within the “Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna”, which arguably has a place in the prehistory of the Vienna Circle (see Blackmore 1988; Fisette 2014). Alois Höfler, in particular, appears to be an important connection between the Brentano School and the Vienna Circle.