

## Chapter 8

# PREVENTIVE AND EMERGENCY CONTROL OF POWER SYSTEMS

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**Abstract:** A general approach to real-time transient stability control is described, yielding various complementary techniques: pure preventive, open loop emergency, and closed loop emergency controls. The organization of the resulting control schemes is then revisited in order to make it able to cover static and voltage security, in addition to transient stability. Distinct approaches for preventive and emergency operating conditions are advocated.

**Key words:** transient stability, preventive control, emergency control, OPF, integrated security control.

## 1. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Power system security is more and more in conflict with economic and environmental requirements. Security control aims at making decisions in different time horizons so as to prevent the system from undesired situations, and in particular to avoid large catastrophic outages. Traditionally, security control has been divided in two main categories: preventive and emergency control.

In preventive security control, the objective is to prepare the system when it is still in normal operation, so as to make it able to face future (uncertain) events in a satisfactory way. In emergency control, the disturbing events

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have already occurred, and thus the objective becomes to control the dynamics of the system in such a way that consequences are minimized.

Preventive and emergency controls differ in many respects, among which we list the following (Wehenkel, 1999).

*Types of control actions:* generation rescheduling, network switching reactive compensation, sometimes load curtailment for preventive control; direct or indirect load shedding, generation shedding, shunt capacitor or reactor switching, network splitting for emergency control.

*Uncertainty:* in preventive control, the state of the system is well known but disturbances are uncertain; in emergency control, the disturbance is certain, but the state of the system is often only partially known; in both cases, dynamic behavior is uncertain.

*Open versus closed loop:* preventive control is generally of the open loop feed-forward type; emergency control may be closed loop, and hence more robust with respect to uncertainties.

In the past, many utilities have relied on preventive control in order to maintain system security at an acceptable level. In other words, while there are many emergency control schemes installed in reality, the objective has been to prevent these schemes as much as possible from operating, by imposing rather high objectives to preventive security control.

As to any rule, there are exceptions: for example controlled generation shedding has been used extensively in Northern America to handle transient stability problems; in the same way, corrective control has been used in many systems as an alternative to preventive control in the context of thermal overload mitigation.

Nowadays, where the pressure is to increase trading and competition in the power system field, preventive security control is being considered as an impediment to competition; in turn, this breeds strong incentives to resort less on preventive control and more often on emergency control.

The objective of this paper is essentially twofold: first, to concentrate on transient stability control, both preventive and emergency, and describe a general methodology able to realize convenient tradeoffs between these two aspects; second, to suggest means of integrated security control, coordinating various types of security (steady-state, voltage and transient stability).

The general methodology used to design transient stability control techniques relies on the transient stability method called SIME. In what follows, we first describe the fundamentals of SIME, and then concentrate on the advocated control techniques.

## **2. A UNIFIED APPROACH TO TRANSIENT STABILITY ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL**

### **2.1 Fundamentals of SIME**

SIME (for Single-Machine Equivalent), is a hybrid direct-temporal transient stability method (Pavella et al., 2000a).

Basically, SIME replaces the dynamics of the multi-machine power system by that of a suitable One-Machine Infinite Bus (OMIB) system. By refreshing continuously the OMIB parameters and by assessing the OMIB stability via the equal-area criterion, SIME provides an as accurate transient stability assessment as the one provided by the multi-machine temporal information and, in addition, stability margins and critical machines.

In other words, SIME preserves the advantages of the temporal description (flexibility with respect to power system modeling, accuracy of transient stability assessment, handling of any type of instability (first or multi-swing, plant or inter-area mode), and, in addition, complements them with functionalities of paramount importance.

One of them is generation control (generation rescheduling for preventive control, generation shedding for emergency control), which uses the knowledge of stability margins and critical machines. Indeed, the amount of generation to shift (or shed) depends on the size of the stability margin, and the generators from which to shift (or shed) are the so-called critical machines.

SIME-based preventive control relies on the temporal information (swing curves) provided by a Time-Domain (T-D) simulation program, whereas SIME-based emergency control relies on real-time measurements. Nevertheless, conceptually, the core of the method is the same. In what follows we assume that SIME is fed sequentially by samples of the multi-machine swing curves, no matter whether they are provided by T-D simulations or real time measurements.

### **2.2 Instability Conditions and Margins**

To analyze an unstable case (defined by the pre-fault system operating conditions and the contingency scenario), SIME starts receiving samples of the swing curves as soon as the system enters its post-fault configuration.

At each new sample, SIME transforms the multi-machine swing curve sample into a suitable One-Machine Infinite Bus (OMIB) equivalent, defined by its angle  $\delta$ , speed  $\omega$ , mechanical power  $P_m$ , electrical power  $P_e$  and inertia coefficient  $M$ . (All OMIB parameters are derived from multi-machine system

parameters (Pavella et al., 2000a.) Further, SIME explores the OMIB dynamics by using the equal-area criterion (EAC). The procedure stops as soon as the OMIB reaches the EAC *instability conditions* expressed by

$$P_a(t_u) = 0 \quad ; \quad \dot{P}_a(t_u) > 0 \quad (1)$$

where,  $P_a$  is the OMIB accelerating power, difference between  $P_m$  and  $P_e$ , and  $t_u$  is the *time to instability*: at this time the OMIB system loses synchronism, and the system machines split irrevocably into two groups: the group of “advanced machines” that we will henceforth refer to as the “*critical machines*” (CMs), and the remaining ones, called the “*non-critical machines*”, (NMs)<sup>2</sup>. Thus, at  $t_u$  SIME determines:

- the CMs, responsible of the system loss of synchronism;
- the corresponding unstable margin:

$$\eta_u = A_{dec} - A_{acc} = -\frac{1}{2}M\omega_u^2 \quad . \quad (2)$$

Figures 8-1a to 8-3a illustrate the above definitions on a stability case simulated on the EPRI 88-machine system. More precisely, Figure 8-1 portrays the multi-machine swing curves provided by a T-D program, stopped at “the time to instability”,  $t_u$ . The symbol  $P_C$  used in the captions denotes the total power of the group of critical machines. Figure 8-2a portrays the equivalent OMIB swing curve, while Figure 8-3a represents, in the  $\delta$ -P plane, the evolution with  $\delta$  of the OMIB powers  $P_m$  and  $P_e$ .




Figure 8-1. Multi-machine swing curves. Critical clearing time: 69 ms; clearing time: 95 ms.  
Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

<sup>2</sup> The “advanced machines” are the CMs for up-swing instability phenomena, while for back-swing phenomena they become NMs.




Figure 8-2. Corresponding OMIB swing curves. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)




Figure 8-3. Corresponding OMIB  $\delta$ -P curves. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

## 2.3 Salient Parameters and Properties

1. Calculation of stability margins, identification of the critical machines and assessment of their degree of criticality (or participation to the instability phenomena) are parameters of paramount importance.
2. The “time to instability”,  $t_u$ , is another important factor. It indicates the speed of loss of synchronism, and measures its severity.
3. Under very unstable conditions, it may happen that the standard margin does not exist, because the OMIB  $P_m$  and  $P_e$  curves do not intersect (there is no post-fault equilibrium solution). A convenient substitute is the “minimum distance” between post-fault  $P_m$  and  $P_e$  curves. Figures 8-4 illustrate this surrogate margin under particularly stressed conditions (Ruiz-Vega et al., 2003). Note that here the surrogate to the “time to instability” is the time to reach this minimum distance and to stop the simulation. To simplify, we will still denote it “ $t_u$ ”.
4. A very interesting general property of the instability margins (standard as well as surrogate ones) is that they often vary quasi-linearly with the stability conditions (Pavella et al., 2000a). Figures 8-5 illustrate the margin variation

with the total generation power of the group of critical machines,  $P_C$ . The proposed control techniques benefit considerably from this property.

5. On stability conditions and margins. Similarly to the instability conditions (1), stability conditions are defined by (Pavella et al., 2000a)

$$\omega(t_r) = 0 \quad ; \quad P_a(t_r) < 0. \quad (3)$$

where time  $t_r$  denotes the *time to stability*: at this time, the OMIB angle reaches its maximum excursion, after which it starts decreasing.

At  $t_r$  the first-swing stable margin can be computed by (Pavella et al., 2000a)

$$\eta_{st} = \int_{\delta_r}^{\delta_u} P_a d\delta \quad . \quad (4)$$

Figures 8-1b and 8-2b portray respectively the multi-machine swing curves provided by an ETMSP T-D simulation stopped at the maximum integration period (5 s) and the corresponding OMIB swing curves. Figure 8-3b represents, in the  $\delta$ -P plane, the evolution with  $\delta$  of powers  $P_m$  and  $P_e$ ; to simplify, only part of the evolution of the electrical power  $P_e$  has been displayed.

Three observations should be made about stability conditions and margins. First, strictly speaking, stable cases do not have an OMIB equivalent (the system does not lose synchronism and its machines do not split into two divergent groups). However, by continuation, one can still use the OMIB corresponding to an unstable case close enough to the stable one. Second, meeting the stability conditions (3) does not guarantee that the system will be multi-swing stable. (More precisely, conditions (3) met after  $n$  swings do not guarantee  $(n+1)$ -swing stability.) Hence, multi-swing stability should be investigated via further exploration of the multi-machine swing curves. Finally, equation (4) is a mere approximate expression of a stable margin, since the angle  $\delta_u$  is never reached but, rather, assessed approximately.

6. Computational requirements. The above SIME calculations (of the OMIB parameters and resulting transient stability information about critical machines and margins) require virtually negligible computing time (generally, much smaller than 5% of the required T-D simulations).
7. The shape of an OMIB curve may differ significantly from the shape of an actual machine's swing curve. Indeed, the OMIB equivalent does not describe the behavior of an actual machine but, rather, the compressed information about the multi-machine system dynamics.




Figure 8-4. Example of a severely stressed case: Clearing time = 95 ms; PC = 5600 MW. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)




Figure 8-5. Typical variations of the standard stability margin and of its surrogate with  $P_c$ . Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

## 2.4 Transient Oscillations Damping

### 2.4.1 Preliminaries

Today, online transient oscillations damping is becoming an issue of great concern, with the trend to include damping techniques as part of a transient stability function.

An interesting online damping assessment technique uses the Prony method, where single or multi-channel algorithms analyze one or several (up to, say, 15) generator swing curves at a time (Ruiz-Vega, 2002; Ruiz-Vega et al., 2004). However, the quality of the analysis depends strongly on the number and proper identification of the relevant generator curves, whereas, generally, their number may exceed the algorithmic possibilities, and their identification may be far from obvious.

This may create serious difficulties when dealing with real-world power systems. SIME allows one to circumvent these difficulties by applying single channel Prony analysis to the OMIB curve. Besides, by identifying the system machines that have a major influence on the oscillatory phenomena, it easily determines the dominant modes of oscillation. Last but not least, it provides control techniques, able to improve transient oscillations damping as is described in Section 3.

#### 2.4.2 SIME-Based Prony Analysis

For a given contingency, the SIME-based Prony analysis proceeds in the following way:

1. Run SIME to compute the transient stability limit (critical clearing time or power limit), using one stable and one or two unstable cases. The computation of such a limit relies on pair-wise extrapolation (or interpolation) of stability margins (§§ 3.2.3, 3.5).
2. On the least unstable case, identify the critical machines and corresponding OMIB. Also, determine the “relative relevance” of each one of the critical machines, defined as the product of its inertia with its angle (absolute or relative to a reference), assessed at time  $t_u$ .
3. On the stable OMIB curve corresponding to the stable case in i), perform Prony analysis to assess the damping ratio of the OMIB swing curve.

#### Remarks

1. The method assesses damping of nearly unstable contingency scenarios, which, generally, are the most interesting ones.
2. Prony method has to analyze signals close to linear, if a direct comparison with modal analysis is required. This is often the case at the end of the data window, rather than at its inception, where the amplitude of the transients may be large.
3. The use of OMIB improves the Prony accuracy, robustness and overall performance. Indeed, this second-order dynamic equivalent contains the key dynamics of machines exchanging energy. Besides, unlike other approaches, the OMIB rotor angle inherently captures the nonlinear and non-stationary dynamics of the system and can be used to determine linear and nonlinear attributes of system oscillations. Also, because of its formulation, the OMIB signals are less likely to include other less relevant dynamics; and this greatly facilitates the analysis of the slow dynamics of interest associated with the critical inter-area modes.



### 2.4.3 Sample of Illustrations

Ref. (Ruiz-Vega et al., 2004) reports on simulations performed on two real-world power systems using detailed system models: the EPRI 627-machine (4112-bus, 6091-line) system, and the EPRI 88-machine (434-bus, 2357-line) system (Ruiz-Vega, 2002; Ruiz-Vega et al., 2004).


The contingencies considered yield oscillatory plant-modes (on the 627-machine system) and inter-area modes (on the 88-machine system). In all simulations, SIME is coupled with the ETMSP T-D program (EPRI, 1994).

#### 2.4.3.1 Plant Mode Oscillations

The plant mode oscillations of the 627-machine system involve two critical machines. The resulting multi-machine swing curves of the considered post-fault stable case are displayed in Figure 8-6c. The Prony analysis is applied to the OMIB swing curve of Figure 8-6d, whose structure, as above-mentioned, was defined on the unstable simulation displayed in Figs 6a and 6b.

Note that the two critical machines, defined on this unstable simulation, are easily identified also on the stable simulation. Hence, in this particular case, the choice of the generators to be analyzed is quite obvious; the SIME method and resulting OMIB are used here to illustrate the approach. Among various observations, we note the following:


1. In (Ruiz-Vega et al., 2004) the original OMIB curve and the curve estimated by Prony have been displayed and shown to fit almost perfectly.
2. Also, Prony analysis has been performed on the two relevant machines identified by SIME, (labeled #2075 and 2074). The result, displayed in Figure 8-7, shows that the frequency of these two and of the OMIB curves is almost the same, while the value of the damping ratio of the OMIB lies in between that of machines 2075 and 2074. Table 8-1 gathers their damping features and shows that the numerical results are reflecting well the shapes and relative positions of the three curves.



Unstable case. Critical machines power  $P_C = 2204$  MW.  $t_u = 0.51$  s.

(a) Multi-machine swing curves

(b) OMIB swing curve



Stable case. Critical machines power  $P_C = 2128$  MW

(c) Multi-machine swing curves

(d) OMIB swing curve

Figure 8-6. Unstable and stable cases simulated on the EPRI 627-machine system. Clearing time of both cases: 67 ms. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

Table 8-1. Results of PRONY analysis of the OMIB and the critical machines swing curves on the EPRI 627-machine system. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

$\alpha$ (rad/s)	$\omega$ (rad/s)	f (Hz)	$\zeta$ (%)	SNR (dB)
OMIB				
-0.483	5.84	0.930	8.23	42.35
Machine # 2075				
-0.509	5.83	0.927	8.7	43.27
Machine # 2074				
-0.474	5.83	0.928	8.0	35.89





Figure 8-7. Comparison of the swing curves of the OMIB and the critical machines (Nrs 2075 and 2074) of the stable case simulated on the EPRI 627-machine system. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

### 2.4.3.2 Inter-Area Mode Oscillations

Application of a severe contingency to the EPRI 88-machine system has created an inter-area mode transient instability in which 36 machines lose synchronism with respect to the remaining 52 system machines. The swing curves of the unstable and stable cases are displayed in Figure 8-8.


The Prony analysis performed on the stable case provides the results listed in Table 8-2. This table reveals that, actually, there are two dominant modes, and that for the above presumably “stable” case the damping ratio of one of them is negative, which suggests existence of an unstable oscillation and predicts future system loss of synchronism. Actually, Ref. (Ruiz-Vega et al., 2004) explains why the T-D simulation did not detect instability, by showing that this instability arises at 11.4 s, i.e., beyond the pre-assigned maximum integration period of the simulation (10 s). Further, this reference suggests interesting by-products of this “early instability detection”.

Again, the original OMIB curve and the curve estimated by Prony are shown to fit perfectly (Ruiz-Vega et al., 2004).



Unstable case. Critical machines power  $P_C = 26,638$ . MW.  $t_u = 1.48$  s.

(a) Multi-machine swing curves      (b) OMIB swing curve



Stable case. Critical machines power  $P_C = 26,103$ . MW

(c) Multi-machine swing curves      (d) OMIB swing curve

Figure 8-8. Unstable and Stable cases simulated on the EPRI 88-machine system. Clearing time of both cases: 120 ms. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

Table 8-2. Damping assessment by Prony analysis of the OMIB swing curve for the EPRI 88-machine system. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

$\alpha$ (rad/s)	$\omega$ (rad/s)	$f$ (Hz)	$\zeta$ (%)	SNR (dB)
-0.101	1.5117	0.24	6.6	42.29
0.206	5.5232	0.87	-3.7	

### 3. SIME-BASED TRANSIENT STABILITY CONTROL TECHNIQUES

Various SIME-based control techniques have recently been proposed (Zhang et al., 1997; Pavella et al., 2000a; Ruiz-Vega and Pavella, 2003). This section describes three such techniques dealing respectively with preventive control, closed-loop emergency control, and open loop emergency control; this latter aims at mitigating control actions taken preventively with emergency actions triggered only upon actual occurrence of the threatening event. All three techniques rely on the same principle, described hereafter.

#### 3.1 Principle

To stabilize a case, SIME uses the size of instability (margin), the critical machines, and suggestions for stabilization. These suggestions are obtained by the interplay between OMIB–EAC (Equal-Area Criterion) and time-domain multi-machine representations, according to the following reasoning: stabilizing a case consists of modifying the pre-or post-contingency conditions until the stability margin becomes zero.

According to EAC, this implies increasing the decelerating area and/or decreasing the accelerating area of the OMIB  $\delta$ -P representation. In turn, this may be achieved by decreasing the OMIB equivalent generation power. The amount of the OMIB generation decrease required to stabilize the system,  $\Delta P_{OMIB}$ , is directly related to the margin  $\eta$  (Pavella et al., 2000a; Ruiz-Vega et al., 2003):

$$\eta = f(\Delta P_{OMIB}). \quad (5)$$

## 3.2 Preventive Control (P-SIME)

### 3.2.1 Iterative Stabilization Procedure

It is shown that to keep the total consumption constant, the following multi-machine condition must be satisfied, when neglecting losses:

$$\Delta P_{OMB} = \Delta P_C = \sum_{i \in CMs} \Delta P_{C_i} = -\Delta P_N = -\sum_{j \in NMs} \Delta P_{N_j} \quad (6)$$

where  $\Delta P_C$  and  $\Delta P_N$  are the changes in the total power of the group of critical and non-critical machines, respectively.

Application of equations (5) and (6) provides a first approximate value of  $\Delta P_C$  that may be refined via a stabilization procedure, which is iterative since the margin variation with stability conditions is not perfectly linear. Nevertheless, in practice, the number of required iterations (margins) seldom exceeds 3 (Pavella et al., 2000a; Ruiz-Vega et al., 2003).

### 3.2.2 Generation Rescheduling Patterns

Expression (6) suggests that there exist numerous patterns for distributing the total power change  $\Delta P_N$  among non-critical machines, and whenever there are many critical machines, numerous patterns for distributing the total  $\Delta P_C$  as well. The choice among various patterns may be dictated by various objectives, related to market or technical considerations.

In the absence of particular constraints or objectives, the total generation power could be distributed proportionally to the inertias of the non-critical machines. A more interesting solution consists of using an optimal power flow (OPF) program, as discussed below, § 3.2.4. Finally, the above procedure may readily be adjusted for stabilizing several harmful contingencies simultaneously (Ruiz-Vega and Pavella, 2003).

*Remark:* The above generation rescheduling procedure can also be used to enhance transient oscillations damping performance.

### 3.2.3 Illustrations

Below we apply the above P-SIME generation rescheduling to two stability scenarios: a relatively “mild” one and a severely stressed one.

Figure 8-9 sketches the simulations performed to stabilize the moderate instability described in Figures 8-1 and 8-2, concerning a contingency applied to the EPRI 88-machine system and creating instability. More

precisely, Figures 8-1a and 8-2a describe the unstable case, Figures 8-1b and 8-2b the stabilized case.

On the other hand, Table 8-3 describes the procedure for stabilizing the very severe contingency, which creates the severely stressed case displayed in Figure 8-4. Asterisk in column 2 indicates a surrogate margin (see item 3 in § 2.3 and Figure 8-4b). Column 3 indicates that there are 7 critical machines out of the 88 system machines. In such a stressed case, the iterative procedure starts with surrogate margins until curves  $P_e$  and  $P_m$  intersect, then continues with standard margins. Note that, generally, so severe cases require a larger number of iterations.




Figure 8-9. Preventive SIME-based stabilization procedure of a relatively « mild » contingency. Conditions of figures 1, 2. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

Observe that the stabilization of this contingency imposes a generation decrease in the 7 critical machines of over 50 % of their total initial generation. This countermeasure might be deemed too expensive to apply preventively. The open loop emergency control (OLEC) technique proposed in §3.4 provides an interesting alternative (see the illustration of § 3.4.3).

Table 8-3. Preventive stabilization of a severe contingency. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

1	2	3	4	5	6
It. #	$\eta$ (rad/s) <sup>2</sup>	Nr of CMs	$P_{c_k}$ (MW)	$P_{c_{k+1}}$ (MW)	sTDI <sup>3</sup> (s)
0	-12.52*	7	5600	5041	0.395
1	-9.70*	7	5041	3431	0.430
2	-1.66*	7	3431	2815	0.605
3	-2.898	7	2815	2731	0.935
4	-2.282	7	2731	2423	1.015
5	0.675	7	2423	2493	5.000

<sup>3</sup> In column 6 sTDI stands for “seconds of Time-Domain Integration”. Recalling that computations of SIME per se are virtually negligible, sTDI is a handy measure of the time required by the T-D program to run a simulation; it therefore makes comparisons of computing performances independent of the computer, system size and T-D program used.

### 3.2.4 Transient Stability-Constrained OPF

The Optimal Power Flow (OPF) uses control variables like active and reactive generation powers to achieve a good tradeoff between security and economics. More specifically, this program optimizes the power system operating condition with respect to a pre-specified objective (minimum operating cost, maximum power flow), while respecting generator limits and static security constraints (line power flows and bus voltage limits).

Several attempts have been made to imbed transient stability constraints within the OPF. According to the way of handling these constraints, they yielded two different approaches that below we call “global” and “sequential”.

*Global approach.* A time-domain (T-D) simulation is run. The power system transient stability model is converted into an algebraic set of equations for each time step of this simulation. The set of non-linear algebraic equations resulting from the whole T-D simulation is then included in the OPF as a stability constraint, forming a (generally huge) single non-linear programming problem, e.g., see (La Scala et al., 1997; Gan et al., 2000).

*Sequential approach.* A T-D simulation is run. The transient stability constraints are directly converted into conventional constraints of a standard OPF program, e.g., active generation power. Hence, they do not affect the size of the power system model and the complexity of the OPF solution method. They can use any conventional OPF program.

Conceptually, the global approach is more appealing: it is supposed to handle the problem as a whole and, hence, to provide an optimal solution, which would be accepted as the reference by the system operator and the electric market participants. However, its practical feasibility has not yet been proven and it requires heavy computations due to the huge programming model.

As concerning the sequential approach, the main objection is that it cannot guarantee optimality.

In principle, the SIME-based transient stability-constrained techniques may comply with either of the above approaches. Figure 8-10 illustrates the use of the sequential approach, which, besides the above-mentioned advantages, may easily comply with market requirements thanks to the flexibility of choice among critical machines and non-critical ones on which generation can be re-dispatched.

### 3.2.5 On-Line Implementation

Preventive Transient Stability Assessment (TSA) has been integrated into an on-line dynamic security assessment platform within the OMASES project funded by the European Commission (EU project OMASES - Open Market Access and Security Assessment System, EU Contract N. ENK6-CT2000-00064, December 2000). Three different operating modes are made available to system operators, i.e., engineering mode; real-time mode; and training mode (Cirio et al., 2005) as follows:

1. *Engineering mode*: off-line application of TSA and voltage stability assessment (VSA) studies involving or not the market environment and performed mainly for planning purposes.
2. *Real-time mode*: the EMS feeds OMASES with network data and solutions. DSA is synchronized with data transfer and cyclically runs with an overall execution time within 15 minutes.




Figure 8-10. Transient stability-constrained OPF (sequential approach). Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

3. *Training mode*: the operator gets used with the power system dynamics and DSA tools, and performs analysis (future scenarios, post-event analysis, etc.) of the existing electrical system and/or experiments. Market rules can be used to provide realistic scenarios.



Figure 8-11 depicts the OMASES platform. The EMS data loader transfers the state-estimator on-line snapshots to a Relational Database management system, from which the different functions (TSA, VSA, Training and market simulators) can access the data.




Figure 8-11. OMASES architecture and application functions. Taken from (Cirio et al., 2005)

These latter functions are controlled by the process control module, which launches requests for analyses. The results are then sent back to the user interface via html files.

The TSA module of the OMASES platform is based on SIME coupled with the Eurostag time-domain simulation software (Bihain et al., 2003). It is composed of a contingency filtering, ranking and assessment module (called FILTRA (Ruiz-Vega et al., 2001)) and a preventive control module used for generation rescheduling, as described in Section 3.2.2. A typical screen-shot of FILTRA module's outputs is shown in Figure 8-12.

Within the OMASES project, the TSA module based on SIME was tested on two real-world systems, namely the Greek EHV system (operated by HTSO), and the Italian EHV system (operated by GRTN).

### 3.3 Closed-Loop Emergency Control (E-SIME)

Closed-loop emergency control relies on the "Emergency SIME" method. In short, E-SIME starts acting after a disturbance inception and its clearance. It aims at *predicting* the system transient stability behavior and, if necessary, at deciding and triggering control actions early enough to prevent the loss of synchronism. Further, it aims at continuously monitoring the system in a closed-loop fashion, in order to assess whether the control actions have been sufficient or should be reinforced.




Figure 8-12. FILTRA results and critical machines of Brindisi power station. Taken from (Cirio et al., 2005)

The principle of the control technique remains the same with the preventive SIME, but its application has the following important differences (Zhang et al., 1997; Ernst et al., 1998; Ernst and Pavella, 2000; Pavella et al., 2000a).

- The information about the multi-machine system is provided by real-time measurements rather than T-D simulations.
- The generation shift from critical machines is made here by shedding generation that is not compensated by a generation increase on non-critical machines (at least at the very first instants following the control action).
- The system status (unstable margin and critical machines) is *predicted rather than assessed* along the system transient trajectory.

The resulting practical procedure is summarized below.

### 3.3.1 Predictive Transient Stability Assessment

The prediction relies on real-time measurements, acquired at regular time steps,  $t_i$ . The procedure consists of the following steps.

- a) *Predicting the OMIB structure*: use a Taylor series expansion to predict (say, 100 ms ahead), the individual machines' rotor angles; rank the machines according to their angles, identify the largest angular distance between two successive machines and declare those above this distance to be the "candidate critical machines", the remaining ones being the

“candidate non-critical machines”. The suitable aggregation of these machines provides the “candidate OMIB”.

- b) *Predicting the  $P_a - \delta$  curve*: compute the parameters of this “candidate OMIB”, and in particular its accelerating power and rotor angle,  $P_a$  and  $\delta$ , using three successive data sets acquired for the three different times.
- c) *Predicting instability*: determine whether the OMIB reaches the unstable conditions (1).

If not, repeat steps (a) to (c) using new measurements sets.

If yes, the candidate OMIB is the critical one, for which the method computes successively the unstable angle  $\delta_u$ , the corresponding time to instability,  $t_u$ , and the unstable margin expressed by (2).

- d) *Validity test*. Observing that under given stability conditions the value of the (negative) margin should be constant, whatever the time step, provides a handy validity test: it consists of pursuing the above computations until reaching an (almost) constant margin value.

### 3.3.2 Salient Features

The method uses real-time measurements acquired at regular time intervals and aims at controlling the system in less than, say, 500 ms after the contingency inception and its clearance.

The prediction phase starts after detecting an anomaly (contingency occurrence) and its clearance by means of protective relays. Note that this prediction does not imply identification of the contingency (location, type, etc.). The prediction is possible thanks to the use of the OMIB transformation; predicting the behavior (accelerating power) of all of the system machines would have led to totally unreliable results.

There may be a tradeoff between the above mentioned validation test and time to instability: the shorter this time, the earlier the corrective action should be taken, possibly before complete convergence of the validation test.

### 3.3.3 Structure of the Emergency Control Scheme

On the basis of real-time measurements taken at the power plants, the method pursues the following main objectives:

- to assess whether the system is stable or it is driven to instability; in the latter case
- to assess “how much” unstable the system is going to be; accordingly,
- to assess “where” and “how much corrective action” to take (pre-assigned type of corrective action);
- to continue assessing whether the executed corrective action has been sufficient or whether to proceed further.

Block 2 of in Figure 8-13 covers the two first steps: prediction of instability and its size, and of critical machines. Block 3 takes care of the control actions i.e., of determining the number of generators to shed. Note that after the order of triggering the action has been sent, the method continues monitoring and controlling the system in a closed-loop fashion, until reaching stabilization.




Figure 8-13. Closed-loop transient stability emergency control: general framework. Taken from (Pavella et al., 2000)

### 3.3.4 Real-Time Implementation Concerns

The prediction of the time to (reach) instability may influence the control decision (size of control; time to trigger it; etc).

The hardware requirements of the emergency control scheme are phasor measurement devices placed at the main power plant stations and communication systems to transmit (centralize-decentralize) this information. Already a few years ago, these requirements seemed to be within reach of technology (Phadke, 1993).

The emergency control relies on purely real-time measurements (actually a relatively small number of measurements). This frees the control from uncertainties about power system modeling, parameter values, operating condition, type and location of the contingency.

Within the EXaMINE project funded by the European Commission (IST 2000 26116), the actual implementation of E-SIME was examined from the viewpoint of designing a real-time measurement and communication system able to cope with the very stringent response-time constraints (Diu et al., 2002).

In particular, the question of real-time estimation and prediction of rotor angles from synchronized phasor measurements was investigated within the project, e.g., (Del Angel, 2003).

Figure 8-14 shows one of two possible schemes for the E-SIME implementation. It is composed of two types of modules:

- *Distributed ANN based rotor angle estimation and prediction* -- Each monitored power plant is equipped with a PMU device measuring the EHV side current and voltage phasors, at a rate of one per each 50 ms interval with respect to a common reference frame synchronized with the nominal frequency. These signals are then put into the actual system frequency reference frame by subtracting the phase signal obtained from a remote system bus (PMU-ref) and fed into the ANN module (three successive values) whose output furnishes an estimate of the current value of the power plants average rotor angle and its predicted value two time steps ahead (100 ms). The ANN module is trained off-line using a detailed system and PMU model to generate input and output samples.
- *Central monitoring of loss of synchronism and emergency control*. -- This module receives the estimated and predicted values of rotor angles computed by the devices of the monitored plant, together with the voltage magnitudes of the PMU devices. These signals are monitored in order to detect fault occurrence near one of the power plants and its clearing. Upon fault clearing the E-SIME module is armed and starts monitoring the system dynamic behavior. As soon as loss of synchronism is predicted the tripping signal is computed and sent to the critical power

plant. The overall round-trip delay was estimated to be about 300 ms, which led to the conclusion of the feasibility of the E-SIME based emergency control scheme.




Figure 8-14. Distributed rotor angle estimation and procedure using one PMU device and one artificial neural network per monitored power plant and one reference PMU

The other implementation scheme that was examined in the EXaMINE project used a centralized version of the rotor angle estimation modules. With respect to the scheme of Figure 8-14, this latter scheme has higher throughput requirements on the links from the monitored power plants to the central location, but reduces the number of channels from the PMU-Ref location (since, this signal does not need to be broadcasted anymore to the individual plant locations).

Note that in both schemes it would be appropriate to introduce redundancy on the different devices and in particular in the common PMU-Ref device.

The EXaMINE project led to the installation of 6 PMU devices on the Italian EHV system.

## 3.4 Open Loop Emergency Control (OLEC)

### 3.4.1 Principle

This technique is a mixture of the preceding two techniques: from a methodological viewpoint, it is event driven and relies on transient stability simulations, like the preventive control technique, described in §3.2; but its application uses generation tripping, like the emergency control technique, in addition to generation shifting.

The leading idea is to mitigate preventive actions (generation shifting) by complementing them with emergency actions (generation tripping) that would automatically be triggered only if the postulated contingency actually occurs. The technique relies on the assumption that (some of) the critical machines belong to a power plant equipped with a generation tripping scheme; therefore a certain number of units could be tripped in the emergency mode.

Below we outline the OLEC procedure in 7 steps (Ruiz-Vega, 2002; Ruiz-Vega and Pavella, 2003).

### 3.4.2 Procedure

1. For an initially unstable scenario (operating condition subject to a pre-defined harmful contingency and its clearing scheme), compute the corresponding (negative) margin and determine the corresponding critical machines.
2. Assuming that (some of) these machines belong to a power plant equipped with a generation tripping scheme, select the number of units to trip in the emergency mode.
3. Run SIME, starting with the initial scenario up to reaching the assumed delay of generation tripping; at this time, shed the machines selected in step 2, and pursue the simulation until reaching instability or stability conditions (see equations (1) and (3)). If stability is met, stop; otherwise, determine the new stability margin and corresponding critical machines (they might have changed from the previous simulation).
4. Run the transient stability control program (see, §3.2) to increase to zero this new (negative) margin. To this end, perform generation shifting in the usual way, from the remaining critical machines to non-critical machines. While performing this task, an additional objective may also be pursued, if the OPF software is combined with the transient stability control program.

5. The new, secure operating state results from the combination of the above generation rescheduling taken preventively, and the consideration of the critical machines, previously chosen to trip correctively.
6. If there are more than one patterns of critical machines to trip, repeat the above steps 1 to 5 with each one of them, until getting an operating condition as close as possible to what is considered to be the “optimum” one (Ruiz-Vega and Pavella, 2003).
7. After the number of machines to trip is determined, the settings of the special protection activating the generation tripping scheme in the plant is adapted so as to automatically disconnect these machines in the event of the contingency occurrence.

### 3.4.3 Illustration

Consider again the severe contingency that has been stabilized in the preventive mode in § 3.2.3. Recall that the corresponding stability case has 7 critical machines, belonging to the same power plant, and having a total generation of 5,600 MW in the transient stability-unconstrained pre-fault operating condition (Ruiz-Vega et al., 2003). Recall also that stabilizing this contingency in the purely preventive mode requires decreasing this generation to 2,423 MW (see Table 8-1). Below, we consider again this contingency and stabilize it by OLEC, using the following parameters:

- Number of critical machines to trip: two; their stability-unconstrained pre-fault generation is:  $5600 - 4010 = 1590$  MW (see columns 4 of Tables 8-3 and 8-4);
- Time delay for tripping these critical machines: 150 ms.

Accordingly, the OLEC preventive generation rescheduling concerns the remaining 5 critical machines, whose stability-unconstrained pre-fault generation is 4010 MW.

The design of the control action follows the procedure of § 3.4.2. First, it is found that, because the case is very unstable, tripping 2 critical machines 150 ms after the fault inception would not be sufficient to stabilize it. Figures 8-15 describe the dynamics of the stability case, respectively before (Figures 8-15a and 8-15b) and after tripping the 2 critical machines (Figures 8-15c and 8-15d).

More precisely, Figures 8-15a and 8-15b portray, respectively, the multi-machine swing curves and the  $\delta$ -P OMIB curves of the totally stability-unconstrained system.


Figures 8-15c and 8-15d portray the curves corresponding to the partly controlled case, obtained by tripping 2 critical machines 150 ms after the contingency inception.



Comparing Figures 8-15a and 8-15c suggests that the partly stability-constrained system is hardly less unstable than the unconstrained one: compare the slope of their swing curves as well as their times to instability (395 ms vs 421 ms). Similarly, comparing Figures 8-15b and 8-15d shows that after the generation tripping (corresponding to  $\delta_i = 7.34^\circ$ ) the OMIB  $P_e$  curve gets somewhat closer to the  $P_m$  one, without, however, crossing it (their minimum “distance” decreases from 12.52 MW to 7.83 MW).

Since the emergency action is insufficient to stabilize the case, the procedure of § 3.4.2 continues with step 3: the new surrogate margin is computed and the appropriate preventive generation rescheduling is decided in order to stabilize the operating conditions.


The iterative procedure of rescheduling the 5 remaining machines is described in Table 8-4. The asterisk in column 2 indicates minimum distances between  $P_e$  and  $P_m$  OMIB curves, in MW, whereas “standard” margins are expressed in  $(\text{rad/s})^2$ .



Totally stability-unconstrained operating conditions:  $P_{c_0} = 5600$  MW

(a) Swing curves,  $t_u = 0.395$  s

(b)  $\delta$ -P OMIB curves



Partly stability-constrained conditions:  $P_{c_0} = 4010$  MW (2 CMs tripped)

(c) Swing curves,  $t_u = 0.421$  s

(d)  $\delta$ -P OMIB curves

Figure 8-15. Multi-machine swing curves and  $\delta$ -P OMIB curves of two unstable cases. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)


See, for example, in row 0 of the table and in Figure 8-15d the margin of  $-7.83$  MW. Row 7, column 4 of Table 8-4 provides the final result of the preventive stabilization procedure of the system with 5 critical machines; it indicates that their generation should be reduced to 2415 MW.

Figures 8-16 display the multi-machine and OMIB  $\delta$ -P curves corresponding to this stabilized case. They clearly show the effectiveness of the combined action of generation shifting (preventive) and generation tripping (emergency) controls. In particular, Figure 8-16b shows that the OMIB equivalent power decreases from its initial value ( $-20.1$  MW, see Figure 8-15d) to its secure value ( $-30.7$  MW), creating a decelerating area and making the system able to dissipate the kinetic energy gained by the five critical machines in the during-fault period.

A synopsis of the 7 simulations listed in Table 8-4 is given in Figure 8-17, plotting the OMIB phase plane. Incidentally, observe how clearly this plot describes the system dynamics under the various conditions.

Table 8-4. OLEC stabilization of a very severe contingency (2 machines tripped). Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

1 It .#	2 $\eta$ (rad/s) <sup>2</sup> (or MW)	3 Nr of CMs	4 $P_{c_k}$ (MW)	5 $P_{c_{k+1}}$ (MW)	6 sTDI (s)
0	-7.83*	5	4010	3609	0.421
1	-4.83*	5	3609	3260	0.461
2	-2.35*	5	3260	2662	0.506
3	-1.964	5	2662	2583	0.771
4	-1.265	5	2583	2440	0.856
5	-0.086	5	2440	2430	1.146
6	-0.036	5	2430	2415	1.216
7	0.028	5	2415	2422	5.000



(a) Multi-machine swing curves      (b)  $\delta$ -P OMIB Curves.  $P_{c_7} = 2415$  MW

Figure 8-16. Multi-machine swing curves and  $\delta$ -P OMIB curves of the stabilized case. Two generators are automatically tripped if the contingency actually occurs. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

In summary, to stabilize the considered severe contingency by OLEC, one should decrease preventively the pre-fault generation of the 5 critical machines (CMs) from 4010 to 2415 MW, under the assumption that the other 2 CMs would be tripped correctly, after the contingency inception.




Figure 8-17. OMIB phase plane representation of the 7 simulations described in Table 8-4. Two generators tripped if the contingency actually occurs. Adapted from (Ruiz-Vega, 2002)

Once the conditions of the stabilization process are obtained, the special protection activating the generation tripping in the plant is armed to *automatically* disconnect the selected plants in case the contingency *actually occurs*. The remaining five machines are rescheduled to their new values.

The pre-fault power of the plant, however, has been improved, with respect to the results presented in Table 8-3 ( $2415 + 1590 = 4005$  MW by OLEC vs 2423 MW by P-SIME in purely preventive mode).

### 3.5 Limit Search

(In)stability margins computed by SIME may be readily exploited to accelerate the computation of transient stability constrained power flow limits and TTC/ATC calculations.

Typically, the calculation of a power flow limit by dichotomy search requires about eight to ten runs (each run is composed of a power flow calculation and a time-domain simulation for each contingency). By exploiting the (in)stability margins one can use extrapolation or interpolation in order to reduce this number to three (Pavella et al., 2000b; Ruiz-Vega et al., 2002).




Figure 8-18. Acceleration of limit search by SIME.

Figure 8-18 illustrates this idea graphically. The first simulation corresponds to the upper bound of the search interval ( $\lambda_1$ , the most stressed base case, for the given stress direction, yielding the margin  $\eta_1$ ). The second simulation corresponds to a ten-percent reduction of the stress parameter, leading in the illustrated case to a second unstable simulation ( $\lambda_2, \eta_2$ ). The two unstable margins are then exploited to estimate by linear extrapolation the critical value of the stress parameter.

If this value is far from the second value (as depicted on Figure 8-18, a third and last simulation is carried with a slightly higher value ( $\lambda_3$  on Figure 8-18) to improve accuracy. The final estimate of the critical value ( $\lambda_{crit}$ ) is obtained from the two smaller, in absolute value, unstable margins.

## 4. DISCUSSION

### 4.1 A Pragmatic Approach to Integrated Security Control

#### 4.1.1 Preventive Mode Security Control

Preventive mode security assessment and control methods and software tools have been developed separately for static security, transient stability and voltage stability. In principle, these tools are able to identify harmful contingencies and preventive control actions to alleviate insecurities from each point of view. However, each method concentrates only on part of the overall security control problem and hence its recommendations are generally not fully satisfactory from a global point of view.

It is thus necessary to incorporate these methods into a single decision support tool for secure on-line operation. Such a tool would ensure at the same time static and dynamic security with respect to a list of potentially

harmful contingencies identified during the analysis stage. We propose to use the optimal power flow formulation as a generic approach to handle this problem.

More specifically, let CL-SS be a list of potentially harmful contingencies from the viewpoint of static security, CL-TS a list of such contingencies from the viewpoint of transient stability, and CL-VS a list of potentially harmful contingencies from the viewpoint of voltage stability.

Then, we can formulate an optimization problem incorporating the following constraints:

1. *Operating (i.e. preventive mode) constraints*: pre-contingency power flow equations, equality and inequality constraints (voltage magnitudes in normal range and branch flows below steady-state limit, operating limits, transactions...).
2. *Static security constraints*: for each element in CL-SS a set of post-contingency power flow equations, equality and inequality constraints (voltage magnitudes in emergency range and branch flows below emergency state limit).
3. *Transient stability constraints*: for each element in CL-TS a constraint on the total normal mode generation of the corresponding set of critical generators (note that such constraints can be derived by P-SIME).
4. *Voltage stability constraints*: for each element in CL-VS one (or several) constraints on the normal mode active and reactive power injections ensuring voltage stability with respect to that contingency (e.g. see (Carpentier et al., 2001; Capitanescu and Van Cutsem, 2002; Bihain et al., 2003), for an approach yielding such information).

For a given objective function (e.g. minimal deviation, minimal cost of reschedule), the solution of such an optimization problem can be computed by a conventional security constrained OPF. As long as the number of elements of CL-SS remains small, the CPU time required by a single run of such a tool remains compatible with on-line requirements.

Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the resulting rescheduled operating point exists (feasibility) and is simultaneously secure with respect to all three security criteria. Thus, in principle, it would be necessary to iterate the above resolution scheme according to the same principle as the one given in Figure 8-10.

Note also, that there is no absolute guarantee that such an iterative process would converge in a reasonable number of iterations, and if yes, that the resulting new operating point would indeed be optimal. Nevertheless, we believe that such an integrated preventive security control framework is feasible and would be of value to on-line operation under stressed conditions.

We notice that the approach proposed relies on the availability of DSA tools able to express approximations to dynamic security regions in terms of pre-contingency parameters. The more accurate these approximations are, the better the resulting optimization will be. In particular, we believe that the proposed scheme is reasonable when combined with methods such as P-SIME and VSA.

#### **4.1.2 Emergency Mode Security Control**

While in preventive mode it is necessary to combine into a single coherent decision making strategy the handling of all security constraints (because they may be conflicting), in emergency mode security control one can generally take advantage of the temporal decoupling of the different phenomena, since thermal problems are typically significantly slower than voltage collapses which in turn are typically much slower than loss of synchronism. Hence, the different emergency control schemes can operate independently from each other.

### **4.2 Limitations and Further Research Needs**

#### **4.2.1 Arbitration between Preventive and Emergency Control**

A first limitation of the current security control approaches lies in the fact that they are not able to arbitrate between preventive and emergency control. More precisely the current approach supposes that the contingencies and phenomena that must be treated in a preventive way are given a priori in the form of a list of “credible” contingencies and a set of static and dynamic constraints. Preventive security control then tries to change the operating conditions so that these constraints are satisfied for all contingencies. Emergency control is supposed to handle all other, non credible, disturbances.

However, from a rational point of view the fact that a certain security problem (or constraint) should be treated in preventive or in emergency mode actually depends on operating conditions (as well electrical ones, economic ones, and meteorological ones).

For example, if a certain N-2 contingency becomes very likely (e.g. because of changing weather conditions), or if the cost of treating it in preventive mode is low (e.g. because there is cheap load curtailment available), then it could make sense to handle it in preventive mode, rather than in emergency mode.

Thus, in principle the arbitration between preventive and emergency mode security control should be an output of (and not an input to) the security

control decision support tools. However, there are intrinsic difficulties in achieving this objective mainly because of lack of data on probabilities of contingencies (as a function of real-time conditions) and difficulties to model the costs of interruptions, both of which would be required to allow a better coordination of preventive and emergency mode security control (Wehenkel, 1999).

#### **4.2.2 New Control Devices**

New control devices such as variable series compensation, as well as more systematic use of interruptible load, can potentially make it easier to handle security in on-line operation. However, the analytical methods developed today, like SIME, VSA etc, do not take into account these possibilities. Thus, further adaptations are needed in order to develop tools able to suggest how to use such devices.

#### **4.2.3 Uncertainties**

A major problem in large-scale systems is that of real-time information concerning the status of neighbor systems and the incorporation of this information into appropriate dynamic equivalents needed to carry out meaningful simulations and DSA computations in real-time.

The unavailability of this information translates into modeling uncertainties, which should be taken into account in a conservative way. Here also, research and developments are necessary in order to reduce the amount of arbitrariness of security control (Diu et al., 2002).

#### **4.2.4 Inter-Area and Inter-Temporal Coordination**

In large power system interconnections, the security control of the overall system is presently organized in a distributed multi-area fashion. Each area is controlled by a system operator, responsible for the security in his/her area. One can show that bad coordination of these control agents can lead to quite suboptimal operation in each area of the system (Zima and Ernst, 2005).

Also, the overall security of the system strongly relies on the quality of the exchange of information between different areas, in the form of static and dynamic equivalents as well as threatening disturbances.

To circumvent these difficulties, the trend has been in the US to create MEGA System Operators responsible for the overall security, leading to the necessity to handle huge SCADA databases and the explosion of computational requirements for security assessment and control software.

In other places and, particularly, in Europe, the trend has been to attempt to improve data exchange and coordination between the different existing system operators. In both cases however, a sound distributed security assessment and control approach, defining in a systematic and transparent way appropriate coordination schemes among areas, would be of great value.

In a similar fashion, a better coordination of security control decisions over different time horizons, i.e., operation planning, day ahead, real-time, next hour, next day, etc., could help improve security and at the same time reduce costs. This would lead to state security control as a sequential decision problem, which could be tackled in the framework of stochastic or dynamic programming (Wehenkel, 2004).

## **5. CONCLUSION**

This chapter has pursued a twofold objective. On the one hand, it has addressed the issue of real-time transient stability control, which has long been considered to be extremely problematic if at all feasible. Three different schemes have been advocated, able to encounter a variety of specific needs, depending on power systems specifics.

It was shown that preventive control and its variant, the open loop emergency control, are mature enough and ready for implementation. Closed loop emergency control, on the other hand, is very much dependent on today's high tech; its implementation requires strong incentives so as to foster the necessary investment in modernized communication infrastructure and monitoring equipment.

The second objective was an attempt towards integrated security control techniques, able to cover all dynamic and steady-state security aspects. It appeared that the software tools available today are able to achieve such integrated approaches.

Nevertheless, while from a theoretical viewpoint the above-advocated approaches are within reach, their realization depends on information about the system configuration, including generation status that the liberalized electricity markets seem reluctant to provide. And although such issues have not been addressed in this paper, these authors feel that blackouts will continue threatening the power systems, unless such information is made available, under the pressure of regulatory bodies in the United States, Europe, and other continents.



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