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Working Paper

The State Against Itself

*Introduction*

One of the key finding of the CIVICUS’s Global Survey of the State of Civil Society is that the political context is immensely important in determining the state of the civil society in any given country. In particular, it is the “attitudes of the government”[[1]](#footnote-1) that crucially determines the role and the impact that civic action can have. Further, despite the difficulties – perhaps the impossibility – in reaching a consensual definition of “civil society”, most of the stakeholders interviewed within the CIVICUS project, agreed that civil society is an eminently political phenomenon[[2]](#footnote-2).

Yet, political dynamics are seldom taken into account when analysing one of the key domains of civil society’s action, namely development policies. This paper will set out a research framework for an attempt to remedy to this lack of attention to political dynamics in the analysis of state-civil society relations and to the role that the latter can play in developing policies.

From what we have just said, it should be already clear that a somewhat narrow definition of “civil society” is what we will focus on. In fact, our attention will be dedicated to what is often considered the “core” of civil society in developing countries (as it is in India, which will be our focus here), namely Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) whose mission is the betterment of the living conditions of the poor. Therefore, not only will a whole range of other types of associations - business circles, caste associations, trade unions, et cetera[[3]](#footnote-3) – not considered; but the differences between movements, community-based organisations, people’s organisations, NGOs, et cetera will not be taken into account not because they are ignored, but simply because, for our purposes, such differences are not very relevant, as the following discussion should make clear. Besides, at least as far as the Indian case is concerned, most of these differences “reflected rhetorical positioning more than substantive differences”.[[4]](#footnote-4)

The research will be conducted on the basis of two working hypothesis. The first one is that civil society in India – or at least in some parts of India – is gradually merging with, and becoming an integral part of the state. The second one is that such a merging is mainly due to the state’s willingness to ally with civil society *against* another part of the state itself. These two hypothesis appears to be true at the national level, but also at the state level of India’s federal system.

The research will seek to test these two hypothesis by analysing the relation between the state government and the CSOs in the state of Andhra Pradesh. More specifically, our focus will be on the relations surrounding the implementation of India’s largest anti-poverty programme, i.e. the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). This is a particularly interesting case, as Andhra Pradesh is almost unanimously seen as a leading example in implementing the NREGA, not least because of its innovative “attitudes” towards CSOs.

The paper is organised as follows. This first section introduces the national political context and the alliance of the state with the civil society at the national level. Section two narrows the focus on Andhra Pradesh. Section three concludes and poses some research questions.

*1. The United Progressive Alliance and the National Advisory Council*

In 2004, the Congress Party and its allies won the Indian general elections. No one had predicted the result. The odds were strongly in favour of the incumbent National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which had brought the country on a path of vigorous economic growth and that was so confident that had based its electoral campaign on the claim that India was “shining”,[[5]](#footnote-5) indeed a very courageous claim in a country where about 50 per cent of the population is poor[[6]](#footnote-6). In fact, voters did not agree with such a claim and the Congress party under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi came back to power. Hectic negotiations held shortly after the elections brought to the establishment of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government and to the communist parties (the so-called Left Front) to lend external support to the government. The whole political arrangement was based on the so-called Common Minimum Programme (CMP), whose first policy commitment was the implementation – within 100 days – of an Employment Guarantee Act, as promised in the Congress’s election manifesto[[7]](#footnote-7). The UPA had to honour its commitment, also because the Left Front made it a *conditio sine qua no* for its support to the government.

A key aspect of the negotiation between the UPA and the Left Front was the creation of a committee, the National Advisory Council (NAC), that would supervise the implementation of the CMP. The NAC was composed by representatives of the civil society – mostly social activists and academics – along with some retired bureaucrats, and was chaired by Congress’s president and UPA’s chairperson Sonia Gandhi[[8]](#footnote-8). The NAC became Sonia Gandhi’s think tank for progressive social policies. Its components designed a series of anti-poverty policies (including the NREGA) that were later passed by the Indian parliament and that were unprecedented in India’s history, not only because of the amount of resources invested – between 2004 and 2008 more than 57 billion dollars were spent in anti-poverty programmes[[9]](#footnote-9) – but also because a serious effort was made to make them work significantly better than in the past.

However, the legislative process was far from being smooth. A tension arose between the government and the NAC – both of which were to a significant extent a Sonia Gandhi’s creations[[10]](#footnote-10). Such a tension was most evident with the formulation of the NREGA. The NAC wrote a very strong bill. This was introduced in the Ministry of Rural Development, which diluted the bill to a significant extent before sending it to the Lok Sabha.[[11]](#footnote-11) Here something very unusual happened. The Standing Committee of the Parliament, in the wake of strong pressures from the NAC members and other informally-affiliated civil society representatives, reintroduced most of the provisions originally envisaged.[[12]](#footnote-12) Eventually, the Lok Sabha passed the NREGA unanimously in August 2005.

This episode is an instance of a larger trend that is profoundly shaping state-society relations in India. On the one hand, part of the civil society is merging with, and receiving strong support from part of the state, and it is assuming official roles in the policy-making and in the implementation of development programmes; on the other hand, that very part of the civil society is assuming a very conflictual and militant position against another part of the state, which is reluctant to implement progressive – and relatively expensive – social policies.

This situation – by which the state allies with the civil society against another branch of the state – is replicated at the state level in India’s federal system, at least in certain cases. Perhaps the domain in which such an alliance is most evident is the promotion of transparency and accountability and the fight against corruption, which affected virtually every single anti-poverty programme in the past.

In order to ground the state’s alliance with CSOs on concrete policy measurers, the central government[[13]](#footnote-13) passed the Right to Information Act (RTI) in 2005. This gives the right to every Indian citizen to get access to government documents within 30 days from the request and envisages stiff penalties for officials who refuse to provide the requested documentation. The RTI has been utilised extensively by CSOs operating at the village level for a proper implementation of the NREGA[[14]](#footnote-14) and resulted in the exposure of numberless episode of theft, malpractice, and corruption by local level state officials and politicians.

Given the immense distance that separates the central government and local level politics and administration, the alliance with CSOs against local state structures is surprising only to a certain extent. However, it is more surprising when such an alliance is replicated at the state level.[[15]](#footnote-15) Here local level officials (at the district, sub-district, and local levels) and politicians have traditionally been part of the patronage structure of senior political leaders and of Members of the Legislative Assembly[[16]](#footnote-16) (MLAs).[[17]](#footnote-17) Nevertheless, what we are seeing in at least some of the Indian states, is an alliance between CSOs and the state government against lower level state structures, in an attempt to curb corruption and make development programmes work the way they are supposed to.

This paper will focus on one state that, evidence suggests, has undertaken such a path.

*2. Andhra Pradesh*

*2.1 Political Background*

Andhra Pradesh’s politics is structured around a bipolar party system since 1983. In January that year N. T. Rama Rao (popularly known as NTR) won the state assembly elections with his newly formed Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and put an end to the last bastion[[18]](#footnote-18) of the “Congress system”[[19]](#footnote-19) in India. Since that moment the TDP and the Congress alternated in power[[20]](#footnote-20).

Along with law and order[[21]](#footnote-21), and the debate over the possible bifurcation of the state[[22]](#footnote-22), development policies were the main issue of the 2004 electoral campaign.[[23]](#footnote-23) The incumbent chief minister[[24]](#footnote-24) Chandrababu Naidu, who had pursued an aggressive market-oriented strategy since his coming to power in 1995, claimed he had brought Andhra Pradesh to the forefront of India’s growth story.[[25]](#footnote-25) The Congress party and its leader Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy (popularly known as YSR) put the emphasis on how the agricultural sector had severely suffered from Naidu’s policies as the abysmally high number of suicides among farmers showed. The Congress also promised to introduce comprehensive welfare programmes,[[26]](#footnote-26) including investments in irrigation, subsidized interest rates for women’s Self Help Groups (SHGs), land distribution to Scheduled Classes,[[27]](#footnote-27) legalised land rights for Scheduled Tribes.[[28]](#footnote-28)

Eventually, the Congress party won the state elections and came back to power after 10 years in opposition. YSR became the chief minister. In fact, YSR kept his promise to introduce a number of welfare schemes. Many of these initiatives can be called “post-clientelistic”[[29]](#footnote-29) policies. These kind of initiatives cover a relative wide array of government programmes and have become a key feature of India’s political system in recent years. Many politicians, especially at the state level, have realised that clientelism – the main political tool during the heyday of the “Congress system” – is just not enough to maintain electoral support and remain in power. In fact, between 1980 and 2008 more than 75 per cent of the elections in India resulted in the ruling party being defeated. For this reasons many chief ministers decided to adopt a set of “post-clientelist” initiatives to supplement their more “traditional” clientelist ways of winning support. The key feature of post-clientelist policies is that these are “protected” from powerful patronage network bosses. Usually (even if not always), this means that such programmes work significantly better than other initiatives, they ensure greater participation, and less political interference.[[30]](#footnote-30)

Politicians can protect development policies in three ways: first, by designing policies which contain strong transparency and accountability measurers. This is what has happened in at the national level since 2004. Most development policies have been carefully designed, with crucial inputs from committed civil society actors within the NAC. The NREGA is the most prominent example. Second, by making it clear to bureaucrats and powerful politicians that thefts from the programme will not be tolerated and that those willing to amass illicit funds from the state should focus on other initiatives. This seems to be the case in Andhra Pradesh, where the Rural Development Ministry ceased – to a significant extent – to be a “wet ministry”, i.e. a source of money and patronage for political leaders controlling it. Politicians willing to make money now concentrate on land policy, or on mining concessions, as these are by far the largest sources of illicit funds. (Given the extension of the phenomenon it is clear that the government is closing both eyes on such practices, if it is not actively participating in such activities). Third, the state government can seek the collaboration of CSOs and make them actors in the policy process, and in the implementation and surveillance of development programmes. Again, this is what it seems to be happening in Andhra Pradesh and it constitutes a major focus of this paper.

*2.2 State-Civil Society Relations in Andhra Pradesh*

It is perhaps useful to recall briefly what the relation between civil society and the government of Andhra Pradesh was like before the advent of the Congress government in 2004. Before the 1980s, the one-party-dominant party system and the firm belief in state-led development in government circles at all levels, had limited the willingness of the state government to engage in a partnership with CSOs.

The crumbling of the state-led development model both in India and among most international donors and institutions led, on the one hand, to the proliferation of CSOs engaged in development programmes and, on the other hand, to the need by the state government to establish some form of relation with them. However, the advent of Chandrababu Naidu at the helm of Andhra Pradesh’s government in 1995 coincided with the establishment of what was probably India’s worst environment for CSOs.[[31]](#footnote-31)

Naidu’s government was much centralised and the chief minister was extremely aware of any alternative power centre, as CSOs potentially were. Thus, his government’s relations with CSOs were based on the systematic exclusion and isolation of independent CSOs from whatsoever role in the design or implementation of development policies. Furthermore, in order to contrast even the limited influence such organisation could exercise at the local level, Naidu established and actively promoted a number of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs), which were headed by government officials and that were in charge of implementing development policies. Perhaps the best example of such organisations is the Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP), which was (and still is) in charge of training members of the thousands of women’s Self Help Groups (SHGs) which mushroomed during Naidu’s regime.[[32]](#footnote-32) In fact, GONGOs virtually eliminated the need for the state government to partner with other (and independent) CSOs[[33]](#footnote-33).

The Congress government that came to power in 2004 changed to a certain extent its relation with CSOs. Generally, there is today far more participation of CSOs in both the policy-making and in the implementation of development schemes, thus replicating in the state a similar development occurring at the national level.

The collaboration between the state government and CSOs is now based on three pillars. The first one is the Government-NGOs Coordination Committee (GO-NGO). The second one is the Andhra Pradesh-NGO Alliance (APNA). The third is the Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT)[[34]](#footnote-34).

The GO-NGO is the institutional platform for the dialogue between the state government and CSOs. According to the GO-NGO’s website[[35]](#footnote-35) the task of the committee is “to serve as a platform for experience sharing and to function as a think tank for a meaningful and continuous dialogue, thematic discussions, sharing information and to devise innovative strategies to enhance effectiveness of on-going programmes” and “to review existing policy regimes”.

How and to what extent this platform actually constitutes an effective channel for CSOs to influence the design and implementation of development programmes is open to speculation. This research will try to offer a contribution on this issue. However, it should be noted that the GO-NGO Committee is chaired by the Chief Minister and among its members there is the Minister for Rural Development (Vice-Chair), a retired civil servant (Executive Vice-Chairperson), and nine senior civil servants. CSOs are represented by six members, who are appointed by the government for a period of two years. Therefore the hypothesis that the GO-NGO coordination committee does not in fact function as an open arena of confrontation between CSOs and the state government, but rather as a top-down system of control over CSOs appears plausible. This will be verified.

The Andhra Pradesh NGO Alliance was formed in 2010, following meetings within the just mentioned GO-NGO collaboration (according to the government).[[36]](#footnote-36) The aim of the APNA is to structure the work of CSOs within the NREGA. Interested organisations that respect certain criteria can apply to join the alliance. To date, about 350 CSOs are part of the APNA. These perform four main tasks. First, they form, strengthen, and train Fixed Labour Groups (FLGs), namely small groups of NREGA workers at the village level (often formed on caste lines) that work together and deal with the administration as a group. Second, they are observers during social audits performed by the SSAAT (more on this below). Third, they undertake fact finding missions, if so instructed by the Commissioner for Rural Development. Fourth, they participate in the monthly meetings with the state’s administration at the mandal,[[37]](#footnote-37) district, and state level.

Again, the structure of the APNA – which is chaired by the Chief Minister and managed by senior civil servants – leaves open the possibility that CSOs’ participation in the alliance is seriously undermined by their objectively weak position. However, the monthly dialogue between CSOs and government representatives is definitely worth investigating. According to the official guidelines, these meetings work as follows. In case a problem arises at the village level, a CSO working in the area should try to resolve the issue with the Gram Panchayat.[[38]](#footnote-38)If there is no resolution, the issue is brought up at the meeting organised at the Mandal level held on the third Wednesday every month. All CSOs working in the Mandal should attend the meeting, where government officials working in the Mandal will be present. If this is not enough to resolve the problems, the issues are brought up at the district level meeting, which takes place every third Friday of the month, and finally at the state level meeting, taking place every last Saturday of the month. Immediate instructions for remedy to issues raised by CSOs should be relayed through video conferences with district and mandal officials.

Obviously many questions remain open. To what extent issues raised during the monthly meeting are in fact tackled? What happens when a CSO step on the toes of a powerful Congress politicians, for example by accusing his/her associates at the local level? Is there an imbalance in the redressed mechanisms between areas dominated by the Congress and areas dominated by the TDP? How are CSOs selected to be part of the alliance? What happen in case of CSOs that are perceived or in fact are political critics of the ruling party? Are CSOs obliged to be part of the alliance if they want to work on the NREGA or there is space for organisations that choose/are forced out of the APNA? Does the government have a relation with CSOs that are not part of the alliance, or are these isolated and/or ostracised? These are some of the issues that will be tackled during a forthcoming field trip in Hyderabad and Delhi.

The third pillars of Andhra Pradesh’s relation with CSOs is the Society for Social Audit, Accountability, and Transparency (SSAAT). The Society was established as an independent body by the Ministry for Rural Development in May 2009.[[39]](#footnote-39) Once again, the control of the Society is firmly in the hands of the state government, since it is governed by a Governing Body composed by four ex officio members (including the Principal Secretary (Rural Development), the Commissioner for Rural Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the SERP) and nine “persons of eminence”[[40]](#footnote-40) nominated by the four ex-officio members for a term of three years. The executive branch of the Society, however, is firmly in the hands of the civil society. The Director is currently a well-known social activist (Sowmya Kidambi). Social Development Specialists (who assist the Director in the design of the social audit policies and liaison with CSOs), State Team Monitors (in charge of the Social Audit Process in maximum three districts), State Resource Persons and District Resource Persons (in charge of the social audit in one district), are hired on a consultancy basis and *cannot* be government officials. Village Social Auditors, who are responsible for the verification of records and procedures at the village level, must necessarily come from families who have worked under the NREGA.

The SSAAT is responsible for the design and implementation of the social audits within the NREGA.[[41]](#footnote-41) This is a monumental exercise. Up to 2010, three rounds of social audits were conducted in most of Andhra Pradesh’s 23.000 Gram Panchayats. More than 10.000 irregularities were found and more that 4.000 government officials were punished. More than 60.000 village social auditors were trained[[42]](#footnote-42). Crucially, the awareness among NREGA’s beneficiaries of their rights and of the functioning of the programme increased dramatically after that Social Audits were conducted,[[43]](#footnote-43) making future abuses less and less likely, and pressure from below for a transparent administration more and more compelling.

The SSAAT seems to be the most genuine form of collaboration between the state government and CSOs. The Director of the Society, Sowmya Kidambi, formerly a social activist of the MKSS[[44]](#footnote-44) is convinced that the government has seriously “embraced” social audits and that the effort is by no means just “lip service”.[[45]](#footnote-45) Other informed observers share this view, arguing that “the state government has willingly open itself up for scrutiny and done so by proactively mobilizing citizens to monitor its programme”.[[46]](#footnote-46)

Overall, it seems that Andhra Pradesh government is seriously undertaking an effort to implement the NREGA (along with other development programmes) the way it is supposed to. In order to do so, the government established a tight and peculiar relation with the civil society. On the one hand, the state chose to “isolate” certain development programmes from political and administrative pressures that could potentially harm their functioning. The establishment of independent societies in charge of implementing the programmes reflect this view. On the other hand, the state government proactively sought the collaboration of the civil society that has been integrated into these quasi-governmental institutions to a significant extent. However, the firm control that the state government exercised on all the institutional arrangements that govern its collaboration with CSOs, raise questions about the degree of independence that CSOs enjoy, their space for manoeuvre, and their possibly politicised role in implementing government policies.

*Conclusions and research agenda*

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion above is that the government of Andhra Pradesh has established a solid relation with a rather high number of CSOs, which apparently reversed the trend inherited by the previous government under the chief ministership of Chandrababu Naidu. While this is a positive trend, at least from the CSOs viewpoint, some questions remain.

First, how genuine could be a collaboration institutionalised on the lines described above? In particular, given that the state government firmly controls access and the procedures of the institutionalised collaboration with CSOs, what voice do they latter have? What limitations are they subject to?

Second, although the exact number of CSOs in rather difficult to guess,[[47]](#footnote-47) it is doubtless that the organisations involved in any kind of collaboration with the government represent a tiny minority. Why many CSOs choose not to be part of what looks like an innovative and rather successful experiment? Are they forced out of the alliance, or they rather fear that the compromises to be accepted would jeopardise the organisation’s credibility and/or independence? Further, what are the consequences for the CSOs that choose not to partner with the government? Is collaboration and communication possible only within the institutionalised channels?

Thirds, what is left of the role of many CSOs – especially those that define themselves people’s movements – of pressuring the state government with a whole range of militant and political activities? Are such activities compatible with a stable and institutionalised form of collaboration with the government? Or rather CSOs that want the weight of the state behind their shoulders when fighting against local level state structures must accept to limit their militant activities to lower level politics?

Fourth, is this collaboration – which is centred upon the promotion of transparency and accountability – limited to the NREGA, or does it extend to other development programmes or even other spheres of governance? In other words, is the government trying to promote a general culture of accountability within its administration, or it is rather limiting itself to protect few selected programmes because they are considered politically beneficial?

Fifth, what is the state government gaining from this form of collaboration from CSOs? Of course, the scale and kind of activities performed by CSOs would be unimaginable to be performed by the state on its own. However, the ruling party is willingly cutting the thread that linked many powerful politicians to the local level through the management of patronage networks that regulated the functioning of development programmes. This is by no means a no-risk activity, especially in a traditionally extremely factionalised party as Andhra Pradesh’s Congress is. Thus, it is plausible that some rewards are being disbursed by the top leadership of the ruling party to disgruntled party leaders.

Sixth, and strictly interrelated with what just said, do CSOs that work in partnership with the government for the implementation of the NREGA support the Congress politically? This is a particularly important question, as people belonging to CSOs play a crucial role in forming the political opinions of village voters. To what extent did CSOs contribute to the Congress victory in the panchayat elections in 2006? Or in the state election in 2009? If any role was played, what will happen if the Congress loose the next elections in 2014? Would the entire programme of collaboration with CSOs just be trashed?

This last consideration brings us to the rather obvious point that the collaboration between Andhra Pradesh’s government and CSOs, although solid from a certain point of view, is at the same time extremely fragile. The whole institutional architecture is in the hands of a few enlightened and committed civil servants who nevertheless occupy the position they do at the will of their elected political superiors. Even in the case that the state elections in 2014 resulted in a third mandate for the Congress, the change of leadership in the state party could compromise the whole system. In short, politics is just too important to be left out of any analysis of development programmes.

1. V. Finn Heinrich and Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.), *CIVICUS – Global Survey of the State of Civil Society, Volume 2*, Kumarian press, Bloomfield, 2008, p. xxxv. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Carmen Malena, “Does Civil Society Exist?”, in *CIVICUS…*, p. 185. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Not that all these kind of associations are necessarily to be considered part of the civil society. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Rob Jenkins, “Non-governmental Organizations”, in Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Metha (eds.), *The Oxford Companion to Politics in India,* Oxford University press, New Delhi, 2010, p. 433. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. “India Shining” was the slogan of a government campaign launched shortly before the elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. N. C. Saxena Committee estimates. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The Congress party had included such a commitment in its manifesto probably because it thought, just as anybody else, that it was going to loose the elections. Jean Drèze commented that the guarantee for employment entered national policy debates “like a wet dog at a glamorous party”, “Employment Guarantee and the Right to Work”, in Reetika Kheera(ed.), *The Battle for Employment Guarantee*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Sonia Gandhi renounced to become Prime Minister and chose to remain party president. Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. James Manor, “Did the Central Government’s Poverty Initiatives Help to re-elect it?”, in Lawrence Saez and Gurharpal Singh, *New Dimensions of Politics in India,* London: Routledge, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Few would question this claim. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The lower chamber of the Indian Parliament. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Deepta Chopra, “Policy Making in India: A Dynamic Process of Statecraft”, in *Pacific Affairs,* Vol. 84, No. 1, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. This is how scholars usually refers to India’s national government. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The NREGA itself contain some of the strongest transparecny measurers a development programme has evern seen. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. India is a federal system made up of 28 states and 7 Union Territories (the latter administred directly by the central government). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The Legislative Assembly is the state-level lower House. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The Congress Party had won every single election in Andhra Pradesh since the formation of the state in 1956. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Rajni Kothari, “The Congress ‘System’ in India”, in *Asian Survey,* Vol. 4, No. 12, 1964. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The TDP ruled between 1983 and 1989. Then the Congress ruled between 1989 and 1994. The TDP came back to power from 1994 and 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Andhra Pradesh is severely affected by the Maoist guerrilla. In fact, the chief minister Chandrababu Naidu survived an attempt to his life just before announcing the elections. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The demand for a separate Telangana state to be carved out Andhra Pradesh is a long-standing demand of a sizeable part of the population of the state who live in the 9 northern districts of Telanaga. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. K. C. Suri, “Andhra Pradesh: Fall of the CEO in the Arena of Democracy” in *Economic and Political Weekly,* Vol. 39, No. 51, 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The chief minister is the Head of the Council of Ministers at the state level. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. International development Institutions and foreign investors regarded Naidu as the best Chief Minister in India. Naidu on his part referred to himself as Andhra Pradesh’s CEO. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Similarly to what the National Congress Party was doing in Delhi. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. This is the legal term to refer to the dalits. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Indian Constitution recognises a number of tribal groups and envisage certain positive discriminations. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. James Manor, “What do They Know of India Who Only India Know?” in *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* Vol. 48, No. 4, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Carolyn Elliot, “Moving from Clientelist Politics to a Welfare Regime: Evidence from the 2009 Assembly Elections in Andhra Pradesh” in *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* Vol. 49, No. 1, 2009. The opposite may be equally true. Chandrababu Naidu implemented many development programmes in a post-clientelist fashion, by not allowing patronage network to develop, but then goods and services were distributed at the local level to well-targeted beneficiaries, the selection of whom was made according to political calculations (James Manor, “Acts of Faith: Civil Society and the Policy Process in Ghana and Two Indian States”, Working Paper Non-Governmental Action Programme, LSE, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. James Manor, “Acts of Faith”… [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Insert figure [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Joy Deshmukh-Ranadive, “”Women’s Self-Help Groups in Andhra Pradesh – Participatory Poverty Alleviation in Action”, World Bank, 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Other forms of institutionalised collaboration exist, like the aforementioned SERP. However, our focus will be on those forms of collaborations which are more closely related to the implementation of the NREGA. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. <http://apard-gongo.gov.in/about_committees.html>. Accessed 14/11/2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Government Order (G.O.) Ms. No. 80 19/2/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. This is how blocks (i.e. sub-district administrative units) are called in Andhra Pradesh. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The elected council at the village level. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. This was the culmination of a policy process started in 2006 with the support of the British DFID, whose contribution terminated in 2009. For more detail see G.O.1.171 - 29/5/2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. G.O. 1.155 13/05/2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Social Audits are mandatory as per the NREGA (Section 17). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. SSAAT Annual Report 2009/10. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Shylashri Shankar, “Can Social Audit Count?”ASARC Working Paper, 2009; Yamini Aiyar and Salimah Samji, “Transparency and Accountability in NREGA – A Case Study of Andhra Pradesh”, Accountability Initiative Working Paper, 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. i.e. the CSO that pioneered social audits in Rajasthan. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Quoted in the *New York Times,* “Indian State Empowers Poor to Fight Corruption”, 02/10/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Aiyar and Samji, “Transparency”… p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Vinod Raida estimates that about 200,000 organisations are operating throuhgout India. Other estimates talk of as many as 1.5 million organisations (both quoted by Jenkins, “Non-governmental Organizations”… p. 425). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)